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Abstract 
This thesis demonstrates both the extent and the limits of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) ability to cooperate as a security community. The 
intent of the dissertation is to analyse the relevance and feasibility of preserving 
sovereign prerogatives within a framework of regional cooperation among the five core 
ASEAN member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. The 
study particularly reflects the tensions between the individual member-states' traditional 
sovereign prerogatives and the Association's stated ambition to develop into a regional 
security community. ASEAN's experience of community building has shown that the 
member-states still have insufficient will to act to reconcile the existing regional system 
with a capacity for deeper security cooperation because the predisposition of ASEAN 
members for Westphalian style sovereignty restricts this possibility. ASEAN can be 
characterised as a 'loose security community' with a judicious idea of power, 
institutions, interests and norms of 'we feeling' prevailing in the process of security 
community-building. 
The thesis argues that to build a security community that can succeed in 
Southeast Asia, the ASEAN member-states must rely on managing 'adaptable 
sovereignty'. Adaptable sovereignty allows the adjustment of sovereign prerogatives 
enabling compromise that provides the impetus toward community-building, but not to 
the point where the primacy of sovereignty is surrendered. Two case studies examine 
how ASEAN manages sovereignty to permit security cooperation. The first analyses 
combating terrorism in Southeast Asia, while the second investigates how three ASEAN 
states have cooperated to improve maritime security in the Malacca Straits. The case 
studies indicate that building a security community within A SEAN can only occur if the 
member-states do not have to substantially sacrifice their national sovereignty 
prerogatives, while simultaneously strengthening their sense of community over time. 
Current collaborative security efforts demonstrate that ASEAN's key member states are 
capable of striking a judicious balance between their respective sovereign prerogatives 
and community building efforts, but not to the point where the primacy of sovereignty is 
extinguished. This 'adaptable' form of sovereignty can be seen in their simultaneous 
protection of state-centric primacy, while also pursuing the higher levels of 
institutionalisation and interdependence necessary for effective security cooperation to 
develop. 
IX 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
As the Cold War recedes further into history, questions about what specific type 
of security orders will emerge internationally and in specific regions are intensifying. A 
major aspect of this debate is whether 'cooperative security' will prevail in other 
regions to the extent that it has developed in Europe over the past half century. Are 
regionally distinct forms of security cooperation destined to evolve in ways that will set 
them apart as a historically significant component of international security relations? 
As part of what is arguably the world's most prosperous and dynamic region, 
these questions have particularly significant meaning for Asia-Pacific countries. This is 
particularly true for countries in Southeast Asia and East Asia where the Cold War 
conflicts are not comprehensively resolved and non traditional threats are on the 
increase. This thesis considers the nature of cooperation within the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), specifically examining the prospects of that institution 
transforming into a 'security community' .1 The intent is to analyse the relevance and 
feasibility of preserving sovereign prerogatives within a framework of regional 
cooperation. It is argued here that in building a security community that can succeed in 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN states will need to accept that the individual sovereignty of 
each member-state must be 'balanced' so as to allow challenging transnational issues 
(i.e. maritime security, terrorism) to become more amenable to collective regional 
decision making and action. This modification is likely to occur when the ASEAN 
states together realise that the individual security of each is best guaranteed by greater 
adherence to collective security.2 Such a realisation might be prompted by the 
1 In this study the term 'security community' refers to 'pluralistic security community'. This can be 
defined as a situation where sovereign states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of 
community, which in turn creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war. See 
Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, International Organization in the Light 
of Historical Experience (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5. 
2 This thesis recognises that the term 'collective security' defines the condition under which ' ... states 
agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and when necessary, band together to stop 
aggression'. See Charles A. Kupchan, and Clifford A. Kupchan, 'The Promise of Collective Security', 
International Security 20, 1, 1995, p. 52. However, within ASEAN, collective security does not include 
such features as the employment of binding norms or regulations that automatically commit states to a 
group response against perceived norm deviation (e.g. aggression or threats). To understand collective 
security in ASEAN it is necessary to applying a more broader and flexible classification, ranging from 
relatively non intrusive monitoring of a potentially dangerous situations to military coercion which 
according Lepgold and Weiss specifically define the characteristics of Collective Conflict Management 
(CCM) as: (1) mutual state behaviour is coordinated among states, based on general norms; (2) 
intensification of external threat to one or more of the ASEAN states, by a growing need 
to react more promptly and vigorously to a wide array of transnational threats, or 
through greater acceptance by the elites within the ASEAN member states to the idea of 
linking national security and survival to collective security behaviour. How ASEAN 
states exercise their sovereignty will significantly shape the level and type of any 
security community that develops in the region. Indeed, with ASEAN now promoting 
the concept of an 'ASEAN Community', greater theoretical and empirical attention to 
the complexity of sovereignty issues is imperative, enabling a more comprehensive 
analysis of ASEAN regionalism to be formulated and applied. 
In creating a security community the concept of sovereignty raises important 
questions. How, for example, will the ASEAN states manage their 'sovereign statehood' 
within the process of security community building? Can ASEAN mature into an 
institution that develops collective approaches to issues that reflect greater 
interdependence among its members? What type of security community might ASEAN 
become? It is important to explore these questions because the institution is now at a 
genuine crossroads, changing from informal structure to more formal one, by issuing the 
ASEAN Charter. In addition, there is also a lot of concern over the rise of China and 
whether it will be a responsible participant in the region's security structure. The 
policies adopted by ASEAN will determine whether a security community will become 
the predominant form of security management in Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN and the Problem of Sovereignty 
ASEAN is an institution which spans a maJor sub-region of the world. It 
encompasses ten countries with an area of 4.5 million square kilometres and a combined 
population of over half a billion people.3 (ASEAN 2005). It comprises one of the largest 
regional markets in the world (ranking 6th in trade, for example, within the US) and 
occupies a central strategic position in the greater Asia-Pacific region. However, its 
long-term stability is dependent on reconciling a diverse mixture of ideologies and 
cultures. Within Southeast Asia rivalries and suspicions continue to exist in the form of 
thorny territorial disputes and domestic instabilities. More recently, transnational issues 
decision-making criteria which includes the pursuit of broad, group based self interests; (3) a collective 
objective of group action which predicates what is best for group system ( 4) military forces as a part of 
collective efforts to enforce norm accountability; (5) and collective action occurring when the peace and 
stability of group members is clearly threatened. See Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss, Collective 
Conflict Management and Changing World Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1998), p. 6. 
3 ASEAN, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2005 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, November 2005), p. 2. 
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such as environmental protection, terrorism, piracy, avian influenza (H5Nl), drugs and 
illegal migration have occupied a central position in the ASEAN security agenda. 
Individual Southeast Asian states and regional institutions generally lack the capacity to 
deal with such problems. Stability in this region, and the Asia-Pacific generally, could 
be seriously undermined if these ongoing challenges are not met and if Southeast Asian 
countries are unable to strengthen their collective management in responding to them 
adequately. 
The development of multilateral security institutions can enhance regional 
security in ways that are not possible for self-reliant or bilateral security arrangements. 
ASEAN member states cannot merely rely on their own limited capacities or 
autonomous policy responses to solve the transnational problems such as illegal 
immigration, terrorism, trafficking, drugs and environmental challenges which are 
emerging in the region. ASEAN has embraced initiatives designed to strengthen its role 
in regional security politics such as an ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Issues in 
1997, and the Bali Concord II in 2003. Its member-states have also envisioned a 
security community as part of the three components or 'pillars' of the overall ASEAN 
community. There remain, however, major concerns among member-states about 
ASEAN' s ability to conceptualise and to deal with critical regional security issues. 
Illustrative of these issues are problems relating to intra-ASEAN relations. Key 
differences prevail in relations between the two key Malay states - Indonesia and 
Malaysia - and between these two states and Singapore over the extent to which 
national security components should prevail in the community-building process and to 
the extent to that ASEAN collectively should interact with external great powers. 
Moreover, there is a view posited by a significant number of observers that 
ASEAN overall remains a weak institution.4 A majority of Southeast Asian countries, 
critics argue, lack high levels of domestic political consensus, technical expertise, 
financial resources and the political will within their own sovereign purviews to 
4 For an illustration of ASEAN's weakness in its contribution in managing the development of 
institutionalisation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) see Robyn Lim, 'The ASEAN Regional 
Forum: Building on Sand', Contemporary Southeast Asia 20, 2, 1998, pp. 115-136; John Garofano, 
'Flexibility or Irrelevance: Ways Forward for the ARF, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, 1, 1999, pp. 
74-94.; John Garofano 'Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. A Security Community 
for Asia?' Asian Survey 42, 3, 1999; pp. 502-521; Tobias Ingo Nischalke, 'Insights from ASEAN's 
Foreign Policy Co-operation: The 'ASEAN way', a Real Spirit or a Phantom?', Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 22, 1, 2000, pp. 89-125; Strong criticism of irrelevance of ASEAN to every aspect of 
political, economic, cultural and religious identity, in addition to security considerations is offered by 
David Martin Jones, and Michael L. R. Smith. 'ASEAN's Imitation Community', Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, Winter 2002, pp. 93-109; David Martin Jones, and Michael L. R. Smith., 'Making 
Process, not Progress, ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order', International Security 32, 
1,2007,pp. 148-183. 
3 
overcome their own national security threats, much less region-wide challenges. 
Traditional approaches such as the 'ASEAN Way' - 'the practice of intense dialogues 
and exhaustive consultations (musyawarah) to generate consensus (mufakat) on 
contentious issues [in which] the cardinal principle [is] non-interference in domestic 
affairs of member-states'5 - are no longer suited to the demands of the contemporary 
international environment. Such approaches are perceived by analysts to have prevented 
ASEAN from acting effectively in meeting a diverse array of security challenges.6 
Weak ASEAN norms are criticized as being responsible for the failure of the 
institution's member-states to design an appropriate response to the economic crisis in 
Thailand in 1997, the smog haze that has emanated from Indonesia in recent years, and 
various domestic crises in ASEAN states that have had repercussions for overall 
regional stability.7 
Concern has also been directed toward ASEAN' s long standing norms of 
prioritising sovereignty and safeguarding non-interference in internal affairs. These 
'principles' are still held to be sacrosanct by most ASEAN states and, arguably, have 
been responsible for that institution's failure to design appropriate responses to various 
domestic crises. Consequently, observers critical of what they view as ASEAN's 
excessive focus on sovereignty have proposed that there is a need for member-states to 
'legitimate the interference'8 or to ameliorate national sovereignty as a necessary 
precondition for greater levels of security cooperation.9 These arguments suggest that to 
5 The meaning of musyawarah mufakat refers to Rommel C. Banlaoi, 'Security Cooperation and Conflict 
in Southeast Asia after 9/11: 'Constructivism, the ASEAN way and the War on Terrorism' in Amitav 
Acharya and Lee Lai To (eds) Asia in the New Millennium, APISA First Congress Proceedings 
(Singapore: Marshal Cavendish, 2004), p. 36. 
6 Michael Leifer, 'The ASEAN peace process: a category mistake', Pacific Review 12 1, 1999, pp. 25-38. 
Lim, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum' p.115; Garofano; 'Flexibility or Irrelevance', p.88; Jones, and 
Smith., 'Making Process, not Progress', p. 155-157; Kay Moller, 'Cambodia and Burma: The ASEAN 
way ends here', Asian Survey 38, 12, 1998, pp. 1100-1104. Khoo, Nicholas 'Constructing Southeast 
Asian Security: The Pitfalls oflmagining a Security Community and the Temptations of Orthodoxy', 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, 1, 2004a, pp. 143-145; Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN's 
Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects (New York: Routledge Curzon, 
2003), p. 219; Jurgen Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment', 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific 3, 1, 2003, pp. 83-84; Jurgen Haacke, 'Enhanced Interaction 
with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its 
Diplomatic and Security Culture?' Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, 2, 2005, pp. 188-216. 
7 Jones and Smith, 'Making Process, not Progress', p.148; Jones and Smith. 'ASEAN's Imitation 
Community', p. l 04; Jurgen Ruland, 'ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical 
consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism', The Pacific Review 13, 3, 2000, pp. 439-443. 
8 Moller, 'Cambodia and Burma: The ASEAN way ends here', p. 1.104; similar exploration is also 
offered by Jurgen Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced 
Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the 'ASEAN way', The Pacific Review 12, 4, 1999, pp. 581-611. 
9 Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 
2002), p. 5. 
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the extent that ASEAN fails to modify sovereignty, intra-ASEAN cooperation will not 
be fully realized, and regional security will be more difficult to establish. 
Such criticisms raise central questions about the inter-relationship of sovereignty 
and regional community-building: do impediments to community-building arise from 
the nature of sovereignty itself as it exists and is applied in the ASEAN states or rather 
how those particular states exercise sovereignty? Is security community-building 
antithetical to the very idea of sovereignty as it has been cultivated and sustained for so 
long by ASEAN governments? Or can security community-building coexist with - and 
eventually supersede - ASEAN elites' overwhelming preoccupation with preserving 
state sovereignty over other forms of governance? How can sovereignty be balanced 
with security community-building? 
These questions together present an interesting policy dilemma. Preservation of 
state sovereignty relates to the most fundamental elements of developing states' ability 
to survive and prosper. Yet the unbending determination of ASEAN members to 
preserve their sovereign prerogatives at all costs may well have undermined their 
collective ability to address regional wide problems. Strict adherence to 'sovereign 
prerogatives' is understood in this study to be embedded in ASEAN's founding 
document, the 1967 Bangkok Declaration: 'to ensure [member states'] stability and 
security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve 
their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.' 10 
The importance of sovereignty, as a cardinal institutional norm, was reaffirmed in the 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPF AN) 1971 and, again in the 
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) which sets down the 
cardinal organisational principle of 'non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
another.' 11 These declarations explicitly proclaimed that ASEAN member-states have a 
right to manage their own national security, survival, and foreign policy without 
interference from external parties. The 'regional interest' - if it is acknowledged at all -
should not undermine or challenge the sovereign prerogatives of member-states. 
Any modification of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference is 
therefore a central issue for ASEAN' s security politics. State sovereignty and non-
interference norms have acted as constraints within ASEAN' s overall pattern of 
10 ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok 8 August 1967 
<http://www.aseansec.org> 
11 ASEAN, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Malaysia, 27 November 1971 
<http://www.aseansec.org>; ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Indonesia, February 1976 
<http://www.aseansec.org/5049 .htm> 
5 
regional security cooperation. On the one hand, the preservation of state sovereignty and 
the adherence to the principle of non-interference challenges the building of stronger 
institutional cooperation within ASEAN. On the other hand, norms of sovereignty and 
non-interference have underwritten the ground rules around which this particular 
security grouping has been formulated. Indeed, ASEAN was recognised by some 
observers until the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 as the most successful example 
of regional cooperation - particularly in politics - to emerge within the developing 
world. 12 Without extended guarantees of non-interference, moreover, newer ASEAN 
member-states such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would not have joined ASEAN. 
Yet ASEAN members have still not implemented specific mechanisms capable of 
commanding widespread consensus among them to reconcile this evident contradiction: 
the safeguarding of sovereign rights versus the development of a stronger collective 
security identity. ASEAN' s High Council, for example, has never been used on the 
basis that any ruling by it could jeopardise its individual member-states' sovereign 
prerogatives. 
ASEAN as a Security Community 
ASEAN also seems to contradict many of the assumptions underlying the 
classical theories of political integration and regional community-building. Karl 
Deutsch's classical portrayal of a security community as either an 'amalgamated' or 
'pluralistic' underscores a high level of interaction among the members, who develop a 
sense of community ('we-feeling', trust and mutual interaction), and integration 
(economic interdependence, and communication process and flows between peoples). 13 
This idea also highlights the role of institutions in shaping behaviour of the states. 
Members of a genuine security community will manage conflict without fighting each 
other and resolve their problems through peaceful means. 
Indeed, the experience of ASEAN community building since the end of the 
Indochina conflicts in the early 1990s has shown that members have been relatively 
successful in avoiding war among themselves and managing conflict peacefully. But 
this has been achieved largely in absence of a sense of interdependence or shared 
12 See Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia andthe Pacific (Toronto: Lexington, 1991), p. 
65; Leszek Buszynski 'Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security', Asian 
Survey 32, 1992, p. 830; Shaun Narine, 'ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security', Pacific 
Affairs 71, 2, Summer 1998, pp. 195; Sheldon W. Simon, 'Southeast Asia: Whither Security 
Regionalism?' in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron Friedberg, Michael Wills (eds) Strategic Asia 4, (Seattle: 
The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2003), p. 270. 
13 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 36-59. 
6 
political and social background. Security and economic cooperation is still conducted 
largely with external members rather than among ASEAN members themselves. The 
ASEAN states represent different political systems ranging from authoritarian regimes 
(i.e. Myanmar) or communist systems (i.e. Vietnam) to countries which embrace 
democratic systems such as Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Classic security community theory, therefore, cannot really explain ASEAN's 
growing legacy of successful conflict management by reference to such underlying 
factors as shared liberal democratic values or substantial intra-regional economic 
interdependence. 14 Moreover, although ASEAN members have been relatively 
successful in avoiding war among themselves, significant rivalries and suspicions 
continue to exist within Southeast Asia. The conventional security community 
characteristics which allow it to resolve problems by peaceful means, therefore, are not 
completely applicable to ASEAN, since the process to mediate peacefully cannot be 
guaranteed. Many sensitive security issues such as territorial disputes have not been 
resolved and could still potentially spark regional conflict. This is especially true 
because ASEAN members have until recently regarded their commitment to the 
organisation below that of preserving their own national sovereignty and pursuing their 
own national interests. One can justifiably ask what type of security community will 
ASEAN become if conflict management among its members has not been resolved in 
close conformity to the security community-building model? 
The recent typology of security communities advanced by Emmanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett aimed to overcome the difficulty of analysing this problem outside the 
traditional Western conceptual framework. 15 They applied three security community 
typologies: nascent, ascendant, and mature. In this category, Adler and Barnett explain 
that 'nascent' which is the lowest stage in the development of security community, 
contains shared threat perceptions, expected trade benefits, collective identity, and 
organisational emulation. The 'ascendant' phase is marked by tighter military 
coordination, reduced fears of other members of the group, the beginning of cognitive 
transition, inter-subjective processes, collective identities, and dependable expectations 
of peaceful change. The main characteristics of the 'mature' phase are greater 
14 Amitav Acharya, 'Collective identity and Conflict management in Southeast Asia', in Emanuel Adler, 
and Michael Barnett (eds) Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 
198-202; Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the 
problem of regional (New York, London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 30-37. 
15 See Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 'Security communities in theoretical perspectives', in 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds) Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 3-17. 
7 
institutionalization, supra-nationalism, a high degree of trust, and low or no probability 
of military conflicts. 16 
However, it is not clear to which of these three typologies ASEAN belongs. 
Using this conceptual approach as a guide, the recent development of institutional 
mechanisms and introduction of a formal ASEAN Charter has prompted some analysts 
to label Southeast Asia as a 'nascent security community'. 17 ASEAN is now expanding 
or revising the identity and norms which have traditionally been embodied in the so 
called 'ASEAN Way' of diplomatic interaction. The 'ASEAN Way' encourages 
informal deliberations in a cooperative sense but does not embrace the application of 
actual mechanisms for conflict avoidance. It thus cultivates security community-
building behaviour that goes beyond the so-called 'embryonic security regime' typology 
outlined by Ralf Emmers and others and that envisions the application of countervailing 
power to deny intra-mural hegemony within a regional grouping. Other ASEAN 
member-states constraining Indonesia's power between 1967-1975 reflected an 
embryonic security regime situation. Cultivating the ASEAN Way' has allowed 
Southeast Asia to move beyond this balancing strategy toward adopting a visibly more 
communal approach in recent years. 18 
Yet, there is a problem with this typology. The norms constituting the 'ASEAN 
Way' are not necessarily exceptional. Similar norms have also marked relations among 
other countries in the world. The United Nations Charter mentions respect for the 
principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. 
The traditional consensus norms such as musyawarah and mufakat which were 
applicable in this context, derived as they were from Indonesia's type of decision 
making process - (actually the words were borrowed from the Arabic language) - now 
tend to linger even after democratization intensified in that country. The musyawarah 
and mufakat system was initially applied in Indonesia under the strong guidance of 
Suharto government (1966-1999). Another contradiction with community-building is 
16Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 'A framework for the study of security community' in Emanuel 
Adler and Michael Barnett (eds) Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
pp. 50-55. 
17 Amitav Acharya, 'The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: "Security Community" or "Defence 
Community"?', Pacific Affairs, 64, 2 Summer 1991, pp. 172-173; Acharya, 'Collective identity and 
conflict management', pp. 198-227; Acharya, 'Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia', 
pp.196-209;Yuen Foong Khong, 'ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex', in Davis. A. 
Lake and Patrick. M. Morgan (eds) Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (Pennsylvania: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 320; Nicholas Busse, 'Constructivism and Southeast 
Asian Security', The Pacific Review, 12, 1, 1999, pp. 46-48. 
18 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative security and the balance of power in ASEAN and ARF (London and New 
York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 87. 
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that the 'modus operandi' of the decision making process in ASEAN is informal rather 
than binding. This has been described as 'agreeing to disagree without being 
disagreeable', basically 'shelving disagreement for later settlement' .19 In fact, most of 
the institutions in the world which have non-binding and informal relationships among 
their members are usually not organisations in which there are high levels of 
cooperation or institutional contact within them. It is therefore difficult to argue that the 
'ASEAN Way' is a particularly unique process of security community-building when 
the key assumption underlying the concept actually qualifies the development of closer 
cooperation among the states. 
Furthermore there is a problem with the intensity of cooperation among ASEAN 
states being viewed as a 'nascent' security community within their institutional context. 
Adler and Barnet believe that 'the possibility of trust' is a key indicator for the level of 
cooperation among groups of states that can be qualified as a 'nascent' security 
community.20 Between the countries of Southeast Asia, however, such cooperation 
remains largely unpredictable and mistrust is still common. If trust does exist, it is 
mainly reflected in the rhetoric of ASEAN statements. However, more often than not, 
significant issues of national interest are not actually involved and the relationship 
between ASEAN states (as seen by leaders, bureaucrats and publics) remains more 
competitive than cooperative. ASEAN's competitive behaviour can be seen in the 
number of still unresolved disputes among its core members. For example, Indonesia 
and Malaysia are in dispute over Ambalat, illegal workers and illegal logging; Indonesia 
and Singapore have clashed over mineral sand exploration, air space, an extradition 
treaty, and the island of Nipah, whereas Singapore and Malaysia are quarrelling about 
water supply issues, the causeway and territorial waters. Although both countries 
finalised 28 year dispute over the sovereignty of Pu/au Batu Puteh or Pedra Blanca 
through mediating of International Court and Justice (ICJ) on 23 May 2008, they still 
have disputed territorial waters and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around Pedra 
Blanca. In short, cooperative behaviour among ASEAN states is still far from assured, 
much less embedded within institutional parameters. 
Despite such problems, ASEAN have survived and the member states have even 
intensified their regional security cooperation. It is noteworthy that the disputes cited 
above have been contained from breaking out into open conflict. ASEAN has thus 
19 See Hoang Anh Tuan, 'ASEAN Dispute management: Implications for Vietnam and an Expanded 
ASEAN,' Contemporary Southeast Asia 18, 1, 1996, p. 63. 
20 Adler and Barnett, 'A framework for the study of security community', p. 53. 
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successfully demonstrated its ability to realise 'conflict avoidance among its 
members.' 21 Diplomatic interaction between the ASEAN member-states has evolved 
quite visibly, particularly regarding the number of organisational committees and 
meetings they convene. ASEAN has also moved to deepen and strengthen its member-
states' politico-security interaction by promulgating 'Vision 2020' in 1997, an ASEAN 
Declaration on Transnational Issues in 1997, the Bali Concord II in 2003, and the 
ASEAN Charter 2007. All of these measures anticipate an ASEAN Community which 
encompasses three components or 'pillars' namely the A SEAN Security Community 
(ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Social-Cultural 
Community. ASEAN member-states have also increased cooperation with external 
powers in the region. The 'ASEAN Way' as noted above, is now undergoing 
reassessment through such proposals as 'flexible engagement' .22 
It must to be acknowledged however, that the reality of community-building, as 
reflected by 'flexible engagement', has not been very effective in the case of Myanmar. 
That country still maintains it's authoritarian, undemocratic style of government and 
flagrantly violates human rights. However, ASEAN members have arguably moved 
beyond the traditional parameters of the 'ASEAN Way' (which is traditionally a device 
to cover up intra-regional dissent) by encouraging non-state actors within the region to 
shape ASEAN. For example, ASEAN invited non government organizations to submit 
their ideas for creating the ASEAN Charter. This example of involvement of non state 
actors, however, is still in the preliminary stage. Their involvement in actual decision-
making processes on security issues is still relatively unimportant. 
At the ASEAN Summit in Cebu January 2007, ASEAN leaders approved a 
blueprint for an institutional charter and accelerating the formal realisation of an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. Currently, the Charter has received approval from 
decision-makers and the parliamentary members of all ASEAN states. This is an 
important step in ASEAN's evolution, which involves the region's broader populaces; 
not just the usual government officials. According to the Charter, ASEAN will become 
21 Michael Leifer, 'ASEAN as a Model of Security Community?' in Hadi Soesastro (ed.), ASEAN 
Changed Regional and International Political Economic. (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1995), p. 132; and RalfEmmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN 
and the ARF (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 17. 
22 
'Flexible engagement' was initially proposed by Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan at the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting convened in Manila on July 1998. The concept involved encouraging more 
comprehensive discussions between ASEAN foreign ministers on the domestic policies carried out in 
other ASEAN member-states. Pitsuwan argued that 'issues affecting each other might be brought up and 
discussed by ASEAN members without this being perceived as interference'. See Hiro Katsumata 
'From non-Interference to Open and Frank Discussions', Asian Survey 44, 2, 2004, p. 238. Also see 
Jeannie Henderson, 'Reassessing ASEAN', Adelphi Paper 328, 1999, pp. 50-53. 
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a rules-based organisation, going beyond a 'talking shop' or informal consensus stage 
which has been a common criticism levelled at ASEAN' s lack of effectiveness in the 
past. The Charter potentially represents an intensity in ASEAN' s determination about 
creating a security community and is weighing the value of the necessary changes. At 
least some of its member-states believe that security community building can be 
implemented if the relationship between state sovereignty and regional institutions 
becomes a more balanced one. 
These recent developments, however, raise questions about the ASEAN' s 
ultimate ability to adapt. Due to the continuing importance of their sovereign 
prerogatives, it may not be possible for ASEAN member-states to implement the 
necessary policy changes at the institutional level to alter fundamental relationships 
between them. If ASEAN does adopt new integration policies, only limited results can 
be expected over the short-term. That is because the successful implementation of such 
policy requires the member-states to relinquish greater levels of their sovereign 
prerogatives than they may be willing to accept. The adopting of the ASEAN Charter 
and its implementation entails varying concerns about how ASEAN countries should 
perceive and sustain their sovereignty and these apprehensions have yet to be fully 
reconciled. Therefore it is critical to understand why ASEAN projects visions of 
institutional transformation and what it precisely hopes to accomplish in such context. 
Can the ASEAN states modify their traditional security norms evolving around 
sovereignty and non-interference to the point where more viable institutional 
approaches to security community building can be applied? 
The Regional Security Debate 
ASEAN, therefore, represents a challenging puzzle within the overall debate 
about Southeast Asian regional security. Most scholars still do not seem to have come 
much closer to agreeing how to characterise 'the nature of the ASEAN beast'. There is 
growing deliberation over ASEAN' s accomplishments and limitations as a framework 
for regional order building leading to questions about what type of security community 
ASEAN really is. Realists believe that 'self-help' will continue as an important 
analytical framework for understanding Southeast Asian security because individual 
states still have unresolved conflicts with each other and because no consensus exists 
concerning whether external threats to regional order are present or even what they may 
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be.23 Indonesia and Malaysia had resolved the conflict about the sovereignty of Sipadan 
and Ligitan in 2002, but the two countries still sustain an unresolved territorial dispute 
over the Ambalat. After losing its sovereignty claims to two islands through a ruling 
issued by the ICJ, Indonesia become very sensitive on territorial issues, especially those 
relating to Malaysia. Another long standing territorial conflict involves Malaysia and 
Philippines contesting the ownership of Sabah.24 In regard to religious and ethnic 
conflicts, intra - ASEAN conflicts also remain instrumental to fuelling bilateral tensions 
among various ASEAN states. Andrew Tan, for example, argued that the Malaysian 
government's tacit support for Muslim separatist organization such as the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Southern Mindanao and the Pattani United 
Liberation Organization (PULO) in southern Thailand has continuously strained the 
relations between the two countries with Malaysian.25 
The problem of coping with external threats is not just restricted to one ASEAN 
state's insurgency movements or terrorist problems 'spilling over' into neighbouring 
countries. The late Michael Leifer, known as the 'dean' of Southeast Asia in security 
politics, wrote most of his works from a realist perspective. According to him, the role 
and survival of ASEAN is dependent on and shaped by a wider regional balance of 
power system among the region's large states but underpinned by a US strategic 
presence.26 ASEAN remains a comparatively weak institution because it has not 
developed a logic, realists insist, commensurate with regional alliances, which is the 
traditional security response by states confronting commonly designated external state-
centric threats. In fact, the threat can emanate from external sources and can project 
multiple dimensions of threat levels. Moreover, realists have significant difficulty with 
the notion of ASEAN employing security community approaches because this school of 
thought has no actual reference or concern with the notion of 'community'. Nor does it 
deal extensively with non-state actors that may operate outside traditional threat 
parameters but evolve into more 'traditional' or state-centric security challenges. 
23 See Sheldon W. Simon, 'Realism and neoliberalism: international relations theory and Southeast Asian 
security', The Pacific Review, 8, 1, 1995, p. 7 and Ruland, 'ASEAN and the Asian Crisis', p. 444; for 
further details see Donald K Emmerson, 'What do the blind-sided see? Reproaching regionalism in 
Southeast Asia', The Pacific Review, 18, 1, 2005, pp. 6-12; Tim Huxley, 'Southeast Asia in the study of 
international relations: the rise and decline of a region', The Pacific Review 9, 2, 1996, pp. 220-221. 
24 Andrew T. H. Tan,' Relations among the ASEAN States: Bilateral Tensions and Prospects ofa Security 
Community', Cambridge Review of International Affairs 13, 2, 2000, p. 307. 
25/bid., pp. 307-309, and pp. 311-315. 
26 Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of the Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), 
introduction, ix-x. For further detailed ofrelations between ASEAN and external powers see Narayan 
Ganesan 'ASEAN Relations with Major External Powers', Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, 2, 2000, 
pp. 258-278. 
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Various shifts in international relations perspectives that occurred after the end 
of the Cold War have thus not actually changed the realist view of ASEAN. For realists 
there has been no 'peace dividend' in Southeast Asia following the Soviet Union's 
collapse. Many of them still see the region as rife with tension resulting from 
geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China after Cold War. Such perceptions 
do provide a certain ideological coherence and congruent threat perception for 
ASEAN.27 Specifically regarding the development of an ASEAN security community, 
realists argue that the idea is problematic because ASEAN lacks a 'general purpose' and 
thus can not generate a common response to mutual threat perceptions. Moreover, the 
theoretical literature underpinning the ASEAN security community idea is, they assert, 
characterised by significant conceptual and empirical flaws. 28 Nicholas Khoo mentions 
three specific problems: (1) norms or identity used to explain the emergence of a 
security community; (2) critical issues within the ASEAN security community literature 
including tautological nature of arguments and failure to rule out alternative 
explanations; and (3) empirically, the nascent security community has never existed. 
Jurgan Ruland typifies this view by arguing that ASEAN's 'policy mix is closer to the 
realist than the institutionalist pole' because what appears to be a growing sense of an 
institutionalist, and collective identity is not really very strong compared to ongoing 
realist behaviour sustained by individual ASEAN member-states29• According to 
Ruland, institutionalist approaches fail too often to take into account the prospect of 
weak or failed integration processes. 30 He also points out the weakness of the 'ASEAN 
Way' as: 
In cooperative arrangements based on a minimalist set of shared value 
with an inherent emphasis on flexibility and pragmatism and lacking 
binding rules, the threshold for exit behaviour is comparatively low 
because retreat from common positions is not morally stigmatized. 
Moreover, the 'ASEAN Way' with its tendency of hiding problems behind 
euphemisms and symbolic action as well as its ad hoc type of institution 
building 'as and when the need arises', leaves little time for concerted 
reaction when the organization is subjected to external shocks.31 
27 Ganesan, 'ASEAN Relations with Major External Powers', pp. 268-274. 
28Nicholas Khoo, 'Constructing Southeast Asian Security: The Pitfalls of Imagining a Security 
Community and the Temptations of Orthodoxy', Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, 1, 2004, 
p. 137. 
29 Ruland, 'ASEAN and the Asian crisis', p. 420. 
30 Ibid, p. 423 
31 Ibid p. 444. 
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In short, realists claim their theoretical perspective is preferable for explaining 
the development of ASEAN's regional security politics. 
From the neoliberalist perspective, ASEAN is only loosely institutionalised, 
thereby limiting its capabilities to manage key issues. At first glance, this would appear 
to strengthen the realist case. Neoliberalism promotes ASEAN's interdependence, the 
viability of its binding rules, the authority of ASEAN's actual regional purview and 
Southeast Asian states' willingness to transfer or share sovereignty at the institutional 
level. The ASEAN Summit and the recent expansion of ASEAN Secretariat role are 
evidentiary of the neo-liberal outlook taking greater hold of member-states' calculations 
about the institution. 
However, neo-liberals are still concerned that ASEAN is not usmg those 
instruments it has established to strengthen that institution's credibility as effectively as 
they might.32 This is exemplified by ASEAN's High Council which, although 
established in 1976, has never been activated. The 'ASEAN Way', is clearly an 
informal rather than a formalised mechanism, allowing member-states to apply it for 
protecting their sovereign prerogatives rather than to compromise or relinquish those 
prerogatives in favour of strengthening institutional norms.33 The role of the ASEAN 
Secretariat as a viable mode of cooperation likewise remams weak. Moreover, 
"Decision making, monitoring and enforcement in the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) remain decentralized, revealing ASEAN's preference for intergovernmental 
mechanisms as opposed to third party modes of cooperation.m4 Institutionalists have 
further argued that the assumption and the processes of institutionalisation in the Asia 
Pacific based on the ASEAN model of inclusivity, and unanimity is not really 
meaningful. This is because the institution has not been able to create results that reflect 
the supposed strength of its own mechanisms. John Garofano suggests that this model 
has to be transformed into strategy for dealing with concrete problems and to move 
from trust-building to actual conflict prevention and conflict resolution.35 
It is not argued here that a highly formal or precise ASEAN institution would be 
an absolute guarantee for more effective regional stability and security - even if 'hard' 
32 Miles Kahler, 'Legalization as Strategy: The Asia Pacific Case' International Organization 54, 3, 2000, 
p. 551. 
33 Ibid. p. 552. 
34 Helen E.S. Nesadurai, 'Co-operation and Institutional Transformation in ASEAN: Insight from AFTA 
Project', in S. Siddique and S. Kumar (eds) The 2nd ASEAN Reader, ISEAS. (Singapore: Seng Lee 
Press, 2003), p. 202. 
35 Garofano, 'Flexibility or Irrelevance', p. 76. 
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institutionalists might prefer Southeast Asia's formal adoption of such an organisational 
mechanism. In the context of this study, the key point raised by neo-institutionalists is 
that A SEAN members designed their organization to maintain and promote W estphalian 
notions of state sovereignty.36 By 'formalising' the sovereignty issue, ASEAN 
members' clear preoccupation with traditional sovereign state prerogatives has 
discouraged the development of advanced institutional cooperation that could 
supplement their national security postures in more effective ways. ASEAN's style of 
regionalism has, according to other neo-liberals, failed to develop that organisation's 
potential as a viable community-building institution. By recently moving toward more 
distinct initiatives in community-building, however, ASEAN's capability to fulfil the 
neoliberal vision more completely and more convincingly is not beyond the realm of 
possibility. 
From a constructivist viewpoint, ASEAN should be examined through 
investigating norms, identity, and the idea of conflict prevention. This approach also 
borrows from the idea of security communities, especially those developed by Karl 
Deutsch. 37 If his notion of a security community is correct there should be a mutually 
constitutive relationship between the security community and its member-states. 
Member-states share meanings that facilitate social learning and the development of 
mutual trust and identity. The diplomatic and security culture in ASEAN under these 
circumstances would be "the outcome of a process of mutual recognition, possibly 
through a process of reconciliation or accommodation."38 From a sociological vantage 
point, the 'ASEAN Way' is viewed as the dynamic product of an evolving process of 
inter subjective understanding and identity rather than 'collaboration by default' 
resulting from material power constraints (such as US military dominance in Southeast 
Asia or China's growing role in that region's balance of power). 
Constructivists further argue that relations in ASEAN cannot be seen in terms of 
merely relative and absolute gains. Arguably, they surmise, relations among ASEAN 
countries have moved to at least a 'quasi security community' status.39 Indeed, Amitav 
Acharya and other constructivists, such as Yuen Foong Khong and Nicholas Busse 
36 Shaun Narine, 'State sovereignty, political legitimacy and regional institutionalism in the Asia Pacific', 
The Pacific Review 17, 3, 2004, p. 437. 
37 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. pp.46-50. 
38 Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 12. 
39 Simon, 'The Future of Asian Pacific Security', p. 68. Also see Nordin Sopiee 'ASEAN and regional 
security', in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.) Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East (London: Crom Helm, 1986), p. 229 and Barry Buzan, 'The 
Southeast Asian security Complex', Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, 1, 1988, p. 11. 
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argue that ASEAN has developed into a 'nascent security community' where there is 
significant common identity and common interests that have re-shaped the security 
behaviour of each member-state along compatible lines.40 In this regard, the 
institutionalisation of ASEAN is seen providing a much more positive and 
transformative basis for cooperation by socialising actors and developing a sense of 
collective interest and purpose. In this context, institutions do not merely 'regulate' state 
behaviour, they can also 'constitute' state identities and interests in ways that 
constructivists anticipate.41 In the ASEAN region, a state's identity is shaped in 
significant ways by its membership in A SEAN. 
The debate over the nature of ASEAN as an institutional example of security 
community building as presented above deserves careful scrutiny. The three dominant 
theoretical approaches of realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism have all 
contributed to the ongoing debate on security community theory. However, these 
perspectives have also tended to differ on what actually constitutes a security 
community and what factors really shape the development of a security community in 
ASEAN. The debate generated by these perspectives about the merit, weakness of and 
possibility of creating a security community in ASEAN still has not really succeeded in 
capturing the complexity and uniqueness of ASEAN. 
It is problematic for realists, for example, to accept the very idea of a security 
community among developing countries in an ASEAN context. They see no prospect 
for a security community within ASEAN because inherently, there is no language of 
'community' within realists' paradigmatic approach. The notion of a security 
community is at best utopian. For realists it is unclear how seeking to transform 
ASEAN into a security community will increase the ASEAN states' individual and 
collective security42 Rather than having succeeded in creating a community, ASEAN is 
more an illusion of community.43 'ASEAN scholarship' thus promotes 'regional 
delusion' rather than proper analyses. 44 Therefore the prospect of a security community 
in ASEAN from a realist perspective is a flawed concept from the outset. 
40 Acharya,' Collective identity and conflict management', 207-214; and Acharya, Constructing a 
Security Community, pp. 4-8 Khong, 'ASEAN and the Southeast Asian', pp. 320-321 and Busse, 
'Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security', pp. 41-54. 
41 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, p. 22. 
42 Khoo, 'Constructing Southeast Asian Security', p. 150. 
43 Jones and Smith, 'Making Process, not Progress', p. 149. 
44 Jones and Smith, 'ASEAN's Imitation Community', p. 94. 
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Realist explanations, however, tend to simplify the complexity of the 
relationships between Southeast Asian countries and undervalue ASEAN' s very 
existence. They are to some extent correct when they argue that the relationship 
between the states is based on reconciling potentially diverse national security interests 
within a power equilibrium designed to achieve conflict avoidance on national interests. 
However, realists have difficulty explaining why ASEAN has existed for almost 40 
years, has successfully expanded its membership and has maintained even a very loose 
organisation in various regional security environments and has minimised conflicts in 
the process. Analysing ASEAN through mainly realist lenses would neglect many of the 
economic and diplomatic achievements that this institution has registered through the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN 
plus Three (APT) and other architectures. Any projection for ASEAN's future based on 
a purely realist analysis would be a futile analytical quest for understanding security 
cooperation among the states of Southeast Asia because of that school of thought's 
exclusive emphasis on relative gains and national self interest. 
In short, a realist analysis of ASEAN' s potential to create a security community 
m Southeast Asia neglects the significant achievement of the member states in 
managing the historical conflicts between them by peaceful means. The idea of a 
pluralistic security community in Southeast Asia's case therefore needs to be linked 
more closely with the actual story of how regional cooperation has developed in that 
region. While the existence of a pluralistic security community in Western Europe is 
arguably a direct consequence of post-war American hegemony over that area of the 
world and of Washington's support of European integration,45 the same factor of 
hegemonic domination cannot be applied to a Southeast Asia which was an arena of 
decolonialisation and more ambiguous geopolitical competition during the Cold War. 
Neoliberalist or institutionalist perspectives alone also yield an incomplete 
analysis of ASEAN security politics. Neoliberalism by itself lacks the empirical 
richness necessary for explaining ASEAN's evolution.46 The neoliberalist tendency to 
focus on regulative norms and supra-national bodies as qualifications for meaningful 
cooperation leads adherents of this approach to reject the idea that ASEAN is 
undergoing a process of security community building. Neoliberalists do not take into 
45 Hemmer, Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein 'Why is there No NATO in Asia? Collective 
Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins ofMultilateralism', International Organization 56, 3, 2002. Also 
see Khoo, 'Constructing Southeast Asian Security', p. 141-142. 
46 Sorpong Peou, 'Realism and Constructivism in Southeast Asian security studies today: a review essay', 
The Pacific Review 15, 1, 2002, p. 120. 
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sufficient account, however, that ASEAN member-state relations are very often based 
on informal norms. These include non-interference, non-use of force, and an informal 
approach to the settlement of disputes between the member-states, short of fully 
resolving conflicts between them. Neo-institutionalists may not too much credit in to 
developing a security community that requires a style that reflect Western institution-
building. However, given the Southeast Asian region's culture, history and 
vulnerabilities, such a change may not be completely justifiable in ASEAN case. 
To examine ASEAN's development as a security community by adopting an 
exclusively constructivist perspective is also problematic. Constructivist analysis looks 
at constitutive norms and identity. It is difficult in ASEAN's case to define the patterns 
and regularity in these areas with any real precision. What precisely is a 'norm' and 
when does it matter? For example, Amitav Acharya has focused mainly on norms and 
identity as the most significant factor to qualify ASEAN as a security community.47 
However, a security community is not only about norms and identity. It must also 
include the interests of member states, their capacity to engage in institutional and legal 
processes with other members and with support accepted from exogenous factors such 
as powerful non-member states as indicated with the supportive role of growing EU 
regionalism. 
As constructivists note, regionalism has developed a unique character predicated 
on the development of member-states' identity that has allowed ASEAN to evolve into 
an organization that can eventually 'mature' into a security community. In reality, these 
developments have not reached a level where a fully constructivist blueprint equating to 
a security community is in evidence. Constructivists such as Acharya for example, tend 
to exaggerate the intimacy of relationships among the ASEAN members. 48 
Constructivists also argue that the 'ASEAN Way' underwrites the common 
identity of member states, reflecting an advanced level of mutual identification and 
producing a 'we feeling'. In fact, the 'ASEAN Way' does not signify an advanced level 
of mutual identification via norms, but rather adjudicates national interests relative to 
regional cooperation. Constructivist theory also implies that ASEAN may have created 
47 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, pp. 71-72. See also Amitav Acharya, 'Do norms and 
identity matter? Community and power in Southeast Asia's regional order, The Pacific Review, 18, 1, 
2005, pp.98-106; and Amitav Acharya , Regional Institutions and Security Order in Asia, Paper 
prepared for the Second Workshop on Security Order in the Asia-Pacific, Bali, 30 April-2 May 2000, 
pp.12-14, <http:/www.cpdsindia.org/asiapacific/regionalinstitutions.htm> Accessed 30 October 2004. 
48 Amitav Acharya, 'Ideas, identity, and institution-building: from the 'ASEAN way' to the 'Asia-Pacific 
way?', The Pacific Review 10, 3, 1997, pp. 328-333. See also Acharya,' Collective identity and conflict 
management', pp. 207-214 and Acharya, 'Do norms and identity matter?', pp. 95-118. 
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a collective identity that is now an integral part of the individual identities of its member 
states. However, the present evidence that the ASEAN states view themselves as part of 
a collective entity is not compelling.49 Although intra-ASEAN relations have definitely 
improved over the past forty years, ASEAN states continue to put their individual 
national interests and security perspectives ahead of any sense of regionalism. 
The ASEAN Secretariat stands out as a graphic case-in-point. It has never 
functioned as a regional body which has genuine authority over the national leadership 
of its individual member-states. In fact, the dominant role of Secretariat is as a 
coordinating body among ASEAN Foreign Ministries. The basic mandate of the 
ASEAN Secretariat is "to provide for greater efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN 
organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projects and activities."50 An 
effort to strengthen the Secretariat as part of developing Vision 2020 (which recently 
been shifted forward to be realized by 2015) is lacking. In the process of drafting the 
charter, the late Ali Alatas, Indonesian Foreign Minister, who represented Indonesia in 
the Eminent Person Group (EPG) revealed that the EGP asked the ASEAN Secretariat 
to be a monitoring body. 51 However, to date, no such response from the Secretariat has 
been forthcoming. In Article 11 of the Charter, it is mentioned that the Secretary 
General shall "facilitate and monitor progress in the implementation of ASEAN 
agreements and decisions."52 Other examples can be cited. There is a relatively low 
commonality of threat perception among ASEAN states. Nor is there significant 
regional security cooperation dealing with such issues such as Malacca Strait, terrorism, 
or transboundary haze problems to conclude that sovereignty has been pre-empted by a 
strong collective security identity. 
A security community usually brings together a group of 'like minded' actors 
who often develop common criteria of inclusion and exclusion. Constructivists like 
Acharya will therefore tend to justify local norms, values, and policies such as 'the 
ASEAN way' and non-interference in sovereign affairs as unique factors that contribute 
to the building of a successful ASEAN identity. As noted above, however, the 'ASEAN 
Way' is not particularly unique. Other organizational groupings also adhere to norms 
values such as non-interference, sovereignty, consensus and informality. Indeed, the 
United Nations Charter recognises and guarantees sovereignty and non intervention. 
49 Nischalke, 'Does ASEAN measure up?', pp. 109-112. 
50 See ASEAN, The ASEAN Secretariat, Basic Mandate, Functions and Composition, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/l 1856.htm> Accessed 30 March 2009. 
51 
'ASEAN faces critical period in a changing world', The Jakarta Post 17 January 2007, p. 4. 
52 See ASEAN, The ASEAN Charter (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, January 2008), Article 11. 
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Consensus decision-making has been practiced by many regional and international 
institutions to avoid undermining the collective relationships underwriting these 
groupmgs. 
The ASEAN 'uniqueness' argument therefore oversells the ASEAN Way's real 
significance. In reality, 'the ASEAN way' is like the two faces of a coin and its results 
are paradoxical. It does facilitate conflict reduction or diffusion and thus helps to 
maintain ASEAN's viability. At the same time, however, it hampers the flexibility of 
ASEAN to be more effective, more integrative and to develop meaningful cooperation 
on a sustainable basis. Currently, the ASEAN member states have adopted an ASEAN 
Charter, which aspires moving beyond the informality of the 'ASEAN Way', and leave 
practices of consensus such as 'musyawarah and mufakat' behind them. If this happens 
the judgments of constructivists will need at least to be reconciled with those of 
institutionalists who have prescribed the more formal approach to institution-building 
that now seems to be occurring. 
The ASEAN states understand that the process of developing a 'we feeling' and 
building their identity will not happen in a policy vacuum. More formal institutional 
aspects will become strengthened only as the result of bargaining and development that 
shape the national interests and members' perceptions towards fostering a common 
identity. ASEAN is also influenced by exogenous factors, such as US or Chinese 
interests in the Asia Pacific and how these are articulated in specific American and 
Chinese foreign policies directed toward Southeast Asia. In short, to assign prominence 
to constructivists in ASEAN's analysis process of security community would neglect 
significant evidence related to the dynamics of institutional processes now intensifying 
within the evolving ASEAN framework. 
To conclude this subsection, any analysis of the security community idea in 
Southeast Asia should be linked to a judicious combination of factors that can be 
selectively derived from neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist thought. Such an 
approach to understanding security community formation runs counter to explanations 
that limit their discussion to the 'ASEAN Way' or are based on ascertaining regional 
identity alone. A more amalgamated approach can reduce analytical ambiguity and limit 
theoretical bias when it comes to judging ASEAN values such as the 'ASEAN Way' 
and ASEAN policy behaviour. 
However, other unresolved issues must also be addressed. These include: (1) 
whether ASEAN should be categorized as either a burgeoning security community or 
just another diplomatic mechanism; (2) determining the stage at which ASEAN may 
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become a security community; (3) what specific type of security community would 
ASEAN become; and ( 4) demarcating what collective identity, if any, exists or is 
developing among ASEAN countries that facilitates security community building. Such 
factors can be usefully investigated by examining the tension between sovereignty 
prerogative issues and collective policy and action intensifying over time. These factors 
constitute the basic conceptual approach for this study's analysis of ASEAN 
cooperative security.53 
This Study's Argument and Contribution 
As noted at this chapter's outset, the basic argument of this study is that to build 
a meaningful regional security community in Southeast Asia, ASEAN member-states 
will need to develop and to implement collective norms sufficiently powerful to 
overcome their past practice of applying sovereignty or non-interference norms as de 
facto inhibitors to realising a regional security community. ASEAN member-states will 
modify the dominance that their own sovereign prerogatives have in intra-ASEAN 
relations when key catalysts for doing so emerge and develop sufficiently to 
substantially shape ASEAN member-states' behaviour towards each other. These may 
include a mutually perceived external threat, transnational security challenges or 
leadership transformation. Collective norms can be cultivated by strengthened 'we-
feeling' arising among ASEAN member-states (as suggested by constructivists) in ways 
required to strengthen Southeast Asian's collective identity. A 'we feeling' can also be 
guaranteed when member-states perceive an 'other' threatening their mutual interest. 
For example Vietnam challenged ASEAN very legitimacy during the 1980s and 1990's 
prior to joining organization. Collective identity, however, should also be congruent 
with the national interest. While states need to avoid approaching regional security 
issues based on purely national interest, they must remain sufficiently sensitive to each 
others' domestic situations and to the potential vulnerability flowing from them. This 
conforms to realist prescriptions for security policy management. Simultaneously, long-
standing norms of respect for sovereignty and non interference must be tempered to 
realise greater flexibility in responding to significant regional security problems. 
Implementing 'adaptable sovereignty' may be one answer to the main challenges 
posited by the sovereignty issue in intra-ASEAN relations. 'Adaptable sovereignty' 
53 ASEAN's form of cooperative security may best described as that of cooperative security which is 
sought in collaboration with others, as opposed to against others. See David Dewitt, 'Common, 
Comprehensive and Cooperative Security', Pacific Review 17, 1, 1994, pp. 1-15. Emphasis is mine. 
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adjusts sovereign prerogatives to community building but not to the point where the 
primacy of sovereignty is surrendered. This approach envisions the simultaneous 
protection of state-centric primacy and the promotion of a higher level of 
institutionalization and interdependence that is required for stronger security 
cooperation without undermining that primacy. 
This amalgamation of realist, institutionalist54 and constructivist arguments 
constitutes a more appropriate basis for conceptualizing and building a security 
community in Southeast Asia, at least over the near term. The mature sovereignty 
reflected by the European model of community building is currently impossible to 
realize in Southeast Asia due to the latter region's recent historical animosities and its 
relative lack of material capacity. An important dual aim of this thesis is to demonstrate 
through case study analysis how the transition of ASEAN collective norms has been 
complicated by the sovereignty factor and how such norms might be pursued more 
effectively by the adoption of 'adaptable sovereignty' as an integrated approach to 
security community building. 
As already highlighted, an ecumenical approach that entails the synthesis of 
various theoretical perspectives as a means of explaining security community-building 
politics in Southeast Asia is preferable to relying exclusively on just one theoretical 
approach. ASEAN states' ability to respond collectively to threats in a Southeast Asia 
regional context matters. So too, however, does their application of appropriate material 
and ideational mechanisms needed to shape their security politics in response to 
perceived threats - both state-centric and transnational in nature - as well as to 
individual national security needs. It is further argued here, that in comparing these 
approaches: (1) realism best explains the existence of the conflictual or negative 
relationship (2) neoliberalist ideas have yielded mixed results but at times have provided 
useful insights into the institution-building process; and (3) the constructivist approach 
offers a useful interpretation of ASEAN 'identity' if is tempered by continuous attention 
to the individual ASEAN states' national interests. By way of example, the ASEAN 
identity explanation for 'diplomacy of accommodation' which appeared to dominate the 
formative stages of ASEAN, was underscored by hard bargaining driven by national 
54 The terms 'liberal', institutionalism (or 'institutionalist') and neoliberalism are used interchangeably in 
this study. Since the 1970s, the term 'liberalism' has been revived under the rubric of 'neoliberal 
institutionalism' as depicted by Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod and that the notion of 
'interdependence' is an essential concept of this approach. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 
and Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions', World Politics 38, 1, 1985, pp. 226-254. 
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interest as those countries moved to settle or at least to defuse tensions over their 
territorial differences. 55 
Investigating tension between issues of state sovereignty and issues of regional 
institution-building by using ASEAN as an overall 'case study' should provide 
international relations (IR) analysts with some useful insights on how integral the 
politics of security community building in the Asia Pacific really is. It will allow them 
to better understand how well the emerging polities in general can move in substantial 
ways to reconcile those domestic and regional security problems that impede 
community-building throughout developing world. It should also contribute to the IR 
field's general thinking about institutionalism by complementing the existing views in 
'Western' circles with nuances in institution-building that have emerged in developing 
reg10ns. 
In this context, the following questions seem relevant to developing this study: 
• Can ASEAN ever represent a viable case of regional security community 
building when the leaderships of its individual member-states are hardly 
prone to relinquish enough sovereign prerogatives to make regional security 
cooperation a credible approach to Southeast Asian regional security and 
politics? Or are ASEAN consultations actually diplomatic mechanisms that 
more often than not mask irreconcilable differences predicament on 
sovereign self-interest? 
• Can ASEAN gradually institutionalise successfully by separate Southeast 
Asian states co-existing and compromising their respective foreign policies 
without decisively relinquishing their sovereignty? 
• In identifying the stage at which ASEAN would become a security 
community: how do ASEAN states create collective security outcomes and 
how does ASEAN as an institution shape and accommodate member-state 
sovereignty with respect to regional security?; and 
In explaining or demarcating what collective identity, (if any), exists or is 
developing among ASEAN countries that facilitate security community building, is 
such accommodation becoming sufficiently prevalent to surmise that a security 
community model can eventually be applied to that institution? 
55 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 66. 
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It is not intended to 'discover' here whether or not ASEAN member-states 
sovereignty can be completely subordinated to the community building process. Rather 
this study is designed to examine whether 'collective identity' 56 - a positive 
identification by an ASEAN member-state with the welfare and security of other 
member-states - has emerged in ways that are sufficiently cohesive as to allow the 
politics of a security community to develop significantly throughout Southeast Asia. 
Before this examination is undertaken, however, it is necessary to examine the evolution 
of the security community concept in more depth. 
Conceptualising Security Community 
As previously noted, the idea of security community was pioneered by Karl 
Deutsch in the late 1950s as he observed the development of post-war European 
integration. Deutsch described a security community as: 
... a group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as the 
attainment of sense of community, accompanied by formal and informal 
institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure 
peaceful change among members of a group with 'reasonable' certainty 
over a 'long' period of time.57 
The ultimate objective of the members of a security community in Europe, then, 
was to manage conflict without fighting each other and to resolve outstanding issues 
through peaceful means. To realise 'perpetual peace' amongst themselves, moreover, 
the Europeans developed high levels of interdependence through the pursuit of 
integration and institutionalisation and through a growing similarity of ideology and 
identity. Similar efforts were later made in ASEAN with measures such as the 
agreement on the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
Inherent in Deutsch's discussion of integration at the national and supranational 
levels was his insight that unified government is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for regional peace and security. Indeed, in some cases it may even be 
destructive to that end. On the one hand, premature steps toward unification - those 
taken before certain background conditions have been met - can lead to conflict and 
breakdown. Unification of unequal partners, on the other hand, can sanction the 
inequality and give a cachet of legitimacy to the exploitation of the weak by the strong. 
56 Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', American Political 
Science Review 88, 2, 1994, p. 386. 
57 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 5. 
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These distinctions, and his attempted explanations of the phenomena, are the heart of 
Deutsch's work. 
The idea of security community was neglected for many years in international 
relations literature after Deutsch's initial investigation. Global politics and international 
relations theory during much of the Cold War was dominated by realism which assigned 
institutions only a marginal role and perceived little prospect for community building. It 
should be noted, however, that integration theory was strong enough to give impetus to 
nascent integration moment in Western Europe spearheaded by such institutionalists as 
Robert Schuman and Jean Monet. Yet, the concept of a security community had been 
developed with too narrow a frame of reference. Initially, the idea of a security 
community was intended to describe only what had happened in a post-war West 
European context, which had a very different character from developing countries such 
as those found in Southeast Asia. 
The concept of a security community is nevertheless, a dynamic and relevant 
concept in IR. Early analysts writing about the position of sovereignty in security 
community-building, moreover, understood that strong, durable cooperation among 
states is possible when states delegate their state sovereignty and authority. This 
analogy is also coherent with 'English School' of IR thought, as Hedley Bull rejected 
the idea that the security community or 'zone of peace' will come into being only if 
states surrender their sovereign powers to centralized institutions of the kind that 
provide order within nation-states' .58 The case of the European Union today with 
supranational authority and core state sovereignty which has been delegated to the EU, 
is illustrative. It has already moved away from the original idea of a security community 
as described by Deutsch and other theorists writing about European integration. In 
Deutsch's classification of security community which divided in to two categories, 
amalgamated and pluralistic security community, the European case is more classified 
as pluralistic security community where the states "retains the legal independence of 
separate govemment."59 However, the last development indicated that the separation of 
the geographic countries have disappeared with eradication of border barrier among the 
European countries and consequently free movement of people among them occurred. 
The state's governments are also losing its part of their sole authority and control in 
decision making process, their people, and its implementation of the policy in the 
58 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: PALGRA VE, 
Third Edition, 2002), p. 255. 
59 See Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 6. 
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ground. Understood in this way, the concept of security community building should not 
always be defined by using the European Union as an ideal case. 
Changes in both actual global politics and in international relations theory 
designed to explain the new post-Cold War international political environment led 
others to re-examine the applicability of Deutsch's basic propositions beyond Europe. 
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnet modified Deutsch's idea of security community 
and investigated whether the concept had relevance outside the North Atlantic region. 
Borrowing from the constructivist perspective, they argued that security community 
should be investigated through identity and the 'we-feeling,' approaches, which in tum, 
could lead to successful institutionalisation rather than through just establishing formal 
institutions for their own sake. Security communities are bound together, they asserted, 
by compatible core values, shared language and institutions, and the degree of shared 
identity that evolves as a sense of 'we-ness.60 Put differently, these factors generate 
'dependable expectations of peaceful change' in which inter-relationships within the 
community are shaped by processes of 'social iteration, learning and habit building that 
help to create both expectation ... and dependability' A mutually constitutive relationship 
exists between those two entities because member-states often justify their behaviour in 
the context of those norms that underwrite the community to which they belong.61 
They further asserted that their modification of Deutsch's work could bridge 
conceptual gaps and allow the analysis of security community politics to apply beyond 
the European precedent. Uncontested cases of security community (or 'thick' security 
community) are, they admitted, only evident among European states, such as the Nordic 
countries or the USA and Canada. Regional cooperation in South America and 
Southeast Asia were as 'thin' (or 'loose') security communities because of their 
relatively lower levels of integration, institutionalisation and more questionable 
democratic values. 62 
The work of Alex Bellamy and Amitav Acharya have further enhanced concept 
of security community beyond the initial precepts introduced by Deutsch. Bellamy 
notes that more analysis needs to be undertaken on the relationships between those 
inside and outside a community. Do shared interests and common identity of 
60 Adler and Barnett, 'Security communities in theoretical perspectives', p. 7. 
61 See Alex J. Bellamy's description of the Adler-Barnett approach in his, 'Security Communities and 
Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?' (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2004), pp. 8-9. 
62 Adler and Barnett, 'Security communities in theoretical perspectives', p. 7 and Bellamy, Security 
Communities and Their Neighbours', p. 8. 
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community members 'project themselves beyond the border of community or do they 
provoke a withdrawal from engagements with outsiders?' 63 Deutsch, for example, 
would argue that political communities can integrate in ways to underwrite enduring 
patterns of peace and other schools of thought such as those adhering to the 'democratic 
peace thesis' would note that those embracing similar norms of democratisation 
normally do not engage in conflict.64 A critique of this view, however, would note that 
security communities could view those not adhering to the same norms or ideals would 
view 'outsiders' as threatening and thus generate a security dilemma with those not 
sharing them.65 Amitav Acharya observes that security communities are too often 
perceived as a positive and inevitable end-game, with 'socialisation and institution-
building as linear processes'. He argues that a security community could disintegrate in 
response to various internal and external circumstances - 'a sociological rather than 
power-based' explanation for unravelling. Understanding how security communities 
may implode, Acharya concludes, is a 'necessary and important complement to 
explanations of how they come about in the first place.' 66 
More recent theoretical examination of security community building has 
therefore challenged the realist and neoliberalist ethos that anarchy and competition 
prevails in international relations (Institutionalists maintain competition can be 
overcome by the introduction of organizational mechanisms designed to induce 
cooperation but these are not inherent). The new security community advocates, found 
largely within the constructivist school of thought, conversely focus 'on shared 
knowledge, ideational forces' and a 'dense normative environment', whereas realists 
focus on material forces, the notion of power and a very thin conception of international 
society to understand interstate outcomes.67 This raises the possibility that reliable 
expectations can be cultivated for peaceful relations, overcoming existing regional 
63 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours, p. 10. 
64 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994) and Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder, 'Democratic Transitions, 
Institutional Strength, and War', International Organization 56, 2, 2002, pp. 297-337. 
65 Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours, pp. 10-13. 
66 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community p. 36. 
67 Adler and Barnett, 'Security communities in theoretical perspectives', p. 8. 
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security dilemmas rather than accepting conflict (as do realist and neorealists) as a 
permanent feature of international relations. 68 
In ASEAN it is argued that a security dilemma is defined without a strong level 
of accumulation and competition in military capabilities. In fact, the security dilemma 
that may exist in Southeast Asia arises from uncertainty and suspicions among the 
members which still linger from colonial times. The security community perspective not 
only challenges the assumptions of realism, neorealism and neoliberalism in this 
context. It goes well beyond the intellectual parameters established by the neorealist-
neoliberalist divide. The constructivist school of thought applies a broader approach to 
security community building by attempting to demonstrate how ideational factors such 
as mutual identification can determine whether states pursue either relative or absolute 
gains in their cooperative relations. The 'we feeling' and sense of community identity is 
claimed by constructivists to entail the more comprehensive dimensions of relations 
between different types of actors, however, rather than merely delving into state-centric 
material, power and interest-based explanations. In 'real world' terms, it cannot be 
denied that the success of European Union has been supported by the United States 
which does not see the development of European unity as a relative gain at the expense 
of itself. A similar 'we feeling' between the US and ASEAN, however, has yet to 
emerge in the same way. 
Security community advocates acknowledge that neoliberalist explanations of 
regional security cooperation are more compatible with the security community 
perspective than the realist perspective that views organizational behaviour as merely 
states seeking relative gains or advantages over other affiliates by means other than 
classical power balancing and largely rejects the prospect for transition from a 
competitive and state-centric world to a more cooperative one underwritten by 
supranational institutions. Yuen Foong Khong criticises Michael Leifer's portrait of a 
Southeast Asia devoid of regional order as 'underdeveloped and methodologically 
imprecise, for example, allowing the analyst to see disorder in every minor perturbation 
in the region' .69 Instead, Khong, like other constructivists propose to replace 'regional 
order' with 'peace and stability', as the preferred discourse for ASEAN's policy elites. 
Khong anticipates that long-term regional stability will allow ASEAN the time to 
68 Alan Collins, 'Forming a security community: lessons from ASEAN', International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific 7, 2, 2007, p. 205. 
69 Yuen Foong Khong, 'The elusiveness ofregional order: Leifer, the English school and Southeast Asia', 
The Pacific Review 18, 1, 2000, p. 25. 
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develop more robust institutional mechanisms needed to instil a sense of mutual identity 
among ASEAN member-states within an institutional context. 
However, there are differences, between classical neoliberalists and those 
constructivists that designate identity as important to understanding security 
communities. While the neoliberalist view emphasises the advantages of 
institutionalisation, integration, peace-building and the need for states to delegate their 
authority to the supra-government institutions70 , constructivists do not necessarily view 
overcoming the sovereign division between the member-states as a mandatory pre-
condition for security community-building. They do anticipate that states can manage 
intra-mural conflicts without resort to force, however, if sufficient intersubjective 
understanding is attained between them about each others' interests and objectives. 
Despite its optimistic insights, the constructivist perspective still lacks 
significant coherent evidence if applied to Southeast Asian security politics. The main 
constructivist argument centering around the 'we feeling' and common identity often 
seems to be contradictory to the logic of how the 'ASEAN Way' actually operates. The 
'ASEAN Way' has been represented by constructivists as a badge of common identity 
among ASEAN state-members. In fact, the notion of common values as integral to 
security-community building is contestable. Bill Mc Sweeney for example, challenges 
the constructivist claim that identity is not necessarily representative of "we are who we 
are" but it rather "we are what we want to be".71 The constructivists' main idea of 
referring to norms and common identity is problematic, he notes, when applied to a 
group of states (such as those in ASEAN) that reflect great cultural and economic 
diversity but who rely largely on relations with countries external to their own region 
for much of their trade and security guarantees. Constructivist claims about the 
importance of norms and identity in the ASEAN case, are problematic insofar as "it has 
not been the core component of that organisation's security outlook and postures that 
ardent constructivists insist is the case."72 The majority of ASEAN member-states have 
preferred to continue relying on traditional bilateral relations with external major 
powers as the main guarantee for their security. They have also developed multilateral 
security relations as a strategy aimed at preventing the involvement of the major power 
70 Wah, 'ASEAN: consolidation and institutional change', pp.427-435; Ruland, 'ASEAN and the Asian 
crisis' pp.423-443; Jones and Smith, 'Making Process, not Progress', pp. 165-169. 
71 Bill Mc Sweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', Review of international 
Studies 22, 1, 1996, p. 89. 
72 William T Tow, 'Alternative Security Models: Implications for ASEAN', in Andrew T. H. Tan, J.D. 
Kenneth Boutin (ed.) Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defense 
and Strategic Studies, 2001 ), p. 262. 
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in regional security. It is therefore necessary to turn to alternative explanations in order 
to fully account for ASEAN security- community building. 
One such approach is the so-called 'new regionalism'. This concept has been 
developed, among others, by Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble and is defined as a 
"state-led or states-led project designed to reorganize a particular regional space along 
defined economic and political lines."73 Such a project is constructed (or 
'reconstructed') by collective human action. It assumes that the world's regions can 
develop more cohesive and autonomous identities within their own parameters. It also 
recognises that the forces of globalisation impose exogenous or outside pressures on 
how the entity of 'region' develops over time. Other theorists have identified specific 
sub-components of this process: regionalisation or informal integration; identity; inter-
state cooperation; state-led integration and cohesion.74 A practical example of how the 
'new regionalism' school's of thought's thinking can be applied to the ASEAN case is 
that endogenous factors such as the rise of terrorism in ASEAN societies driven by 
poverty, social marginalisation or domestic political power plays can combine with 
exogenous factors such as intensified U.S. or the United Nations (UN) pressure directed 
toward the ASEAN states to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts in the Southeast Asia. 
Such conceptual integration enriches our overall understanding of that region's security 
dynamics. 
In fact, exogenous factors are not as important as the new regionalism school 
believes. Not only have ASEAN members often ignored pressure to follow the US or 
UN 'guidance', but their individual views of US interference in their domestic security 
approaches to counter terrorism is also divergent from the assumptions of new 
regionalism that presuppose outside forces, have substantial impact on individual 
ASEAN states' foreign policy formulation. 
Furthermore, recent critiques of the 'new regionalism' approach contend that 
differences between the 'old' regionalism spearheaded by liberal-institutionalists and 
underscoring the processes of regional integration and 'new' regionalism are ambiguous 
and often exaggerated. They assert that international relations must now move beyond 
both the old and new regionalism approaches because both tend to be too 'Eurocentric' 
73 Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble. 'Introduction: the Political Economy and World Order, in 
Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds) Regionalism and World order (Basingstoke, England: 
Macmillan, 1996), p. 2 
74Andrew Hurrel, 'Regionalism in theoretical perspective', in Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell (eds) 
Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 39 
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and therefore insufficiently sensitive to the unique identities and complexities of other 
(especially developing) regions.75 Taking this cautionary note seriously, this study will 
nevertheless assess new regionalism's applicability to ASEAN at appropriate intervals. 
To analyse security community evolution in the Southeast Asia, this study 
further interrogates the process by selectively drawing on the reflectivist perspective. 
One way to interpret this particular approach is to focus on the concern with 'the way 
things were' .76 ASEAN should be interrogated closely to what has really happened and 
what actually 'mattered' in its institutional development. This analysis is largely 
undertaken in Chapter Three. The purpose here is not to reject 'all the truth' that 
rationalist and constructivist lines of thought might raise. Instead, reflectivist judgment 
will be used to develop some inherently critical questions that have not been answered 
satisfactory by rationalists (realist/institutionalist factions) and constructivists in order to 
identify and to explain ASEAN security community building. Again, while emerging as 
predominant in the next chapter, this approach will be applied selectively at appropriate 
junctures throughout the study. 
The Relevance of the Security Community Idea: A Critique 
The security community idea is useful to conceptualise an 'alternative 
cooperation' to the realist explanations for balancing. However, it still lacks a 
sufficiently precise conceptual framework and remains limited in its explanation of how 
'community' is actually attained. A major problem with this concept is the absence of a 
commonly accepted definition of what actually constitutes a security community. Karl 
Deutsch argues that a security community among the states can be achieved whenever 
those states are able to avoid war and maintain peaceful relations between themselves. 
The focus of Deutsch's theory is avoidance of protracted conflict through more distinct 
integration. 
The problem with this argument is that the understanding of 'conflict avoidance' 
m Deutsch's perception is very narrow. First his idea only mentions avoiding war 
between the member-states. In fact, war among groups of states today is rare and 
decreasing in significance. According to one account only six out of 103 armed conflicts 
75 Bjorn Hettne, 'Beyond the New Regionalism', New Political Economy 10, 4, 2005: pp. 544-571. 
76 Steve Smith, 'Reflectivist and constructivist approaches to international theory', in John Baylis and 
Steve Smith (eds) The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 229. 
31 
in the period 1989-97 were interstate conflicts. 77 Domestic conflicts have always take 
place in Southeast Asian security politics and so is the same today. Armed conflict has 
also occurred among ethnic and religious groups within the states. Moreover, 
contemporary international and regional insecurity have been much affected by conflict 
between states or group of states vis-a-vis non-state actors. Threats from trade in illicit 
drugs, illegal migrants, environmental issues, terrorist threats, and other transnational 
sources require closer cooperation between states in order to address them. Several case 
studies presented in a volume edited by Tan and Boutin have demonstrated these 
transnational issues range from environment to human rights. 78 Similarly, Alan Dupont 
has highlighted how new security issues such as environmental degradation, 
unregulated population movement, transnational crime, and AIDS are already having a 
significant impact on the security of the Asia-Pacific region. 79 These transnational 
challenges to state power are highly diffuse and complex: 
With rare exceptions, the criminal threat to the state emanates from non-
state actors rather than from other states; environmental scarcity reduces 
the capacity of the state to protect and provide for its citizens; and conflict 
generated by transnational forces may be played out within states as well 
as between them. Moreover, the transnational challenge to security extends 
beyond the boundaries of the state to encompass broader issues of survival 
and resource scarcity that affect people irrespective of national borders. 80 
Thus, transnational challenges are likely to become more prominent causes of 
conflict and insecurity among people and states. They are unlikely to be resolved by 
military force or ameliorated by traditional security approaches. States would not be 
pursued to integrate their security policies if they cannot resolve these problems 
significantly and comprehensively both nationally and multilaterally. 
In the case of Southeast Asia, transnational issues may indeed create significant 
potential to spark conflict between states. However, the nature and intensity of the 
conflict would be different from the traditional concept of war as it is understood in 
international relations, in which 'war' is a state-centric enterprise of high intensity. It 
may instead evolve around the erecting of barriers against forced people movements or 
77 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflict 1989-98', Journal of Peace Research 
36,5, 1999,pp.593-606. 
78 Andrew Tan and J. D. Kenneth Boudin, Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia (Singapore: 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001 ). 
79 Alan Dupont, Transnational Security Issues and Preventive Diplomacy in Pacific Asia, The CICP 
Distinguished Lecture Series Report, Issue No. 18 (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation 
and Peace, 1999). Alan Dupont, East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
80 Tan and Boudin, Non-Traditional Security Issues, p. 32. 
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prohibiting citizens from countries experiencing a pandemic from entering one's own 
territory. Nor does the traditional notion of a security community cover the very basic 
problems of insecurity within developing countries such as ASEAN states. However, 
without the necessary cooperation between states, neighbours may be unable to resolve 
their various domestic or intra-state conflicts and have few guarantees that preclude 
those problems from 'spilling over' into the inter-state arena existed. 
Secondly, Deutsch's notion of war avoidance is an anticipated outcome of 
regional integration. The significance of interaction between regionally proximate states 
is that it creates an interdependence that fosters a level of intersubjective understanding, 
the chief benefit of which is a reduction in mistrust making the avoidance of war more 
likely. In fact, avoiding war can be achieved without significant institutionalisation or 
integration as demonstrated by both ASEAN in Southeast Asia and Mercosur in South 
America. 81 While traditionalists would not see these cases as security communities, the 
constructivist ideas of Adler and Barnett especially those concerning integration via a 
common identity or understanding allows for a broader interpretation of the security 
community concept to be applied. 82 
Proponents of security community theory claim that achieving integration via 
the idea of 'we feeling' and consensual norms comprise the key variable that in tum 
provides explanation as to how these groups of countries can avoid war.83 However, this 
interpretation is not without problems, especially since there is little clarity as to what 
exactly constitutes 'we feeling' and requisite consensual norms. Do they relate to a 
similarity of purpose in the conduct of foreign policy, the recognition of common 
threats and common interests, the idea of belonging to a certain geographical location or 
having similarity of political, social, or cultural identities? If these are valid criteria to 
what extent do they need to be realised to qualify as a 'we feeling'? Is 'we feeling' 
something that represents temporary or permanent change? Should a definition of 'we' 
or 'us' mean different things to 'them' when referring to states outside the members of 
the security community? These questions pose a challenge to theorists who are 
proponents of the security community idea, particularly in Southeast Asian countries 
where the notion of the 'ASEAN Way' has been seen as an integral and 'unique' part of 
81 The Common Market of Southern Cone (Mercosur) members include: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay 
82 Adler and Barnett, 'Security communities in theoretical perspectives', p. 3-16 
83 Ibid. pp. 4 -7. 
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ASEAN's identity (although, as noted earlier m this chapter, the ASEAN Way's 
uniqueness is a contested concept as well). 
There is still ongoing debate as to whether the 'ASEAN Way' is an 'identity' 
which means something that is inherent or 'given' in the relationships among the 
member-states. For example, it is possible that the idea of identity has been adopted by 
the members-states to accommodate the interests which are too diverse and different to 
be reconciled without immense effort and perhaps much good fortune. Another problem 
with the arguments of' ASEAN Way' proponents is they only contain weak empirical 
evidence to demonstrate when states implement or do not implement the traditional state 
sovereignty or non-interference norm. The proponents of the 'ASEAN Way' are also 
only able to present frail evidence of the use of the concepts of non-interference or 
sovereignty. By assuming non interference in ASEAN as solidly envisioned or 
constructed, they deny the divisibility of the practice of sovereignty in Southeast Asia. 
The progress of regionalism among ASEAN countries means changes in the 
indivisibility of state sovereignty. 
Considered development of notions related to collective identity and shared 
identity can actually reshape the notion of state sovereignty. It is clear that scholars 
entertain varying perspectives on how processes of interdependence and transnational 
relations affect sovereign prerogatives. It may also be that the constructivist argument 
that the 'ASEAN Way' explains the 'uniqueness' of ASEAN is less significant than is 
accounting for why member states behave in accordance with the 'ASEAN Way'. 
Moreover, the 'ASEAN Way', although helpful in accommodating the difficulties faced 
by member-states with dissimilar goals, has made the development of a Southeast Asia 
security community more challenging due to the subtleties that must be addressed 
within that construct. ASEAN member-states apply musyawarah (deliberation) and 
mufakat (consensus), to manufacture agreements and loosely binding commitments in 
order to be able to implement policy. Informality, however, means that it is often 
difficult to predict the result because commitments are not binding. This uncertainty of 
outcome is particularly the case with the kind of non-traditional and transnational 
security issues that have predominated within ASEAN and that require closer 
cooperation and overlapping authority to resolve. 84 
The role of actors both (state-centric and non state-centric) in achieving the goal 
of perpetual peace and avoiding war are significant indicators of the existence of a 
84 Tan and Boudin, Non-Traditional Security Issues, p. 8; Dupont, East Asia Imperilled, p. 5. 
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security community. According to the 'European model' of integration, regional 
institutions should be strong enough to be able to operate and coordinate trans-regional 
interaction. These institutions also should be able to represent the security community 
on behalf of the members' interests vis-a-vis external states. Similarly, people-to-people 
interaction should also be strong. If there is a distinct interaction between populations, 
then states will be reluctant to declare war. In fact, however, states still occupy the most 
significant place in the hierarchy that controls the decisions about war and peace. The 
UN cannot impose force unless its Security Council - comprised of state actors -
authorises it. In developing regions, as well, the state is the only actor with a decision-
making role in this area of policy. The phenomenon of conflict avoidance in Southeast 
Asian countries has been advanced by intensified government-to-government relations, 
not through the interaction of populations or the role of regional institutions. 
Another key ambiguity of security community theory pertains to levels of 
interdependence or integration relative to a specific degree of member-state sovereignty. 
Logically, for a security community to develop, 'loyalty beyond the nation state' 
becomes increasingly significant.85 The centrality of the state is downplayed in favour of 
creating integration between the member countries of a security community. In order to 
create such political integration, the national interest 'will be redefined in terms of a 
regional [rather] than a purely national orientation' .86 Adler and Barnett also mention 
the need for 'policy coordination', 'internationalisation of authority', and 
'multiperspectival polity' which are all preconditions for the pooling or sharing of 
sovereignty.87 However, security community theorists have not really pinpointed how 
much states need to share or modify their sovereignty in order to create a common or 
shared security objective. This is a critical factor in the ASEAN institutional story. 
The typology for a security community which has been developed by Adler and 
Barnett therefore needs to be re-examined and refined. The main problem with their 
categorisation is whether the typology of a 'nascent security community' can be 
classified as a security community at all. In their elaboration of nascent security 
community, Adler and Barnett explicitly assert that relations are relatively limited 
among the governments which 'do not explicitly seek to create a security community', 
85 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Political, Social and Economical Forces (London: Steven & 
Sons Limited, 1958), p. 13. 
86 Ibid 
87 Adler and Barnett, 'Security communities in theoretical perspectives', p. 57. 
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and still in the context of low level interaction and cooperation. 88 This constructivist 
elaboration of a nascent security community is not too different from those 
understandings shaping mutual interests between states that are primarily addressed by 
the realist perspective. It is true that a 'mature' security community can be differentiated 
from other types of security community because of the high levels of integration and 
community identity. There is no significant difference, however, between a nascent 
security community and other types of diplomatic relationships. 
In ASEAN these diplomatic relationships have been fundamental and have been 
built on bilateral ties, not regional institutions. Therefore, the claim that ASEAN is a 
burgeoning security community because it satisfies some criteria ascribed to a nascent 
security community requires elaboration and clarification. Consensus is an important 
decision-making procedure in ASEAN. In fact, however, if multilateral consensus is 
included as a prerequisite for a 'mature' security community, ASEAN often fails the test 
because the 'ASEAN Way' encourages delaying decisions or hiding differences 
between member-states, rather than confronting and resolving them. Similarly, security 
community proponents are unable to explain under what conditions security 
community-building might break down or weaken relative to a particular threat. 
Case Study Selection 
The central research question of the thesis will be examined through the 
application of two case studies. These are: (1) the development of an ASEAN counter 
terrorism strategy; (2) cooperative measures to secure the Malacca Strait. The case of 
the institutionalisation of a formally declared ASEAN Security Community which 
ASEAN currently developed will also be highlighted in this study's concluding chapter. 
By employing these two broad case studies and a brief assessment of community-
building progress in the conclusion, this thesis will identify and assess linkages between 
sovereignty and pluralistic security community building to better understand how key 
ASEAN states have interacted to either facilitate higher levels of regional security 
cooperation in an institutional context or to impede such cooperation. As noted above, 
this thesis intends to apply an appropriate combination of the realist, liberalist and 
constructivist approaches (with some attention also directed toward the 'new 
regionalism' approach) to illuminate the security community building process in 
Southeast Asia. It will incorporate and assess selected historical and geopolitical factors 
88 Ibid p. 50. 
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within the case study framework. How key domestic security priorities can be 
incorporated into regional community-building will also be examined when relevant. 
For several reasons, the two major case studies focus on ASEAN's five founding 
countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippine, and Thailand. These states have 
relatively more influence within that organisation than more recent members. In 
particular, these countries' experiences seem highly relevant to the case studies and 
security community-building processed cited above. For example, the Malacca Straits 
case initially involves three countries, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and recently 
includes Thailand. This case study is typical of ASEAN conflict management because it 
includes only the contending parties and has never been considered at the regional or 
ASEAN-wide level. Similarly, the issue of terrorism has generated more concern as 
well as security cooperation between these five countries compared to the rest of the 
ASEAN member-states. The Security Community declaration is a less issue-specific 
case than the other two cases. In reality, however, ASEAN's five founding states have 
been more active and influential in shaping the idea of security community as well as 
the development of regionalism in ASEAN. A Security Community was proposed by 
Indonesia and the discourse on the development of an ASEAN Security Community has 
usually been circulated between the organisation's five founding members before being 
disseminated to other member-states. Therefore, by concentrating on these specific 
sovereignties, this thesis aims to gain relevance in its investigation of how Southeast 
Asian countries are pursuing the idea of security community. 
The primary case studies of the thesis are also predicated on several additional 
criteria. First, they highlight the interactions of five original ASEAN member-states 
who have harboured similar security concerns since ASEAN was created in 1967. These 
states have also addressed such concerns in increasingly different ways. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore and Thailand all share apprehensions over 
domestic stability as it has become tested by the issues of terrorism, security of adjacent 
seas and the proliferation of alternative or non-traditional security issues such as forced 
people movements, intensifying drug trafficking, pandemics and environmental issues. 
However, Indonesia and Malaysia have all insisted that domestic elite decision-making 
must be prioritised in their policy formulation for responding to such issues. By 
contrast, the Philippines and Thailand have recently, along with Singapore, favoured 
increased external (and more specifically, US) strategic intervention in ASEAN security 
affairs. It will be important to examine how those countries articulate their policies as 
well as the process by which they reach accommodation as this will facilitate a more 
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general understanding of ASEAN security dynamics. Focusing this study on Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines Singapore and Thailand should yield discernible and concrete 
patterns of collective identity and security politics in Southeast Asia by tracing their 
policy objectives and behaviour over nearly four decades. 
The second criterion for the case study selection is informed by a pattern of 
strengthened regional security cooperation between the five ASEAN states relative to 
their traditional adherence to sovereign prerogatives. In each instance, the five states 
have been willing to modify or transfer some of those prerogatives to a regional level of 
security interaction at different intervals. This study will investigate these transitional 
episodes with the intent of examining how much of an evolution and intensification of 
common regional values and identities occurred. 
Third, the case studies contain elements of both traditional and non-traditional 
security politics. This allows for the application of realist, liberal-institutionalist and 
constructivist analysis; cross-comparing and synthesising these approaches. It also will 
allow the bridging of current ambiguities in Southeast Asia's ongoing security politics 
with policy of the five member-states under review. This embodies questions about the 
timing, typology and identity of security community development. 
Ideally, tracing the interaction in the case studies selected should provide an 
explanation for interaction between national security interests and security community 
building. It should also yield some answers at least two key areas of enquiry: 
• A judgment as to whether ASEAN qualifies as a security community by 
ascertaining what degree of collective cooperation has been attained relative 
to the preservation of sovereign prerogatives; and 
• An understanding of ASEAN's collective identity: relative to whether or not 
it is sufficiently prevalent to conform to the security community model. 
Addressing these two aspects in particular should enhance our understanding 
about the role of sovereignty in Southeast Asia and the types of cooperation that 
ASEAN states may undertake as security community aspirants. 
Methodology I Analytical Framework 
The thesis examines and measures the questions raised earlier in this chapter by 
applying the method of process-tracing. This methodology traces the links between 
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possible causes and observed outcomes.89 Process tracing exammes the evidence or 
chain of events by which the specific key factors contribute to the outcomes of the cases 
under review.90 The identification of 'common variables' is undertaken and a 
subsequent examination of those variables in controlling or incidental factors in each 
case is then conducted. Patterns of significant similarity can be identified by cross-
comparing the relative impact of those variables on outcomes identified in each case to 
measure their relative significance in qualitative terms. 
The methodology employs histories, archival documents, interview transcripts 
and other sources to see whether the causal process or theory hypotheses implied in a 
particular case is, in fact, evident in the sequence of intervening variables relevant to 
that case. A range of methods have been used to gather data. In both major cases 
studies, research was undertaken via interviews and the collection of primary source 
document materials. This included discussions with the people who are involved in 
combating terrorism and securing the Malacca Straits. The range of interviewees 
included, police, naval and foreign ministry officials and their equivalents in other 
sector specific agencies. In addition, a wide range of secondary sources were surveyed, 
including local, regional, and international accounts of ASEAN's efforts to create a 
security community, to secure the Malacca Straits and to conduct counter terrorism. In 
addition, seminars were conducted with local and regional analysts to obtain further 
relevant information to the case studies under examination. It should be noted that an 
Indonesian point of view is often strongly reflected in the primary evidence collected 
for this thesis because of the greater accessibility to that country's policy-makers and 
analysts afforded to this study's author (who is a native Bahasa Indonesia speaker). 
Wherever possible, however, this factor has been counterbalanced by presenting the 
views of other ASEAN member-states as they have been developed through official 
policy statements and in-depth secondary source analysis. 
In the two primary case studies offered by this thesis, the methodology of 
process tracing will be employed to investigate whether the differences among national 
interests, identities and organisational inclinations among ASEAN member states are 
large and persistent or whether dynamics exist that lead to an institutional convergence 
towards community. Process tracing in this instance would ideally explain the sequence 
89 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), p. 6. 
90 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Comel University 
Press, 1997), p. 643. 
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of events leading to community building and the reasons for ASEAN countries either to 
safeguard or to relinquish their state sovereignty. The greater correlation between a case 
study outcome relative to those questions commonly applied and assessed in each study 
the more credible is the conclusion that a stronger security community evolution is 
indeed taking place in Southeast Asia. 
A bit more detailed explanation of process tracing as it applies to 'the ASEAN 
story' of security community building is warranted here. Any analysis incorporating this 
method must pay particular attention to the historical examination of institution 
building, regional order and norms, and empirical evidence of greater ASEAN 
propensity toward conflict resolution and conflict avoidance. The 'ASEAN Way' 
including sensitivity to non-interference with state sovereignty will be interrogated in 
conjunction with those processes of regional order-building. 
Developing case studies via process tracing has considerable advantages for an 
investigation of the complex phenomena of ASEAN regionalism. Process tracing as 
used in this thesis assists with understanding the nature of the relationship or 
cooperation among ASEAN countries in the case studies assessed. In particular, it will 
facilitate answering the following questions: How do ASEAN states create collective 
security outcomes? Are they relinquishing their sovereign prerogatives or are they 
merely interacting without renouncing sovereignty? 
Process-tracing is used in this thesis - particularly in chapters Four and Five - in 
an effort to identify the causal evidence or process - the causal chain and causal 
mechanism - by which the key variables contribute to the outcomes of the cases under 
review.91 One of the benefits of using process tracing is to help clarify the mechanisms 
and to trace the process in a theoretically informed way.92 Employing a process-tracing 
approach permits the use of qualitative studies for the cases assessed here, explaining 
the causal evidence, processes, and mechanisms leading to the cooperation in combating 
terrorism, securing the Malacca Straits and declaring a security community. 
The decision to use this approach is based on a premise made by Checkel: 
initially, this method can minimise the problems of the so- called 'first-mover 
advantage' and encourage the researcher to consider alternative explanations, 
subsequently it helps to promote 'bridge building', by finding distinctions and 
connections between alternative theoretical schools.93 Process tracing can thus help 
91 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, p. 64. 
92 Jeffrey Checkel, 'Tracing Casual Mechanisms', International Studies Review 8, 2, 2006, p. 366. 
93 Ibid. p. 367. 
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determine whether convergence in the issue of national interests, identities and 
organisational inclinations among ASEAN member states has already existed 
substantially or whether divergence in these issues are more prevalent. The investigation 
of intra-ASEAN policy convergence and divergence through process tracing will 
hopefully yield an explanation about the level of identity and 'we ness' or commonality 
in regional security and institutional building. It will also identify how and why 
individual ASEAN member-state policy makers privilege sovereignty in their foreign 
policy decision making and the implications of them doing so. It builds on previous 
attempts to understand the role of state sovereignty in the building of a security 
community. 
It is expected that the greater the correlation between a case study outcome 
(relative to those questions which will be applied and assessed across the two major 
case studies) the more credible will be a conclusion that a tangible security community 
evolution is taking place in Southeast Asia. If so, this examination should contribute to 
measuring the usefulness of applying various theoretical perspectives in the debate over 
ASEAN' s development as a security community; i.e. which perspectives among the 
realist, liberalist, rationalist or constructivist ideas are most effective in analyzing the 
case studies under review. The end result of this approach will hopefully be to gain a 
better understanding about ASEAN state sovereignty and how it operates in building 
security community. 
Despite these attempts to employ process tracing methodology, there are some 
potential methodological limitations that relate to its use. To discuss comprehensively 
all the problems identified in case-study analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, two main issues need to be discussed. As already noted, the concepts of 
sovereignty and a security community are difficult to define and measure with any great 
precision. A similar problem exists with using independent variables such as levels of 
institutionalisation, identity, perception of threat and national interest. One solution to 
this problem is to investigate the responses of individual states and regional policies to 
see whether these variables are meaningful in terms of either collective action or the 
existence of cross authority among the ASEAN member-states. The result of such an 
investigation would facilitate an explanation of how deep (or weak) the efforts to build 
collective solutions to security issues are within ASEAN. 
Another issue related to the use of process tracing is the issue of maintaining the 
consistency and currency of the data used in the thesis. In part, the effectiveness of 
process tracing rests on its claims of employing 'historical research'. However, the 
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cases under consideration in the thesis might not be seen as providing the depth and 
type of evidence that is conventionally understood as 'historical data'. In fact, the case 
studies, including the formalisation of a security community in ASEAN are relatively 
contemporary and were still developing and changing throughout the writing of these 
chapters. However, process tracing should not be regarded as only examining the events 
of the distant past. Indeed, issues such as combating terrorism in Southeast Asia and the 
security of the Malacca Strait are not really new problems and both problems have been 
ongoing for some period of time. In order to retain its currency with these issues, the 
thesis has been updated whenever these have been significant developments that have 
required some revision of the arguments presented. In this way it has also attempted to 
retain the originality of the study's perspective.94 
Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter One develops the theoretical 
context which informs this study's approach to the understanding of security 
community politics in greater depth and particularly as that concept relates to ASEAN. 
Chapter Two will elaborate upon the degree and impact of endogenous and exogenous 
factors to the building of security community. The chapter is specifically concerned 
with addressing the problematic issues of state sovereignty and non-interference in the 
development of security community and understanding how ASEAN member-states 
reconcile their tendencies to preserve their sovereign prerogatives within the overall 
process of security community-building. An ecumenical approach to 'regional security' 
will be adopted to analyse how and why distinct mechanisms for security community-
building have been constructed within the ASEAN framework. Such an approach can 
provide useful insights to understanding the policy calculations and regional style 
underwriting ASEAN states' and policy elites' security outlooks and collaboration. 
Chapter Three traces ASEAN' s regional security cooperation by providing a 
historical account of its development as a regional organisation. It will discuss how key 
ASEAN member-states have managed to gradually reconcile their state security 
interests in ways that are less threatening to each other. Accordingly, it will investigate 
94 Originally, the data planned for use in this thesis was to be derived from fieldwork. However, the 
primary limitations in collecting this type of data were time and cost. An attempt to collect large 
amounts of such material was simply not time or cost effective. In addition, much of the data required 
was unavailable because it would have been classified due to the sensitivity of the issues it deals with. 
Therefore, this study has had to rely on secondary sources to develop the two main case studies. To 
compensate for these difficulties, events and arguments have been documented as extensively as 
possible, relying on multiple secondary sources, including the most widely accepted data from 
newspapers, seminars and electronic data 
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the processes of norm identification and norm adherence. The 'ASEAN-Way' will be 
assigned special weight within this discussion. ASEAN has generally been seen as an 
organisation that has been increasingly successful in reconciling endogenous and 
exogenous security considerations.95 
Chapter Four assesses ASEAN's strategies, policies and coordination on 
counter-terrorism. It begins with an assessment of how recent terrorist threats to 
Southeast Asia have evolved. It then proceeds to explore how the ASEAN counter-
terrorism policies have developed since the definitive ASEAN Declaration on 
Transnational Crime (1997). The chapter will trace the influence of the exogenous 
factors (including the United States and other external counter-terrorism actors) in 
contributing to the process of 'securitising' the terrorism issue in the region. It then 
explains intra-ASEAN policies, strategies and levels of coordination on counter 
terrorism policy. Questions addressed in this chapter include: To what extent can 
sovereignty-sensitive ASEAN states cooperate in combating terrorism? To what extent 
has the impact of terrorism challenged regional norms embodied in the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC) such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in 
the internal affairs? Is the ASEAN principle of sovereign equality amenable to 
constructive change? Could ASEAN policies and actions against terrorism in Southeast 
Asia directly contribute to the development of security community building? 
Chapter Five presents a case study on ASEAN' s security politics directed 
toward the Strait of Malacca. The significance and potential for conflict in this littoral 
will be examined in light of future security community-building outlooks. The chapter 
will assess the level of cooperation between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia whose 
territories are all contiguous to the Strait and also outline the challenges to the 
development of these states increased strategic cooperation on this issue. Chapter Five 
will also consider questions such as: Will ASEAN by itself be capable of generating 
strong and effective security cooperation in the Strait of Malacca? What would be the 
precise nature of such cooperation? Is there strong evidence that they prefer to pool 
95 See Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, pp. 21-30: Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan 
'Betwixt Balance and Community: America, ASEAN, and the Security of Southeast Asia', International 
relations of the Asia-Pacific, 5, 1,2005, pp. 1-23; Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, 
pp. 3-7; Katsumata, 'Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms' pp. 108-111; Anthony, Regional Security in 
Southeast Asia, pp. 49-156; Alastair Ian Johnson, 'The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the 
Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum', in Helga Hafterdom, Robert 0. Keohane, Celeste A. 
Wallander (eds) Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Overtime and Space (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 287-324. 
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sovereign assets to secure this littoral? This chapter will address these questions in the 
context of this study's overall conceptual framework. 
Chapter Six concludes the study by summarising its findings and assessing its 
theoretical and policy implications particularly relating with process of ASEAN 
community-building. It addresses the ramifications of ongoing developments in 
ASEAN security cooperation by applying what 'lessons' may be derived from this 
study. It will also offer analysis on the future success of the security community-
building enterprise in Southeast Asia. Finally, this study will return to its original 
enquiries concerned with understanding overall security community-building theory and 
practices. In this context, it will consider why the 'ASEAN story' is importantly 
different from Europe and why that needs to be told. In doing so, it will help us assess 
the extent to which ASEAN remains a sovereign recalcitrant or a genuine security 
community architect. 
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Chapter Two 
Sovereignty in Regional Order-Building 
This chapter will analyse the relationship between the ideas of sovereignty and 
security community building in the pursuit of regional order. It will initially identify the 
characteristics of sovereignty relevant to this study. It will then examine the 
characteristics of sovereignty as it exists between ASEAN members. A second major 
part of the chapter will examine the tension between the exercise of national sovereignty 
by individual ASEAN member states and promoting security community building. 
Sovereignty: A Contested Concept 
Practitioners and academics in international relations have long debated whether 
the idea of sovereignty is 'divisible' or 'indivisible'. In this regard, it is useful to 
categorise at least four different views of sovereignty: the Traditional/Westphalian, the 
Realist/Neorealist, the Liberalist/Interdependence and Postmodernist. The traditional 
view of state sovereignty is that it is indivisible. Hans J. Morgenthau, the dean of 
modem realist thought, asserts that sovereignty cannot be 'shared' and cannot be 
subordinated to any higher supranational order: 
If sovereignty means supreme authority, it stands to reason that two or 
more entities - persons, group of persons, or agencies - cannot be 
sovereign within the same time and space. He who is supreme is by logical 
necessity superior to everybody else, he can have no superior above him or 
equals beside him. 1 
The traditional concept of sovereignty or Westphalian sovereignty is commonly 
related to the view that the authority of the state is supreme within its territorial 
boundaries and should also be legally immune from intervention by external forces. In 
this context John Ruggie asserts that sovereignty as traditionally been viewed as "the 
institutionalisation of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional 
domains."2 Janice E. Thomson insists that various actors within an international system 
recognize that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities 
1 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 
fourth edition, 1967), p. 312. 
2 John Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', in 
Robert 0. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 
143. 
within its physical territory.3 Central to these elements of the Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty is the preservation of territorial and political integrity. In such contexts, 
sovereignty underlines the exclusiveness of state power over its territory and the 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the state. 
Significant understanding of traditional state sovereignty is linked, moreover, to 
the perception of the nature of the state relationship within a system of sovereign states. 
This traditional view of state sovereignty adopted by the realist school of thought 
commonly accepts the world as an anarchical system. In this view, which is 
predominantly derived from Hobbes,4 the nature of the international system will 
naturally lead to the conflict and war. The absence of any ultimate power and authority 
over states provides no protection to the states and they are therefore structurally 
insecure. In order to survive in this environment where there is no higher structure of 
power and authority, states must inherently possess offensive military capability, which 
gives them "the where withal to hurt and possibly destroy each other". 5 A preoccupation 
with sovereignty is natural for states within such a system. The competitive nature of 
the system creates fear and generates conflict and states must make preparations for 
their survival. 
Understood m this way, the Westphalian system provides states with a 
mechanism that can support the existence of the state within the competitive 
international order. For fragile states, such as those within ASEAN, the adoption of 
traditional state sovereignty will assist their effort to survive in an anarchic world. Even 
though they are without power and material capacity to compete with larger states and 
have minimal desire to ally with external powers, the constructs of Westphalian 
sovereignty provide them with a means to contest physical attacks against their territory 
and to resist other forms of unwanted interference. The success of them doing so, 
however, is predicated on other more powerful states accepting this logic and on the UN 
endorsing it. 
3 Janice E. Thomson, 'State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and 
Empirical Research', International Studies Quarterly 39, Summer 1995, pp. 219-220. 
4 See Thomas Hobbes, 'Leviathan', chapter 13, in Chris Brown et. all. (eds.), 2005, p. 339: ... that during 
the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is 
called war; and such a war, as is of every man against every man (p. 337). And therefore, as long as this 
natural right of every man to everything he endures, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or 
wise so ever he be,), of living out the time, which nature ordinarily allows men to alive. And 
consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far 
as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he can not obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and 
advantages of war. Emphasis in the original. 
5 John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise oflnternational Institutions', International Security 9, 3, 1994, 
p. 9. 
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For many realists and neo-realists, however, the notion of sovereign states led by 
internal actors completely free from external influence is by and large an artificial 
construct. They believe that the idea of state sovereignty is pointless without the power 
to exercise it because states cannot always do as they please nor are they are invariably 
free of outside influences. "The sovereignty of states has never entailed their insulation 
from the effect of other states' actions."6 Sovereignty is dependent upon the capability 
of a state to exercise it. Robert Jackson differentiates the phenomenon of sovereignty 
between developed and developing states into 'negative sovereignty' (the passive 
freedom from outside interference) and 'positive sovereignty' (an active ability to act 
and collaborate domestically and internationally).7 
Some international relations analysts remain doubtful whether the process of 
interdependence really affects the divisibility of sovereignty. The idea of 'offensive 
realism' proposed by neo-realist John J. Mearsheimer insists that the important actors in 
the international system are sovereign states which do not recognize superior authority 
and merely seek as much power as they can acquire. 8 If interdependence is growing, he 
reasons, it is only a reflection of state power and interests. Any international economic 
system is predicated on the exercise of state power. Furthermore, realists assert, the 
Westphalian model is consistently violated: "rulers have issued invitations that 
compromise their autonomy by joining conventions or signing the contracts, and they 
have intervened in the internal affairs of other states through coercion and imposition".9 
According to realists, immunity from external interference is profoundly compromised 
by power differentials. For them it is clear that exercising sovereignty is dependent on 
the dimension of power. 
The neoliberal/interdependence approach to sovereignty is likewise predicated 
upon the state-centric paradigm. State sovereignty is consistently being modified by 
intensifying interdependence at various levels of state-to-state interaction. The 
autonomy of states has been reduced by factors of interdependence, including monetary 
6 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 96. 
7 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi -states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 26-31. 
8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 4-8. 
9 Stephen D Krasner, 'Sovereignty and Its Discontents', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) Sovereignty: 
Organised Hypocrisy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 27. Krasner actually 
distinguishes four uses of the notion of sovereignty: (1) 'interdependence sovereignty' is the ability of 
governments to control activities across borders and the level of effective control; (2) 'Domestic 
sovereignty' is the organisation of authority within a particular polity; (3) 'Westphalian sovereignty' 
refers to the exclusion of external authority; and (4) 'International legal sovereignty' refers to mutual 
state recognition (p. 35). Using this typology, this study focuses on primarily the Westphalian 
sovereignty dimension and to a lesser extent, on interdependence sovereignty. 
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and economic factors. 10 The benefits of inter-state communications and transactions, 
particularly those relating to increased trade and prosperity, clearly diminish the instinct 
of national elites to sustain autonomy or extreme self-reliance in their policy-making 
and deepens regional cooperation. 11 Expectation of diffuse reciprocity by the member-
states in multilateral arrangements has gradually superseded the immediate and short-
term calculation of state interest. 12 
Two significant approaches to describe how state sovereignty has been exercised 
m the integration or institutional process are the: 'functional', and the 
'intergovernmental/supra national' approaches. 13 In explaining a security community, 
functionalists describe it as being constructed piece by piece, or from the 'bottom up', 
through transnational organizations that emphasize the sharing of sovereignty instead of 
its surrender. Habits of cooperation learned in one technical area will, they assume, 
'spill over' into others - especially if the experience is mutually beneficial and 
demonstrates the potential advantages of cooperation in other areas. According to Leon 
N. Lindberg, 
... 'spill-over' refers to situation in which a given action, related to a 
specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured 
only by taking further actions, which in tum create a further condition and 
need for more action ... 14 
10 Robert 0 Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. 
(Canada: Little Brown, 1977), pp. 100-162. 
llWalter Mattli, 'Sovereignty Bargains in Regional Integration', International Studies Association, 
Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 2000, p.150. See Robert 0. Keohane 
'Reciprocity in international relations', International Organisation, 40, 1, 1986, p. 20. 
12 Diffuse reciprocity refers to situation in which equivalence is less strictly defined and one's partners in 
exchanges may be viewed as a group rather than as particular actors, see Robert 0. Keohane 
'Reciprocity in international relations', International Organisation, 40, 1, 1986, p. 20. Also see John 
Gerard Ruggie, 'Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution', International organization, 46, 3, 
1992, p. 571. 
13 I am borrowing and adopting the categories from Thomas Christiansen, 'European integration and 
regional cooperation', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (edsJ The Globalization of World Politics: an 
Introduction to International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 583-586 and Charles 
W Kegley and Eugene R.Wittkopf, World Politics: trend and transformation (Belmont, CA: 
Thomson/Wadsworth, 2004), p. 598. See also numerous articles comparing the strength, weakness of 
governmentalist and supra authority from classical such as David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to 
World Organization', International Affairs 24, 3, 1948, pp. 350-363; Ernst B Haas, The Uniting of 
Europe, Political, Social and Economical Forces (London: Steven & Sons Limited, 1958); Leon N 
Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1963) to Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis 'An Institutional Critique of 
Intergovernmentalism', International Organization 50, 2, 1996, pp. 269-299; Moravcsik, The Choice for 
Europe, (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press,. 1998); Oran R. Young, 'Regime Dynamics', 
International Organization 36, 2, 1989, pp. 277-298; Oran R Young 'The Politics oflnternational 
Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment', International Organization 43, 
3, Spring 1989, pp. 349-375. 
14 Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European, p. 10. 
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Karl Deutsch , however, has argued that in order for a security community to be 
successful, both the elites and people from different states should be able to 
communicate, respond and interact. 15 The community building model actually requires 
two processes in which the synergy of top down and bottom up process have to be 
realized. Deutsch's thoughts on integration deal with the creation of 'security 
communities' among peoples who may or may not be unified under a single 
government. 
The intergovernmental approach espouses that intergovernmental relations are 
predicated upon the 'bargaining' of state interests in a regional setting rather than a 
purely integrative process of tightening federation. Intergovernmental relations refers to 
mechanisms such as the European Commission, which help define and shape the 
interests of the European Union's (EU) state actors. The supra national approach 
regards the emergence of supranational institutions in Europe as a distinct feature to 
explain the security community condition and tum these into the main object of 
analysis. 
Variant approaches to the security community model have advanced the notion 
of a supra authority and non state actors which actually challenge state sovereignty. 
Here, politics above the level of states are regarded as the most significant, and 
consequently the political actors (institutions in the European example) are most 
relevant. For the proponents of security community theory, therefore, to create regional 
integration a multi-level integration process is needed to share various levels of state 
sovereignty. Regional security community building should be achieved by pooling part 
of state sovereignty, and creating an efficient coordinative body which is outside the 
direct control of states. In this situation, if states can not moderate their sovereignty by 
sharing, pooling or surrendering sovereignty, regional security community building, as 
the functionalists see it, could not be realised. 
Robert Keohane rejects ideas of a strictly supra authority approach in the process 
of integration in After Hegemony. He criticizes the attributing of state-centric 
cooperation strictly to 'building headquarters', 'imposing mandates', or 'centralising 
institutions': "Institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what governments 
pursue in their own interests through cooperation."16 This is because regimes provide 
information and reduce costs of transactions that are consistent with their injunctions. 
15 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 66. 
16Robert 0 Keohane, After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 246. 
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As Keohane observes, "To evaluate the regimes on the basis of whether they effectively 
centralize authority is misleading."17 
Perhaps a more nuanced understanding about how states should behave in 
accordance with the concerns of state sovereignty and collectivity is presented by 
Muthiah Alagappa who proposes adopting the notion of 'solidarist order' to explain 
alternative types of cooperation among states where "national goals and interest are not 
absent ... , but these are shaped by considerations of collective identity and shared 
identity."18 It is clear that Liberal scholars entertain varying perspectives on how 
processes of interdependence and transnational relations affect sovereign prerogatives. 
They still, however, highlight the sovereignty of the state. 
The constructivist approach to state sovereignty and collectivity in a Southeast 
Asian context has been led by Amitav Acharya. He has argued that because the ASEAN 
Way has not required 'legally binding principles or procedures' to be introduced into 
that sub-region's institution-building process, state identities and interests can be 
'constituted' rather than 'regulated' via formally or legally binding mechanisms. 19 This 
sets the constructivist argument apart from the realist approach that emphasises 
balancing against external powers rather than the socialising of ASEAN member-states 
into verifying their mutual geopolitical and economic identities as the major factor in 
striking an equilibrium between sovereign prerogatives and transnational relations. 
Writing about the ASEAN Regional Forum, Alistair Johnston has cited a 'third way' of 
how 'involvement in international institutions changes state behavior into more 
cooperative directions' .20 As other observers have subsequently observed, 'Johnston 
distinguishes the third way from behavioral change brought about through material 
incentives and threats (the first way), as well as through rearrangements in the 
distribution of power on the domestic level, leading to changes in state preferences (the 
second way)' .21 
17 Ibid. 
18 Muthiah Alagappa, 'Managing Asian Security: Competitive, Cooperation and Evolutionary Change', in 
Muthiah Alaggapa (ed.) Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford 
California: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 50-52. 
19 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community p. 22. 
20 Alistair Iain Johnston, 'Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International 
Relations Theory', in John G. Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno (eds) International Relations 
Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 107-162. 
21 Ryoma Sakaeda, 'Sovereignty and security realism in the Asia-Pacific: The case of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum'. Paper prepared for presentation to the 50th annual International Studies Association 
convention, February 18-19, 2009 and reprinted at the All Academic Incorporated website at 
<http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?click_key=l> Accessed 28 November 2009. 
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Yet the constructivist argument as it applies to ASEAN and its offshoots 
(primarily the ARF) is powerfully contested by the realist perspective that, ultimately, 
state survival and sovereignty 'matters the most' and certainly more than building a 
Southeast Asian community that cannot be strong enough to compete with the region's 
larger external powers (i.e. China, India and the United States) for normative or material 
supremacy. Until a recognizable and acceptable juncture is identified along the realist-
constructivist 'continuum' that is able to reconcile the ongoing debate between 
constructivists and realists over the role of sovereignty, the best that can be expected is 
that ' both narratives are legitimated' depending on which specific context the role of 
member-state sovereignty is assigned.22 
A dissenting category from which to define sovereignty is post modernism. In 
this approach, sovereignty rests upon intense cooperation between autonomous states. 
States tacitly bargain their sovereignty in the sense that they allow other states to 
influence the regulation of their domestic affairs in return for similar influence over the 
domestic affairs of these other countries. The post-Maastricht conceptual discourse has 
put forward alternative concepts such as 'post-sovereignty' or 'governance beyond the 
state', 'late sovereignty', 'open statehood' and 'sovereignty belonging to the Member 
States jointly through the intergovernmental conference. ' 23 Postmodernists argue that 
state actors are no longer the dominant actors in international affairs and that state 
sovereignty is obsolete. Growing interdependence through multiple channels of contact 
and communication over many issues, growing decentralisation through globalisation 
and localisation and, most importantly, empowerment of global nongovernmental 
organisation (NGOs) have all significantly changed the way sovereignty interest are 
managed across border. Along with this, the proliferation of transnational activities such 
as organised crime, drug trafficking, international terrorism, and computer hacking have 
posed new and difficult challenges to sovereign authorities. 
Despite these transnational threats, the rise of the postmodernist concept of 
sovereignty is conducive to peace and security, according to its advocates, because it 
can improve the chances for a regional order based on solidarity or a security 
community that can subjugate individual national interest and goals to a collective 
22 Ibid. p. 18. 
23 William Wallace, 'The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European paradox', Political Studies 47, 3, 1999, 
pp. 503-521; Neil Walker, Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), Tanja E Aalberts, 
'Sovereignty Reloaded? A Constructivist Perspective on European Research', Constitutionalism Web-
Papers, Con WEB No. 2, 2005. 
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identity and interests.24 Post-modernists further argue that states have moved beyond 
sovereignty and have reached a status of post-sovereignty. The European Union has 
been recognised as a major example of a post-sovereignty political community.25 For 
post modernists, state sovereignty is 'dead concept' that is no longer able to explain the 
relationship among the nations. Despite the view, and notwithstanding the 
implementation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), individual 
EU member-states reserve the prerogative to manage their own diplomacies, defence 
budgets and other sectors involving critical material resources. 
Sovereign Categories and the ASEAN Experience 
As these various perspectives demonstrate, the idea of sovereignty is very 
complex and there is hardly any consensus on what constitutes it: 'The actual content of 
sovereignty, the scope of the authority that states can exercise, has always been 
contested.' 26 The absolutist Westphalian system most familiar in the West does not 
apply everywhere. Globalisation, growing international interdependence and various 
effects of security cooperation among states has sometimes encouraged nations to 
reduce their exclusive control over aspects of their sovereignty. Shared interests and 
goals have also ensured that the exclusiveness of state interests does not always prevail. 
State sovereignty has been increasingly challenged by both voluntary initiatives such as 
when states become members of international or regional organisations and by coercive 
efforts such as humanitarian interventions imposed by the UN, the US or international 
community. 
Numerous agreements and negotiations among ASEAN members provide 
examples that demonstrate state sovereignty is not immune from a range of external 
influences. There have also been instances of ASEAN states supporting each other to 
solve their internal problems. For example, Indonesia since the 1970s has facilitated 
negotiations with Muslim rebels, playing a major part in the 1996 Peace Agreement 
between Manila and the main insurgent organisation, the Moro National Islamic Front. 
ASEAN was also involved in Cambodian affairs after Prime Minister Hun Sen's power 
24 This is coincides with Krassner notion of interdependent sovereignty cited in note 9; also Chung-in 
Moon and Chaesung Chun, 'Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian Concept and Implication for 
Regional Security', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Asian Security Order Instrumental and Normative 
Features (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p.110-111. 
25 Ole WIBver, 'Identity, Integration and Security. Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies', 
Journal of International Affairs 48, 2, 1995, p. 389. 
26 Krasner, 'Sovereignty and Its Discontents', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) Sovereignty: Organised 
Hypocrisy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 235. 
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grab in July 1997. The Asian Economic Crisis, the international military intervention in 
East Timor and the Southeast Asian haze problem, as well as membership in 
organisation such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) etc. all exemplify situations in which the traditional sovereignty of ASEAN 
states have not been immune to external influences. 
Indeed, the traditional realist view of sovereignty - in which the idea of power is 
central - is becoming less applicable to Southeast Asia. Vietnam, for example, was 
forced to withdraw its forces from Cambodia in 1978, permitting the restoration of 
Cambodian sovereignty. A SEAN has been successful in creating the A SEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF)- an extra-sovereign institution that has successfully presumed upon most 
regional powers (US is an exception) to accede to its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC), the symbolic brand of ASEAN member-states' collective sovereignty. Within 
ASEAN itself, a new member such as Myanmar, has been able to enforce the principle 
of non interference regarding domestic matters, notwithstanding immense international 
diplomatic pressure on other ASEAN states to change this posture. This situation 
indicates that within the ASEAN grouping 'sovereignty matters', but the degree to 
which it matters and how it is applied needs to be further explored. 
The idea of a post-Westphalian order is problematic in the case of ASEAN 
because ASEAN does not literally meet the criteria of the post Westphalian order.27 In 
this new order sovereignties, in the words of Henry Summer Maine, as a 'Bundle or 
collection of power" that can be separated from one another.28 Under these conditions a 
'state may continue to have international legal sovereignty, but the element of territorial 
control that defies Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty no longer applies. 29 
However, even the most successful example of the integration of state sovereignty in the 
world, the European Union, does not fulfil all the characteristics of a fully post-
Westphalian order. Indeed, the EU provides an example that demonstrates the 
complexity of sovereignty as it operates in the real world. For some EU member states 
27 Post W estphalian is commonly equated with emergence of distinctively European Community in which 
states shared their authority with regional or world authorities and with sub-state authorities." see 
Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, Ethical Foundations of the Post-
Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 194. Further explanation see James Caporaso, 
'Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty', Department of 
Political Science, University of Washington, International Studies Association (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2000), pp. 4-5 and Wallace, 'The Sharing of Sovereignty', pp. 503-513. 
28 Cited in Oliver Jutersonkel and Rolf Scwarz, 'Slicing up the cake: divisible sovereignty in the pre and 
post Westphalian order', p. 7, European Standing Group on International Relation (SGIR) Turin 
Conference 2007 <http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Scwarz-divsov _and_ wesphalian _ order.pdf> Accessed 
12 January 2009. 
29 Ibid. p. 10. 
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the integration process can be said to be interest driven, as in the case of new EU 
members from the former Eastern Bloc nations. Such states would not give up their 
authority if they did not see the value of EU membership in terms of generating 
additional security and economic benefits for themselves. European Community 
membership, with all of its compromises and special concessions, has in turn led to a 
more complex set of identities and loyalties within the EU framework.Jo 
In the current international environment, the global war on terror has been 
described as a great challenge to state sovereignty.J' However, Amitav Acharya has 
argued that the George W. Bush administration, in commanding a global war on terror 
exaggerated the challenges posed by terrorist organisations to W estphalian 
sovereignty.J2 Similarly, Robert Jackson argues that the West's response to the terrorist 
attacks had been conducted within the existing framework of sovereign security 
responsibilities.JJ This argument relates to the empirical evidence examined in this 
thesis. In fact, external pressure such as the US 'global war on terror' has not drastically 
changed the basic principle of state sovereignty as it operates in Southeast Asia security 
politics. The form of cooperation is still based on state interest rather than the genuine 
sharing of sovereign authority among ASEAN member-states. Thus to argue that the 
concept of state sovereignty has eroded misrepresents the true situation. 
As these examples indicate, the issue of state sovereignty is very complex and 
cannot be fully explained by the concepts and ideas proposed by those who posit 
various and specialised theories. Neither is it obvious that this issue will simply wither 
away. The Westphalian system, although challenged, has by no means yet been 
transcended in contemporary politics. In fact claims - even to old fashioned forms of 
state sovereignty - are defended or asserted more diversely, more frequently, more 
visibly and often with greater urgency than ever before. J4 On one hand, the idea of 
sovereignty is subject to growing challenges as an out-mode or inadequate way of 
making sense of emergent patterns of legal and political authority and imagining the 
future. At the same time, in both legal parlance and political application, sovereignty 
Jo George Sorensen, 'Sovereignty: 'Change and Continuity in Fundamental Institution', Political Studies, 
47,3, 1999,p.603 
JI Barack Mendelsohn, 'Sovereignty under attack: the international society meets the Al Qaeda network', 
Review of International Studies, 13, 2005, p. 45. 
J
2Amitav Acharya, 'State Sovereignty After 9/11: Disorganised Hypocrisy', Political Studies, 55, 2, 2007, 
p. 274. 
JJ Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty and Its Presuppositions: Before 9/11 and After', Political Studies, 55, 2, 
2007, p. 297. 
J
4 Neil Walker, Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), preface, vii. 
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remains a key operating principle in constitutional, international and supranational law. 
In this broad context, the concept of sovereignty itself is, therefore, open to a range of 
interpretations, including how sovereignty is constructed within a particular polity, by 
what methods and on whose behalf it is constructed. 
In light of these contending views of sovereignty it is important to understand 
how the concept applies in the case of Southeast Asia. These various explanations of 
sovereignty link to this study of ASEAN in several important ways. First, if sovereignty 
is not 'absolute' but is more divisible than indivisible then state sovereignty in ASEAN 
might also be expected to exhibit these characteristics. It is argued here that the 
traditional meaning of Westphalian state sovereignty does apply in ASEAN, but this is 
not the only characteristic of sovereignty to be found in Southeast Asia. Sovereignty in 
ASEAN also operates within the similar parameters as those described in the 
institutionalist or liberalist and intergovernmentalist perspectives. For example, the rigid 
and strong territorial claims on the South China between some ASEAN countries and 
China have been modified by the claimants agreeing to explore and share the resources 
in the area. ASEAN has developed economic integration in various sectors: custom, 
tourism, financial, transport, investment etc. The organisation has also developed 
functional cooperation across many fields: education, women, health, drug prevention, 
etc. 
As such, Westphalian and intergovernmental types of sovereignty are the most 
significant features of sovereignty as they consistently are applied by the ASEAN 
member states. Post-Westphalian sovereignty has not been clearly articulated by 
Southeast Asian nations, but, indeed, has been mostly rejected, as will be discussed 
below. Second, ASEAN member-states' traditional emphasis on sovereign prerogatives 
may have complicated the institution's role in regional security community-building, 
but it has not fatally compromised the process. This is because the member-states have 
increasingly recognised the value of developing means for maintaining control over 
sensitive sovereignty issues while simultaneously exploring ways to gradually transform 
their traditionally narrow national interests into more ecumenical approaches 
increasingly broaden reflecting region-centric concerns. Third, deepened regional 
cooperation among ASEAN countries can be developed because their varying national 
outlooks and identities can be 'conditioned' to constitute a more distinct collective 
identity. The problem that remains is how it will be possible for state sovereignty to 
change or moderate significantly enough to allow for building this identity. Can 
ASEAN states, given their political history and character, moderate their contending 
55 
concepts of sovereignty sufficiently to allow the development of a genuine security 
community in Southeast Asia? 
The Nature of Sovereignty among ASEAN Member-states 
Sovereignty has been represented as a key idea in the formation of ASEAN's 
normative framework. ASEAN members view the mutual respect of sovereign 
prerogatives as integral to maintaining and promoting the Westphalian notions of state-
centric relations which they revere. 35 The collective commitment by Southeast Asia's 
elites to the Westphalian system means 'non interference is still sacrosanct to the 
grouping.' 36 Compared to other norms, sovereignty still enjoys the highest position in 
ASEAN member-states' hierarchy of values. Evidence of this commitment can be 
examined through looking at how declarations or treaties between them have been 
embodied into the 'ASEAN Way'. In addition, the preservation of sovereign 
prerogatives have been influenced by important ideational and material factors, 
including colonial memories, the Cold War experience, priority for domestic or regime 
stability and the nascent institutions of state. 
Agreements and Declarations 
One way to demonstrate that sovereignty in ASEAN is closest to traditional 
meaning of state sovereignty is by tracing the content of the organisation's declarations 
and the agreements. ASEAN' s adherence to traditional understandings of W estphalian 
sovereignty is strongly apparent throughout the formal-verbal histories that such 
agreements provide. This can be seen by reviewing documents such as the 1967 
Bangkok Declaration and the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration. Both of these statements 
emphasise ASEAN member-states' national existence free from outside interference. 
The document that most obviously underscores ASEAN member state sovereignty, 
however, is the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) in 1976. Article 2 
mandates: "respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and 
national identity of all nations; non interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
35 Shaun Narine, 'State sovereignty, political legitimacy and regional institutionalism in the Asia Pacific', 
The Pacific Review 17, 3, 2004, p. 437; and Moon and Chun, 'Sovereignty: Dominance of the 
Westphalian Concept', pp. 106-140. 
36 Robin Ramcharan, 'A SEAN and non-interference: a principle Maintained', Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 22, 1, 2000, p. 60. 
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settlement of disputes by peaceful means and renunciation of the threat or use of 
force."37 Article 11 of that same document stipulates that the member-states: 
... shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their 
political, economic, socio-cultural, as well as security relations in 
conformity with their respective aspirations, free from external 
interference as well as internal subversive activities in order to preserve 
national identities.38 
There is no doubt that these interpretations of the shared principles embodied in 
the TAC have greatly helped to establish and improve friendly relations between the 
nations of ASEAN. 
The most recent agreement that pertains to ASEAN member-states' sovereignty 
is the ASEAN Charter, which was released in Singapore, 21 of November 2007. In 
Chapterl, Article 2, it is mentioned that: 
ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles: 
(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all ASEAN Member States. 
(e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States.39 
The ASEAN Charter clearly defines the commitment of ASEAN members to 
uphold state sovereignty, even while the organisation is facing criticism of its poor 
performance in collectively facing new regional security issues and building a regional 
security community. These documents together demonstrate the enduring strength of 
ASEAN's commitment to a very traditional Westphalian concept of state sovereignty. 
It can be argued that the claim to uphold state sovereignty is universally 
symbolic and not specific to ASEAN. Other international organizations such as United 
Nation (UN), Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Organization of American 
States (OAS) have also included the ideas of non interference and strict adherence to 
state sovereignty in their founding documents. ASEAN has also adopted the UN Charter 
of state sovereignty as an important organisational norm. The right to sovereign 
nationhood was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, which proclaims that its 
members must: "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
37 
see Asean, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976 
<http://www.aseansec.org/1654.htin> 
38 Ibid. 
39 ASEAN, the ASEAN Charter (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, January 2008), p. 6. 
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principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... "40 According to Article 2 
of the Charter, the UN and its members are to pursue its purposes according to certain 
principles, which include: 
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.41 
By adopting the norms embedded in the UN Charter ASEAN demonstrates that 
it respects international agreements and reinforces the organization's concern for the 
primacy of state sovereignty. 
However, there are some important differences between ASEAN' s interpretation 
of this norm and that of the UN Charter. While the UN Charter mentions in Chapter VII 
the role of UN Security Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to take military and nonmilitary action to 
"restore international peace and security."42 ASEAN, has not adopted any similar 
concept that would compromise its member-states sovereignty. In some ways ASEAN' s 
relative adherence to the concept of state sovereignty, even while attempting to create a 
security community, invites further comparison with the European Union. The EU 
symbolically removed the problem of state sovereignty through the Maastricht Treaty of 
199243 and the further expansion of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999. Even within the Community's founding document, 
the Treaty of Rome of 1957, there is a commitment to merge sovereignties. In this 
sense, the European Union as Michael Leifer pointed out is a 'political community', a 
grouping of states which are committed ultimately to overcoming the sovereign 
divisions between them.44 
40 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Chapter 1, Purpose and Principles, 
Article 1, no 2 <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapterl .shtml> 
41 Ibid. Article 2. 
42 See United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to 
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression. 
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.shtml> 
43 One 'pillar' ofMaastricht Treaty is a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which allows member 
states to take joint action in the field of foreign policy, see European Union, Treaty Maastricht on 
European Union <http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/maastricht_ en.htm> 
44 Michael Leifer, 'ASEAN as a Model of Security Community?', in Hadi Soesastro (ed.) ASEAN in a 
Changed Regional and International Political Economy (Jakarta: Centre For Strategic and International 
Studies, 1995), p. 130. 
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Despite such considerations, the European Union is not totally an appropriate 
model for ASEAN, since the latter organization was not established on the basis of a 
formal treaty (even though there are treaties between its member-state governments). 
ASEAN was founded through a common declaration which had the converse intention 
of strengthening the national entities that made up the membership of the Association 
through their elective support for non-interference in their individual internal affairs. 
The Bangkok Declaration was shaped to emphasise the principle of non-intrusiveness 
by great powers that had been singularly violated in Indochina and maintaining the 
separation of Indonesia and Malaysia. Previously, in the absence of such a declaration, 
Indonesia conducted a confrontation policy against Malaysia. It might be argued that 
such declarations only amount to symbolic gestures, which function to reinforce the 
concept of sovereignty within ASEAN. However, the consistency of such statements in 
ASEAN' s official pronouncements provides at least some tangible evidence that the 
organisation can aspire to balance the long-term building of a regional security 
community, with maintaining individual state sovereignty to the extent that is required 
over the short-term to maintain regime legitimacy and domestic political stability. This 
relates to the idea of 'adaptable sovereignty' raised in Chapter One. 
The Practice of Diplomatic Style: the 'ASEAN Way' 
Another way to identify the role of state sovereignty in ASEAN diplomacy is 
through examining diplomatic style. This is done by raising questions about: what most 
consistently cultivates and manages intra-ASEAN relations and how these relations are 
actually pursued. In ASEAN the answers for these questions can be answered by 
applying and assessing the term, 'the ASEAN Way'. This term is 'shorthand' for the 
practice of inter-governmental relationships that are concentrated in the hands of state 
elites, who support such norms as non interference and consensus in the decision 
making process. The practice of 'the ASEAN Way' among these elites is characterized 
by habits such as close consultation and accommodation that are fostered by frequent 
interactions which are multi-level as well as multi-dimensional. Typically, consultations 
between ASEAN member states will involve heads of government, foreign ministers, 
economic ministers and senior officials and encompass interactions that are 
simultaneously political, economic, social and cultural. At least around 700 
intergovernmental meetings a year are conducted by ASEAN and these provide a 
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mechanism for cooperation and conflict avoidance. Only rarely, however, do they result 
in binding decisions or mandatory policies.45 
Furthermore, within ASEAN, these decision-making processes do not extend 
beyond the level of elites and government officials. The 'ASEAN Way' can be 
contrasted with the decision making processes of the European Union, which frequently 
submits its policies and treaties to the parliaments of member-states or to popular 
phlebitis, thus ensuring the involvement of non-elites in such processes. Recently 
ASEAN has begun trying to involve other parties outside the elites and government 
officials. The ASEAN Charter had been circulated around the parliaments of member-
states for their approval. However, this move has still been criticized on the grounds that 
the evolutionary process for the Charter did not allow any significant role for the non-
elite groups in member-states.46 
Historically, the 'ASEAN Way' has been practiced among ASEAN's elites with 
great value accorded to the principle of non-interference. This principle envisions 
ASEAN elites conforming to a behavioural pattern of 'no public challenges, comment, 
or criticism of other regimes' legitimacy, domestic systems, conduct, policies or style.' 47 
Thus ASEAN' s diplomatic style can be characterized as quiet diplomacy in which 
"government leaders generally refrained from open criticism of their neighbours".48 In 
the past this has meant that there was no open criticism of military coups in Thailand, 
martial law in Philippines, or Indonesian military actions in East Timor. Before 
democratic reforms in Indonesia, even critical commentary of other ASEAN states in 
the media was frequently followed by government apologies to the offended party. Such 
behaviour has strengthened perceptions of ASEAN as a grouping that does not wash its 
dirty linen in public. 
As in most other aspects of international relations, there have been exceptions to 
the rule. On rare occasions, open criticisms by some ASEAN leaders against their 
counterparts have been leaked into member'states' national media outlets in ways that 
can be considered as traversing the practice of the 'ASEAN Way'. In 1999, for 
45 Interview with staff from Directorate of ASEAN from Indonesian Foreign Ministry Department, 
Jakarta, 2 June 2006. 
46 This view is taken from informal interview with member of Commission I, Indonesian Parliament, 
Jakarta 21 June 2006, and a formal interview with researchers/staff from Forum Asia, Bangkok, August 
2006. See also Jenina Chavez Joy, 2007. 'New ASEAN Charter lacks vision, Bangkok Post, 20 
November <http://www.focusweb.org/new-ASEAN-Charter-lacks-vision.html?itemid:94.> 
47 Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (New York : M.E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 
156. 
48 John Funston, ASEAN and the Principle of Non Intervention-Practice and Prospects (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 200), p. 3. 
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example, ASEAN's elite, particularly Indonesian President B.J. Habibie and the 
Philippines President Joseph Estrada directed strong criticism against Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir's prosectuion of his former deputy Anwar Ibrahim. In this case, 
however, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines were deflecting serious 
domestic crises of their own and had already been rebuffed by Mahathir in their efforts 
to introduce 'flexible engagement' into ASEAN deliberations the previous year. With 
incessant insurgency problems in Mindinao worsening during early 2000 and events in 
East Timor directly confronting Indonesian sovereign interests in late 1999, the instinct 
for ASEAN elites to support each other against such internal and external challenges 
reinforced the ASEAN Way as the preferred 'modus operendi' for managing Southeast 
Asian diplomacy. 
As recent events have shown, ASEAN is still largely adhering to this principle 
of non interference. The member states made no official statement to criticise, or place 
sanctions on Thailand after the military coup that occurred on 19 September 2006 
against the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This was the reaction 
even though the coup could have endangered the overall process of democratisation in 
Southeast Asia. At most, expressions of concern were conveyed privately. In an even 
more recent case involving suppression of democratic protests in the ASEAN member 
state of Myanmar, the organisation did not initially adopt the tough line which the 
international community suggested it should adopt. In their official statement released at 
the ASEAN summit in Singapore 2007, the ASEAN Leaders agreed that ASEAN 
'stands ready to play a role whenever Myanmar wants it to do so'. 49 In confirmation of 
'the ASEAN Way' any involvement by the Association in the Myanmar case will be via 
'constructive engagement', in which most of the action takes place in private, without a 
direct confrontation with Myanmar's military regime. 50 Only very recently (after the so-
called 'Safron Revolution' took place within Myanmar's borders in 2007) has ASEAN 
shifted toward adopting a more overt policy of 'critical disengagement' relative to 
Myanmar. Yet Myanmar remains a member of ASEAN in good standing, even to the 
point where President Obama was compelled to meet with its representative as part of 
the inaugural U.S.-ASEAN dialogue session held in Singapore during November 
49 ASEAN, Chairman Statement on Myanmar, Singapore 20 November 2007 
<http://www.aseansec.org/21057 .htm> 
50 See for example Statement by Marty Natalegawa, Permanent Representative of the Republic Indonesia 
to the United Nations at the meeting of the Security Council on The Situation in Myanmar in New York 
on Oct 5, 2007 and 'Myanmar government puts ASEAN charter at risk, The Jakarta Post, 9 October 
2007 <http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 16 January 2009. 
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2009.51 This illustrates how the 'ASEAN Way' recognises and applies the principle of 
equality among its sovereign members. The policy of non-interference shows that 
ASEAN is not a 'higher authority' placed above its member states, but does intercede 
selectively and subtly to influence domestic conflicts in Myanmar and elsewhere within 
the member-states' domain. 
The practice of the 'ASEAN Way', with decision-making carried out strictly by 
consensus, has reinforced the maintenance of individual member-state sovereignty. The 
rule of consensus has been particularly important to the ASEAN political process but 
has also been described as producing "meat-grinder wisdom", based on the lowest 
common denominator, when unity is not possible to achieve. 52 Because only small 
demands have been made on member-states to date, stable regional relations have 
served both their national and regime interests well. Decisions based on consensus also 
avoid the impression that "some merely follow or that the process is run by one 
member."53 This has particular relevance to Indonesia whose recent history of relations 
with its neighbours and its overwhelming size would otherwise have generated 
suspicions of it practicing institutional hegemony. 54 
For ASEAN, a decision making style that could not protect its member-states' 
national prerogatives by avoiding international pressure to force a government to adopt 
externally imposed policies would be currently unworkable.55 Reconciliation and 
decision-making through consensus provides ASEAN states with the reassurance that 
even the weakest member-state will not have unwanted policies imposed on it. To 
resolve possible differences between members ASEAN has relied less on formal 
institutions and treaties than on close personal ties at official, ministerial and head of 
government levels. This high level networking has facilitated the resolution of 
differences among the elites, reducing the need to resort to other forms of diplomatic 
pressure for achieving national goals. As the 'ASEAN Way' became more prevalent, 
51 For background on 'critical disengagement' see Lee Jones, 'ASEAN's Albatross: ASEAN's Burma 
Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement' Asian Security 4, no. 3 (September 
2008), pp. 271-293. 
52 Noordin Sopiee, 'ASEAN and regional security", in Mohammad Ayoob (ed.) Regional in the Third 
World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 25. 
53 Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 101. 
54 Kusuma Snitwongse, Thirty years of ASEAN: achievements through political cooperation', The 
Pacific Review 11, 2, 1998, p. 184. 
55 Hiro Katsumata, 'Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict 
Adherence to the 'ASEAN way', Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, 1, 2003, p. 113. 
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the raison d'etre of non intervention began to shift from a mechanism to contain 
divisions between member-states to a means of supporting each other. 56 
Practices associated with the 'ASEAN Way' such as compromising behind 
closed doors are still perceived to serve the important and necessary function of helping 
to mediate estrangement and insecurity among various ASEAN elites. It is also viewed 
as limiting interference in the organization by non-ASEAN states. In this sense, pressure 
for rapid institutional reform has not been great until recently and the politics of security 
community formation remains a challenging proposition to ASEAN's future identity. 
The legacy of the 'ASEAN Way' is a unique testament to how jealously this 
institution's member-states guard their sovereignty. 
Material and Ideational Explanation 
Another way to consider the characteristics of sovereignty within ASEAN 
relates to the ideational and material explanations underlying the concept of state 
sovereignty. 'Sovereignty', in this context, even where it remains a meaningful indicator 
of state capacity and independence, not only varies in intensity and scope. It is also 
constructed and constituted in highly distinctive ways that reflect ideational as well as 
material factors. 57 This ideational perspective is relevant to explaining why ASEAN 
states have been keen to preserve their state sovereignty and also why it will be difficult 
to modify how the concept of sovereignty operates within ASEAN. 
Sovereignty within ASEAN reflects Southeast Asia's unique historical and 
geopolitical position. Historical experience has forced the ASEAN states to consider 
state sovereignty as an essential element of their national and regional security. Chief 
among these historical forces are the memories of their colonial experience. Until the 
middle of the twentieth century, with the exception of Thailand, all the ASEAN 
countries had been under colonial rule, though Thailand was quite clearly influenced by 
the potential for colonialisation. Colonial powers often undermined the rights and 
dignity of Southeast Asia's indigenous peoples, extracted resources and often left 
nothing in return. In many cases the indigenous people were treated badly. Frequently, 
the concept of 'divide et imper a' was applied with different classes and ethnic groups 
being set against one another by the imperial power. The painful memories of life under 
56 John Funston, ASEAN and the Principle of Non Intervention - Practice and Prospects (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 5. 
57 Cameron J. Hill and William T. Tow, 'The A SEAN regional forum: material and ideational dynamics'. 
in M Beeson (ed.) Reconfiguring East Asia: Regional Institutions and Organisations After the Crisis 
(London: Curzon Press, 2002), pp. 161-183. 
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colonialism have created strong nationalist sentiment58 - particularly in Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and Myanmar - all of whom have developed a tradition of rejecting the 
involvement by external parties, particularly in their domestic affairs. To these states, 
such interference by other countries will be understood as a matter that brings disgrace 
and does not benefit the indigenous people. As a consequence of these experiences, 
nationalism in Southeast Asia (like in the case of Arab nationalism according to 
Barnett) has nearly identical meaning with the notion of sovereignty.59 Historical 
memory of a common colonial past is a strong factor that unites the ASEAN states. 
Such memories make them constantly distrustful of external intervention, more 
respectful of one another's sovereignty, and at the same time always ready to guard 
their own sovereignty. 
Along with their collective historical memory of colonialism, the ASEAN states' 
perspective of international relations has been shaped by great power military 
interventions during the Second World War and the Cold War. These memories explain 
why ASEAN members consider state sovereignty an essential element of national and 
regional security. Their national security has often been threatened by other countries' 
interference or intervention in their domestic affairs. 60 ASEAN countries were also the 
object of an ideological conflict between the super powers during Cold War. This 
experience sometimes led them to adopt similar policies and strategies to those of their 
superpower sponsors in order to secure themselves. 
During the Cold War period in particular, the national security problems of most 
ASEAN states were directly linked to the politics of military intervention by outside 
powers. The war in Indochina and the subsequent division of Southeast Asia between 
the communist bloc and the capitalist world are illustrative. These interventions 
internationalised and intensified local conflicts and, as a result, the national security of 
each of the Southeast Asian countries was jeopardised. Furthermore, during this period, 
China's interference in the domestic affairs of the ASEAN countries through supporting 
various communist insurgencies was viewed as a threat to their national security. The 
Chinese intervention to Vietnam in 1979 confirmed Hanoi's perception that China was a 
threat. Western diplomatic intervention in Cambodia was 'welcomed' by ASEAN 
58 Ramcharan, 'ASEAN and non-interference', p. 65; Moon and Chun 'Sovereignty: Dominance of the 
Westphalian Concept', pp. 111-112. 
59Michael Barnett, 'Sovereignty, nationalism, and regional order in the Arab States System', in Thomas J. 
Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds) State sovereignty as social construct (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 148. 
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because the conflict was creating instability that also impinged on regional security. 
Similarly, confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1960's which saw the 
secret deployment of the Indonesian army to Sabah and Serawak cemented Malaysia's 
perception that Indonesia was a threat. However, from an Indonesian perspective 
'Ganyang Malaysia' or 'Crushing Malaysia' was about challenging the British control 
in the region. The significance of these historical experiences has been to make the 
ASEAN countries consider state sovereignty as an essential element of national and 
regional stability. Ever since the countries of Southeast Asia established ASEAN, they 
have been greatly concerned about each other's sovereign integrity. This is reflected in 
policy choices that defend the concept of sovereignty as a fundamental international 
norm. 
Moreover, a concern to build and maintain domestic political legitimacy within 
ASEAN has contributed to a reinforcement of state sovereignty.61 In this context, 
domestic political legitimacy as Alagappa defined it was: 
the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, 
so that that commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self interest, 
but because they are believed to have moral authority, because subject 
believe they ought to obey.62 
ASEAN states adopted the principle of state sovereignty in the context of their 
efforts to pmsue nation building and state making. This was generally projected at two 
different levels of international relations. At one level, (and for most developing states 
in the Southeast Asia this was the more important consideration), non-intervention was 
a normative guarantee against superpower involvement in their internal affairs. At 
another level, it was represented as a political guarantee of peaceful relations between 
neighbouring states whose sovereign authority was being challenged from within their 
own borders. 63 
Emerging inter-state relations between the post-colonial nation states of 
Southeast Asia were complicated during the 1950s and 1960s by various internal 
challenges (i.e.; communist subversion, secessionism and communal strife). Ethnic, 
religious and linguistic conflicts remain the source of serious political tension in every 
61 See Narine, 'State sovereignty, political legitimacy' p. 424. 
62 Muthiah Alagappa, 'Introduction' in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 2. 
63 Herman Kraft, 'The principle of Non Intervention and ASEAN: Evolution and Emerging Challenges', 
Working Paper of Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, no 344, The Australian National University , 
Canberra, 2000, p. 2. 
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Southeast Asian state. 64 Ethnic tensions are less significant issues in Cambodia, Vietnam 
and Laos (though these do exist) but for these three states the popular legitimacy of the 
government in power is fragile. There is tension between government and Islamic 
radicals in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. For Southeast Asian states, the idea that 
intervention by either other ASEAN member-states or external non-members would 
help to settle these disputes is still viewed with some apprehension, although this 
tendency has been modified over the past decade (with Indonesian mediation in 
negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF and ASEAN 
participation in peace-keeping contingents in the region, such as those in Aceh and East 
Timor). More often than not, they are still prone to believe that the party which 
intervenes will gain for their own benefit and that such intervention will undermine state 
legitimacy. For most ASEAN states, therefore, the consolidation of domestic socio-
political forces is of most significance and will always be priority, and if the external 
parties are allowed to become involved it is because they will help the government. 
Moreover, although Southeast Asian governments are keen to be involved in 
security cooperation with Western countries, such sentiments are not necessarily shared 
at the popular or non-elite level of state politics. The outcry from Islamist groups in 
Indonesia, for example, has forced that country to downplay its security cooperation 
with the United States to combat terrorism. The cooperation has also become difficult 
since the United States has linked the security cooperation with the Indonesia's human 
rights record. For example, between the late 1990's until 2005 the US Senate banned 
providing military training or purchasing military equipment for Indonesia because of 
its human rights record in East Timor and due to current concerns about West Papua. 
Their predominant concern with domestic stability has led ASEAN governments 
to perpetuate the exalted status of state sovereignty. This has been reflected in the 
policies they have adopted in response to various domestic security issues. These 
policies have, in the main, consolidated the principles of non-interference and the non-
use of force, partly because their key security concerns are internal and result from their 
fragility in terms of socio-political cohesion. 65 ASEAN members advocate these 
principles in the context of their efforts at 'nation-building' and this has enabled them to 
practically separate 'domestic matters' from the task of developing co-operative 
64 Ooi Giok Ling, 'Governance in Plural Societies and Security: Management oflnter-Ethnic Relations in 
Southeast Asia' in Andrew Tan and Kenneth Boutin (eds) Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast 
Asia (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2001) 
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relations with their neighbours. In other words, domestic national interests are the 
priority although they have to be developed in conjunction with pursuing common 
regional interests. External interference in one ASEAN state's affairs by another 
ASEAN state-member, however, would have hindered overall institutional co-operation 
because, for each member, any interference from the other would have been an obstacle 
to their collective nation-building enterprise. 
ASEAN states thus presume that an intervention applying force against any one 
of them will bring the credibility of the entire organization in to question. This is 
something that would endanger national security more than any internal problem. This 
also reinforces tendencies for the ASEAN governments to securitise domestic politics to 
emphasise the norm of non-interference in internal affairs. "ASEAN states explicitly 
reject the norms of humanitarian intervention, because they recognise their vulnerability 
to such norms during the state-building process. They have deliberately limited the 
institutional power of ASEAN to prevent it from infringing on their sovereignty".66 In 
these circumstances, ASEAN member-states have been greatly concerned about each 
other's sovereignty. The recent UN sanctioned humanitarian intervention in East Timor, 
which has been led by Australia, has only strengthened the idea within ASEAN that 
intervention by external parties will jeopardise the territorial unity and legitimacy of the 
state. ASEAN members such as Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia did 
send forces to support the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and the 
United Nations Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET), but they did so at the 
explicit invitation of Indonesia. As Jurgen Haacke points out, the participation of 
ASEAN member-states in East Timor was conducted in a manner that respected 
Indonesia's sensitivities on the matter. He concludes his discussion of the issue by 
noting that while this involvement "broke new ground" it " ... neither amounted to nor 
automatically heralds a major changes in the 'ASEAN Way'."67 Any involvement of 
external parties in other potential areas of secession, such as West Papua, would be 
understood to as directly threatening to the unity of ASEAN itself because its member-
states still contend with many of the problems associated with state and nation building. 
There is also sense shared by ASEAN member-states that looking after their 
own domestic problems is more important than becoming involved in others countries' 
problems. Limited national resources are better allocated to deal with pressing domestic 
66 Narine, 'State sovereignty, political legitimacy', p. 16. 
67 Jtirgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects 
(London: Routledge, 2003), p. 204. 
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issues rather than 'helping others'. Accordingly, the Philippines have not cooperated 
with Thailand in the case of the Muslim resurgence in South Thailand, because it needs 
all the resources it can marshal to focus on military operations and stabilisation 
campaigns in southern Mindanao. Similarly, with other security problems such as 
terrorism, ASEAN states may not always be keen to work cooperatively because they 
need to concentrate their efforts to deal with other, equally pressing, domestic problems. 
While public sensitivity about such issues varies between different countries, being 
weak states, Southeast Asian polities' logical priorities will be directed toward 
achieving at least minimally acceptable levels of domestic well being and security, 
rather than becoming too involved with their neighbours' security problems. 
The very nascent character of domestic political institutions and structures 
within ASEAN also mitigate against intervention. Most of the ASEAN countries have 
different ideologies and not many of their governments could be categorised as 'liberal 
democratic' (although some ASEAN countries may have more democratic governments 
than their ASEAN counterparts). Additionally, most ASEAN member-states have 
different levels of economic and security capacity. Different legal systems also create 
obstacles to greater coordination of security cooperation which further discourages the 
development of significant collective support. Differences in political and legal systems 
between Indonesia and Malaysia for example, have created disputes between these two 
countries on issues such as how to deal with illegal logging and illicit immigrant 
workers. In these situations, rather than choose to collaborate poorly and risk resultant 
tensions that might reflect badly on both nations, both Indonesia and Malaysia have 
tended to deal with such issues within internal parameters or boundaries because failed 
efforts in intra-state cooperation would not have been conducive to long-term harmony. 
While it might seem logical that accepting assistance from states with greater 
capacity could be helpful in matters such as counter-terrorism, such arguments are often 
not effective within ASEAN. As 'junior partners' in any such arrangements, the 
perception is that they would not have equal rights and position and they would be 
subject to pressure from the external parties. Illustrative is the rejection by Indonesia 
and Malaysia of an American proposal to upgrade the U.S. Navy's involvement in 
securing the Malacca Strait. (An episode covered in greater detail in Chapter Five). 
Jakarta's and Kuala Lumpur's rejection of the U.S. Pacific Command's Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) proposal in 2004 was a firm one even though both 
countries have since been condemned by the international community for their lack 
resource capacity to significantly secure the Strait. The basis for this decision was that 
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both states believed that their authority as independent nations would have been 
diminished if they accepted assistance from the U.S or other developed countries likely 
to be involved in this scheme. 
Logically, such reactions challenge the notion of regional cooperation. When 
single states are unable to solve security problems, regional cooperation that draws on 
the resources of all the member-state would seem to offer a better capacity to deal with 
regional security challenges. However, due to the nascent condition of political 
structures in ASEAN, collective security action would highlight the internal and 
external vulnerability of the member states. There is a strong perception among the 
ASEAN members that cooperation, when it occurs should invariably strengthen state 
sovereignty, not risks undermining it. 
In these circumstances, sovereignty has served as both a legal and practical 
framework for ASEAN states to gain a more equal status in the international system. 
Embedding sovereignty within institutional documents serves as an important protection 
against the internal and external weaknesses of the ASEAN states and this is reinforced 
by the 'ASEAN Way'. A SEAN' s socio-cultural norms emphasise states' rights to make 
independent decisions without intervention or pressure from other members of the 
Association. However, as Shaun Narine points out, protecting sovereignty may at times 
require the involvement of the other institutions.68 Throughout their history the ASEAN 
states have indeed acted, at least intermittently, in ways that violate the basic principles 
underlying their own organization and these actions have usually been undertaken in 
defence of individual state sovereignty. ASEAN was not only a product of great power 
conflict in the region; its existence is a testament to the profound difficulty of realising 
sovereign status and interest in Southeast Asia.69 The core member states have been 
united by 'the need to consolidate their authority as state' which had been jeopardized 
by domestic threats. 70ASEAN's emphasis on principles and norms, as well as its 
conceptions of comprehensive security and national resilience, stem from the 
comparative weakness of ASEAN states in regional power relations and their fragility as 
modem states. ASEAN has therefore been used as a diplomatic mechanism to counter 
68 Shaun Narine, 'The English School and ASEAN', The Pacific Review 19, 2, 2006, p. 213. 
69 Mark Beeson, 'Sovereignty under siege: globalization and the state in Southeast Asia', Third World 
Quarterly 24, 2, 2003, p. 365. 
70 Ibid. 
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the greater structural power of larger regional neighbours. 71 It is in this sense that 
ASEAN states are committed to traditional Westphalian sovereignty as the major 
organising principle in their international relations.72 They view international 
cooperation and regional cooperation - including that in the economic arena - as a 
means to strengthen sovereignty, not dilute it. 
All of these factors have contributed underscore the principle of non interference 
as the basis of ASEAN member-state relations. As a result, preserving sovereign rights 
has become the standard prescription for many political difficulties in the region and, as 
noted previously, the comer-stone of ASEAN's attempts to create an enduring 
Southeast Asian regional order. From this perspective, regional and international 
cooperation could only take place on the basis of respect for each other's national 
independence and integrity. 
State Sovereignty versus Building a Security Community 
Tensions 
ASEAN' s preoccupation with safeguarding traditional state sovereignty is likely 
to ultimately create tension between the principle of non interference and the 
organisation's desire to build a mature security community, if only because these two 
objectives have divergent perceptions and aims. Firstly, there is a significant difference 
about the perception of the nature of the relationship between the two objectives. State 
sovereignty operates in a very static and narrow domain, while a security community 
demands adaptability, conformity and broader perspectives. The current perceptions 
within ASEAN member-states are clearly static. For the ASEAN states there is still 
significant difficulty in changing their perception of the relationship between them 
because their reality has shown them that 'enmity' is more prevalent than 'amity'. 
While it is true that ASEAN has demonstrated a capacity successfully to settle disputes, 
there are still significant bilateral conflicts and sensitivities over issues such as territorial 
disputes that have yet to be resolved. The natural relationships between them are still 
preoccupied with mistrust, competition and problems of state legitimacy, which are 
exaggerated by differences in political, social, and legal systems. In A SEAN, therefore, 
71 Alagappa, 'Managing Asian Security: Competitive', pp. 574-576; Evelyn Goh, 'Great Powers and 
Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies', International Security 
32, 3, 2007, pp. 118-120. 
72 Narine, 'State Sovereignty, Political Legitimacy', p. 444. 
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it will be difficult, at least in the short term, to shift the perception of states from one of 
mutual suspicion to one of mutual trust. 
When states decide to create a security community, tension arises between the 
traditional concept of sovereignty and the idea of sovereignty within a community of 
states. In these circumstances, the formation of a successful security community 
requires states to adjust their perception of the relationship between states from the 
traditional competitive view of international relations to a more cooperative 
understanding of how the international system can work. 
Secondly, there are also differences in the perception of those factors that are the 
main concern of the state between the Westphalian system and a security community. 
Within the Westphalian system the state is the main actor and the ultimate authority. 
Barry Buzan and Richard Little have argued that" ... the Westphalian state had hard and 
precisely defined boundaries and it also consolidated into a single centre all the powers 
of self-govemment."73 The related conception of traditional sovereignty argues that the 
state is the only unified, uniform, and unique actor on the international scene and it was 
the role of sovereignty to defend the state or the regime. 
These views contradict the perceptions necessary for building a security 
community. A world in which the security community idea operates is, as Arend 
Lijphart and Karl Deutsch argues, a less orderly world in the sense that it is more 
complex: there are all kinds of actors in addition to, fundamentally different from, and 
operative both outside and inside the sovereign states; and there are social, economic, 
and cultural variables that should be considered in addition to the purely political 
forces. 74 In order to realise the role of these many actors in building a security 
community, states need to gradually adopt more liberal and democratic values. Only 
within such as system will non-state actors have the chance to take a part in building a 
'mature' security community. This significance of a liberal-democratic milieu to 
developing mature security community has been raised by Emmanuel Adler: 
Members of pluralistic security community hold dependable expectations 
of peaceful change not merely because they share just any kind of values, 
but because they share liberal democratic values and allow their societies 
to become interdependent and linked by transnational economic and 
cultural relations. Democratic values, in tum, facilitate the creation of 
73 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 'Capitalism after the Fall', Review of International Studies, 5, 5, 1999, 
p. 90. 
74 Arend Lijphart, 'Karl W. Deutsch and The New Paradigm in the in International Relations' in Merritt, 
Richard L, and Bruce Russett (eds) From National Development to Global Community: Essay in Honor 
of Karl W Deutsch (London: George Allen and Unwin,1981), p. 234. 
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strong civil societies... which also promote community bonds and 
common identity and trust through the process of the free interpretation of 
societies ... 75 
The main differences between the two domains are that the significant actors in 
Westphalian system are centred around the state, while the requirements of security 
community are for wider relationships. These conflicting demands will consequently 
create tension over how to actually strengthen the security community building process 
by involving significant non state actors. 
In ASEAN, there is some evidence that members are willing to strengthen 
regional cooperation. Numerous declarations, meetings, and joint actions have been 
made and or conducted. The idea that cooperation would help states to solve their 
domestic and regional security problems is constantly on ASEAN's agenda. However, 
that ability of ASEAN institutions to realise practical collective action is complicated by 
the fact that its member-states would be required to strengthen in sharing, transferring, 
or pooling part of their authority and control over issues that are within their own 
political and geographical boundaries. For example, in the case of countries like 
Myanmar, changing to a democratic system would clearly supplant the current state 
regime. 
As noted previously, another impediment is the weakness of ASEAN itself. The 
ASEAN's member states have not given the necessary authority to ASEAN Secretariat 
for it to make binding decisions on behalf of the Association. Recently, the ASEAN 
Charter has expanded the ASEAN Secretary General's powers. However these 
enhancements are still minor and their implementation has yet to be seen. There is also 
no probability that ASEAN's more authoritarian governments will share significant 
power with their populaces over the immediate future. The influence of officials such as 
foreign ministers is still dominant and that of broader ASEAN populaces still weak 
despite their involvement being stipulated in the Charter. A JusufWanandi points out: 
The Charter is supposed to reflect a people-centred ASEAN, but nowhere 
does it state how people can relate to ASEAN, how to give feedback, how 
to exert control and through what institutions. It reemphasizes the 
dominant role of the foreign ministers by putting another layer as a 
75Emmanuel Adler, 'Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community' in Beverly 
Crawford (ed.) The Future of European Security (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, 
University of California 1992), p. 293. The italic words was emphasised by the author. 
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coordinating agency under the summit and above the three pillars 
(economic, political-security, and socio-cultural). 76 
While there is limited interaction in ASEAN at the government-to-government 
level, without strong people-to-people interactions there will consequently be only weak 
support for the building of a security community. States will be required to delegate part 
of their control or authority so that genuine people to people interaction and sub-state 
operational modes of communication among member states will work. Under these 
circumstances, there would be tension for member-states as to how far they should 
sacrifice their own state sovereignty or maintain their authority/control rather than to 
delegate it. 
Moreover, the prospect of a security community creates tension over the 
responsibility for security within such a system. A basic assumption and expectation of 
state sovereignty is that central government is responsible for the security of the state 
and its citizens.77 Compared to a security community, this idea is clearly a restrictive 
notion of security. The former approach underlines the need for responsibility for 
security to be enlarged to a regional basis. A vision of collective responsibility for 
security within the ASEAN community was indeed one reason behind its foundation. 
After being basically subordinated for almost forty years the idea has only recently re-
emerged within ASEAN circles. The natures of contemporary threats are transnational 
and this has forced states to rethink their national security which they now see as being 
linked to other states. Assuming that such transnational or transboundary threats can not 
be handled by a single state alone, collective security policies and action will be 
required to resolve such problems. 
Yet another source of tension arises because the notion of security community 
reflects different ideas about what the conditions for security actually are and rests on 
the 'assurance that the members of the community will not fight each other physically 
but will settle their disputes in some other way'. 78 This assurance will not be guaranteed 
however, if states are still overwhelmingly occupied with state sovereignty. A 
preoccupation with sovereignty can be both ambiguous and problematic. The 
Westphalian sovereignty-ethos is one of 'self help'. States are individually responsible 
for looking after their own security and welfare; the state decides for itself how it will 
76 JusufWanandi, 'ASEAN's charter: Does a mediocre document really matter?', The Jakarta Post, 27 
November 2007. 
77 Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty and Its Presuppositions: Before 9/11 and After', Political Studies 55, 2, 
2007, p. 298. 
78 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p.5. 
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cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance 
from other. "States develop their own strategies, chart their own resources, [and] make 
their own decisions about how to meet whatever desires they develop."79 
Differences between the traditional state sovereignty approach and the security 
community prescription in interpreting the responsibility for security are acute and 
potentially volatile. Without a collective notion of responsibility for security issues, 
ASEAN member-states may not be able to confront what is a growing number of 
serious transregional security challenges. However, the urge to collective action is not a 
natural preference for self-reliant Westphalian states. Reconciling this dilemma is ever 
more problematic due to ingrained levels of established interaction. The management of 
security in ASEAN is based on national or bilateral arrangements and geared towards 
conflict avoidance. The idea of non-interference in ASEAN is a way for states to 
manage security issues so that they are not victimized as pawns in regional power plays. 
This method of management, however, implies that there is very limited capability to 
positively implement regional cooperation within ASEAN. 
ASEAN promotes a collective security idea known as 'regional resilience'. 
However, as Kusuma Snitwongse clarifies this concept: 
National resilience would be achieved when the government won the 
support of the populace by raising the level of social and economic well-
being which would translate into political stability and regional resilience. 
Regional resilience would come about as members need not fear 
destabilisation from their neighbours. Regional resilience would also result 
from the cumulative effect of national resilience achieved by all members 
because external powers would be denied the opportunity for 
intervention. 80 
In this sense, however, the 'regional resilience' concept has nothing to do with 
genuine concept of cooperation beyond the states. It focuses too much on individual 
states and there is no coordinative institution or common accepted planning and 
management mechanisms. 
The creation of a security community, therefore, is recasting notions of power 
and sovereignty away from their traditional conceptualization of being bounded in 
territory. In order for regional cooperation to work efficiently it is necessary for states to 
understand that their security concerns matters beyond their national borders. To 
achieve a security community, a group of states must revise their traditional notion of 
79 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 96. 
80 Snitwongse, Thirty years of ASEAN' pp. 183-194. 
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state sovereignty. The changes will range over a continuum of options from different 
ways from sharing power, to transferring authority, to the ultimate demise of state 
sovereignty. Joining the community must not entail an erosion of essential national 
sovereignty. ASEAN, therefore, will not achieve a security community so long as states 
remain preoccupied with their individual sovereignty or alternatively, until ASEAN 
member-states can, together, create a different notion of a security community. 
Possibilities 
How can the member states shift or adjust their preference for regional security 
cooperation without ignoring their strict adherence to the principle of non interference? 
Ideally, moving beyond state sovereignty is one option that has been offered by 
the EU model for building security community. ASEAN leaders can absorb the lessons 
of the EU's evolution and how it has organised its collective security. This precedent 
may inspire them, but it does not mean that ASEAN elites want to or are capable of 
adopting that particular model. EU policies implied the notion that, in order to create a 
security community, sovereignty should be transferred to a common higher authority or 
managed collectively. This requirement is problematic for ASEAN because the 
Association would not and has not been able to transform its member-states' traditional 
state sovereignty into a collective authority as easily as did the EU. ASEAN member-
states mostly evolved to statehood after World War Two, whereas many EU states have 
enjoyed 'sovereign self-confidence' accrued from centuries of statehood. 
Even so, the current reluctance of ASEAN members to pool their sovereignty 
should not undermine their long-term vision of building a security community. 
Sovereignty cannot be seen as a permanent barrier to the creation of a security 
community. Indeed, despite the role that sovereignty still plays in ASEAN, member-
states still show interest in the creation of a Southeast Asian security community. It 
should be noted that Karl Deutsch never viewed state sovereignty in Europe as an 
insurmountable challenge for building a security community. His idea of a pluralistic 
security community did not require the existence of a 'higher authority'. Deutsch 
thought that integration should be seen as creating the 'expectations of peaceful change' 
among peoples who may or may not be unified under a single government. 81 Deutsch 
later clarified this position by the pointing out differences between integration (no 
expectation of war between participating sovereignties) and amalgamation (the 
sovereignties' formal political unification). The former has to do with the formation of 
81 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 5 
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communities, and the latter with formal political merger of participating units.82 The 
'higher authority' is best placed in this latter category of amalgamation. In amalgamated 
security communities, state sovereignty has been surrendered to a higher authority. A 
pluralistic security community is where states retain their sovereignty relative to other 
states without surrendering it to a superior authority. While forms may vary, some kind 
organization in a security community is required, even though it may be very loose. 83 
Yet this view, which still assumes that tension between the idea of state 
sovereignty and security community-building is inherent, may be exaggerated. The 
English School argues that international cooperation between states does not challenge, 
or reduce state sovereignty. Such cooperation often occurs in any case and states exist 
within a larger society, bound together by common interests and rudimentary values. 84 
States regularly and logically cooperate out of self-interest. It is quite normal. 
Moreover, sovereignty as a legal capacity to act should not be seen in opposition to 
interdependence. Sovereignty is a starting-point for considering integration and can 
facilitate states developing it. The establishment of ASEAN initially and the recruitment 
of the new member-states happened because of the guarantee of respect sovereignty. It 
is rather the idea of state independence (vis-a-vis other states) that gradually dissipates 
for members of a security community. In ASEAN, sovereignty is denoted as the 
significant variable that will enable or prevent the member states from creating regional 
cooperation. In some ways, a collective understanding of the norms of sovereignty have 
actually helped foster a regional order in Southeast Asia through developing consistent 
behaviour associated with the concept of sovereignty 
From the ASEAN perspective, the concept of sovereignty is therefore not 
necessarily at odds with that of a security community since both share a similar aim in 
the avoidance of war between states and the maintenance of security in the international 
community. Non-intervention, recognition of equality between states, and non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other states all support attempts to avoid conflict. 
Within ASEAN, mutual respect of state sovereignty reduces tensions among states that 
might otherwise be apprehensive about external interference in their own 
underdeveloped polities. Contrary to what neorealism claims, the international system 
need not be one of inevitable self-help for post-colonial states. Indeed, weak, post -
82 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, p. 16. 
83 Ibid 
84 Narine, 'The English School and ASEAN', p. 212. 
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colonial states, unable to put up defences against threats from outside; rely on 
international community to provide more durable security guarantees of non -
intervention. "Sovereignty may also promote collective identity formation in the long 
run' ... because states do not want to be engulfed by a collective."85 States would be 
more confident about engaging in joint cooperation with other states if other states 
recognized sovereignty as sacrosanct. That said, contrasting interpretations of what 
should or should not be regarded as 'sovereign' continue to undermine conflict 
avoidance in international relations. 
The preference of ASEAN states for traditional sovereignty, then, is something 
that does not particularly run counter to the aim of creating a security community. There 
is significant evidence that their preference for sovereignty and peaceful resolution has 
contributed to the absence of conflict between ASEAN countries. State sovereignty, as 
mentioned in the TAC, has made a significant contribution to the establishment of 
neighbourly and friendly relations within Southeast Asia. By recognizing their own 
weakness and frailty, ASEAN states have created a situation with "no room for 
antagonism between member nations and have endeavoured to eliminate any mutual 
distrust and to establish neighbourly friendship." 86 Principles of sovereignty and non-
interference have helped establish a semblance of a security community. Indeed, as 
noted earlier, without extended guarantees of non-interference, the newer ASEAN 
member states like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would not have joined ASEAN. 
Respect for state sovereignty in the ASEAN context has contributed to Southeast Asia's 
regional stability as the TAC underscores the relevance of the Westphalian ethos -
particularly its focus on non-interference in sovereign affairs - to preventing or 
resolving differences in a state-centric context. In short, state sovereignty in ASEAN is 
significant factor supporting the security of the region, uniting the members to provide 
regional order. 
To summarise, there is gap between the theoretical view and the empirical 
development of the relationship between sovereignty and creating a security community 
in Southeast Asia. Theoretically, the institutionalist/liberalist perspective argues that 
traditional state sovereignty should be surrendered, or transform in to a higher authority 
in order to create a meaningful security community. In their view, the Westphalian 
85 Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', American Political 
Science Review 88, 2, 1994, p. 388. 
86 Susume Yamakage, 'The Construction of an East Asian Order and the Limitations of the ASEAN 
Model', Asia-Pacific Review 12, 2, 2005, p. 2. 
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concept of sovereignty must be replaced by a notion of sovereignty in which liberal 
norms, principles and rules prevail. An effort to project a security community without 
adopting these liberalist principles will merely generate tension. 
The reality of building a security community in ASEAN, however, is that states 
have attempted to proceed towards building a security community without substantially 
sacrificing their sovereignty. The reason for this behaviour can be found in the cultural 
and historical background of the ASEAN states. For example, 'the ASEAN Way' is a 
political and diplomatic style with strong cultural roots and allows states to preserve 
their traditional sovereignty via norms that rely on consensus and formal agreements. 
The collective experience of the past, which includes, colonialism, nationalism, the 
Cold War period and national efforts for economic development also explains why the 
reality of sovereignty in ASEAN varies from theoretical models. The result is that on 
one hand, ASEAN can be categorized as preserving the sovereign prerogatives of its 
member states, while on the other they can also play the 'sovereignty card' in ways that 
differ from the accepted international norms. Inherently, sovereignty is more divisible 
than indivisible. 
Thus, within ASEAN, the tension between sovereign prerogatives and goal of 
building a security community would be less and its members could redefine their state 
sovereignty if: (1) there are clear benefits; (2) the endogenous and exogenous factors are 
supportive of that goal; (3) their national capacities are not impinged in the process; (4) 
the process does not generate intense friction between them; and (5) institutions and 
norms allow the process to go forward. These considerations are based on a 
combination of ideas drawn from the rationalist and institutionalist perspectives that 
suggests there is a link between state sovereignty and building a security community in 
A SEAN. Beyond this theoretical perspective, empirical evidence and the fieldwork 
conducted for this thesis reinforces the idea of a security community in ASEAN is more 
than feasible, even if it does not resemble the standard theoretical model of a security 
community. 
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Chapter Three 
ASEAN's Evolution; 
Calibrating Sovereignty and Community 
This chapter discusses the historical development of ASEAN as a regional 
association. In particular, it considers how the organisation members' preference for 
state sovereignty has been maintained or adjusted over the past four decades. It will 
describe the external and internal factors which shaped the divergence and convergence 
between the member-states by considering some of the more significant events and 
policies which influenced the development and character of ASEAN as a regional 
organisation. It will also highlight the meaning of compromises that they finally 
undertook to manage the problem of balancing sovereign prerogatives and community 
building initiatives. It is argued that consideration of state sovereignty is central for the 
development of the ASEAN. Historically, efforts to create regionalism in Southeast 
Asian before ASEAN largely failed. In spite of the organisation founders determination 
to use the new frameworks to create broader based middle-class societies with requisite 
national development strategies. Indeed the language of Bangkok Declaration stipulates: 
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished 
ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best 
attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and 
meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region already bound 
together by ties of history and culture; 
CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary 
responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the 
region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, 
and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from 
external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their 
national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their 
peoples.1 
In fact, more efforts to create regional understandings among Southeast Asian 
countries in the beginning had centred upon the preservation of state sovereignty. 
During the latter stage of the Cold War, ASEAN's institution-building efforts were 
1 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 'The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)' Bangkok, 8 
August 1967 <http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm>. 
arguably relatively successful in maintaining that organisation's security. During this 
period ASEAN had maintained intramural stability, reduced the impact of external 
influences on member states and contributed to domestic security (if only in the very 
minimum sense of the term 'security'). They did so by maintaining their territorial 
integrity and political independence. In a Cold War context, the strengthening of state 
sovereignty was the most rational choice for the member-states of the Association, 
especially as any attempt at concerted regionalism - with the many challenges it 
presents to sovereignty - might have rendered ASEAN more vulnerable to external 
pressure of the two major power blocs. 
However, post-Cold War developments have demonstrated that ASEAN has 
only a very modest capacity to manage the complex combination of internal and 
external regional security dynamics. A major reason for this problem is that ASEAN 
states have not been able to reconcile their understanding of the norm of state 
sovereignty with more comprehensive regional interests and institution building. 
Southeast Asian Regional Building before ASEAN 
Before ASEAN was established, Southeast Asian countries had already 
attempted to set up regional and multilateral institutions. The initial effort to build a 
regional institution was the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), founded in 
September 1954. The membership of SEATO included countries mostly from outside 
Southeast Asia: Australia, France, United Kingdom, New Zealand, United States, and 
Pakistan. Only two Southeast Asian countries, Thailand and Philippines, were affiliated. 
Three other countries in Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were also 
part of the organisation's Collective Defence Treaty, participating as 'Protocol States'. 
Under the Manila Treaty, these states had the right, 'should they so desire, to appeal for 
help against external aggression [without] countervailing duties, the customary 
procedure in an ordinary alliance. ' 2 SEATO members agreed to resist aggress10n 
collectively and individually, though not automatically inasmuch as the constitutional 
process of each country would decide the action it would take in any case. 
SEATO was designed as part of a network of global anticommunist security 
arrangements. However, each of the member-states had its own aspirations for the 
organisation. For the USA, the main patron in this alliance, the purpose was, 
2 George Modelski, 'The Asian States participation in SEATO', in George Modelski (ed.) SEATO: Six 
Studies (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire for the Australian National University, 1962), p. 153. 
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. . . to deter overt armed aggression from communist China in the treaty 
area and provide a shield to buy time for American and related programs 
of aid which might lead to the economic and social advance of the people, 
to greater stability in their governments, and to the reduction of communist 
appeal. 3 
For other countries such as Britain, Australia, and France, this alliance would 
also preserve their traditional security interests in Southeast Asia, particularly for the 
British and French who were among most important former colonial powers in the area. 
Thailand hoped that SEA TO would solidify Western defence commitments to mainland 
Southeast Asia and thus help it to preserve its own independence. The Thais also hoped 
that SEATO would prevent Indochina from failing under the influence or control of 
Peking or Hanoi. The Philippines already had a bilateral alliance with the US dating 
from 1951 and therefore viewed the significance of SEA TO more for the economic 
benefits to be gained by facilitating US deployments from bases on its territory.4 
Pakistan's interest in SEATO membership stemmed from its fears of Indian aggression.5 
SEATO failed to achieve its main purpose of curbing the influence of 
communism in the protocol states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The organization 
also lacked cohesion for a number of reasons. SEATO members such as France and 
Britain reduced their responsibilities to the organization and generally their strategic 
interest in being directly involved in Southeast Asia security politics diminished.6 In 
fact, rather than uniting the region, SEA TO had helped to divide it by tending 'to push 
the uncommitted states into greater independence of attitude. ' 7 The organisation was 
also unable to attract other Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia or Burma to 
join it. Indonesia opposed SEATO not only because of President Sukarno's 
nonalignment policy, but also because of that country's strong anti-colonial stance. 
Jakarta viewed SEATO as a means for the leading Western powers to dominate 
Southeast Asia. Indeed, Indonesia was wary of becoming a pawn in the struggle of the 
Cold War superpowers, not least for fear of endangering the integrity of its only 
recently secured sovereign territory.8 Jakarta supported an unmitigated neutralist bloc of 
3 Russell H. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia, The roots of commitment (New York: Crowell, 1975), 
p. 236. 
4 Ibid. p. 240. 
5 Estrella D. Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community (Quezon: University of Philippines Pres, 
1974), p. 24. 
6 Modelski, 'The Asian States participation in SEATO', p. 4. 
7 Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy a/Southeast Asia: 1945-1958 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 
p. 498. 
8 Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 33. 
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Southeast Asian states.9 SEATO ultimately failed because it was initiated by powers 
outside the region and predominantly meant to serve the interests of these external 
actors. 
Instead of joining a pro-Western, anti-communist organization such as SEATO, 
Indonesia and Burma actively attempted to create a more genuine Pan-Asian movement. 
In April 1955, Indonesia convened the Bandung Conference, which was attended by 
twenty-nine African and Asian countries. The conference served as a forum for the 
newly independent Third World countries of Asia and Africa to stake their claim for a 
voice in international affairs. The result of the conference was the Dasa Sila Bandung, 
or 'Ten Points of the Bandung Declaration'. The major components of the statement 
articulated a belief in the equality of all nations, respect for their sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, abstention from the use of 
collective defence and restraint from acts of aggression or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any country. 
The Bandung Conference therefore declared a specific regional security formula 
of non-alignment. It also led to the establishment of the post-war Non-Alignment 
Movement (NAM). A direct result of these developments was a boost for the diplomatic 
and strategic confidence of Third World countries, which during the Cold War had often 
become the pawns of the two superpowers. NAM generated a greater awareness of how 
weak states in Africa and Southeast Asia could manage their relationships with the more 
powerful actors in the international community. The Bandung Conference established 
the foundation for which many of the states subsequently pursued peaceful and friendly 
relations with the PRC. This was significant because a good number of Southeast Asian 
nations viewed China as a dissatisfied power, extending its support to the Viet Minh in 
South Vietnam and to other local communist parties. The Bandung Declaration created 
a basis for which it would be more difficult, or least embarrassing, for China not 
conform to the evolving principles and norms of international society. 10 
The contribution of the Bandung Conference to regional cooperation also rested 
on the content of Dasa Sila Bandung. This statement became an important benchmark 
for Southeast Asian states when they considered how they might develop their own 
engagement in an association that encompassed multilateral interaction. The confidence 
they gained from the Afro-Asian Conference provided the foundation for the ideas of 
9 Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, p. 242. 
10 Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 34. 
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regional independence and non-interference that would later come to characterise 
ASEAN. 
An initial attempt to establish a distinctly Southeast Asian vehicle for peaceful 
and constructive interaction among countries of the region was the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA), established in Bangkok on July 31 1961. 11 Only three countries, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand joined this association. ASA's objectives as 
stated in its Declaration released in Bangkok on 31 July 1961 included the promotion 
(through joint endeavour), of the well-being and the economic, social and cultural 
progress of the region, with no connection to any outside power or bloc. ASA 
established mechanisms intended to carry out these objectives including: an annual 
meeting of the foreign ministers of ASA; and a standing committee composed of 
experts in the fields of economic, socio-cultural and technical cooperation and research. 
There was no central secretariat to conduct the association's business. 
ASA soon faced problems, however, when the Philippines pressed its claim on 
Sabah, which the British intended to include in the proposed Federation of Malaysia in 
late 1962. In 1878, the Sultan of Sulu had transferred administration of Sabah to the 
North Borneo Company. Manila's claim on the territory was predicated on the argument 
that the British were relinquishing the rights originally held by the company, which now 
reverted to the Philippines as the sovereign successor to the Sultan and could not be 
transferred to another state. Malaysia and the Philippines suspended diplomatic relations 
in 1963 because of the dispute. For the next three years, as a result, ASA was essentially 
inactive. The association was revived only in 1966, when relations between Malaysia 
and Philippines improved, ASA members voted to phase out this organization with the 
founding of ASEAN the following year. 
Another attempt to create regional grouping was MAPHILINDO, which was 
proclaimed in August 1963 by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines. This grouping 
according to Estrella Solidum was one of 'political necessity.' 12 It was designed to 
prevent the worsening of the dispute between Malaysia on the one hand and Indonesia 
and the Philippines on the other over the incorporation of the Borneo territories into 
11 Background on ASA is provided by Vincent Pollard, 'ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian 
Regionalism' Asian Survey 10, 3, 1970, pp. 244-255 and Charles E. Morrison & Astri Suhrke, Strategies 
of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller States (New York: St Martin's press, 1978), pp. 
266-268. 
12 Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community, p. 29; Norman D. Palmer, 'SEATO, ASA. 
Maphilindo and ASPEC', in K.S. Sandhu, et. al. (eds), The ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), pp. 5-11 and Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies of Survival, pp. 147-
148. 
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Malaysia, which had proceeded without determining the wishes of the inhabitants of 
Borneo. The development of this group was dealt a decisive blow a month later with the 
creation of the 'Federation of Malaysia'. Neither Indonesia nor the Philippines 
recognised this new political entity. The Philippines was still mired in the Sabah dispute 
with Malaysia. For its part, Indonesia viewed Britain's creation of Malaysia as a case of 
an imperial power imposing its will on Southeast Asia and Borneo's incorporation into 
the new federation only intensified this feeling. In response, Indonesia adopted a policy 
of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) with Malaysia (and with Singapore, after it was expelled 
from Malaysia) that endured until 1966. Significantly, however, MAPHILINDO was 
the first regional organisation that Indonesia had agreed to join. 
These early attempts at forming regional organizations by the newly-
independent states of Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s failed. Their lack of 
success can be blamed on a number of factors. In the case of SEA TO there were too 
many competing agendas and too few Southeast Asian states committed to the 
organisation. Moreover, the dominance of external parties in SEATO primarily served 
the interests of the Western powers which did not fit the priorities of regional members. 
ASA failed to develop a viable institutional framework, while MAPHILINDO was 
ruined by member-states' rival claims over territory and sovereignty. MAPHILINDO 
self-destructed - not because of lack of respect for sovereignty but because they differed 
on what constituted state sovereignty in a special case. 
Above all, tensions generated by Indonesian politics and arguably hegemonic 
diplomacy directed towards the Malayan peninsula and beyond foreclosed any real 
chance for community-building ventures prior to the end of the Sukarno government in 
1965. In general, the newly independent states of the region were more concerned with 
nation building tasks, territorial disputes and other legacies of colonial rule. Inability to 
agree on what constitutes the norms of state sovereignty led regional states to deny other 
norms such as respect for territorial integrity, non-violence settlement of differences and 
peaceful coexistence. However, these early attempts to engage in multilateral diplomacy 
were important exercises that taught Southeast Asian nations valuable lessons about 
how to develop regional cooperation. 
The Establishment of ASEAN 
On August 8 1967, in Bangkok, the governments of Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines officially established ASEAN. This was the third 
attempt by Southeast Asia states to form a regional multilateral body following the 
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failure of ASA and MAPHILINDO. The choice of Thailand as a venue for the meeting 
said a great deal about the relationships between the participating governments. 
Bangkok was a neutral venue, especially given that Thailand had fewer disputes with its 
neighbours than did Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore or the Philippines. In fact the Thai 
government had played an important mediation role between Indonesia and Malaysia, as 
well as Malaysia and the Philippines to enable the meeting to occur. 13 
Because of its size and history, Indonesia clearly played a central role in the 
process of establishing ASEAN. 14 The principal negotiators were Adam Malik, 
Presidium Minister for Political Affairs and Foreign Minister of the New Order in 
Indonesia; Tun Abdul Razak, then Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and 
Minister for National Development of Malaysia; Narciso Ramos, the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines; S Rajaratman, Foreign Minister of Singapore; and 
Thanat Khoman, Thailand's Foreign Minister. The meeting itself has been described as 
a: 
... warm and congenial interaction among the five men, who had become 
friends despite their highly disparate personalities, [and that] contrasted 
sharply with - indeed, masked - the tensions that had marked and 
continued to loom over the relations between their countries. 15 
In some respects, the personal relationships that eventually emerged between 
these policymakers contrasted sharply with the actual state of the relationships between 
their countries. Indonesia only recently ended its konfrontasi with Malaysia and 
Singapore over the formation of Malaysia. Malaysia and Singapore had undergone a 
bitter separation in 1965. The Philippines continued to lay claim to the territory of North 
Borneo, which, under the name of 'Sabah', had been incorporated into the Federation of 
Malaysia as a component state. Thailand was not involved in any of these disputes, but 
nonetheless felt threatened by other regional conflicts occurring on and within its 
borders. Thailand's fears arose from conflicts in Indochina and a communist insurgency 
within - threats also felt by all the other countries represented in Bangkok. The 
'personal approach' to regional problems, extended by Southeast Asia diplomats in tum, 
13 See Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 
l 989a), p. 17 and Estrella D Solidum, The Politics of ASEAN. An Introduction to Southeast Asian 
Regionalism (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003), p. 21. 
14 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 54 - 56; also Ranjit Gill, ASEAN Towards the 21st Century. A thirty-
year Review of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (London: ASEAN Academic Press, 1997), p. 
20-21. 
15 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community: insights from the former 
ASEAN secretary-general (Singapore: !SEAS Publication, 2006), p. 2. 
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depended upon elites gradually improving relations between each other in ASEAN 
member countries. This has been a feature of the organisation down to the present day. 
As noted above, the creation of ASEAN in the aftermath of Indonesia's 
Konfrontasi with Malaysia and Singapore suggests a strong link between these two 
events. Dewi Fortuna Anwar has described the establishment of ASEAN as an act to 
"exorcise the ghost of confrontation."16 The late Michael Leifer argued that the 
establishment of ASEAN was "a by-product of institutionalised regional 
reconciliation."17 The establishment of ASEAN was a powerful symbol of Jakarta's 
reconciliation with its neighbours. It had paved the way for political settlement to 
Indonesia's coercive challenge to the legitimacy of Malaysia between 1963 and 1966. 18 
The end of the confrontation can therefore be seen as a formal step marking a new stage 
in regional relations and opening up a range of possibilities for the development of 
cooperation between Southeast Asian nations. 
Other countries that had experienced conflict with Indonesia saw the 
establishment of ASEAN as an opportunity to 'socialise' Indonesia and reduce it 
potential as a threat. Konfrontasi had underlined the disruptive potential of Indonesia as 
the largest and most militarily powerful state in the region. Suspicion of Jakarta was 
therefore a powerful factor in shaping Southeast Asian security perceptions in the post-
Konfrontasi era and remains one today. As residual and potential levels of conflict 
between them were reduced, ASEAN states' growing modus vivendi became 
increasingly significant, enhancing prospects for peaceful security relations within the 
Southeast Asian sub-region. 
In this sense, the governments of the five ASEAN member states would appear 
to have shaped a general approach which may be termed 'collective internal security'. 19 
The traditional concept of collective security, usually identified with the ill-fated 
League of Nations, was intended to protect member states from acts of aggression by 
any one of its number. A process of reconciliation institutionalised through Southeast 
Asia's framework of regional cooperation was designed to counter the revival of serious 
contention between member governments. 
16 Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy, p. 45. 
17 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, 'Introduction', p. vii 
18 Ibid. p. 2. 
19 Michael Leifer, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum: a Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle East', 
Dept. oflntemational Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (Canberra: Australian 
National University, 1998), p. 3. 
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Factors which led to the end of konfrontasi were mostly domestic. The change of 
Indonesian leadership from Sukarno to Suharto in late 1965 resulted in an altered 
foreign policy outlook that strongly supported the idea of regional cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. Suharto ended President Sukarno's aggressive foreign policy which had 
led to actions such as konfrontasi. His government became concerned with reducing 
intra-regional tensions and tried to reassure Indonesia's neighbours that the 'new 
Indonesia' would not be the destabilising influence it had been under Suharto's 
predecessor. Indonesia still aspired, however, to realise a more independent foreign 
policy. As an established leader of global non-alignment movement, Indonesia wished 
to avoid any open political affiliation between ASEAN and the West. For this reason, 
the Suharto government desired to be a co-founder of ASEAN as a means of restoring 
the country's regional and international standing.20 This change in priority transformed 
the image of Indonesia from a state largely seen as indifferent to efforts at regional 
order building to one being a major proponent of regionalism.21 Under Suharto, 
Indonesia also became more concerned with regional economic cooperation as an 
important means of promoting its own economic development. The belief was that 
economic stability in the ASEAN region would lead to political stability, which in 
Indonesia's view, meant a situation that was less vulnerable to outside intervention.22 
From the Indonesian perspective, a new form of regional cooperation was, therefore, 
necessary in order to foster the development of Southeast Asia. There was also the 
advantage that by joining a new regional association - by virtue of its size alone -
Indonesia might be able to assume the role of 'the leading country' in any such 
organisation. 
The other four founding states, however, also had their own individual agendas 
for A SEAN. Malaysia had been in dispute with all four of the other founding states 
during various intervals since gaining its independence 1957. There had been the 
dispute with Indonesia that led to confrontation. There had been quarrels with Singapore 
between 1963 and 1966 after Singapore's separation from Malaysian Federation. In 
1965, border friction with Thailand had erupted and friction with the Philippines had 
resulted from Manila's claims on Sabah. Consequently, from Malaysia's point of view 
20 Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, p. 45. 
21 Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Colorado: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 12. 
22 Vinita Sukrasep, ASEAN in International Relations, Institute of Security and International Studies, 
(Bangkok: Chulalongkom University, 1989), p. 8. 
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joining ASEAN was an important means of developing better relations with all of its 
regional neighbours. 
Despite the end of confrontation, Singapore was the least secure nation at the 
Bangkok meeting. The government of the city state saw both Indonesia and Malaysia as 
potential enemies. Singapore had experienced a bitter political separation from 
Malaysia, and felt uncomfortable as a country populated by a Chinese majority, 
surrounded by its two much larger Melayu and Islamic neighbours. Singapore had no 
alternative to joining ASEAN. Remaining outside the organization would have left it 
isolated politically and economically. For Singapore the promise of regional 
cooperation offered by ASEAN was a way of coping with its own geopolitical 
adversity. 
Thailand was the only mainland Southeast Asian country in the group and also 
the one with the least history of disputes with the other countries. In spite of this fact, 
the Thai government was still concerned about irredentist sentiments within Malaysia 
towards the Muslim-Malay co-religionist population that inhabited Thailand's southern 
most provinces.23 By becoming a member of ASEAN, Thailand hoped to discourage any 
support by the Malaysian government for the people in the border region. For Thailand, 
the main purpose of joining ASEAN was to provide an extra alternative to its traditional 
reliance on Western powers to strengthen its domestic stability and national security.24 
The Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, hoped that ASEAN would become an 
organ for a 'collective political defence' of the region, allowing Bangkok to employ a 
policy of regional co-operation that could supplement and perhaps eventually replace its 
alliance with the United States25 
The Philippines' membership in ASEAN reflected an attempt to prove that it 
was part of Southeast Asia. By supporting ASEAN, Manila was pursuing the aims of 
previous Filipino leaders who had played major roles in the formation of the antecedent 
regional organizations (President Garcia, for example, helped to form ASA, while 
President Macapagal sponsored MAPHILIND0). 26 The Philippines also expected that in 
the long run regional cooperation would result in economic gains. 
The establishment of ASEAN centred around political cooperation among 
members to avoid conflict between them. In addition, there was economic cooperation 
23 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, p. 18. 
24 Sukrasep, ASEAN in International Relations, p. 8 
25 Tim Huxley, 'ASEAN Security Co-operation: Past, Present and Future', in Alison Broinowski (ed.), 
ASEAN into 1990 (London: Macmilllan Pres, 1990), p. 84. 
26 Sukrasep, ASEAN in International Relations, p. 11. 
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m order to counter the effects of imperialism and improve the well being of the 
populations of the member-states. Malaysia's Tun Dr Ismail noted that economic 
cooperation is often a durable foundation upon which political and cultural co-operation 
can be built. Thanat' s view was that ASEAN could counter the revived germs of an old 
disease: imperialism. Narciso Ramos, in a similar vein, declared that the time had come 
for a concerted struggle against the forces which are arrayed against the very survival of 
member countries.27 For his part Adam Malik stressed: 
... for a strong bulwark against imperialist manipulations as well as a 
decisive stabilizing factor in this part of the world, ending once and for all 
foreign influence, domination and intervention, stemming yellow as well 
as white imperialism in Southeast Asia. 28 
Notwithstanding the divergence of motivation among ASEAN's founding 
members, these countries were also united by a feeling of insecurity, as newly 
independent countries engaged in the difficult process of nation building. Almost all of 
them had to deal with secession movements to some degree or other in the period after 
the decolonialisation of the region. As Michel Leifer pointed out, the "common threat 
was defined with reference to internal subversion and insurgency only, not to any single 
external source".29 In this situation, there was a mutually held perception that regional 
cooperation would discourage member countries from providing support to secession 
movements within the group that could endanger the territorial unity of individual 
states. 
The establishment of ASEAN was also as a result of the awareness of the leaders 
to the dangers of major power rivalry and the ideological competition between them. 
The United States had just revived its 'domino theory' (originally advanced by 
President Dwight Eisenhower in the height of the Cold War)3° by supporting South 
Vietnam and claiming that if South Vietnam was defeated by communist North 
Vietnam, then the other countries in the region such as Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, 
Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia, would soon share its fate. This kind of proposition 
27 On statements from state officials, i.e. Tun Dr Ismail, Thanat and Narciso Ramos see Gill, ASEAN 
Towards the ~I st Century, p. 33. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Leifer, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum', 1998, p. 2. 
30 See the explanation of Domino Theory in Tim Huxley, 'Southeast Asia in the study of international 
relations: the rise and decline of a region', The Pacific Review, 9, 2, 1996, p. 204. It was proposed by 
Dwight Eisenhower in 1954 when he claimed that 'the loss oflndochina will cause the fall of Southeast 
Asia like a set of dominoes.' This view underlined the American policy in the region and influenced the 
attitude of non - and anti-communist Southeast Asian governments. 
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made Southeast Asia increasingly sensitive to prospects of communist expansionism in 
Southeast Asia. Yet, the ASEAN member-states had only recently achieved 
independence from colonial rule and also wanted to avoid any new form of dependency 
or intensification of great power rivalry in peninsular Southeast Asia. 
The creation of ASEAN thus occurred at a time of continuing escalation in the 
Vietnam War and also was congruent with China's 'Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution,' which dominated the consciousness of the whole Asian region. 
Washington's military involvement in Vietnam accelerated after the U.S. bombing of 
North Vietnam in February 1965, during which the Americans had made use of military 
bases in Japan, the Philippines and Thailand. 31 In China, the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution began on August 1966 and mass movements of student activists continued 
throughout 1967. This revolution was initiated by Mao Zedong to revitalize the 
revolutionary spirit of the Chinese people, particularly in opposition to the Vietnam 
War. 
The security situation in Southeast Asia, and particularly the internal threat 
posed by communism to states such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and 
Singapore, was a shared concern. All of these states confronted the possibility of 
instability from communist subversion and ethnic separation. These problems were 
further exacerbated by the intensity of Cold War rivalries in Southeast Asia, which also 
had the potential to destabilise the region. These concerns were reflected in a reflective 
statement by Adam Malik, Indonesia's Foreign Minister: 
There was a convergence in the political outlook of the five prospective 
member- nations, both with regard to national priority objectives as on the 
question of how best to secure these objectives in the emergent strategic 
configuration of East Asia ... 
The five member nations were also aware of the compulsive inclination of 
outside powers, and especially the major powers, to continue to insert their 
interests in the affairs of this vitally important part of Asia. 32 
However, ASEAN was never meant to become another SEATO, or anything 
approaching that type of security pact. There was a general concern over common 
external threats among the five ASEAN member states (though this concern was not 
specifically directed towards any one country). Nevertheless, more internally-oriented 
security concerns did form an integral rationale underlying the establishment of ASEAN 
31 Yoshiyuki Hagiwara, 'The Formation of ASEAN,' in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds.) The 2nd 
ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 18. 
32 See in Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community, p. 161 
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m 1967. According to Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl the strong perception of living in an 
international environment fraught with dangers and inhabited by forces only too eager 
to exploit internal weakness provided the main impetus for the formulation of 
ASEAN33 • This perception with internal stability has prevented ASEAN from 
disintegration, despite inter-state tensions between its members. The establishment of 
ASEAN helped reduce these tensions and, together with generating genuine hopes of 
revitalizing regional cooperation, allowed ASEAN to become successful in policy areas 
where ASA and MAPHILINDO had failed. 
The Bargaining Process and the Establishment ASEAN 
The bargaining process that accompanied the establishment of ASEAN reflected 
the different views of the five co-founding nations, but also demonstrated how they 
managed to finesse differences between them. One significant issue debated by the five 
states was how to position ASEAN relative to powerful states outside the region. 
Indonesia wanted to minimize the role of external powers and questioned the legitimacy 
of foreign (i.e. Western) military bases in the region. 34 As the largest and most powerful 
of the ASEAN member-states, Indonesia was concerned to deny external powers 
influence in Southeast Asia. The Indonesian military was particularly concerned about 
the defence arrangements between the United States, Thailand and the Philippines and 
between Britain, Singapore and Malaysia. The basis of such concern was illustrated 
during the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) revolt of 
1958-61, when several Western-allied neighbouring countries, particularly Malaysia, 
Singapore, and the Philippines had assisted the regional rebels against the central 
government in Jakarta. The British allowed the PRRI rebels to obtain supplies and later 
to seek sanctuary in territories still under their control.35 This type of episode, therefore, 
had long been viewed by Jakarta with concern and suspicion. 
Singapore and the Philippines resisted Indonesia's demands for total non-
alignment because they believed that "access to external sources of countervailing 
power had direct practical relevance to national security."36 For the Philippines, the 
Indonesian position would have challenged Manila's own security relationship with the 
United States, which maintained major military bases on the island of Luzon. With the 
33 Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional organization and order in South-East Asia (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1982), p. 34. 
34 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, p. 22. 
35 Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, p. 133. 
36 Ibid. 
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exception of Indonesia, the ASEAN states still depended upon alliances with Western 
states to ensure their security from external threats. Most ASEAN states, but especially 
Singapore, were also concerned about the region being dominated by Indonesia if there 
were no external powers to check Jakarta's potential ambitions. 
The idea of excluding all external actors from the region was the source of 
considerable disagreement at the Bangkok meeting. Finally, however, all five states 
agreed, as a general principle, that Southeast Asia should be free from the possibility of 
external intervention. They all understood the appeal of being the masters of their own 
region and so the Indonesian ambition of non-intervention in the region by external 
powers was incorporated in preamble of the Bangkok Declaration: " ... the countries of 
Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social 
stability of the region and that they were determined to ensure their stability and 
security from external interference in any form or manifestation."37 
The Bangkok Declaration, therefore, in principle, rejected the military activities 
of external actors within the region. It affirmed that foreign military bases were not to 
be used to threaten or subvert other countries in the region. The preamble states: 
... all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed 
concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used 
directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of 
states in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national 
development. 38 
The ASEAN states agreed to include the statement 'all foreign bases are 
temporary' in the declaration out of deference to Indonesia because they recognised the 
need to have Indonesia as part of the new regional organization. As noted above, the 
objective of removing foreign bases from Southeast Asia stood as a statement of 
principle, with no timetable for actual realisation. In a similar way the preamble 
mentions the concept of sovereign prerogatives, but not in a manner that suggests a true 
concordance of interests. This endorsement is probably best understood as an intra-
mural concession; not as an expression of genuine consensus about how to manage 
regional order.39 This type of outcome has been a hallmark of ASEAN pronouncements 
in order to avoid conflict and play down differences and has resulted in a less 
institutionalised approach to resolving issues. As previously noted, ASEAN statements 
37 See ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), 8 August 1967 
38 Ibid. 
39 Leifer, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum', p. 23. 
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tend not to be legally binding and decisions by the Association were often delayed (an 
unofficial arrangement to 'agree to disagree') until more long term solutions can be 
found. Such approaches have come to characterize the way in which ASEAN manages 
conflict and is commensurate to the 'A SEAN Way'. 
The Bangkok Declaration was largely confined to be a generalised appeal for 
better understanding and meaningful co-operation among member-states in economic, 
social and cultural fields. The focus on economic and social cooperation had two 
purposes. Firstly, it avoided declarations portraying ASEAN as a security alliance or 
military grouping. Secondly, it concentrated on the single issue - economic development 
- that was the source of much of the insecurity in ASEAN countries. The relevance of 
economic development to regional security was based on the half-truth that poverty is 
the prime cause of political discontent because it provides a fertile soil in which 
revolutionary forces can flourish. 40 
The Bangkok Declaration did not, however, mention security and political 
cooperation in explicit terms. The language of the Declaration on these topics was 
muted, mentioning only a mutual desire "to promote regional peace and stability 
through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among 
countries of the region and adherence."41 But there were tacit security objectives in the 
document. The previously mentioned statement on foreign military bases, which were 
articulated in the preamble, is illustrative. The Declaration also affirmed the principle of 
non-interference in the national affairs of member countries, in order to ensure that the 
anti-government forces of one country would not be supported and sheltered by 
neighbouring states. In this way, the removal of threats from the immediate regional 
neighbourhood was aimed at fostering the development of trust-building among the 
ASEAN states. If successful, this process would allow their governments to devote 
scarce resources, both financial and military, more readily towards domestic purposes.42 
Greater resource allocations directed toward their own citizens made for better internal 
security and also helped to establish greater political stability of the region. 
There were important considerations why the Declaration's references to 
regional security were deliberately subdued and why military cooperation, in particular, 
was excluded from the agenda in Bangkok. A major reason was to deflect hostility or 
suspicions from communist countries towards the formation of the Association. North 
40 Ibid, p. 2. 
41 ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok 8 August 1967. 
42 Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, p. 134. 
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Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union had already condemned ASEAN as a defence 
pact or military alliance, as well as an extension or surrogate of SEAT0.43 Moreover, 
matters related to defence and security were also too sensitive for member countries to 
negotiate, particularly in view of the various bilateral tensions that existed between 
them. A third factor for not addressing regional security directly was that some 
prominent members, especially Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, preferred to espouse 
their own perceptions of 'comprehensive security'. The new Suharto regime viewed 
security as mostly synonymous with 'national resilience' while Singapore also 
embodied domestic elements in its 'Total Defence' policy posture. Finally, as already 
mentioned, the focus on economic issues reflected the core concerns of the ASEAN 
states, especially as economic development was also seen as an important security 
measure in the fight against internal subversion. For example, Indonesia under Suharto 
considered economic rehabilitation and development as the first task of the government 
after the economic chaos of the mid-1960s. 
The immediate international response to A SEAN' s creation suggested that there 
was little hope that regional cooperation in Southeast Asia had a bright future. The 
security situation in Southeast Asia was so grim during ASEAN's early years that the 
international media often likened the region to the Balkans. Singaporean Foreign 
Minister, S. Jayakumar, recalled that the Western press frequently described the 
countries of the region as a row of dominoes that were about to fall. 44 From the outside, 
the members of ASEAN seemed too diverse and lacking a strong, shared threat to unite 
them. The " ... relatively impermeable politico-geographical argument in favour of 
ASEAN's survival was the member-states' firm desire to remain minimally affected by 
the new colonising style of the principle actors within the framework of East-West 
tension".45 Even so, there was little optimism at ASEAN's creation that would ever 
attain its vision of regional cooperation. 
Challenges to security cooperation in Southeast Asia continued to emerge, but 
ASEAN leaders simultaneously demonstrated the capacity to modify traditionally 
nationalist postures. A case in point was Indonesian President Suharto's response to 
1967 crisis between Indonesia and Singapore. This began when two Indonesian marines 
were convicted as saboteurs and hanged by the Singaporean government for causing the 
43 Severino, Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community, p. 161; Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: 
Foreign Policy and Regionalism, p. 132-133. 
44 ASEAN, Overview <http://www.aseansec.org/92.htm> Access 27 March 2008 
45 Dosch Jorn and Manfred Mols, 'Thirty years of ASEAN: achievements and challenges', The Pacific 
Review, 11, 2, 1998, p. 169. 
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deaths of three people after setting off a bomb at McDonald House on Orchard Road in 
1967. The hangings occurred despite a clemency plea by Suharto and inflamed the 
feelings of Indonesian nationalists. Notwithstanding such incidents, ASEAN survived 
and Suharto's position of moderation served as an example of increased elite flexibility 
in the interest of building stronger sense of regional community under the logic of 
regional cooperation. Despite such incidents, during this period ASEAN also served as a 
rallying point for the member states.46 While none of them were initially willing to 
concede to the other in their various disputes, equally none of them wanted to be the 
first to be accused of sabotaging the agreement for regional cooperation reached in 
Bangkok. 
The Consolidation and Dealing with the external Power 
After the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was relatively inactive for some years. 
During this period, the member states had time to recover from the stress that 
konfrontasi and other regional disputes had placed on their relationships. The period 
was also one of consolidation for ASEAN, particularly because they managed to avoid 
further intramural conflict. In addition, the five ASEAN states also looked to ways of 
dealing with external factors in a rapidly changing strategic environment. The concept 
of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (ZOFPAN) is an example of 
how ASEAN sought to deal with such issues in the years following its establishment. 
ZOFPAN 
The ZOFPAN proposal was endorsed by the ASEAN members on 27 November 
1971 in Kuala Lurnpur.47 The idea was to respond in a unified way to the changing 
policies of the external powers active in Southeast Asia. A number of international 
developments occurred between 1967 and 1971, which rapidly altered the region's 
security environment. The most significant of these was the recession of traditional 
colonial powers from South East Asia. By 1968 Britain was dismantling its naval and 
military bases in Singapore and Malaysia. This British move forced Singapore and 
Malaysia to rethink their own security strategies. The following year, US President 
Richard Nixon issued his 'Guam Doctrine', limiting American involvement m 
Southeast Asia and signalling the US' s gradual disengagement from the war m 
Vietnam. The regional states interpreted this new policy as signalling a declining 
46 Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, p. 169 
47 See ASEAN, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, 27 November 1971, Malaysia 
<http://www.aseansec.org> 
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American commitment to the security of its Asian allies. Also in 1969, the Soviet Union 
proposed an Asian collective security system. Other factors (such as the re-emergence 
of China after the Cultural Revolution, the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict, the 
increasing importance of Japanese economic power and the spread of the Vietnam War 
to Laos and Cambodia) underlined the reality that Southeast Asia was undergoing rapid 
and historical changes. 48 All of these developments marked a sea change in the power 
balance within Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member-states were keen to anticipate 
the final outcomes and to guard against threats to their national territories. 
Malaysia was the most active ASEAN member in supporting the 'neutralisation 
of Southeast Asia'. This was an interesting role for Malaysia, particularly given that at 
the time it had a reputation for following the 'Western Camp'. British still maintained a 
small political and military commitment there as part of the Five Power Defense 
Arrangements (FPDA) and the economic dominance of British companies were 
unchallenged.49 A change in domestic leadership had also been instrumental in causing 
Malaysia to propose the ZOFPAN initiative. The former Deputy Prime Minister, Tun 
Abdul Razak, became Prime Minister in 1970 and wanted to distinguish his 
administration from that of his very pro-British predecessor. He was determined to take 
the country on a new direction in foreign policy towards non-alignment and the 
ZOFP AN proposal facilitated that goal. 
Other domestic political factors also played an important role in Malaysia's 
support for neutrality in the region. In May 1969, the country had experienced a wave of 
race riots between ethnic Malays and Chinese. Neutrality was a means of peacefully 
accommodating the growing interests of China in Southeast Asia. By reaching out to 
Beijing, the Malaysian government also hoped to promote domestic reconciliation with 
its own Chinese minority, while at the same time undermining the ethnic-Chinese-
dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP). In addition, Malaysia believed that 
ZOFP AN would help to create a benign environment that would enable it to focus on its 
own economic development and relieve it of having to take on a heavy defence burden. 
In the broader international context, detente between the United States and the Soviet 
Union and the easing of tensions between the United States and China convinced 
Malaysia that the time was right for its proposal. 50 
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On 9 September 1970, at the Non-Aligned Conference in Lusaka, Zambia, Tun 
Abdul Razak advanced his proposal for regional neutrality in his first major policy 
statement to an international audience. His neutralisation proposal had two distinct 
components. One was the collective neutralisation of Southeast Asia via guarantees by 
the United States, the Soviet Union and China. These powers would be required to 
accept and respect Southeast Asia as an area of neutrality, exclude the region from 
competition among themselves and devise supervisory means to guarantee its neutrality. 
The second element required countries in the region to fully commit themselves to the 
principles of non-interference and non-involvement in the rivalries among the big 
powers, and seek the exclusion of these rivalries from Southeast Asia.51 The concept 
showed Malaysian thinking was clearly based on fusing two different ideas. 
Having launched its proposal for the neutralisation of the region in Lusaka, the 
Malaysian government also raised the ZOPF AN idea in the United Nations, thus 
seeking both multilateral and bilateral support for the concept. Despite its own 
enthusiasm for the idea, the Malaysian government received an unsympathetic response 
from its regional partners. Indonesia would not accept the neutralisation of Southeast 
Asian via guarantees from external powers. Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, 
had told a meeting of the Press Foundation of Asia held in Bali September 1971 (well 
before the Kuala Lumpur declaration of ZOFPAN on 27 November): "It will not be in 
the interest of Southeast Asia to see any single power within the new constellation 
assume a position of paramount, as this would only lead to continued tensions or even 
confrontations between the major powers."52 Razak's neutralisation proposal was 
regarded by Jakarta as being a direct contradiction to Indonesia's own prescription for 
regional order which was very much in the spirit of ASEAN's founding document the 
Bangkok Declaration. That document implied that Southeast Asia should assume its 
own responsibility for the management of regional affairs and not rely on external 
powers. Indonesia's President Suharto responded Tun Razak' s appeal to support the 
Malaysian neutralisation proposal by stressing the need for national resilience, and 
citing Indonesia's own doctrine of self-reliance. 53 
The other ASEAN states also initially opposed Tun Razak's neutralisation plan 
because they still basically relied on foreign powers to guarantee their security. 
Thailand was at that time more closely aligned with United States than any other state in 
51 Ibid. p. 15. 
52 Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 53. 
53 Ibid p. 56. 
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Southeast Asia. Field Marshal Thanom, the then Thai Prime Minister, visited Kuala 
Lumpur in the middle of 1971 and made it clear that he could not accept the Malay 
neutralisation plan because of Chinese backing for the communist insurgency in 
Thailand. The Philippines was also sceptical of the proposal, with President Marcos 
telling correspondents in Manila that he believed it was "a novel concept to the point 
where it is an experiment."54 The Philippine's resistance to the proposal was signalled 
when Foreign Secretary Romulo told Tun Razak that the Philippines wanted to know if 
the neutralisation plan would "prejudice territorial boundaries and certain commitments' 
made by the Philippines, a reference to the dispute over the sovereignty of Sabah and to 
its defence relationship with the US."55 For Thailand and the Philippines, bound by 
alliance commitments with the United States, neutralisation was not deemed to be 
feasible option at the time. 
Singapore, perhaps the most vulnerable state in Southeast Asia (on the basis of 
its size and location), was also opposed to the concept of regional neutralisation. For 
economic and security reasons Singapore was in favour of a permanent great power 
presence in the region, particularly that of the United States.56 As the first President of 
Singapore, I. Yusof bin Ishak, told his nation's parliament soon after Singapore's 
independence: "So many of our neighbours and we ourselves would not have had a 
separate existence if purely Asian forces were to settle the shape of the decolonised 
Asia."57 His speech was a thinly veiled reference to confrontation during 1963-1965, 
which, without British Commonwealth military assistance, could well have seen 
Singapore become an adjunct of Indonesia. 
In the autumn of 1971, however, other events occurred that altered the existing 
situation in the region and brought Tun Razak's proposal greater credibility. President 
Nixon visited Beijing and China took its seat at the UN. These events forced the 
ASEAN countries to consider the state of their own relationship with China. Despite 
internal disagreement about the Malay neutralisation proposal, ASEAN member-states 
finally compromised in order not to conspicuously appear to reject Malaysia's initiative. 
In fact, they endorsed the Indonesian vision of regional order - focusing on national 
resilience and self reliance - producing the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality in Southeast Asia. This was done at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
54 Ibid., p. 69. 
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meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971.The operative paragraphs of the 
ZOPF AN Declaration were: 
That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are 
determined to exert initially necessary effort to secure the recognition of, 
and respect for South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside 
Powers; 
That Southeast Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden 
the area of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity 
and closer relationship.58 
The Declaration did not mention the idea of neutralisation as had been proposed 
by Malaysia, neither in the operative paragraphs nor in the accompanying Joint 
Communique. The formula lacked a clear conceptual definition of neutralisation, which 
was referred to in the Preamble only as a "desirable objective". There was also the 
recommendation that the ASEAN states should "explore ways and means of bringing 
about its realisation." Neutralisation was conceived to be one of many options that could 
meet the objectives of the Declaration. Though the term 'neutralisation' was used in the 
Preamble, the operative concept was really more attuned to political 'neutrality'. The 
meaning of neutrality was conceived as being the status of a zone, free from 'any form 
or manner of interference by outside Powers' - a phrase that again, echoed the Bangkok 
Declaration. As noted above, this constituted a political definition of neutrality, rather 
than a legalistic one involving the delineation of rights and duties. 59 
The formula also excluded any role for the major powers as guarantors for 
Southeast Asia, though the Preamble strongly implied that they should respect the 
sovereignty and independence of the ASEAN states. Nor did Declaration make any 
reference to foreign military bases or military alliances with foreign powers. It only 
refers to the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. Since the notion of 'temporary basing' was 
never precisely defined, each ASEAN country was free to interpret how it wished to 
relate to foreign powers operating bases in their territory. It was at least implicitly 
agreed in Kuala Lumpur that the Declaration should have no direct bearing on how each 
A SEAN country shaped or sustained existing military arrangements. 60 
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The ambiguous language of the ZOPF AN Declaration invited critics. According 
to Shaun Narine, it merely reflected " ... a political compromise cobbled together to 
accommodate ASEAN states with strongly divergent strategic perspectives."61 The 
declaration amounted to a broad statement of intent that imposed no legal obligations on 
the signatories. The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality was meant, at best, to be a 
long-term goal but one that would not undermine the existing policies and security 
arrangements of the ASEAN states. 62 The fact that no specific guidelines were 
developed on how ZOPF AN could be achieved, represented an ambiguous commitment 
to the concept on the part of most of the ASEAN states. 
ZOPF AN was therefore a relatively amorphous concept over which most of the 
ASEAN core member-states had 'serious reservations.' 63 For Thailand and the 
Philippines, existing security relations with the United States was a better security 
guarantee than being part of a neutrality zone. Singapore preferred to trust its security to 
a balance of great power forces in the region. Each state had a different interpretation of 
what ZOPF AN meant and implied. It is not surprising that ASEAN made very little 
movement toward implementing the policy. Tim Huxley has argued that ZOPF AN was 
a statement of principles that was never meant to be taken seriously and represented 
what the ASEAN states understood to be "a vague long-term aspiration."64 
Nonetheless, in the period before 1975, ZOPFAN stood out as ASEAN's most 
conspicuous diplomatic accomplishment. This was the case despite strong criticism that 
the organisation had accomplished very little during its first decade. In retrospect, 
however, ASEAN may have been far more successful during this formative period than 
is first evident. During this period of apparent inactivity, the ASEAN states were 
actually recovering from the trauma of Konfrontasi. According to Frank Frost: 
While its formal co-operative projects were limited and its members were 
divided on the major questions of regional security, ASEAN had enabled a 
pattern of regular contacts to develop among regional leaders which was 
reducing the likelihood of inter-state conflict and which later provided a 
base for more ambitious programme of consultation and co-operation. 65 
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The ZOPFAN Declaration of 1971 provided a principled basis for avoiding 
positions on issues such as the Cold War and hostilities in Indochina. It also bolstered 
ASEAN's credibility in the developing world, and provided Moscow and Beijing with a 
more concrete rationalisation for soliciting A SEAN' s good will when it suited their 
purposes. At the same time, ASEAN members pleased the West by their fervently anti-
communist domestic policies, and all of them continued to rely heavily on Western 
trade and investment for achieving their core economic objectives. Moreover, the goal 
of neutrality notwithstanding, ASEAN states appreciated the collective advantage the 
organisation's by member-states derived from the security umbrella provided by 
traditional external defence affiliations. In this context, the ZOPF AN ideal was, in 
reality, only a long term aspiration. 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
The TAC emerged from the Bali Conference convened on 24 February 1976. It 
was first meeting of the ASEAN heads of state and this alone signified that the 
institution was becoming more important to the foreign policies of the member-states. 
The conference and its outcomes reflected the concerns of the leaders for the geo-
political situation in the region. The retrenchment of US military power from Southeast 
Asia and the related collapse of anti-communist regimes in South Vietnam and 
Cambodia in 1975 provided a powerful rationale for ASEAN's political development as 
a basis of underwriting its member-states' regime survival. The leaders of the ASEAN 
countries obviously viewed the rise of communist Vietnam with deep suspicion. They 
feared that the triumphant Vietnamese communist government would provide arms to 
indigenous communist movements in other parts of Southeast Asia, particularly 
Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. 66 
Concerned with the potential for communist expansionism in the region, the 
ASEAN states decided to initiate a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). 
Previously, Indonesia had sought to make more explicit the provision for security co-
operation between ASEAN members, but there was no consensus for how existing 
bilateral defence collaborations with external partners could be dealt with under 
ASEAN's auspices.67 In his opening address in Bali, President Suharto rejected the 
notions of defence cooperation on an intra-ASEAN basis. He clarified the concept of 
security as being "inward looking" namely "to establish an orderly, peaceful and stable 
66 Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p. 23. 
67 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, p. 68 
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conditions within each individual territory, free from any subversive elements and 
infiltrations"68 The Indonesian view was that security should be defined primarily with 
reference to the concept of national resilience, "which will in turn be conducive to the 
creation of a regional resilience." This view was echoed by Malaysia's Prime Minister, 
Datuk Hussien Orm, whose foreign ministry was very keen to build a political bridge to 
Hanoi and therefore concerned to prevent any ASEAN initiative which might impede 
that exercise. He stressed that "ASEAN is not, nor should be, a security organization. In 
the final analysis, our security depends on our ability to provide the goods of life for our 
people and to build societies which are just and fair to all."69 A role for ASEAN as a 
security alliance was also explicitly repudiated by Philippines President Ferdinand 
Marcos. No specific mention of conventional security cooperation was made in their 
opening addresses by either Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore or Prime 
Minister Kuk:rit Pramoj of Thailand. 
Despite general agreement among ASEAN elites that their institution was not 
and should not become a security organisation, the outcomes of the 1976 Bali 
Conference did have security connotations. Within the Declaration on ASEAN 
Concord, one facet of a security role for this organization was already articulated. The 
Declaration endorsed the "continuation of the co-operation on a non-ASEAN basis 
between states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interest". 70 
The treaty made a reference to a regional 'code of conduct' and an institutional 
mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes in order to "to promote perpetual peace, 
everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples."71 The guiding principal of the 
TAC was mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all nations. Other principles included: freedom from external 
interference; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of 
differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of threats or use of force; and 
effective cooperation between the member states. Most of these principles, such as non-
interference and the peaceful settlement of differences were not exceptional and were 
taken from the UN Charter and the Bandung Declaration. 
In effect, the TAC was ASEAN's code of conduct for regional relations and, as 
such, embodied the most important norms and values governing the behaviour of states 
68 ASEAN, Ten Years ASEAN, Jakarta, 1978, p. 88. 
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in the international environment. It also served as a non-aggression pact between the 
member states. 72 The treaty obliged its signatories to settle disputes peacefully through 
consultation and promoted cooperation in different areas, with the objective of 
furthering "economic development, peace and stability in Southeast Asia." Importantly, 
the TAC explicitly allowed for the accession of non-ASEAN Southeast Asian states to 
the treaty, which was a gesture indicating the desire for peaceful coexistence between 
ASEAN and the communist states of Southeast Asia.73 
The treaty of Amity and Cooperation was conceived as a way of promoting 
greater mutual understanding both within and beyond the boundaries of ASEAN. It 
thereby served to promote the Association's general security interests and the essence of 
that understanding was the concept of respect for national sovereignty. This treaty 
clearly demonstrated an attempt to realize the long-standing commitment for ASEAN 
member-states to respect national sovereignty in managing security in the region. 
ASEAN's Role in Mediating the Cambodian Conflict 
The conflict in Cambodia had been ongoing ever smce the Soviet-backed 
Vietnamese invasion and the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime took place in 1979. The 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia had unsettling implications for the ASEAN 
countries. The occupation violated ASEAN's code of conduct for regional cooperation, 
as embodied in the TAC. It had also challenged the commitment of the ASEAN 
members to such principles as the non-use of force, respect for state sovereignty and 
non-intervention. The invasion of Cambodia thus constituted a "blatant challenge" to 
the public philosophy of ASEAN. 74 The member-states governments were conscious, 
therefore, of the implications that this development might have in the future for one of 
their own members. For example, the Vietnamese occupation potentially threatened the 
security of ASEAN's front-line state Thailand, which shared a 2,000 kilometre common 
border with Cambodia and Laos, as well as close geographical proximity to Vietnam 
itself. The flow of refuges from Cambodia likewise became a significant burden for 
Thailand. The invasion had also seemed to dash the 'dream' of the original founders of 
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ASEAN to have one Southeast Asia, eventually including Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. 75 
Although ASEAN rejected Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia as a violation of its 
sovereignty and self-determination, in reality, member-states had different views on 
how to respond this military intervention. Naturally, Thailand was most concerned by 
the Vietnam's resultant occupation, seeing it as a potential threat to Thai independence 
and a challenge to its own national sovereignty.76 There was also a long history of 
rivalry between the two countries. In addition, the Thais saw Vietnam as a dangerous, 
expansionist power that was closely allied with Soviet Union.77 Of primary concern in 
Bangkok was the prospect of a new concentration of power in Indochina under 
Vietnamese and quasi-Soviet auspices. 
The Indonesian government and, to lesser extent, its Malaysian counterpart, 
were less threatened by Vietnam. For them, China was a more serious long-term 
strategic threat to their national security than a strong, independent Vietnam. Their 
different perception to the dangers of the Vietnamese invasion compared to other core 
member states became evident in 1980 with their release of the Kuantan Declaration. In 
March of that year, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussain Orm and President 
Suharto of Indonesia met in Kuantan, Malaysia, and actually expressed sympathy for 
Vietnam's position in Cambodia. They recognised that Vietnam had a legitimate 
security interest in the future of Cambodia and argued that Western economic assistance 
should be provided to Vietnam. 78 This declaration contravened the general ASEAN 
stance of maintaining consensus on regional security issues and grew out of the long-
standing hesitancy Malaysia and Indonesia had over taking a hostile position against 
Vietnam.79 
Indonesia had long regarded China as its main external threat, while Vietnam, 
despite its communist identity, was regarded as a potential security partner to be 
included in a structure of regional relations in order to counter Chinese influence.80• 
Indonesian has more commonality with Vietnam compared with other core member 
states - both countries had a 'common revolutionary heritage' and thus share an acute 
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sense of sovereignty identity. General L.B. Murdani, commander of Indonesia's armed 
forces and a Suharto confidant, declared that all Southeast Asian states should be 
forging closer ties with each other in order to "face the potential threat from a stronger 
China in the next century". Murdani added "Some people are talking about a 
Vietnamese buffer between Southeast Asia and China - I don't want to put it that 
bluntly, but maybe that's what we're thinking of ... " 81 Indonesia, like Vietnam, saw 
China as a threat. Just as Chinese expansionism threatened Vietnam, Indonesia 
harboured suspicions of China's hegemonic ambitions, especially after the alleged 
involvement of ethnic Chinese in the 1965 attempted coup d'etat. 
However, the differences of perspective on Vietnam between some ASEAN 
members, particularly Thailand and Indonesia, did not prevent ASEAN from 
maintaining a credible image of cohesion over this issue. Indeed, the different emphasis 
on regional security issues among the members actually increased ASEAN' s flexibility 
and allowed the organisation to pursue all possible avenues for discussion over 
Cambodia. 82 Through intra-mural bargaining and collective dialogue on a appropriate 
response to the Cambodian problem, the ASEAN member-states became more closely 
knit diplomatically.83 ASEAN's regional credentials, which highlighted its respect for 
national sovereignty, permitted the Association to play a considerable role in denying 
international legitimacy to the government imposed on Pnom Penh by the Vietnamese 
army.84 
A SEAN' s policies and strategies to end the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia 
also gave the Association a significant international profile as a regional actor. During 
the occupation, which lasted from 1978 to 1990, ASEAN demonstrated its ability as a 
community to apply diplomatic pressure that eventually compelled Vietnam to depart 
from Cambodia and underscored ASEAN's ability to be a coherent diplomatic force. To 
minimise the impact of Indochina refugees on the region, for example, ASEAN states 
co-operated to alleviate the immediate impact of the crisis and reduce refugee numbers. 
ASEAN's response to boat refugees in the period 1978 and 1979 was a success. The 
ASEAN member-states agreed to establish a 'refugee processing centre to alleviate the 
immediate burden on the most affected ASEAN states.' 85 The organisation also 
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continued to receive financial support from the international community. Of particular 
value were the Association's activities at the UN where ASEAN nations sponsored 
annual resolutions on Cambodia (which, in November 1988, attracted support from 122 
out of the 159 UN members).86 
The case of Cambodia illustrates the ability of ASEAN to influence the process 
of conflict management in the region. In this instance ASEAN was: (1) successful in 
containing the violence and stopping it from transferring to neighbouring countries; (2) 
able to overcome its own internal differences in order to help restore the situation in 
Cambodia; and (3) apply its own norms of state sovereignty as part of the process of 
successfully ending the conflict and restoring Cambodian independence. 
ASEAN Dealings with China Over the South China Sea 
A key test of inter-ASEAN security cooperation, as the sovereignty issue has 
impacted upon it, was the South China Sea issue. The South China Sea is an area of 
competing claims over territory in a maritime space that involves six major claimants 
namely China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan.87 Indonesia is 
not a direct party to the South China Sea dispute, but Jakarta has major strategic interest 
in preserving its claims around Natuna Island which lies well to the south of the 
Spartlys. 88 The sovereign dispute over the area by these states has become exacerbated 
because of the potential natural resources involved. These include some of the world's 
richest fishing waters, as well as potentially large reserves of oil and natural gas. 89 The 
overlapping claims in this area have been a particular source of conflict between 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and ASEAN countries. Vietnam and the Philippines 
have experienced the most serious conflicts with Beijing on this issue.90 Sino-
Vietnamese hostilities in the area have twice resulted in naval battles - in 1974 in the 
Paracels and in 1988 near the Spratlys. China prevailed in both skirmishes resulting in 
its occupation of the Paracels. Sino-Philippine hostilities in the area are more recent. 
The Philippines considers China's occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 and repeated 
Chinese incursions into Scarborough Reef since 1997 as direct assaults on its sovereign 
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territory. Indonesia had no record of conflict with China in the South China Sea but that 
country worried that Chinese claims pertaining to the South China Sea could eventually 
extend into the waters around the Natuna Islands.91 The idea that China's aggression in 
the South China Sea was rooted in its desire to impose hegemony over the area is 
countered by Greg Austin, who concluded that PRC's action was based on China's 
desire to defend its rights in international law.92 The question of sovereignty over the 
Spratlys has become controversial since the claimants contest each other on historical, 
archaeological and legal grounds through maps and legal documents to justify their 
claims.93 
Under these circumstances, the signing of the Declaration on the South China 
Sea between ASEAN and China on 4 November 2002 was a significant milestone. The 
declaration aims to contain conflict over the numerous maritime boundary and 
sovereignty disputes in the area. China's acceptance of this statement represented a 
substantial concession. From the realist perspective China could be expected to claim 
sovereign rights over the area to which the smaller ASEAN states would expected to 
acqmesce. 
Previously, China had insisted on bilateral negotiations with the claimant states 
and had avoided a multilateral approach to the issue. From 1987-1998, China's 
negotiating tactics were framed in terms of the recovery of 'lost territories' and aimed at 
achieving 'exclusive sovereignty' over the area. The Chinese claim for exclusive 
sovereignty was a serious problem for ASEAN, as it denied the possibility of 
compromise and negotiation over the issues and implied that China was merely waiting 
for a propitious time to assert its position in the South China Sea. After 1993, moreover, 
China became a net oil importer and securing offshore energy supplies became 
important for its continued economic growth. But this situation actually led to a change 
of attitude by the Chinese. Subsequently, Beijing's position became one based on 
resources and not exclusively on the recovery of 'lost territories'. This altered stance 
made compromise more feasible and led to more productive Sino-ASEAN negotiations. 
From 1999 onwards, China revealed a greater interest in resolving the dispute.94 
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The negotiations between ASEAN and China over the South China Sea took 
place against a background in which the ASEAN states held disparate views on the 
issue. Malaysia, for example, favoured a continued US presence as a latent safeguard 
against excessive Chinese claims. This is the case despite being critical from time to 
time of US economic and political interference in Southeast Asia. Yet Malaysia has also 
advocated a policy of engagement towards China. Indonesia maintained friendly, but 
guarded, relations with China and favoured greater cooperation with Beijing within well 
defined limits. Vietnam and the Philippines were suspicious activists on the South 
China issue. They feared that Chinese hegemonic policies were targeting them. While 
they were heavily engaged in establishing dialogue with China and negotiating a code 
of conduct, they doubted that ASEAN would be able to engender genuine cooperation 
from the Chinese. Thailand and Singapore were geopolitically inclined. They believed 
that peace and stability in the region was possible only with the cooperation of the US in 
maintaining a regional balance of power without following a policy of direct 
containment toward China. The newer ASEAN states, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and 
Brunei, were happy to follow the policies of other ASEAN states on this issue because, 
as a rule, they avoided adopting independent stances. 95 
Despite these intra-ASEAN policy divergences, the overall desirability of 
cooperating with China over the South China Sea provided sufficient encouragement to 
the ASEAN states underwrite a common approach in the negotiations with China. The 
need to cooperate with China, rather than to oppose it, was actually derived from the 
reality that the ASEAN countries were not able to challenge the rising economic, and 
military power of China. Cooperating with Beijing would be more rational and less 
costly than to confront it. Although the members differed over the level of US 
involvement desirable in the Southeast Asia, most saw the continuing need for US 
offshore military power to balance China, particularly as their own military capabilities 
were no match for Chinese People's Liberation Army, and in the absence of a common 
ASEAN defence identity. Indeed, ASEAN has never explicitly acted as if it regards 
China as a potential threat.96 However, in 1992 ASEAN urged Washington to maintain 
its forces in the region due to Chinese advances into the South China Sea. The 
implication to be drawn from this plea is that for Southeast Asian states the presence of 
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a dominant, unpredictable and potentially aggressive China is a threat that can only be 
balanced by US power.97 
In fact, A SEAN was able to arrive at a common position on several aspects of its 
dealings with China, reconciling the dilemma between cooperating with China and 
engaging the US to minimise the threat of China in the process. This ASEAN posture 
was embodied in the Declaration of Principles of the South China Sea released at the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in August 1995. Firstly, ASEAN's members 
agreed that China and Southeast Asian states should refrain from unilateral intervention 
in each other's spheres of influence. The Declaration called for all parties to refrain 
from taking actions that could destabilise the region and for an early resolution of the 
problems caused by Sino-Philippines confrontation in the Mischief Reef.98 This 
statement left China in no doubt that ASEAN considered the Chinese occupation of 
Mischief Reef to be an unacceptable encroachment of sovereignty that was detrimental 
to regional peace and stability. Secondly, ASEAN suggested preventive measures 
against the possibility of armed confrontation and convened informal workshops in 
Jakarta on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea in 1991 and 1992.99 
When the 1995 Mischief Reef incident threatened to result in armed confrontation 
between China and the Philippines, ASEAN unanimously called for the resolution of 
differences by peaceful means and suggested measures such as low-level consultations 
between the armed forces deployed in the South China Sea. ASEAN was similarly 
united in supporting the establishment of a code of conduct for the area that focused on 
restricting violence by promoting consultation and applying international legal 
provisions that pertained to the situation in the South China Sea. '00 
ASEAN' s handling of the South China Sea issue demonstrates how its member-
states were able to put the unity of the Association above their individual interests. 
Despite the hard line Chinese position on its exclusive sovereign claims, ASEAN was 
able to maintain a united front. One reason for this was that, had any one ASEAN state 
agree to the Chinese demand for exclusive bilateral negotiations, such a development 
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would have opened a significant rift in the Association. 101 It is important to view 
ASEAN' s management of its dispute with China in the South China Sea not just as a 
means of settling individual issues via multilateral agreements on sovereignty and joint 
development arrangements. It is also a means of confirming that China's presence in the 
area would not jeopardise peaceful coexistence in the region. 102 The Sino-ASEAN 
consultations and the resulting code of conduct will contribute to regional peace and 
stability. 
A SEAN' s evident success in managing this issue illustrates several aspects of 
the Association's development. First it reflects that organisation's ability to overcome 
individual national interests when dealing with a major external power. The united front 
adopted by ASEAN was a key factor in influencing the behaviour of China. Second it 
demonstrates ASEAN's application, as the late Michael Leifer noted, of "conflict 
avoidance and conflict management". 103 Departing from Leifer's general pessimism that 
the European diplomatic practices were not transferable to conflicts in Asia Pacific, the 
case of South China Sea saw a legalistic precedent applied to a significant regional 
conflict. Other dimensions of ASEAN policy management include: (1) flexibility and a 
willingness to compromise when coping with a core issue such as sovereignty; (2) the 
application of a united approach that has brought benefits to all of the ASEAN 
members; (3) a determination to use peaceful means in settling disputes; and (4) the 
capability to influence regional stability. ASEAN's record of dealing with the South 
China Sea issue reflected its appreciation of the need to balance or to adjust its 
preoccupation with state sovereignty with an appreciation of collective security to 
resolve disputes within Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. 
The Post Cold War Era and a New Era of Internationalism 
The end of Cold War and subsequent developments in the international security 
environment encouraged ASEAN to rethink its strategies and enhance the 
organization's credibility and performance. Traditional security issues relating to major 
power involvement in the region still constituted the main concern of ASEAN members. 
However, a number of non-traditional issues that were muted by the Cold War began to 
influence the relations between the ASEAN member-states and their relations with 
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external powers. While ASEAN has continued to cope with the challenges imposed by 
traditional issues of sovereignty, the organisation's management of new, non-traditional 
issues has been much less successful. Despite attempts by a number of international 
relations scholars in the region to promote human security, it remains in the margins of 
sub-altern security discourses in Southeast Asia. 104 
For Southeast Asia, the initial effect of Soviet Union's demise and the end of the 
Cold War was an intensified concern about possible US strategic disengagement from 
the region. ASEAN countries felt that the United States was in danger of turning inward 
and losing interest in Southeast Asia during the early to mid- l 990s. The withdrawal of 
US forces and the closure of US bases in the Philippines seemed to lead to a possible 
strategic vacuum in the region. This development, along with the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces from Vietnam, confronted ASEAN with the loss of a useful counter weight to 
possible geopolitical designs by China to establish hegemony in Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, there were some doubts over whether the US would even continue to protect 
essentially pro-American governments in Southeast Asia as a result of Washington's 
much stronger promotion of democracy and human rights after the end of the Cold 
War. 105 Washington's perceived disengagement from the region seemed to provide an 
increased strategic latitude for the PRC. This posed a key challenge for ASEAN' s 
leadership within the context of an apparent shift in the global balance of power. Japan 
was also the subject of ASEAN concerns, in part because of the possibility of Japanese 
rearmament. 106 Nevertheless, during this period China's relationship with ASEAN 
began to improve and Indonesia and Singapore established formal diplomatic relations 
with the PRC in 1990. 
Overall, ASEAN members felt that the new post-Cold War strategic 
environment was unlikely to presage an end to major power rivalry in the region. They 
also recognized that Southeast Asia could not be isolated from possible rivalry between 
East Asia's major powers. The problem of regional order as it presented itself to 
ASEAN was essentially one of creating a stable balance of power between the major 
powers in East Asia that would not disadvantage ASEAN. In this context, two options 
presented themselves. One was to strengthen intramural security and defence co-
operation in ways that would raise ASEAN's standing as a political-military power. The 
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other centred on extending the existing model of ASEAN's interaction emphasizing 
economic development and security diplomacy into the wider region. The establishment 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an illustration of the second option. As will be 
argued below, the ARF process has now matured to an extent where the first option is 
more realistic than was previous by the case. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
The ARF emerged as a consequence of the fourth ASEAN heads of government 
summit meeting in Singapore in January 1992. The participants at that meeting 
recognised the necessity of looking beyond Southeast Asia to cope with the post-Cold 
War regional security environment. 107 The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in 
July 1994 in Bangkok, Thailand. As the first Asia-wide regional security organization, 
the ARF built upon the so-called ASEAN post-ministerial conferences with its dialogue 
partners. Initially, there were proposals from Australia and Canada in July 1990 to 
initiate a so-called Conference on Security and Cooperation in 'Asia' (CSCA) which 
could be seen as a way of establishing an institution modelled after the 
Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE). 108 
However, the ASEAN countries refused their proposals. As many policy makers in 
ASEAN noted, it was inadvisable to duplicate the European process in Asia. 109 They 
believed that it was more appropriate to promote an informal framework to carry out a 
security dialogue consistent with the 'ASEAN Way'.IJ0 One reason why ASEAN 
demurred from creating rigid institutionalisation in the Asia Pacific was that it would 
challenge their basic commitment to preserving state sovereignty in the context of 
regional security. The ASEAN proposal which was finally applied to create the ARF 
complied with this ideal. Equally important was the fact that ASEAN had seized the 
opportunity to successfully initiate the ARF after it was claimed that major Asia-Pacific 
powers were incapable of forming a concerted arrangement among themselves to 
manage regional security. ASEAN's initiation of the ARF refutes the conventional 
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realist argument that only major powers such as the US or China are able to establish 
and spearhead multilateralism, while small powers like ASEAN will mainly follow the 
major powers' lead. 
The central aims of the ARF are outlined in the First ARF Chairman's Statement 
(1994), as to: 
foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and 
security issues of common interest and concern; and 
make significant contributions toward efforts towards confidence-building 
and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. m 
This statement clearly demonstrates the informality, loose institution-building 
and limits of the ARF in managing conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. ARF, therefore, 
is not projected - at least in the near future - to achieve breakthroughs in settling acute 
and sensitive conflicts in the region, such as that on the Korean Peninsula, or to provide 
comprehensive solutions for other contemporary regional security crises. Moreover, the 
nature of ARF can be seen in the Concept Paper which was issued at the second meeting 
of the ARF in Brunei convened in August 1995. This document outlined a 'gradual 
evolutionary approach to security cooperation.' 112 This evolutionary process would 
unfold in three stages. It starts with the promotion of confidence building, it moves on 
to cultivate preventive diplomacy and, ultimately, it elaborates approaches to 
conflicts. 113 While the three stages of achievement are not designed in accordance to 
strict timeframes, the realization of confidence building objectives will provide a 
benchmark on overall viability of the evolution process. 114 Apart from criticism of the 
ARF for doing too little to help secure the wider Asia-Pacific region115 the effectiveness 
of ARF in providing long-term solutions to traditional conflict issues has generally been 
accepted. 116 
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Although it includes major powers, ASEAN actually plays a significant role in 
the ARF. ASEAN acts as 'an anchoring hub for regional socialization'. The Association 
remains a neutral broker among the great power interlocutors and works to delegitimize 
containment and traditional power balancing policies that might aggravate the regional 
security dilemma. ASEAN has used the ARF to successfully act, in the words of 
Michael Leifer, as the 'acceptable interlocutor' with the major powers 117 As Jeannie 
Henderson observes, ASEAN instigated the ARF, retains a leading procedural role in 
the Forum and also acts as a caucus within it. 118 • 
For these reasons ASEAN wants to ensure that it remains in the 'driver's seat' at 
the forum. Yet, the position of ASEAN as 'a driver' has been questioned by many. 119 
According to Rizal Sukma, ASEAN's leadership role in the ARF is a result not only of 
an act of corporate will but of strategic convenience. However, this position was not 
gained so much through "skilful diplomacy but essentially by default". This is because 
"such central position was given and entrusted to ASEAN primarily for the reason of 
strategic convenience". 12° From this evidence, ARF, therefore is not mainly an arena for 
power politics between the major powers in the region. ASEAN's role in the ARF, it 
can be argued, undercuts the realist argument that the fate of the smaller powers 
invariably depends on the balance of power among the major powers. ASEAN has 
successfully 'hedged' against this prospect. 121 
The effectiveness of the ARF has been questioned because the 'ASEAN Way' of 
diplomacy may be modified by specific security agendas and demands required by the 
former entity. Notwithstanding this, the ARF, - with its emphasis on confidence-
building - fulfils an essential security enhancing role in the Asia-Pacific 122 For ASEAN, 
the informality of the ARF process reflects ASEAN's own style and the ARF 
membership to date has not posed a threat to even the most politically sensitive of 
ASEAN governments (such as Myanmar). Initiating and developing the ARF has 
demonstrated that ASEAN, even in very challenging situations involving major powers, 
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tries to maintain its continuity and adherence to observing those norms of security 
cooperation that combine respect for state sovereignty with a sense that the momentum 
of regional community building is an inevitable part of the Asia-Pacific's strategic 
landscape. 
Inclusion of New ASEAN Members 
With the demise of Cold War superpower rivalries, ASEAN decided to expand 
its membership to include Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. Vietnam was the first 
Indochinese entrant into the Association as a full member. Entering ASEAN on 28 July 
1995, its accession was a logical outcome of the end of the Cold War era in Southeast 
Asia. The decline of the Soviet Union and the pursuit of economic prosperity in the 
international arena, gave Vietnam a basis of common interest with the rest of Southeast 
Asia after three decades of conflict had kept it apart from the rest of the region. 
Vietnam's withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia in September 1989 was followed by 
the Paris Agreements in October 1991, removing the major area of difference between 
Vietnam and ASEAN. 
For Vietnam, membership of the Association offered a number of benefits. It 
was a basis for international acceptance and held out the prospect of access to 
investment both from ASEAN and externally to the region. Importantly too, 
membership of ASEAN provided Vietnam with a chance to join a prestigious 
diplomatic group which could balance the influence of China. 123 The membership also 
boosted the Vietnam's security. Although ASEAN is not formal defence organization, it 
is nonetheless a respected regional group which has an explicit interest in preserving 
and advancing regional security. 124 
For ASEAN, accepting Vietnam bolstered the Association's image of "being 
able to adapt to the post Cold War environment, to be flexible and to have the 
confidence to embrace as a member a country with political system which differs" from 
those of other ASEAN member-states. 125 Moreover, having Vietnam as a member would 
add to their own geopolitical weight in relations with major powers. This rationale was 
particularly underscored in the process of admitting Vietnam, when Thailand and 
Singapore were initially reluctant to approve Vietnam's accessions. Malaysia and 
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Indonesia used this argument to award full ASEAN membership to Vietnam. ASEAN 
members finally agreed to admit Vietnam because it would support ASEAN in dealing 
with China in the issue of South China Sea. 126 
The end of Cold War also provided the logic for ASEAN to admit Laos. 
Membership of ASEAN was both necessary and unavoidable for Laos, with the major 
motivations for joining being to shake off its isolation and gain a sense of regional 
identity. 127 In addition, ASEAN membership allowed Vientiane to balance Thailand's 
traditional and often enormous challenging economic, cultural and political influence in 
its national affairs. 128 By joining ASEAN, Laos could more easily express any 
dissatisfaction with and possibility gain concessions from Thailand via ASEAN 
mediation. For ASEAN in general, by including an isolated and poor country like Laos 
could enhance its image in the regional and international arenas by bringing economic 
and security benefits to it. 
The accession of Myanmar into ASEAN confronted the Association with 
particularly challenging difficulties. The political situation in Myanmar had been widely 
criticised internationally. A key reason for ASEAN's desire to add Myanmar to its 
membership was to counter increasing Chinese influence in that country. President 
Suharto, for example, believed that if Myanmar was not incorporated into ASEAN it 
would be particularly open to China's long-term influence, with the resulting risk of 
'ASEAN's encirclement by China. 129 From 1991, ASEAN began pursuing a policy of 
'constructive engagement' with Myanmar. The process was subdued however because 
of factors that an editorial in Asia week magazine labelled 'geo-strategic realities' that: 
. . . ensure that ASEAN can never ostracise Myanmar. Unlike outsiders, 
neighbours have to live with one another-forever. Patient, sensitive 
diplomacy is usually the only practicable approach to difficult 
relationships. 130 
Prime Minister Mahathir in his address to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
noted, in reference to the US position towards Myanmar, that: 
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It is regrettable that there are those who would not see the obvious. Instead 
of encouraging ASEAN to accept all South East-Asian countries as soon 
as possible, ASEAN has been urged to pass judgment, deny membership 
and apply pressure on a potential candidate ... so as to force that country to 
remain poor and therefore unstable. ASEAN must resist and reject such 
attempts at coercion-they are not the ASEAN way. 131 
Compared to the other new ASEAN members, Myanmar represented a more 
delicate policy challenge for ASEAN, particularly with concerns posted by the 
international community over its human rights record. In fact, despite such difficulties, 
ASEAN leaders ultimately adopted the view that Myanmar's isolation from ASEAN 
would not be in the Association's long term interest. 
The inclusion of Cambodia in ASEAN was interrupted by an upsurge in political 
tensions in that country when prime ministerial aspirant, Hun Shen, overthrew his rival, 
Prince Norodom Ranariddh, through a coup d'etat on July 1997. This led to violent 
conflict in Phnom Penh. 132 Due to ensuing international criticism, the meeting of 
ASEAN foreign ministers on 10 July 1997 decided to delay Cambodian' s entry into the 
Association and the foreign ministers of Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines were 
appointed to mediate a resolution of the crisis. Objections to Cambodia's entry had been 
led by Vietnam and Malaysia, and other ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Philippines, 
Thailand and Singapore) also opposed Cambodia's entry until its domestic problems 
stabilised. Hun Sen challenged these objections. As fighting between forces loyal to the 
two contending Prime Ministers spread into Cambodia's western provinces bordering 
Thailand, Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia acknowledged that 
ASEAN's "non-involvement in the reconstruction of Cambodia contributed to the 
deterioration and final collapse of national reconciliation". For the first time the idea of 
a more 'constructive intervention' in Cambodia's affairs involving ASEAN's 
diplomatic mediation was openly advocated. While it was clear that ASEAN had a real 
interest in responding pro-actively to Cambodia's political problems, this meant 
breaking precedent with its hallowed principle of 'non-interference'. 133 Internal discord 
in Cambodia and ASEAN' s efforts to exercise influence in the country sparked a debate 
about the organisation's ability to be more active in moderating other domestic 
conflicts. There was concern from some quarters that the Association was moving 
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beyond its stated policy of non-interference in domestic affairs m order to reduce 
instability within a potential member state. 
The final inclusion of ten countries in Southeast Asia underscored ASEAN's 
relevance in realizing the ideal of Southeast Asian regionalism. It also demonstrated 
ASEAN capacities to support better relations among various Southeast Asian states 
which had long records of conflict. The determination of ASEAN' s elite to 
institutionalise Southeast Asia as a whole ultimately overcame traditional intra-ASEAN 
tensions and underscored longer term prospects for regional community building. This 
determination of like-minded elites constitutes an important precedent for 
regionalisation, not only in the region under study, but also with reference to other 
developing regions of the world. The ASEAN dream of including all ten countries of 
Southeast Asia was fulfilled at the end of the Cold War only because, unlike the 
European Union, the Association did not impose conditions such as the democratisation 
of domestic member-states' domestic political system. General adherence by ASEAN to 
its norms of non-intervention and respect of sovereignty encouraged new states such as 
Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar to take up membership. 
While these norms have proven to be attractive to such states, there have been 
some negative aspects. 134 Some erosion of the Association's traditional spirit of 
solidarity, accommodation and consensus building have occurred. For example an 
ASEAN consensus can no longer be expected over all issues as members include states 
of widely different historical experiences and foreign policy orientations. 135 Limitations 
in ASEAN's ability to move effectively to make decisions on key regional issues and 
new areas of cooperation are now more likely to exist. The potential for new members 
to bring longstanding animosities into ASEAN has increased. So too has the risk of 
incurring problems in ASEAN's relations with such external partners as US and the EU 
over the human rights policies of new member states such as Myanmar and Cambodia. 
Counter balancing these factors is the reality that with the incorporation of newer 
partners ASEAN has become more significant in an economic sense. An increased 
population base gives it greater commercial appeal in the eyes of external powers. The 
criteria for ASEAN membership also contributes to the stability and security of the 
region through conditioning the newer members into adhering to such norms such as the 
agreement to resolve conflict peacefully and respecting the sovereignty of other states. 
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These positive aspects of ASEAN membership have encouraged (but not guaranteed) 
the peaceful settlement of border disputes, accommodations with separatist movements 
through long-term confidence building and a greater sense ofregional identity. 
East Timor 
Perhaps the most important change in the character of international relations that 
followed the end of superpower rivalry was the shift in international security concerns 
to a greater emphasis on human rights and democracy. For ASEAN, this new 
environment has opened a Pandora's Box. The clearest example of this in the region 
was the events in East Timor during 1999. In the 1990s, the intense focus on human 
rights and the 'responsibility to protect' as an issue in international security had a 
significant influence on the international community's view of Indonesian rule in East 
Timor. The conventional view was that in 1975 Indonesia was encouraged to take 
control in East Timor because of the danger that the former Portuguese territory might 
become part of the communist bloc. However, with the end of the Cold War's 
ideological rivalries, human rights became a more central concern for the international 
community. Countries which were seen as not abiding with acceptable standards of 
human rights became the object of international criticism. Commenting on this change 
of circumstances, Ali Alatas, the Indonesian Foreign Minister observed: 
From that time, the East Timor issue became a human rights issue, rather 
than a political issue ... Now it became a human rights problem, a 
humanitarian problem, a problem the world perceived as the cruel attitude 
of the Indonesian nation against a small people who want independence. 136 
In the post-Cold War environment, Indonesia faced considerable international 
pressure to permit the East Timorese people to vote on self-determination and withdraw 
from the territory it had held since 1975. Following the initial Indonesian intervention in 
East Timor, the United Nations Security Council had passed Resolution 384 on 22 
December 1975. Under the terms of this resolution Indonesia was required " ... to 
withdraw without delay all of its forces from the territory". 137 Resolutions for the 
exercise of the right of self-determination by the East Timorese people were put to the 
General Assembly annually between 1976 and 1982. Support for the Indonesian 
occupation never won a majority. 
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From the beginning, the other ASEAN countries had supported Indonesian 
government's intervention in East Timor case. Until the 1990s, ASEAN tended to view 
East Timor as an Indonesian domestic problem and thus applied the Association's norm 
of non-intervention in domestic affairs to the situation. 
An incident at the Santa Cruz Cemetery in November 1991 raised the profile of 
East Timor within the international community. Approximately 271 East Timorese are 
known to have died, while a further 250 were missing, believed dead, and 382 were 
wounded. Although the demonstration at the cemetery began peacefully, Indonesia 
claimed that some of its soldiers were also killed during the protest, which began as a 
memorial procession for Sebastio Gomez, a young Timorese man. Lobbying by human 
rights organisations and sympathetic countries over a number of years, led to the UN 
Security Council passing Resolution 1246 to establish the United Nations Assessment 
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. The role of UNAMET was to 
monitor a ballot by the East Timorese people on an Indonesian proposal for special 
autonomy on 30 August of 1999. The violence that accompanied the vote led to the UN 
Security Council passing Resolution 1264 on 15 September 1999 asking Australia to 
mount and lead International Force East Timor (INTERFET), and providing Chapter 7 
authorisation to use 'all necessary means' to restore peace and stability. 138 INTERFET, 
headed by Australia, was deployed in Dili on 19 September 1999 and its mandate was: 
to restore peace and security in East Timor; to protect and support UNAMET in 
carrying out its tasks; and to provide humanitarian assistance. On 25 October 1999, the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1272, which established the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNT AET). This was established as an integrated, 
multidimensional peacekeeping operation, fully responsible for the administration of 
East Timor during its transition to independence. 
The ASEAN countries were not particularly prominent in these developments. 
They continued to adhere to the view that the East Timor issue was a domestic 
Indonesian problem. 139 ASEAN felt that the problem should be resolved under its 
umbrella. Malaysia had pledged troops for a possible deployment to East Timor, but the 
Thai Deputy Foreign Minister, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, stated that Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) should try to resolve the East Timor crisis "largely on its own" and 
138 For details see Hugh White, 'The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions 
Concerning East Timor', December 1998-September 1999', Security Challenges, 4, 1, 2008, p.83 
<http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/SCVol4No 1/vo4no 1 White.pdt> Access 5 January 2009. 
139 Derek McDougall, 'Regional Institutions and Security: Implication of the 1999 East Timor Crisis, in 
Tan and Boutin (eds), Non-Traditional Security Issues, p. 170. 
120 
that, "ASEAN should play a very active role in the resolution and management of the 
East Timor crisis." He went on to observe: "We have been saying all along that we 
would like Southeast Asia to be free of intervention from outside powers ... so it is time 
for us to put our words into practice and try to manage and resolve the East Timor crisis 
largely on our own."140 
The decision by the UN Security Council to establish the INTERFET 
peacekeeping force to restore order in East Timor was a humiliation for Indonesia and 
ASEAN. Australia was asked by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to lead the force, 
Indonesia objected to Canberra's participation in the mission but to no avail. 141 ASEAN 
was left behind in dealing with the East Timor Crisis. The Australian government took a 
risk with its future relations with Indonesia when it accepted the lead role in pushing for 
a UN referendum on self-determination and then followed up by sending the largest 
number of peacekeepers to East Timor. Indonesia's close ally, Malaysia, had indicated 
its willingness to lead such a force, but was rejected on the basis of its own poor human 
rights record and its close ties with Indonesia142 By and large, regional institutions 
played no role in the international response to this situation and leadership of the 
humanitarian intervention in East Timor came from Australia. 143 
Overall, the reputation of ASEAN as an organ for conflict management was 
severely damaged by the situation in East Timor. ASEAN incurred strong criticism over 
the irrelevance of its non-interference norm and views on sovereignty, which were 
flouted in this case. From the ASEAN perspective, East Timor represents a case of 
international pre-emption over regional approaches to conflict management and one that 
it would therefore have been impossible to oppose. In addition, had other ASEAN 
nations taken a strong stand on the issue it would have violated the norm of non-
interference in domestic affairs, a significant consideration given that many ASEAN 
states have separatist movements within their own borders. 
This precedent has led to ASEAN policymakers to think more seriously about 
intra-institutional approaches to regional peacekeeping. Indeed Indonesia has recently 
advocated the development of an ASEAN Peace Keeping Force (APKF). The issue of 
the APKF demonstrates the pervasive influence of sovereignty in all matters touching 
140
' Australia picks chief of its peacekeepers', The Jakarta Post, 15 September 1999, 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com/Archives> Accessed 4 June 2008. 
141 Ibid 
142 
'Belo rejects plan to replace Australia as Interfet leader', The Jakarta Post, 19 October 1999 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com/Archives> Accessed 4 June 2008. 
143 Dougal, 'Regional Institutions and Security', p. 174. 
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on security cooperation by ASEAN's member-states. However, it also signals a 
collective desire by these states to become more self-reliant in pursuing crisis 
resolution. 
The ASEAN Peace Keeping Force is a proposal effort to institutionalize security 
cooperation within the Association. The very idea of an APKF represents a conceptual 
leap for ASEAN, especially as security cooperation of this type was never envisaged 
when the grouping was established. The ASEAN Declaration in 1967 did not touch on 
security but aimed only 'to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on 
matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields' .144 The Bali Declaration I did mention security cooperation, but 
only on the basis that cooperation 'between the member states in security matters 
[would be] in accordance with their mutual needs and interests. 145 The APKF presents 
ASEAN with the prospect of much closer engagement in security matters between the 
member-states, an idea that requires the Association to consider seriously the 
advantages and drawbacks of state sovereignty. 
Malaysia, to date, has rejected the proposal, with Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid 
Albar, arguing that the establishment of an APKF would " ... be mechanism of 
intervention' for both internal conflicts and disputes between ASEAN member-
states."146 This statement again underscored the continuing sensitivity of ASEAN 
member-states to intervention in matters of domestic security by other ASEAN partners. 
Moreover, for countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, an 
APKF would reduce the need to rely upon external powers for material support. All of 
these states have either enjoyed the benefits of a formal security guarantee that a close 
relationship with the US had brought them or less formal consultative or collaborative 
such as FPDA. Strong bilateral or multilateral security cooperation arrangements with 
external powers are matters that Indonesia has long rejected. From the ASEAN states' 
perspective, the APKF would potentially shift the primary role in regional security to a 
more dominant Indonesia. 
144 See ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok 8 August 1967. 
145 See ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Indonesia 24 of February 1976 
<http://www.aseansec.org/5049 .htm> 
146 
'Malaysia Khawatirkan Pasukan Penjaga Perdamaian ASEAN' (Malaysia Concerns' of Peace Keeping 
Force) Republika, 5 May 2006. 
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Transnational Crime (TNC) 
Any analysis of ASEAN failing to consider the Association's response to non-
traditional threats such as transnational crime (TNC) would be incomplete relative to the 
character of the organisation and its quest to become a security community. The United 
Nations (UN) defines transnational crimes "as offences whose inception, prevention 
and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country."147 These types of 
crimes contain elements which are clearly not bound by the territorial sovereignty of 
individual states. As a consequence, an independent national response will not suffice to 
effectively combat this type of criminal activity and national strategies are inherently 
inadequate for responding to challenges that cross multiple borders and involve multiple 
jurisdictions.148 Many of the security challenges that currently confront ASEAN are 
actually transnational issues. Problems such as illegal logging, drug trafficking and 
human trafficking have now become daily occurrences and might easily create conflict 
or tensions between the organization's member governments. Although transnational 
crime has an 'international dimension' many cases of TNC occur on the boundaries of 
states and thus need to be addressed by ASEAN in the context of regional security. 
In this sense, for ASEAN the degree of cooperation and management required to 
deal with such challenges has provided the logic, motivation and opportunities for the 
member-states to work closely together and adopt a broader, community-wide concept 
of security. In particular, the development and promulgation of 'national security' 
policy would not only be the concern of national authorities but would permeate into the 
broader sectors of ASEAN societies 
Within ASEAN there are significant levels of TNC because various domestic 
settings are favourable to the spread and increase of this type of criminal activity. For 
example, the illicit drug trade is emerging as a significant long-term security issue for 
many individual ASEAN states and is one capable of creating security problems at both 
the regional and international level. 149 The Golden Triangle, are area that includes 
Northern Thailand, Eastern Myanmar and Western Laos is one of the leading 
production regions of narcotics in the world. Myanmar for example, accounts for 80% 
147 Gerhard 0 Mueller, 'Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts', in Phil Williams and Dimitri 
Vlassiss, Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses (London-Portland: Frank 
Cass Publisher, 2001), p. 14. 
148 Roy Godson and Phil Williams, 'Strengthening Cooperation Against Transnational Crime: A New 
Security Imperative', in Williams and Vlassiss (eds) Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, 
London-Portland: Frank Cass Publisher, p. 321. 
149 Alan Dupont, 'Drugs, Transnational Crime and Security in East Asia', Working Paper no.328, 
(Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1998), p. 2. 
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of all heroin produced in Southeast Asia and is a source of heroin for the United 
States. 150 Myanmar, together with Laos, is still an important source of global opium 
cultivation, although since 2000 Afghanistan has dominated in the areas of cultivation 
and production.151 In addition, drug traffickers in the Golden Triangle have diversified 
their activities to meet the ever growing demand for synthetic drugs. 152 Other examples 
abound. 
Developing countries are at most risk of transnational crime and where state 
authority is weak or where there is corruption international criminal organizations can 
thrive. Some ASEAN states have experienced significant levels of human trafficking. 
Although accurate and reliable data on the number of the victims and social and 
economic impact of the trade have not been calculated comprehensively, there is 
significant reason for ASEAN to be concerned. Member states such as Myanmar, the 
Philippines and Thailand are important transit zones or destinations for various forms of 
human trafficking. Child trafficking and sex trafficking have occurred at both the 
domestic and trans-border levels. Most illegal migration or human trafficking in the 
Mekong region has originated in either Laos, Cambodia or Myanmar, with Thailand 
being an important transit zone153 • Malaysia and Singapore, and to a lesser extent, 
Brunei Darussalam, have been the main destinations for people trafficking originating in 
Indonesia and Philippines. 
Transnational crime has increased in some ASEAN states where individuals and 
elites have become used to working outside the regulatory environment and the rule of 
law, thereby weakening state capacity to deal with the issue. ASEAN states where the 
economies are developing or are in a state of transition are most at risk because "law 
enforcement and criminal justice capabilities are poorly developed, [and] border control 
is minimal to non existent."154 These criminal activities can pose a direct threat to the 
150 Wyler, Liana Sun, Burma and Transnational Crime, Analyst in international Crime and Narcotics, CR 
Report for Congress Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2008. 
151 See UNODC, World Drug Report 2007, 10-11 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/WDR-2007.htrnl> Accessed 12 May 2008 
152 RalfEmmers, 'International Regime Building in Southeast Asia. ASEAN Cooperation Against the 
Illicit trafficking and Abuse of Drugs' (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006) 
<http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ids033/ids033.pdf> Accesses 6 June 2008 
153 See Phil Marshal, 'Globalization, Migration and Trafficking: Some thoughts from the South-East 
Asian region', UN Inter-Agency on Trafficking in Women and Children in the Mekong Sub-region. 
Paper to the Globalization Workshop in Kuala Lumpur, 8-10 May 2001. 
<http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/marshall_ uniap _ mekong_ 200 I _.pdf> 
154 Phil Williams, 'Organizing Transnational Crime: Networks, Markets and Hierarchies', in Phil 
Williams and Dimitri Vlassiss (eds) Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and 
Responses (London-Portland: Frank CASS Publisher, 2001), p. 64. 
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political sovereignty of the state because powerful criminals many have the capacity to 
undermine and subvert the authority and legitimacy of governments. 
Transnational crime also has an important military and strategic dimension, 
especially when criminal organizations or gangs expand their bases of operation in a 
weak or developing state. Revolutionary political movements and insurgent groups 
sometimes tum to crime to finance their operations. In the process, their original 
political goals and motivations become subordinated to their illicit money making 
activities. The number of separatist movements within ASEAN member-states has 
increased the opportunity for TNC to develop because such groups frequently support 
their political or military activities through crime. The hill tribes of Myanmar finance 
their armed struggle against Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) through opium cultivation. 
And, more recently, methamphetamine production.155 In Indonesia, Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (The Movement of Acehnese Independence) was financing its insurgency by 
arms smuggling and by piracy in Malacca Straits. The sixth ARF Inter-sessional 
meeting on 21-22 February 2008 at Semarang in Indonesia, concluded that terrorist 
networks are able to survive and evolve despite surveillance by security authorities 
because they are supported by a range of activities including drugs, human trafficking 
and arms smuggling. 156 
Concern and Response 
The existence of transnational crime within ASEAN and the challenge that the 
problem presents to the credibility of many of its individual member governments has 
become an important issue for the Association. Recognition of the problem is long-
standing as the Bangkok Declaration noted the imperative for "strengthening the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations." 
Transnational crime has the potential of eroding this central belief thereby affecting the 
political, economic and social well being of A SEAN. 157 Furthermore, numerous 
political commitments among ASEAN governments on transnational crime-related 
issues have been made since the first ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime was 
held in Manila on 18-20 December 1997. It is widely accepted within the Association 
155 Alan Dupont, 'Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia', Asian Survey, 39, 3, 1999, p. 9. 
156 See Lilian Budianto, 'ARF urges improved ties to fight terror', Jakarta Post 23 February 2008 
<http://thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 March 2008. 
157 ASEAN, ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, 1999 
<http:www.aseansec.org/16134.htm,> Accessed 10 April 2008. 
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that transnational crime has the potential of eroding the political, economic and social 
well being of Southeast Asian governments and peoples. 
The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime declared at the 1997 Manila 
Conference provides the basis for a comprehensive approach to fighting the problem by 
means of regional collaboration and by forging closer links for international cooperation 
on the issue. The declaration employed categories similar to those described by the 
UN's Naples meeting158 • The organization recognised the need for clear and effective 
regional modalities to combat these forms of crimes, especially on the aspect of 
information exchange and policy coordination 159 
Several ASEAN bodies are tasked with formulating these policies, strategies and 
measures as well as in initiating activities against transnational crime. These include, the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), ASEAN Finance 
Ministers Meeting (AFMM), ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting/ ASEAN Senior Law 
Officials Meeting (ASLOM), ASEAN Directors-General of Immigration Departments 
and Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (DGICM), 
SOMTC (ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime), ASEAN Chiefs of 
National Police (ASEANPOL) and ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD). 
All of these bodies are crucial for addressing the complex issues involved in combating 
transnational crime. 
The 1997 Declaration established a basic framework for regional cooperation on 
fighting transnational crime. This declaration mentioned that the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) would convene at least once every two 
years and coordinate actions of other ASEAN bodies, including the ASEAN Chiefs of 
National Police (ASEANAPOL). The Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime 
was to meet at least once a year to assist the Ministers in accomplishing their task. The 
Declaration also introduced some proposals encouraged member states to exchange and 
disseminate information. These proposals included the signing of bilateral treaties and 
mutual assistance agreements, consideration of the establishment of an ASEAN Centre 
of Combating Transnational Crime (ACTC), the assignment of police liaison officers to 
other Southeast Asian capitals and plans to explore ways of extending cooperation with 
158 According to the1994 World Ministerial Conference of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council in Naples, Italy, TNC can be divided into ten categories: illicit trafficking in drugs, smuggling, 
of illegal migrants, arms trafficking, trafficking in nuclear material, transnational criminal organizations 
and terrorism, trafficking in women and children, trafficking in body parts, theft and smuggling of 
vehicles, money laundering, other activities that cross borders. 
159 See ASEAN Declaration on transnational Crime', Manila, 20 December 1997, 
<http:///www.aseansec.org/5985.htm> Accessed 10 November 2008. 
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dialogue partners, the UN and other international agencies involved in the fight against 
transnational crime. 
Since then, subsequent ASEAN Summits have expressed concern over narcotics 
abuse and illegal drug trafficking in the region. The Foreign Ministers, at the 31st AMM in 
Manila in July 1998 reiterated the need for enhancing regional efforts against 
transnational crime and signed the Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN to 
eradicate the production, processing, traffic and use of illicit drugs in Southeast Asia 
by the year 2020.160 The second AMMTC was organized 
In Yangon in June 1999 where transnational crime was described as a non-
traditional threat to regional security. The Interior Ministers recognised that it "was 
becoming more organized, diversified and pervasive, and thus posed a serious threat to 
the political, economic and social well-being of all nations, including the ASEAN 
Member Countries."161 The 2nd AMMTC adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action to 
Combat Transnational Crime. The Plan established mechanisms for collaboration and 
put in place what was viewed as a cohesive regional strategy to fight transnational crime 
with the emphasis on information exchange, cooperation in legal and law enforcement 
matters, institutional capacity building, training and extra-regional cooperation as key 
program activities. The Plan called for closer cooperation and coordination between the 
AMMTC and other ASEAN bodies such as the ASEAN Law Ministers and Attorneys-
General, the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police, the ASEAN Finance Ministers, the 
Directors-General of Immigration and the Directors General of Customs in the 
investigations, prosecution and rehabilitation of perpetrators of such crimes. 162 The 
Interior Ministers decided to form a Senior Officials' Meeting on Transnational Crime 
(SOMTC) that would develop a work program to carry out the plan of action. 
ASEAN has been successful in broadening regional collaboration in order to 
counter the significant challenges of the TNC issue. The frequency of meetings among 
the various bodies is one indication of the Association's commitment to deal with the 
problem. However, issues still remain, including a lack of domestic capacity in various 
ASEAN states that result in weak levels of cooperation. Several domestic problems 
which present a challenge to effective cooperation have been identified: (1) tackling 
corruption within the bureaucracy, particularly in the criminal justice system and 
160 See ASEAN, Joint Communique the Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, Philippines, 24-
25 July 1998 <http: //www.aseansec.org/3933.htm.> Accessed 10 November 2008. 
161 ASEAN, ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, 1999. 
162 ASEAN, Joint Communique of the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime 
(AMMTC), Yangon, 23 June 1999 <http://www.aseansec.org/5632.htm> Accessed 10 November 2008. 
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implementing reforms to produce good governance; (2) greater political will in the 
commitment to fight transnational crime; and (3) examination of domestic problems in 
order to discern the possible involvement of transnational crime syndicates. 163 In short, 
the basis of the problem is the individual domestic circumstances within ASEAN states, 
which make it difficult for the institution to address TNC problems. 164 
Conclusion 
ASEAN' s primary concern in fostering greater regional cooperation has long 
been security. The main mechanism used by the Association's member states has 
revolved around confidence building and conflict management as the means to develop 
regional security. ASEAN was initially developed to overcome intra-mural conflict 
arising from border and territorial disputes, racial or ethnic prejudices that were the 
historical legacy of the region's colonial past. Many of these issues threaten the stability 
of the region when the colonial powers disengaged or were forced to leave as a result of 
indigenous independent movements. The TAC and other treaties reflected ASEAN' s 
attempt to inculcate norms of non-interference and non-aggression between its members 
as a means of dealing with the tensions created by colonialism. Although many of these 
tensions remain to a greater or lesser degree, the Association has been able to modify 
them with a rising sense of a common interest which allows the ASEAN states to work 
together toward security community-building. 
Another important factor that has shaped the perceptions of ASEAN members 
has been the dynamics of the international security environment, in particular the 
policies and rivalries of the great powers that have influenced the region. In this context, 
ASEAN has served as a forum for its members to share their views on such issues and 
mediate the impact of these external factors on the region. In this way, it has developed 
policy initiatives that allow its member-states to adapt to changes in a rapidly evolving 
and changing international environment and to formulate a common approach to 
security based on norms and values that are shared by all of its members. This approach 
has helped the Association to limit the disadvantage imposed by this external 
dimension, while boosting their confidence through acting as a bloc, rather than as 
weak, individual states. 
163 Melita L Salvador, 'Confronting Transnational Crime in the Asia-Pacific Region: Challenges and 
Prospects' in Challenges Facing the ASEAN Peoples, Report of the Second ASEAN People's Assembly, 
Bali, Indonesia, 30 August- 1 September 2002, ASEAN ISIS, (Jakarta: CSISS, 2002), p. 320- 334. 
164 RalfEmmers, 'ASEAN's Response to Transnational Crime', Working paper No 70, (Canberra: 
Australian Defence Studies Centre, 2002), p. 12. 
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Chapter Four 
ASEAN's Response to the Challenge of Terrorism 
ASEAN's response' to terrorism underscores the fundamental tension between 
the Association's collective will to coordinate joint policy responses and the imperatives 
of the domestic political and social agendas of the individual member-states. In the case 
of counter-terrorism policy this dichotomy has created a situation in which the some of 
the rhetoric of ASEAN does not match the actions of individual member states. 
Powerful outside actors have pressured ASEAN to act in ways most congruent to their 
own interests. Yet the issue of managing counter-terrorism policy is faced within a 
highly charged domestic political context. The involvement of various political and 
social groups, the national media and external actors have all contributed to making 
counter-terrorism policy much more contested at the national level. Adaptable 
sovereignty is clearly required to navigate an effective policy balance between these 
countervailing pressures. A process of adaptable sovereignty will need to adjust 
sovereign prerogatives to compromise with the impetus toward community-building, 
but not to the point where the priority of sovereignty is surrendered. 
This chapter demonstrates both the extent and the limits of the ASEAN' s ability 
to operate as a security community. It will begin by examining the initial responses of 
the ASEAN states to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the U.S .. This 
investigation will reveal the latitude that each nation had in responding to the American 
call for support in its so-called 'Global War on Terrorism' (GWOT) based on a range of 
domestic constraints and foreign policy objectives. This will be followed by a review of 
terrorism as it affects Southeast Asia, particularly focusing on the problems faced by 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines. The review of regional 
terrorism will be followed by an examination of some of the initiatives that ASEAN has 
launched to address the threat of terrorism. The chapter will conclude with an 
assessment of how ASEAN' s response to the problem of terrorism reflects upon the 
Association's development as a regional security community. 
Process-tracing is incorporated in this chapter by cross-comparing the national 
security interests and postures of the five core A SEAN states as they pertain to viewing 
1 
'ASEAN response' in this chapter should be interpreted as specifically focuses on the five individual 
core states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. 
and neutralising the security threat under review (in this case, terrorism) - at both the 
sovereign national and regional levels of operation. It will be shown here that questions 
of what the problem ('terrorism') is and who is doing what to resolve it (in this case, 
whether collective approaches to counter-terrorism have been sufficiently embraced) 
has divided the ASEAN core states' on key issues. These include responding to U.S. 
calls for participation in the global war on terror, cooperating on intelligence exchanges 
of information relating to the nationals of one state committing terrorist acts in another 
ASEAN member-state and ASEAN governments striking an effective balance between 
showing sensitivity to Moslem populaces and maintaining secular approaches in 
response to religious extremism. Differences between the various national interests, 
identities and organizational inclinations are all evident in this particular case study. 
These same key variables emerge once more in Chapter V, although in slightly different 
contexts - i.e. who is upholding or violating international norms of maritime security 
and balancing nationalism with intra-ASEAN negotiations to achieve the type of 
equilibrium in relations that is required to develop a sense of community in responding 
to the challenge at hand. 
States' Responses to the Global War on Terrorism 
Despite the ASEAN's expression of sympathy to the U.S. following the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, its member-states' willingness to become part of the 
U.S. campaign of GWOT have demonstrated a range of reactions to the U.S. policy.2 
This especially became evident during the initial U.S. reactions to the attacks. There 
was a marked divergence of responses between states such as the Philippines and 
Singapore, who were keen to embrace U.S. assistance and policies and Indonesia which, 
until recently was seen by the U.S. as lacking commitment in its efforts in the fight on 
terror. The other two core ASEAN states - Thailand and Malaysia - were regarded by 
Washington as falling somewhere in between, with Thailand being more uncooperative 
than Malaysia. In part, these differences can be explained by long-standing bilateral 
relations between the U.S. and individual ASEAN states. However, there were also 
important domestic elements that determined the degree of variance, most of which 
relates to the size of the Muslim populations in each of the ASEAN nations. 
2 See CPF Luhulima, 'Colin Powell's visit: seeking a compromise', The Jakarta Post, 31 July 2002 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 February 2009 and Sheldon W. Simon, 'Mixed Reaction 
in Southeast Asia to the U.S. War on Terrorism', (undated) 
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0104qus_seasia.pdf> Accessed 11 December 2008. See also 
Rommel C. Banloi, War on terrorism in Southeast Asia (Manila: Rex Book Store, Inc., 2004), p. 42. 
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When considering the issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia it is important to 
discriminate between regional separatist groups, such as the Islamic Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) in the Philippines, the Pattani United Liberation Organization 
(PULO) in Thailand or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Indonesia (before the Peace 
Agreement on July 2005) and outright terrorist organisations that are either external to 
Southeast Asia, such as al-Qaeda or regionally-based such as Al Jamaah-Al Islamiyah -
better known as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). 3 The problem of discerning between terrorism 
and insurgencies (or separatist movements) is commonly expressed in the popular 
aphorism: 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. This thesis recognises 
that the distinction between separatist groups operating as military units to seize 
territory and seek political goals and terrorists is often blurred in the perception of the 
public.4 Purely 'terrorist' groups differ from separatist organizations. Terrorists seek to 
discredit the state by demonstrating that it is incapable of providing safety and social 
stability in those polities they are contesting. Separatist organisations are less focused 
on the demonstrating a state's impotents and more concerned with the primary political 
objective of separation or independence from the authority of the state they are 
challenging. Another difference that could be cited is the terrorists' recourse to religion 
as a basis of action. Such groups as JI always validate their behaviour in the name of 
Allah, and categorise the U.S. and its allies as 'disbeliever regimes.' They are fighting to 
impose their vision of an Islamic state. 5 While separatist groups such as GAM, MNLF, 
MILF and PULO have used the religion (Islam) to strengthen their identity, it is merely 
one aspect of an ethno-nationalist identity. By their nature, separatists are more intent 
on exploiting class differences or ethnic divisions as integral to their agendas, although 
they too can often exploit religious grievances. 
3 The case of GAM is illustrative of how, under exceptional circumstances, a separatist group can alter its 
methods once it decides to renounce armed struggle and pursue its goals through a political process. 
Writing in the Jakarta Post in April 2006, Radio Netherlands journalist, Aboeprijadi Santoso, predicted 
that, following the success of negotiations with the Indonesian government over limited local autonomy 
for Aceh, GAM's next move would be to transform itself into a political party. See 'GAM's next move 
is setting up political party', Jakarta Post, 24 April 2006. 
<http://www. thej akartapost.com/news/2006/04/24/ gam03 9s-next-move-setting-po litical-party .html? 1 > 
Accessed 12 March 2009. Three years later the paper published a column by Hotli Simanjuntak, under 
the title, 'Aceh Party's victory offers hope, concern', that began, 'Former separatist combatants have 
managed to transform the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) into a major local political force after last 
week's legislative elections.' <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/04/18/aceh-
party%E2%80%99s-victory-offers-hope-concem.html> Accessed 23 April 2009. 
4 Thomas Copeland, 'Is the "New Terrorism" Really New?: An Analysis of the New Paradigm for 
Terrorism', The Journal of Conflict Studies, 21, 2, 2001, p. 93. 
5 F.Gregory Gause III, 'Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?', Foreign Affairs, 84, 5, 2005, p. 62. 
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Of course, the existence of domestic separatist groups in Southeast Asia long 
predates the 11 September attacks in the U.S .. Indonesia, for example had to deal with 
militant Islamic groups such as Darul Islam (DI), a group dedicated to establishing an 
Islamic state in the archipelago from 1948 to 1962. GAM was established in the 1970s 
as an expression of grievances and feeling of despair and deprivation against the 
Indonesian government. It conducted a protracted military struggle for the independence 
of Aceh from Indonesian control. This group was able the gain significant support from 
the Acehnese people by propounding an ideology that mixed ethnic nationalism and 
Islamic religious values. Similarly, in the Philippines, Thailand, and Burma (all nations 
without a majority Islamic population) separatist groups proclaiming Islamic ideologies 
have used violence or terrorism against the national authorities. 6 
By contrast, contemporary Southeast Asian terrorist groups such as JI have 
strong links with international terrorist networks, while also tapping into the older 
domestic Islamic separatist movements. JI has strong links with the group DI, which 
was based in western Java. The late Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, the 
spiritual leaders of JI, borrowed inspiration from DI's ambition to create Negara Islam 
Indonesia (NII) or the Indonesian Islamic State. Some of the key members of JI, 
including such active terrorists as Al-Ghozi7 and Sholahudin,8 have strong family 
backgrounds within both groups.9 Their fathers were former hardcore DI members who 
were detained during the Sukarno and Suharto periods. The independent, non-partisan 
analysis organization, the International Crisis Group (ICG), argues that much of JI's 
platform is a 'recycling' of DI: 
No understanding of jihadism in Indonesia is possible without 
understanding the Darul Islam movement (DI) and its efforts to establish 
the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). Over the last 
55 years, that movement has produced splinters and offshoots that range 
from Jemaah Islamiyah to non -violent religious groups. Every time the 
older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new 
6 For distinctions between DI and GAM, see Kirsten E. Schulze, 'Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: 
Strategy and the Aceh Conflict, October 1976-May 2004', in Anthony Reid, ed. Verandah of Violence: 
the Background to the Aceh Problem (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), pp. 225-271 and 
Bob S. Hadiwinata, 'From Violence to Voting: Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Aceh', in Antje 
Missback and Eva Streifeneder (eds), Indonesia: The Presence of the Past (Essays in Honor of Ingrid 
Wessel) (Berlin: Regio-Spectra, 2007), especially pp. 153-154. 
7 Known as a key figure of JI member and bomb maker, and suspected to plotting and carrying terrorist 
attack in the region. 
8 Sholahudin was known to be involved in the 2000 Atrium Plaza shopping centre bombing in Jakarta. 
9 Noor Huda Ismail, 'What draws recruits to join Noordin's squad?' The Jakarta Post, 2 May 2006 <The 
Jakarta Post .com> Accessed 17 October 2008. 
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generation of young militants, inspired by DI's history and the mystique of 
an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life. 10 
These links mean that there is a superficial similarity between past and 
contemporary terrorist groups. This has often led governments to believe that they face 
a familiar, well understood threat, and unsurprisingly they tend to react by adopting old 
policies and methods. 
Historically, terrorism in Southeast Asia whether it was religious, ideological or 
political in character, was always seen as a domestic concern, with insurgency and 
separatist groups making claims on the sovereign territory of individual states. The 
experience of the five core ASEAN states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines and Thailand) with terrorist groups - whether communists, ethnic separatists 
or Islamic insurgents - has largely been seen as an internal problem. Links between 
groups pursuing similar goals in different countries were either non-existent or very 
weak. Most operated only in their own country or islands, focusing on domestic issues 
such as promoting a communist state, the adoption of Islamic law (sharia), or 
independence from the control of the central government. 11 Dealing with such groups 
was a protracted process spanning decades as national governments struggled to meet 
competing priorities of nation building during the post-independence period. 
When ASEAN was formed in 1967 the only regional commitment that riveted 
member-states was one which guaranteed abstaining from involvement in the domestic 
affairs of another member, - a policy embodied in the Treaty Amity of Cooperation 
(TAC). For decades the TAC was the highpoint in security cooperation among ASEAN 
members. Where terrorism was concerned the Treaty translated into a commitment not 
to support insurgent groups in other ASEAN states, nor to criticise the policies 
employed by member-states in dealing with a domestic insurgency. Singapore and 
Malaysia relied upon tough internal security acts to confront the issue. In Indonesia, 
domestic disorder of any kind was countered by the strong central political control and 
the institutionalised violence of military and para-military forces. The Philippines 
waged an extended military campaign against both communist and Muslim militant 
groups. Thai governments launched a series of military operations against the 
insurgency in the southern provinces, while adopting a policy of accommodating certain 
10 
'Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing', International 
Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 92, 22 February 2005. 
11 Mark Manyin, Emma Chanlet-Averty, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch and Bruce Vaughn. 'Terrorism in 
Southeast Asia', CRS Report for Congress, 13 August 2004. 
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demands and allowing some special privileges to Muslims. 12 These policies were 
supplemented by joint police raids with Malaysian authorities against secessionists 
thought to be hiding in northern Malaysia. 13 
General Perceptions of the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Policies 
After 2001, the type of multilateral anti-terrorist policies which the U.S. 
suggested for the region were unfamiliar to ASEAN and unsurprisingly the Association 
has been greatly challenged in adopting a collaborative approach to the threat of 
terrorism. While it was easy for ASEAN to unanimously condemn the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and promise its support the U.S. in combating terrorism, it has been more 
difficult for the Association's individual member-states to respond as positively to the 
detailed execution of U.S. counter-terrorism policies. President Bush's statement that 
other states and parties were 'either with us or against us in the global war on terror' left 
no room for neutrality. 14 Most of the world's major and medium powers, unhesitatingly 
threw their support behind the American-led campaign against international terrorism. 
As one commentator noted, " ... failure to support U. S. efforts would put a country in 
danger of being labeled an undependable ally, or a rogue regime. So far, that is 
providing a formidable incentive to stand up and be counted."15 There were other good 
reasons for ASEAN to jump on the bandwagon and support the U.S. The region's 
obvious terrorist problems provided a clear rationale for doing so. Additionally, the 
Americans' willingness to participate in a range of bilateral and multilateral military and 
security-related exercises in Southeast Asia provided welcome assistance to nations 
feeling the need to enhance their capacity to counter the threat. ASEAN states were also 
eager that the U.S. should not disengage from the region, particularly as U.S. political, 
economic and military support would serve their domestic interests. 
In general, however, the efficiency of ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts has 
been hampered by domestic concerns, especially in those states with either a Muslim 
majority or a sizable Muslim minority. One reason is that, for many of the region's 
12 In more comprehensive see Syed Serajul Islam, 'The Islamic Independence 
Movements in Patani of Thailandand Mindanao of the Philippines', Asian Survey, 38, 
5, May 1998, p. 447 
13 Peter chalk, Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Sothem Thailand, Mindanao and 
Aceh, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24, p. 245. 
14 Julia Preston 'America's message to UN: You're with us or against us', Sydney Morning Herald, 25 
October 2002 <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/24/1035416936620.html >Accessed 30 
November 2008. 
15 Bruce Gilley 'The Coming War --The Region Takes Sides', Far Eastern Economic Review, 164, 38, 
27 September 2001, pp. 24-26. 
135 
Muslims, the U.S. has a poor image. This makes the governments of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand reluctant to be seen as blithely 
cooperating with aspects of U.S. foreign policy, particularly as they relate to the Muslim 
world. 16 Southeast Asian Muslims are concerned about U.S. support for Israel and 
Israel's treatment of the Palestinian people. Washington's policies in Afghanistan and 
Iraq have reinforced the impression that the U.S. is out to undermine Muslim states. 
Many moderate Southeast Asian Muslims were outraged in October 2001, when the 
U.S. conducted its bombing attack on Afghanistan during the holy month of Ramadan. 
Such actions by the U.S. have encouraged radicalism among Southeast Asian Muslims. 
This situation has created a paradox in which states that seek U.S. support against 
terrorism may actually be helping to promote domestic extremism and the international 
groups who sponsor it. 
Another reason for Southeast Asia's reluctance to support the global war on 
terror is that Southeast Asian elites do not want to be perceived by their citizens as 
having fallen too readily into an American orbit. The ASEAN states could not see why 
the war against terrorism had to be fought under American leadership and strictly on 
American terms. 17 Moreover, the unity of ASEAN in supporting the U.S. in combating 
terrorism weakened after it was realised that elements of Washington's anti-terrorism 
policies risked violating state sovereignty and ignored human rights. Many critics felt 
they were only safeguarding the economic and security interest of the U.S., while 
neglecting the safety and pride of Muslims around the world. The ASEAN states thus 
agreed that the U.S. should fight terrorism, but they did not agree with 'how the U.S. 
should fight it' .18 To assist in understanding the complexities of this dilemma, a brief 
review of how each of the five ASEAN core states have perceived the region's terrorism 
problems will be offered below. 
Indonesia's Response 
Immediately after 9/11, the Indonesian government extended strong support to 
the U.S. Indonesia's President Megawati Sukamoputri was the second leader and the 
first Muslim/non-Western head of state to meet personally with President Bush on 19 
September 2001. The two leaders exchanged pledges to strengthen existing cooperation 
16Kumar Ramakrishna, 'The Southeast Asian Approach to Counter-Terrorism: Leaming from Indonesia 
and Malaysia', The Journal of Conflict Studies, 25, 1, 2005, p. 35. 
17Rizal Sukma, 'World still dealing with Sept. 11 ', The Jakarta Post, 16 July 2002 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/print/50900> Accessed 21 September 2008. 
18 Abdullah Toha, 'Wolwowitz's remarks on terror questionable', The Jakarta Post, 18 October 2002 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha.default.aspx>Accessed 1December2008. 
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and President Megawati assured her U.S. counterpart that Indonesia, although a Muslim 
nation, would join the world community in the fight against terrorism. 
The visit was a clear demonstration of the Indonesia's foreign policy priorities. 
Indonesia under Megawati needed to have close relations with U.S. to boost its national 
economic and security conditions. For its part, Washington understood the benefit of 
having the support of the leader of the world's most populous Muslim nation. 19 The 
meeting was also important for U.S. efforts to create a broad-based international 
coalition that included Muslim countries such as Indonesia.20 Moreover, with Indonesia 
frequently labelled as a 'terrorist haven', or at least suspected of unknowingly 
harbouring terrorists, garnering Megawati's support was a significant step in the U.S. 
fight against global terrorism. During the meeting, Bush and Megawati issued a joint 
statement that included its former's promise to restore U.S. military aid to Indonesia and 
a U.S. pledge for financial aid totalling US$657.4 million.21 This signalled the beginning 
a visible U.S effort to improve relations with Indonesia as an important component of 
its overall Asia-Pacific counter-terrorism strategy. 
For Indonesia the opportunity to enjoy good relations with the U.S. was highly 
important, particularly as the relationship had become visibly strained during the 1990's 
over human rights issues. Such U.S. support would enhance Indonesia's national 
security. This was especially the case with a resumption of closer US-Indonesia military 
relations providing the possibility of American arms and advisers to assist Jakarta with 
separatist and sectarian problems in Aceh, the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and West Papua. In 
mid-2002, the U.S. State Department requested the American Congress to vote a $US16 
million appropriation to assist Indonesia in training its police for counter-terrorism 
missions and it's military in domestic peacekeeping operations. The State Department 
also requested an additional $US 400,000 for training civilians in security-related 
matters under the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program and a 
further $US 179 million for combating terrorism throughout Southeast Asia. While the 
monetary amounts involved, were relatively small, Jakarta viewed the funding and the 
programs as important symbols of America's commitment to good relations. 
On 19 July 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee followed up these initial 
measures by voting to drop other restrictions on military aid to Indonesia. This was 
19 Fabiola Desy Unidjaya, 'A year of new beginning for Indonesia-US relations', The Jakarta Post, 29 
December 2001 < http://global.factiva.com> Accessed 1 December 2008. 
20 Derwin Pereira, 'Megawati leaves on trip to US', Straits Times, 18 September 2001. 
21 Tianarma Siboro, 'TNI not expecting U.S. to lift arms embargo', The Jakarta Post, 23 April 2002 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 February 2008. 
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signalling that Tehtara National Indonesia (TN!) or the Indonesian military was now 
viewed as a more valued asset by Bush administration in combating terrorism and less 
of a blight on human rights. Among Indonesians, however, the reaction to the U.S. 
lifting of the military ban was mixed. It was welcomed by the government because it 
improved the TNI's military capabilities, giving the U.S. military more support in its 
anti-terrorism campaign, and as an opportunity to interact more with the United States, 
across various sectors.22 For the human rights activists, however, the lifting of 
restrictions was merely putting U.S. short-term interests above other important issues. 
According to human rights activists the lifting of the ban was proof that the U.S. is 
inconsistent in promoting human rights and democratisation in Indonesia. 23 
Progress towards a closer U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship slowed after 
various members of the U.S. Congress persisted in trying to block military aid to 
Indonesia. Indonesia cautioned the U.S. that delay in providing military and education 
funds could slow down combined US-Indonesia's effort to combat terrorism since the 
TNI needed the aid to maintain equipment and improve its soldiers' professionalism.24 
In response to efforts directed toward retaining the U.S. military ban, Indonesia argued 
it was prepared to look toward other countries for such aid. During a hearing on security 
affairs conducted by Indonesia's House Commission I (and which was attended by TNI 
Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto ), Indonesian legislators recommended that TNI 
maintain the nation's dignity and sovereignty by seeking other sources of military aid to 
end dependency on the U.S and to curb what they perceived as U.S interference in 
Indonesia's affairs. 25 Given the U.S. policy of not exporting lethal military to Indonesia, 
President Megawati was forced to look for other sources of weaponry, particularly from 
Eastern Europe.26 However, Indonesia knew that in reality, sidelining the U.S. in this 
way was impossible since Washington supplied most of the TNI's weapons. 
Furthermore, Indonesia did not have enough funds to purchase military equipment, even 
if other countries were willing to allow it to buy them. 
22 Kurniawan Hari and Tianna Siboro, 'Resumption ofIMET boosts RI-US military relations', The 
Jakarta Post, 22 July 2002 <http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 February 2008. 
23 
'U.S. Congress lifts military ban on Indonesia', The Jakarta Post, 21 July 2002 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 February 2008. 
24 Tianna Siboro, 'U.S. Congress to evaluate military embargo on Indonesia', The Jakarta Post, 20 May 
2002 <http:/old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 February 2009. 
25 
'TNI told seek non-US military aid', The Jakarta Post, 17 September 2002 
<http:/old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 February 2009. 
26 Fabiola Desy Unidjaya, 'Indonesia looks forward to reinstatement ofIMET program', The Jakarta 
Post, 30 November 2002 <http:/old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 February 2009. 
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The U.S. also pressured the Indonesian government to undertake more effective 
action to support the U.S. campaign against terrorism. The State Department drew 
attention to Indonesia's inadequate role in its 2001 report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 
which was released on May 2002. The report noted that: "The Indonesian Government 
... has taken limited action in support of international antiterrorist efforts."27 The U.S. 
Ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph Boyce, insisted that al-Qaeda cells were operating in 
Indonesia and urged the Megawati government to counter them.28 The U.S. was also 
concerned that Indonesia had not arrested those who the U.S. considered to be high 
profile Indonesian terrorists, such as the cleric Abu Bakar Baasyir and that Megawati 
had done little to check anti-America sentiment in Indonesia. Dana Dillon, a senior 
policy analyst at Washington's Heritage Foundation listed the key sources of U.S. 
dissatisfaction with Indonesia: the Indonesian government's withholding of support for 
the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; its half-hearted economic reform measures 
and its apparent lack of resolve to find the killers of two U.S. schoolteachers at the 
Freeport Mine in Papua.29 To this list might be added Indonesia's lack of cooperation in 
disrupting terrorist finances. 30 The accusation that the Indonesian government under 
Megawati was not being cooperative with the U.S. may not have been true in all cases. 
The Indonesian government eventually did bring Abu Bakar Baasyir to trial for 
allegedly heading JI and helping to plan several bombings in Indonesia, (although U.S. 
officials and other external observers were concerned that the Indonesian courts failed 
to convict him of terrorism but instead merely convicted him with infringement of 
Indonesia's immigration law that commanded only a light sentence). Indonesia also 
secretly handed over suspected terrorist Omar al-Faruq to U.S. authorities. This latter 
act created tension within Indonesia, however and raised questions among Muslim 
leaders in that country about Megawati' s sense of legality and her pride in Indonesian 
sovereignty.31 
27 U.S Department of State, 'Africa, South Asia, East Asia Overview', Pattern Global Terrorism 2001, 
May 2002, p. 17 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10290.pdf> Accessed 25 February 
2009. 
28 
'U.S. yet to link RI groups to int'l terrorist cells-Boyce', The Jakarta Post, 25 September 2002 
<http://global.factiva.com.> Accessed 28 February 2009; and Robert Go, 'US urges Indonesians to 
tackle Al-Qaeda problem, Straits Times, 25 September 2002 <http://globalfactiva.com> Accessed 28 
February 2009. 
29 Roger Mitton, 'US-Jakarta ties hit rocky Patch', Straits Times, 18 July 2003 <http://global. 
factiva.com> Accessed 1 December 2008. 
30 Lee Siew Hua, 'Call to have own plan to fight terror funding', Straits Times, 30 October 2001. 
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The US-Indonesia relationship experienced a serious downturn when on July 
2003 the U.S. House of Representatives voted against providing Indonesia additional 
funds for military education and training for the next two years. The House of 
Representatives accused the Indonesian government of not being sufficiently 
cooperative with U.S. investigators in the Freeport Mine case. The Indonesian 
government warned that the House vote could jeopardise bilateral ties. Coordinating 
Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono called the 
action by the U.S. a "dramatic decision" and questioned how the U.S. House of 
Representative could come to such a conclusion while the Freeport investigation was 
still going on.32 TNI chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, said that the TNI "had never 
asked for such a small amount of financial aid" and continued to vehemently deny that 
the military was involved in the Freeport incident.33 This situation only worsened when 
Indonesia's air force detected five American F-18 Hornet jets manoeuvring over 
Bawean Island in East Java and a combat jet 'dog fight' almost ensued.34 The U.S. ban 
continued until January 2004, when the U.S. Congress restored IMET assistance to 
Indonesia. 
The bilateral relationship between Indonesia and U.S. strengthened after the U.S. 
Congress finally restored IMET for Indonesia in November 2005. This was the result, 
particularly, of a policy recommendation by U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. 
She insisted that Indonesia was cooperating effectively with U.S authorities on the 
investigation of the Freeport killings. With this decision, Indonesia once more becomes 
a significant ally in the U.S. global effort to combat international terrorism. 
Indonesia's inability to initially fulfil U.S. expectations resulted from its need to 
balance the benefits of the American relationship against significant domestic pressures. 
Until the Bali bombing in 2002, the Indonesian government regularly denied the 
presence of terrorist organizations such as JI and Al-Qaeda within its territory. Evidence 
on such secretive organisations using informal and clandestine links was difficult for 
Indonesian authorities to gather. In addition, the definition of Jamaah Islamiyah as a 
terrorist organisation had sensitive ramifications for the wider Muslim community, 
which was always wary of being tainted through guilt by association. 
32 Tianna Siboro, 'RI wants of sour ties with U.S', The Jakarta Post, 22 July 2003 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 25 February 2008. 
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Indeed, the nation's top security officials could not agree on the extent of 
involvement by al-Qaeda operatives in Indonesia.35 The National Intelligence Agency 
chief, Lieutenant-General A. M. Hendropriyono, asserted that al-Qaeda militants were 
present in Poso, for example, but the Chief Security Minister, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, maintained that there was no proof of any international terrorist groups, 
much less al-Qaeda, operating in that locality. The inability of these two senior officials 
to agree on the presence or absence of international terrorists in their own country 
projected a poor image of Indonesia's state security apparatus and suggested to the 
outside world that Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts were half-hearted. Indonesia 
finally acknowledged the existence of an international terrorist network in the country in 
September 2002 through Indonesian Defence Force Chief, General Endriartono Sutarto. 
However, he still denied that there was evidence linking such network directly to al-
Qaeda.36 
At the time the Indonesian government faced often demanding domestic security 
problems. These included the separatist movements in Aceh and Papua which it viewed 
as threatening the unity and existence of the Indonesian republic. Moreover, any 
admission that al-Qaeda was operating within its national territory could, various 
Indonesian officials feared, invite a unilateral American intervention, similar to the U.S. 
attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. No Indonesian government could survive any such 
interference in its domestic affairs. Prior to the 2002 Bali terrorist attack, many 
Indonesians felt that combating international terrorism was largely a U.S. problem. 
They looked to their government to provide them with domestic reforms in the areas of 
democratization and the economy, rather than acting on a security agenda that appeared 
to be dictated by foreign interests. 
President Megawati's ability to act on her commitment to support the U.S. 
GWOT was clearly hampered by the Indonesian domestic political environment, 
especially as she had to consider the views of Indonesia's Islamic political parties in 
order to govern. There was a "cultural denial" among the Indonesian Muslim 
community that in fact terrorism links to Islam.37 For example, Mr Hamzah Haz, the 
Vice President, was also the head of the largest Islamic Political Party, Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP) in the parliament and was one of the staunchest defenders of the 
35 
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idea that Indonesia has no terrorism problems and a supporter of some of the country's 
most radical Islamic leaders, including Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.' 38 Other leaders of Islamic 
based parties such as the National Mandate Party and the United Development Reform 
Party Reform also criticised the government's support for international efforts to label JI 
as a terrorist organization, as well as urging it to drop charges against Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir.39 The opposition of Islamic parties to such measures, Megawati's reliance on 
these parties to vote her programs through the Indonesian parliament and fear of further 
damaging her already tarnished popularity with the Indonesian public all severely 
undermined her administration's efforts to respond decisively and quickly on terrorism-
related issues and diminished the government's earlier enthusiasm for close bilateral 
relations with the U.S. 
Only in the aftermath of the Bali bombing in 2002 was there a marked change in 
both the amount of government action on terrorism and public perceptions of domestic 
counter-terrorism operations. The death toll in a locale that was so economically 
important to the nation and which had previously been peaceful was a wake up call for 
Indonesia. The successful efforts of the Indonesian police in investigating the attack and 
bringing its perpetrators to justice convinced both the public and politicians that the 
country had a serious terrorist problem. This success led to the Megawati government 
implementing a range of domestic counter-terrorism measures such as the creation of a 
special anti-terrorism desk within the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political 
and Security Affairs. The role of this unit is to better coordinate intelligence gathering 
between relevant departments and agencies and to formulate antiterrorism policies and 
strategies. 
A new special police section dedicated to counter terrorism, Densus 88 or 
Detachment 88 which was partly funded by U.S. was established on August 2004. This 
unit was at the forefront of Indonesian anti counter-terrorism beside other existing units 
in the Police such as Gegana or Kopasus. Part of 'Detachment 88's success comes from 
its heavy reliance on intelligence - part of which comes from cooperation by former 
members of radical Islamist groups who have come realise that they had undertaken 
'wrong jihad' .40 The unit adopted cultural and psychological approaches such as tracing 
38 
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the movements of families and related social networks, which proved to be quite useful 
tactics in detecting terrorist activities. 
Soon after the Bali attacks in October 2002, President Megawati issued a decree, 
Peraturan Pemerintah (Perpu), promulgating government regulations 1/2002 and 
2/2002 in lieu of a law on terrorism. Article 6 of the decree defines terrorists as: 
Persons who deliberately use violence or the threat of violence to create an 
atmosphere of terror or spread fear among the general public or create 
victims on a mass scale by depriving persons of their liberty or their life, 
or inflict damage or destruction on strategic, vital objects or the living 
environment or public facilities or international facilities.41 
The decree specifically provides that "intelligence reports may be used to initiate 
a formal investigation and detain a suspect for up to six months without charge or trial" 
(Article 25). The provisions of the decree are close to the policies that the Bush 
administration has urged on its allies in the GWOT. They are not as draconian as the 
Internal Security Acts of Malaysia and Singapore (legacies of the British colonial era 
that were devised in response to a communist uprising). In January 2003, Indonesia' 
parliament passed a formal anti-terrorism law. 
The Indonesian government also pursued 'soft' fronts to curtail terrorism. It 
enlisted the help of some of the country's most respected religious authorities to 
confront Islamic fundamentalists. In November 2005, leading Muslim scholars from 
around Indonesia declared an all-out jihad against religious extremism.42 Using this 
'front' was important, since the religious aspect appears to dominate the character of 
Indonesian terrorism. For example, most terrorists in the country had been trained in 
pesantren, or Islamic boarding schools. 
In summarising the current Indonesian efforts to combat terrorism, Indonesian 
authorities have arrested many terrorism suspects (at least 300 terrorists to 2006) and, in 
particular, many high-profile terrorists. Australia, a close counterpart in fighting 
terrorism, has praised Indonesia's recent efforts to tackle the problem.43 Moreover, 
Indonesia has achieved notable success without adopting widespread arbitrary 
detention. Suspects are either charged within a week of their arrest or are released. In 
41 See complete document of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law in Bahasa Indonesia: Lembaran 
Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 2002, no. 16, Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang 
Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2002, Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terrorism. Jakarta, 18 
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addition, trials are prompt, held in open courts and widely covered by both the domestic 
and international media. As Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group (ICG) has 
observed, "The Indonesian government, to its credit, sees terrorism as a law 
enforcement problem, not an insurgency, to be addressed by the police, not the 
military".44 Jones also gives Indonesia credit for doing better than either the Philippines 
or Thailand, let alone the United States, in striking a proper balance between security 
and liberty and counter-terrorism. 45 
The Indonesian government has developed particularly strong anti-terrorism 
cooperation with Australia. Indonesia and Australia established a joint investigation and 
intelligence team to work on the issue following the Bali tragedy. This historic 
partnership was initially viewed by some Indonesians, both in the media and public, 
with suspicion. The Australian role in the investigation of the 2002 Bali Bombing was 
seen by some Indonesians as outside interference in a matter of domestic security. 
However, the technical assistance provided by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and 
the good relations built up during the investigation did much to allay initial suspicions. 
The fact that citizens from both nations were the targets and victims of the Bali 
Bombings and the Bomb Kuningan or Australian Embassy attack two years later did 
much to cement the partnership. Australia is also the main supporter for the Jakarta 
Centre for Law Enforcement (JCLEC) in Semarang, which was established in 2004 to 
provide training programs in counter-terrorism. 
A current sign of Indonesia's strengthening resolve in the fight against terrorism 
was the declaration by a district court in South Jakarta on April 2008 that JI was a 
organisasi terlarang or 'forbidden corporation.' The Indonesia government also 
prosecuted two senior JI members, Abu Dujana and Zarkasih. Both were found guilty of 
charges that included funding, aiding and abetting JI fugitives. 46 Through such trials, JI 
has been proven to exist, with a structure, funding and board members and has now 
been disclosed as being behind the planning of many terror incidents in Indonesia.47 Yet, 
Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts have experienced a slow but steady development 
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that is in keeping with the domestic problems any Indonesian government will face in 
dealing with this issue. 
The Philippines Response 
Compared to the other core ASEAN member states, the Philippines has shown a 
strongest response for counter-terrorism efforts in the region. 48 It was the first ASEAN 
state to declare its support for the U.S. war on terrorism. When the Philippine President, 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, called President Bush shortly after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, she pledged to "help in whatever way we can to strengthen the global 
effort to crush those responsible for this barbaric act."49 
Initially, Manila also expressed its willingness to fully back the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, offering the use Philippines airbases and troops.50 However, when a Philippines 
national was taken captive in Iraq, the Arroyo government brought forward the 
timetable for the withdrawal of its peacekeeping contingent in that country in order to 
secure the release of the hostage.51 Although the U.S. was critical of the move, the 
policy was an understandable one from the Philippines' perspective, especially given 
the ongoing issue of the Muslim insurgency in the country's southern area. Thereafter 
the Philippines has limited its support to providing 'military installations for transit, 
refuelling and staging operations' for U.S. troops in Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan. 52 This policy has also been sufficient to secure the Philippines continued 
American support for its own domestic struggle against Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and 
other terrorist elements in Mindanao. 
In mid-September 2001, the Philippines government formed an Inter-Agency 
Task Force Against International Terrorism. The purpose of this entity was to 
coordinate intelligence operations and to facilitate the identification and neutralization 
of suspected terrorist cells in the Philippines. On 29 September 2001, the Philippine 
Congress also passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act to freeze the financial assets of 
international terrorists. Three weeks later, President Arroyo announced a fourteen point 
approach to combating terrorism. The plan designated a cabinet Oversight Committee 
48 Luhulima, 'Colin Powell's visit', 31 July 2002. 
49 Pretti Bhattacharij, Terrorism havens: Philippines, Council on Foreign Relations, 30 June 2008, 
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50 Luhulima, 'Colin Powell's visit', 31 July 2002. 
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on Internal Security as the nation's leading anti-terrorism body and sought to 
consolidate various national intelligence projects. It also contained a wide range of 
political, security, legislative and social measures in order to boost the Philippines' 
ability to detect, protect and respond to acts of terrorist violence. Additionally, there 
were moves to modernise both the armed forces and the national police as well as a 
pledge to pursue Christian-Muslim dialogue. Such initiatives acknowledged the need to 
address the socioeconomic and political roots of what it called 'perceived fanaticism 
and irrational violence'. To implement this plan, the government issued General Order 
No 2 and Memorandum No 61 on 9 May 2002, directing the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police to prevent and suppress acts of 
terrorism and lawless violence in Mindanao and the Southern Philippines.53 
President Arroyo perceived tangible benefits for her country closely associating 
itself with the U.S. war on terrorism. US-Philippines security relations had been strained 
for some time over extradition issues, even as the Philippines wanted to obtain 
economic and military assistance from the U.S.54 A show of strong support for the 
GWOT could do a great deal to improve relations between the two countries. Soon after 
Arroyo's September 2001 visit to Washington, the Philippines received at least $US 4.6 
billion in economic and military aid from the U.S.55 President Bush also offered military 
advisers to assist the Philippines in its campaign against the ASG but President Arroyo 
initially declined, saying the Philippines could deal with this problem on its own way.56 
Eventually, however, Arroyo did accept training, equipment and maintenance 
support. The impetus for this offer was an incident in which the ASG had abducted and 
held hostage a number of people, including two U.S. missionaries, on the southern 
island of Basilan. The U.S. also sent military equipment and increased its military aid to 
the Philippines Government by $US92.3 million to assist the AFP in its 
counterinsurgency operations. For its part, the Philippine's government has signed a 
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement with the U.S. Although no U.S. military personnel 
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are permanently stationed in the Philippines, the agreement ensured the U.S. greater 
involvement with the Philippines military than it had had since it relinquished its bases 
in the country in 1992. This agreement allowed the U.S. to conduct military exercises 
with the Philippines Armed Forces, but on a renegotiated basis that is mutually 
satisfactory to both parties. 
For Washington, the Philippines's counter-terrorism commitments were 
important, not only for re-establishing close defence relations between the two 
countries, but also as proof that the U.S. anti-terrorist coalition was broadly based. The 
U.S. was also keen to take the offensive against terrorist groups in the Philippines, 
especially after the interrogation of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed revealed links between 
Al-Qaeda and ASG. Indeed, Mohammed told his interrogators that the plot that led to 
9/11 had been planned in Manila in 1994.57 The persistence of terrorism on Philippines' 
soil thus underscored its importance in U.S. efforts to counter global terrorism. 
During 2002, joint military exercises in the Philippines were conducted 
involving substantial numbers of U.S. forces. 58 President Arroyo welcomed the renewed 
U.S. military involvement in the Philippines as she believed it would: 
Maintain and secure future cooperative engagement activities with the 
U.S; Enhance domestic security through improved military capabilities; 
and Gain American assistance in the war against the country's Muslim 
separatists. 59 
The joint AFP/U.S. military exercises, designated Balikatan, began in February. 
Balikatan 02-l entertained the goal of enhancing the capability of Philippine and U.S. 
forces in combating international terrorism. 60 It was the largest military exercise of its 
kind between the AFP and the U.S., and involved nearly 2700 U.S. soldiers, advisers, 
trainers and logistics personnel. The rationale for the exercise was predicated on the 
1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) between the two states, which requires them to 
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undertake military exercises in order to develop their joint capacity to resist aggression 
and to combat common adversaries. 
The exercise took place primarily on the island province of Basilan, a haven for 
the ASG. Aggressive forays against suspected terrorist enclaves gave Balikatan more 
significance in neutralising threats than most military exercises normally assume. Other 
units conducted operations in Zamboanga City, the headquarters of the Philippine's 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). With ASG largely neutralized, the Philippines 
government used the occasion to attack left wing groups such as the Communist Party 
of the Philippines (CPP) and its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA). This 
episode led to other left-wing political groups in the Philippines viewing Balikatan as a 
sign of a more general crackdown on 'progressive' forces. 61 In July 2002 Filipino and 
U.S. troops ended Balikatan 02-1 in the Zamboanga peninsula and Basilan where they 
hunted elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). However, hundreds of American 
soldiers remained in the area to undertake 'humanitarian' projects. 
The Philippines was more prepared than any other ASEAN nation to join the 
U.S. in combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. Unlike some of its ASEAN partners, the 
Philippines clearly perceived that the threat of international terrorism was interwoven 
with its own Muslim separatist struggles in the south of the country. In the wake of the 
2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S., the Philippines moved reinvigorate its relations with 
Washington and used U.S. support to aggressively deal with ASG.62 Unlike Indonesian 
domestic opinion, the majority of Filipinos support the government's counter-terrorism 
policies. For example, a survey conducted by the polling group Social Weather Station, 
a non-profit social research institution, found strong support (84 percent) for both 
stronger ties with the U.S. and U.S. military aid.63 
Singapore's Response 
As a close strategic partner of the U.S., Singapore's firm backing of the U.S. 
global anti-terror campaign was not surprising. Soon after 9/11, Deputy Prime Minister, 
Lee Hsien Loong, confirmed his nation's support America's efforts to hunt down the 
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terrorists behind the attacks and to support the global anti-terrorism fight. 64 Singapore 
also offered logistic support to the U.S. and opened its air and port facilities to U.S. 
forces. 65 Unlike Malaysia and Indonesia, who criticised U.S. military involvement in 
Afghanistan, Singapore has extended full support for the U.S. global campaign against 
terrorism. Singapore's position on Afghanistan, as outlined by the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, was justified in the context of international law: 
Military action by the U.S. and other countries against terrorist training 
camps and military facilities in Afghanistan is in conformity with UN 
Security Council resolution 1368 passed on Sept 12 ... .It is a legitimate act 
of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 66 
Yet, such Singaporean interpretations have created tensions between Singapore 
and its Muslim neighbours. Tensions between Singapore and Indonesia arose over 
terrorism when Singapore informed the Indonesian authorities that interrogation of 
detained JI members had implicated the Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir in the JI 
network. Embarrassed by the accusation against the prominent cleric, the Indonesian 
response was that there was no hard evidence linking Bashir with the group. 
Tensions also occurred when Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
observed that Indonesia was a haven for terrorists, with many terrorism suspects at large 
within its borders, which could endanger Singapore. 67 This remark was intended to 
emphasise that Indonesia was not doing enough to crack down on terrorism. Indonesia 
saw this criticism as an insult and the incident sparked demonstrations from Muslim 
hardliners outside the Singapore Embassy in Jakarta.68 Chairman of the Indonesian 
National Assembly, Amien Rais, accused Mr Lee of acting " .. .like the mouthpiece of 
President Bush" and called for an apology.69 The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hasan 
Wirayuda, further observed saying that Indonesia was not able to act as ruthlessly as 
Singapore's 'authoritarian government' in its efforts against terrorists. 70 
64 Irene Ng., 'Terrorism - S'pore will do its part', Straits Times, 20 September 2001. 
<http://global.factive.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 5 June 2008. 
65 Felix Soh, 'Asians working closely with US to fight terror', Straits Times, 27 October 2001 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 15 May 2008. 
66 
'Strikes- S'pore backs them', Straits Times, 9 October 2001 <http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> 
Accessed 8 June 2008. 
67 Derwin Pereira, 'Jakarta Protest to Singapore Envy', Straits Times, 22 February 2003. 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 12 May 2008. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Devi Asmarani, 'Jakarta - S'pore is too authoritarian to understand us', Straits Times, 25 February 2002 
<http:// global. factiva.com> Accessed 28 February 2009. 
149 
Despite such criticisms from a fellow ASEAN state, Singapore has maintained a 
very concentrated approach to terrorism. This is characterized by close co-ordination of 
its law enforcement agencies. Singapore's national security framework is well 
integrated across the various agencies of government and also involves both the 
community and private sector to yield a highly effective approach to counter-terrorism. 
The Singaporean government has formed multi-agency task forces to conduct 
comprehensive reviews of the city-state's vulnerabilities. 
A range of measures have been implemented across several sectors, facilitating 
improvements to security in aviation, maritime and land transport. Singapore has also 
taken measures to secure itself against cyber terrorism. Within the national security 
framework, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) plays a key role, working closely with 
civilian agencies in many areas. The air force is at the frontline of aviation security, 
while the navy, the Police Coast Guard and the Maritime and Port Authority and 
Immigration and Checkpoints Authority have all worked to enhance the security of 
Singapore's ports and its proximate sea lines of communication. The SAF has also set 
up an Island Defence Headquarters (IDHQ) to command and control all the security 
requirements of the states key industrial and communication installations.71 Singapore's 
achievements in anti-terrorism security have been significantly aided by its wealth and 
technical capacity in both the government and private sectors. The character of its 
government and the lack of an effective political opposition have also made it easy for 
Singaporean policy planners to enact a range of robust measures to combat external 
terrorist threats. 
Thailand's Response 
Thailand communicated its condemnation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the 
U.S. in a letter from Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, to the U.S. President George 
Bush. Prime Minister, Thaksin related to Bush that he had been "deeply shocked and 
saddened" by the attacks and that "the Thai people also share my views that these 
terrorist acts are to be condemned in the strongest terms."72 Thai Foreign Minister, 
Surakiart Sathirathai said in a letter to his counterpart, Colin Powell that "Thailand is 
ready to render any possible assistance that will alleviate the suffering of the victims of 
71 See speech by Mr Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Defense, 'Working Together in the Fight Against 
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these terrorist acts."73 These messages of condolences and support were however not 
matched by actions, despite the fact that Thailand is only one of four Asian countries 
that have a formal defence pact with the U.S. 
Immediately following 9111, Thailand announced that it would not support the 
U.S. in its Global War on Terror (GWOT) with deployments of its own forces to 
Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Surakiart said that the 'extremely sensitive situation' 
called for Thailand to remain neutral and refrain from pointing a finger at anyone. 74 
According to White House insiders and diplomatic sources, this statement irked 
Washington, which expected that a close ally such as Thailand would be a better friend 
in America's time of need.75 Washington's displeasure at this neutral stance was 
particularly strong considering that the two nations had been formal allies ever since 
1954.76 From a practical standpoint, the U.S. had expected that Thailand would 
demonstrate its commitment and obligation to GWOT by opening the facilities of U-
Tapao naval air base, as a convenient logistical base for the U.S. 7th Fleet and troops 
from its Pacific Command (PACOM) transiting the Indian Ocean on their way to 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Thailand's lack of cooperation with the U.S. and its tentative response to 
terrorism were the result of the Thai government's general dissatisfaction with U.S 
policies and especially for not doing more to help Thailand during the 1997-1998 
financial crisis and American opposition to Supachai Panitchapakdi's candidacy to head 
World Trade Organization, and also the Thai's domestic problems with Islamist 
militants.77 An editorial in The Nation, described the dilatory actions of Thai leaders as a 
metamorphosis from a long practiced policy of "neither deny nor confirm" to one of 
"either deny or confirm."78 For many months after September 2001, Thai politicians and 
senior officials were in denial mode regarding terrorist activities on Thai soil. This was 
despite the fact that Western intelligence agencies had identified Thailand as both a 
shelter for terrorists and a possible springboard for their activities, both in the region 
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and internationally.79 The Thai government dismissed these reports and denied that al-
Qaeda operatives had transited through southern Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin 
lashed out at American media reports that Riduan Isamuddin, better known as 
'Hambali', was hiding in Thailand and that terror networks had established cells in the 
country. 
Four weeks after this announcement, the armed forces Supreme Commander, 
General Surayuth Julanont, confirmed aspects of these allegations, marking a shift in 
Thai policy from outright denial to limited confirmation. On December 12, the Foreign 
Ministry followed suit in a briefing for the diplomatic corps confirming that 
international terrorists 'could have transited through' Thailand. However, the Ministry 
flatly denied that there were any local cells linked to international terrorism. At most, 
Thailand was prepared to acknowledge that JI and other terrorist might be using its 
national territory for transit purposes, but definitely not as a base for their activities.80 
The Thai government also sought to diminish any image of the country as a terrorist 
haven by comparing it favourably with to other ASEAN states: " ... the Kingdom was 
not such a hot bed compared with neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore."81 
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the Islamic communities in 
Thailand had called on the government to exercise caution and maintain a 'balanced' 
stand if Washington chose to go to war.82 Many Thai leaders were cautious about giving 
visible support to the U.S. military. This position was adopted for fear of causing 
negative reactions domestically. Thai Muslim leaders voiced opposition to any Thai 
military involvement in the Afghanistan, including allowing U.S. forces to use Thai 
military bases to assist their operations in Afghanistan. 83 There were calls by opposition 
and civil rights groups for the Thai government to publicly disclose the details of its 
agreement with Washington over the use of U-Tapao airbase. However, the Thai 
government through Defence Minister Chavalit Y ongchaiyudh denied that the airbase 
has been used for the transport of U.S. soldiers or shipment of arms. This was the case, 
although Thailand is bound by agreement to grant the use of Utapao naval airbase, 
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particularly for the purpose of military cooperation and joint military exercises. 84 Even 
when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Thailand in October 2001, there was 
no formal announcement about Utapao airbase had been used for U.S. activities in 
fighting terrorism despite the extensive debate in Thailand.85 
In addition, the ambivalence of Thai support for the U.S. Global War on Terror 
can also be related to concerns that the U.S. war on drugs, - with which Thailand does 
cooperate, - would be integrated with the U.S. war on terrorism, thus displacing 
Bangkok's priority in addressing drug problems.86 The Thai government still lacked the 
capacity to combat narcotics and badly needed help from the U.S. in this policy sector. 
In an attempt to balance domestic criticism against alliance obligations to the 
U.S., Thaksin reaffirmed his country's adherence to the UN's anti-terrorism measures 
and its commitment as a U.S. ally.87 By framing Thailand's commitment to opposing 
international terrorism under the umbrella of the UN, rather than the U.S., Thaksin was 
attempting to temper domestic criticism, but in doing so, also succeeded in angering 
U.S. officials. When the Thai leader visited Washington in December 2001, 
misunderstandings and differences of opinion over the Thai position on the US-led 
GWOT ensured that he received a much less warm welcome than his ASEAN 
counterparts, Presidents Megawati and Arroyo. While Thailand subsequently undertook 
preventive action to increase security at holiday resorts such as Phuket and Pattaya, it 
was unable to significantly disrupt the activities of terrorist networks within its territory. 
The country's porous borders and liberal immigration rules, along with its broad range 
of social and political problems have made it difficult for Thailand to act decisively 
against terrorism. The government's harsh and slipshod attempts to deal with violence 
perpetrated by Muslim separatists risks drawing support for these militants from 
regional and international terrorist networks. 88 
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Malaysia's Response 
In common with all other ASEAN states, Malaysia also condemned the 2001 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. Like a number of other nations, Malaysia also took the 
opportunity to strengthen its bilateral ties with the U.S. by pledging its support for the 
GWOT to the Bush Administration. Relations between the two nations had been 
strained since 1998, when U.S. Vice President Al Gore, on a visit to Kuala Lumpur to 
attend the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Business Advisory Council, criticized 
Malaysia's human rights record, causing considerable anger.89 In particular, Washington 
was affronted by Mahathir Muhammad's treatment of his former deputy, Anwar 
Ibrahim. 
Mahathir nevertheless demonstrated his support for the U.S. on an official visit 
to Washington in mid-May 2002. The journey was in response to an invitation by 
President Bush, who wanted to thank the Malaysian leader personally " ... for a very 
stirring response in the global campaign against terror".90 This invitation came after 
Mahathir delivered a spirited address supporting global efforts to combat terrorism to 
the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC) meeting in Kuala Lumpur in April 2002. 
Malaysia and the U.S. also signed a declaration on co-operation against international 
terrorism designed to facilitate information exchanges and the flow of intelligence 
between the two nations.91 The U.S. appreciated Mahathir's determination to preserve 
secularism in Malay politics. For Washington, he was the leader of a 'moderate' Islamic 
country and therefore an important ally in its international anti-terrorism coalition. 
Mahathir's closer alignment with the United States, however, had strong 
domestic ramifications. Opposition political parties in Malaysia argued that Mahathir 
was using the GWOT as a way to silence political opponents at home (especially Parti 
Islam Se Malaysia (PAS). It was also alleged that he used the issue to divert attention 
from detained popular opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim. The Prime Minister 
maintained that some Muslim groups had had training in small arms and other weapons 
systems and if left unchecked, would attempt to bring about an Islamic state in Malaysia 
by overthrowing the elected government by violent means. In reality, Malaysia's 
response to the U.S. anti-terror campaign was ambiguous. For example, Malaysia has 
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supported the ASEAN declaration on anti-terrorism, but simultaneously became 
increasingly critical of U.S. involvement in regional counter-terrorism activities, 
particularly in the Philippines. Malaysia was suspicious that the U.S. activities 
specifically targeted the Islamic community, considering the operation in the Southern 
Philippines was dominated by targeting various Muslim factions. With an ambition to 
create a moderate Islamic country but to still be a defender of Islam, Mahathir felt 
responsible to comment on what he believed were both the strengths and weakness of 
the GWOT. 
Despite adopting this balancing posture, Malaysian authorities moved quickly to 
arrest suspected members of JI. Malaysian authorities have recourse to a harsh Internal 
Security Act with broad powers of arrest and detention, although some critics have 
condemned the Act for violating human rights. However, Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim, of 
the Prime Minister's Department defended the Internal Security Act as a law which had 
saved Malaysia from 'many disasters' .92 It will also be recalled that Prime Minister 
Mahathir even proposed a definition of terrorism at the OIC meeting in Kuala Lumpur 
in April 2002. Dr Mahathir suggested the act of terror must include "the attack on the 
World Trade Center in New York in September, suicide bomb attacks by Palestinians 
and the Tamil Tigers, attacks on civilians by Israel security forces and the killing of 
Bosnian Muslims."93 While the U.S. applauded the move, the definition was rejected by 
the fifty-seven member OIC. The problem was that Mahathir's definition had 
condemned all suicide bombers, but the ore was unwilling to adopt proposal as it 
would have condemned the Palestinian use of suicide attacks in what the Organisation 
deems to be a legitimate struggle with Israel.94 
Malaysia also ordered local banks to freeze the assets of organizations found to 
be sponsoring or connected with terrorism. It implemented strict measures to crack 
down on groups with links to extremists. It also enforced more rigid policies on visas to 
prevent terrorists using Malaysia as a transit point.95 Perhaps most significantly, the 
Mahathir government has also enacted a new law prohibiting the use of religious 
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schools as fronts for terrorist activities and enforced an integrated curriculum for 
religious schools to ensure that they were not used for terrorist indoctrination. The 
Malaysian police force has created a special force deployed in various universities to 
monitor covert terrorist activities on campuses and to identify foreign students trying to 
recruit students into terrorist organizations. The Immigration Office now requires all 
Malaysian students planning to study abroad to register before their departure. 96 
Mahathir's successor, Abdullah Badawi, continued Mahathir's tough anti-terrorist line, 
banning designated madrasah (Islamic schools) accused of spreading terrorist 
doctrines. 97 
Despite this raft of tough measures, Malaysian has still criticized several U.S. 
policies of the campaign against terrorism. Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid 
Albar, warned the U.S. to be careful about labelling all Muslims as terrorist after 9/11, 
saying, " ... I don't think they [the U.S.] really understand the consequences of the 
indignities inflicted on Muslims, nor care about how we feel about being labelled 
terrorists after the Sept 11 tragedy." At the UN, Hasmy Agam, stated his own position 
on this issue: 
... While he understood the reasons for the ongoing planning to hunt down 
terrorist groups and stop terrorism, he was against the use of force that 
would result in the victimization of innocent civilians. He felt that 
retaliatory actions through the use of force would not solve the problem, as 
they might only provoke counter-retaliation and is therefore fraught with 
risks to international peace and security. 98 
Malaysia also condemned U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the 
Prime Minister expressing his view that the U.S. and British military intervention in 
Afghanistan would not eradicate terrorism.99 On this point he was in rare agreement 
with the Malaysian opposition parties, who labelled the U.S. military operations as an 
act of extremism: "We condemn the U.S. and find the attacks an act of extremism. No 
proof has been shown, yet they have already acted violently."100 Apart from Malaysia, 
the only other Asian countries to condemn the strikes on Afghanistan were North Korea, 
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Iran and Iraq. Malaysia's decision to condemn the strikes on Afghanistan irritated 
Washington. To compound these tensions, Dr Mahathir also stated his opposition to any 
U.S. attack against Iraq, especially one launched without the sanction of the UN. '0 ' In 
short, Malaysia was viewed as an ambiguous supporter of the GWOT due to its policy 
of juggling the role of maintaining its normal Malaysian relations with U.S., while 
simultaneously cultivating for itself the image of being a voice for Muslim grievances 
against Washington. 
ASEAN's Vulnerability to Terrorism 
In the considerable literature on global terrorism that has evolved since 2001, 
Southeast Asia is frequently characterized by appellations such as: a 'terrorist haven'; 
providing 'fertile ground for terrorists'; the 'new theatre of terrorist operations for 
Islamic extremist groups'; and 'the springboard of terrorism' .102 In the U.S. State 
Department's report, Patterns Global Terrorism (2003), the region is characterised as 
"an attractive theatre of support and logistics for Al-Qaeda, and a theatre of operations 
for the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)."103 Such assertions underscore the 
claim that Southeast Asia is 'the second front' in the America's GWOT. 
As already noted, Southeast Asian countries are vulnerable to the spread and 
activities of transnational terrorist groups. The region's geography and long-standing 
cultural, socio-economic and political conditions form the basis of this susceptibility. Its 
history of European colonization and its rich mix of ethnic and religious groups have 
left many deep and underlying divisions. The existence of majority Muslim populations 
in Indonesia, Malaysia and concentrations of Muslims in the south of the Philippines 
and Thailand does potentially constitute a ready made haven for radical causes with an 
Islamic basis. As Peter Chalk argues, "There exists a substantial Islamic demographic 
milieu into which extremists can quickly disappear."104 Radicals can also draw on a 
feeling of Muslim brotherhood and a sense of injustice caused by the plight of Muslims 
101 
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in places such as Mindanao, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Palestine and Iraq. 105 As 
various ASEAN states attempt to democratise their political systems they inadvertently 
create opportunities for militant groups to exploit the more open social and political 
structures they are attempting to produce. This is particularly the case in those states 
with diverse ethnic and religious populations that also have a history of sectarian 
conflicts. 
The archipelagic nature of the Southeast Asia's geography creates highly porous 
land and sea borders that are well suited to the illegal movement of people, arms or 
drugs. ASEAN states such as the Philippines and Indonesia are particularly vulnerable 
in this regard. Indonesia is open to infiltration because its borders - land, sea and air -
are not adequately guarded. 106 This condition is exacerbated by weak visa requirements 
and immigration cooperation within ASEAN. Southeast Asia has experienced 
considerable economic impacts from terrorism. Since 1990 a wide range of violent and 
criminal incidents aimed at both government and civilian targets have been experienced 
across the region including bombings, murders, kidnappings, extortion and robbery. In 
Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has committed a range of crimes such as 
bombings, beheadings, assassinations and extortion. In 2000, the group made 
international headlines when it abducted twenty-one tourists, including foreigners from 
Sipadan Island. In return for the hostages the ASG demanded the release of various 
Muslim terrorists such as Ramzi Yousef who was convicted of masterminding the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing. The group later kidnapped twenty tourists on Palawan 
Island and in 2004 it blew up Super ferry 14, killing 116 people. The Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) has committed a similar range of attacks. In 2005 the group 
was responsible for the deaths of twenty-three government troops in Maguindanao and 
the kidnapping of Italian priest, Fr. Giancarlo Bossi. In Indonesia JI carried out a 
program of incidents that include the bombing of the Philippines Ambassador's 
residence in Jakarta in September 2000, Operasi Natal (see above) in December 2000, 
involvement in the ethno-religious conflict in Ambon and Poso that killed almost seven 
thousand people in two years, the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings and bomb attacks in 
Jakarta on the JW Marriot Hotel in 2003 and a similar attack on the Australian embassy 
in 2004. These last four incidents killed 244 people of more than twenty nationalities. 107 
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In particular, the 2002 Bali Bombing reflected a new phase of terror-related violence in 
Indonesia by causing the greatest psychological impact on innocent civilians both 
domestically and internationally. 108 
Terrorist networks have also taken advantage of weak financial and 
administrative systems in regional states such as Indonesia and the Philippines. There is 
evidence that Al-Qaeda has used countries in the region to raise, launder or transfer 
funds. According to a UN Report, by 2002 roughly one-fifth of al-Qaeda's 
organizational strength was centred in Southeast Asia. 109 Funds were frequently moved 
through an extensive network of Islamic charities with few financial controls, providing 
the terrorists with ample scope to fund their operations. Endemic bureaucratic 
corruption within some regional nations has also been exploited by terrorist groups. In 
Indonesia it has been relatively easy for militants to obtain multiple identity cards and 
passports under a range of false names. This problem was encountered in the high 
profile case of Abu Ba' asyir, who was sent to prison for eighteen months on 
immigration related charges on September 2003. 
The complexity of foreign relations between the ASEAN states themselves and 
their interactions with external nations have clearly made the region a target for 
terrorism. Lingering historical tensions between ASEAN members make them reluctant 
to cooperate on transnational issues such as terrorism and suspicious of the motivation 
of neighbouring states when they arrest each others nationals on terrorism related 
charges. When Indonesia announced its desire to capture of two Malaysian citizens, Dr 
Ashari and Nordin Top, on terrorism charges, the response from Malaysia was far from 
cooperative. Malaysian MP, Kamaruddin Jaffar, of the opposition Islamic (PAS) 
demanded proof of their involvement in terrorist activities and any links to the JI 
network. uo Coordination and cooperation between the ASEAN member-states is still 
weak compared to a body such as the EU, especially in areas such as extradition of 
criminals. The case of Mas Slamet bin Kastari, allegedly the head of the Singapore 
branch of JI, is illustrative. When bin Kastari fled Singapore for Medan in Indonesia, 
the Indonesian authorities did not take him into custody because there was no 
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extradition treaty between Indonesia and Singapore.'" Eventually, bin Kastari was 
arrested in 2003 and handed over to Singapore. However, when bin Kastari escaped 
from custody in Singapore in March 2008, the authorities in both pursuit of the fugitive 
was hampered because there is no ASEAN agreement for investigations across various 
jurisdictions; Indonesia and Singapore had still not negotiated an extradition treaty. 112 
Finally, Mas Slamet was captured in Johor Bahru on May 2009 after 13 months on run. 
These examples demonstrates how delicate the relations between ASEAN members can 
be and how insecurity and mistrust can quickly degenerate into petty squabbles that 
spoil the opportunity for serious cooperation on counter-terrorism measures. 
In addition, ASEAN states such as Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines with 
close links to the West are obvious targets for militants. As an organisation, ASEAN is 
generally keen to maintain good relations with the U.S. and other Western polities such 
as the European Union (EU) and Australia, while Singapore and Malaysia's 
membership of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) clearly align them with 
Western defence interests. The long-term question, however, is to what extent those 
links will benefit ASEAN governments' aspirations to build a closer regional security 
community or inhibit such a vision by becoming agents of polarization between regional 
elites and their own populaces. 
The Nature of the Terrorist Threats to ASEAN 
Strong Transnational Character 
Recent terrorist activity in Southeast Asia has been characterised by its strong 
transnational nature. Contemporary terrorist groups combine domestic ambitions with 
an international political dimension focused on the broader Muslim world. This shift 
can be traced to the conjunction of several phenomena during the last four decades of 
the twentieth century. One central theme in this pan-Islamic political dimension arises 
from the ongoing tension in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians. U.S. 
support for Israel has added an anti-American sentiment that has spread from the Arab 
nations across the Islamic world, including Southeast Asia. Several JI terrorists detained 
in Singapore, for example, have spoken of their affinity with their fellow Muslims in 
"'Interview with senior officers, specialized Programmes Unit, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 13 June 
2006. 
"
2 Bantarto Bandoro, 'The Escape ofKastari and RI-S'pore anti terror bond', The Jakarta Post, 12 
September 2008 <http://ww.thejakartapost.om/print/162783> Accessed 25 September 2008. 
160 
Palestine. 113 Contributing to the anti-American character of these groups was the 1979 
Iranian Islamic Revolution, which brought down the corrupt secular government of the 
U.S. backed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlaviand, replacing it with a theocratic 
government led by the Shia cleric Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. The Iranian policy of 
supporting fellow Muslims in armed struggles in the Middle East exemplifies a 
continuation the anti-American sentiment. 
The Soviet-Afghanistan War (1979-1989) also had a tremendous impact on the 
growth of Islamist militancy in Southeast Asia. The conflict provided a catalyst for 
young militant Muslims from around the world to learn radical ideologies and gain 
military expertise. Their experiences in the Afghan War inspired their confidence in the 
power of jihad or 'holy war' as an effective instrument for dealing with political and 
military opponents. Bound together by shared experiences, these Mujahidin forged an 
international brotherhood of Afghan alumni, returning to their respective countries filled 
with fervour to replicate the militant jihad at home where they opposed anything they 
regarded as an enemy of Islam. Their experience in the war zones strongly affected their 
minds to the point that they would fight anything they regarded as the enemies of 
Islam. II4 The Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), by way of illustration, was a group 
of Afghan veterans who sought to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia by force. 115 In 
Indonesia, JI members such as Muklas, Ali Imron, Ali Gufron, Nasir Abbas, Imam 
Samudra and Al-Ghozi were also veterans of the Afghanistan War. The U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan, in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and 
Washington, had the effect of increasing anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world. 
The Bali Bombers, - Amrozi, Ali Imron and Imam Samudra - cited their hatred of the 
U.S. as motivation for their October 2002 attack as revenge for what they called the 
Western oppression of Muslims around the world. u 6 
In the aftermath of the 2001 attacks in the U.S., Southeast Asia was seen by the 
international community as a springboard for the operations of the global terrorist 
network al-Qaeda. When United Nations Resolution 1373 (2001) compelled all member 
governments to take measures against terrorism and established a UN Counter-
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Terrorism Committee to monitor progress, one of its first actions was the publication of 
a list of terrorist organizations. A published list released by the Committee included 
such Southeast Asia-based groups as JI, ASG, NPA, MILF, RSRM and KMM. 117 This 
publication embarrassed regional governments who had these groups operating in their 
national territory. Investigations by the U.S. 9/11 Commission also argued that 
Southeast Asia had been used by the terrorist network responsible for the September 11 
attacks. The Commission's report revealed that the terrorist who planned the attacks had 
managed to evade an intense intelligence crackdown in Kuala Lumpur during 2000. 118 
Prior to the attack, the perpetrators had met in Kuala Lumpur and other Southeast Asian 
countries. Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, a regional syurah (council) member of JI in Kuala 
Lumpur had helped host Zacarias Moussaoui and 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar when 
they passed through Malaysia. On the basis of such information, some security analysts 
came to regard Southeast Asia as the 'new battleground' in the global campaign against 
terrorism. After crushing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the U.S. opened a second 
front in its global war on terror in January 2002 by sending troops to the Philippines to 
assist with training the Philippines Armed Forces. As previously noted, this mission 
enabled it to assist the Philippines in its operations against Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) in its southern provinces and to attack a broader terrorist network that 
linked JI and Al-Qaeda. 119 
U.S. intelligence has also supplied much of information about the links between 
al-Qaeda and Southeast Asian terrorist groups that has been applied by the ASEAN 
states. From the interrogation of JI member Hambali, the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) learned of plans to attack two U.S. hotels and commercial airliners in 
Bangkok in the lead-up to the 2003 APEC summit. 120 Despite the strong possibility of 
Hambali's involvement in such high profile attacks as the ten church bombings in 
Indonesia known as Bomb Natal (or Christmas Eve Bombings) in December 2000 and 
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the 2002 Bali Bombing, the U.S. has denied Indonesia access to him. 121 The CIA also 
designated Omar al-Faruq as al-Qaeda 's senior representative in Southeast Asia. Al-
Faruq had received orders from senior al-Qaeda officials, Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-
Shaykh al-Libi, to 'plan large-scale attacks against U.S. interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam and Cambodia.' 122 In particular, as 
leaked CIA documentation reveals, "[al-] Faruq prepared a plan to conduct 
simultaneous car/truck bomb attacks against U.S. embassies in the region ... "123 
Dependence on U.S. intelligence sources for information about the activities of 
global terrorist networks within the region meant that, at least to some extent, U.S. 
counter-terrorism policy shaped ASEAN' s response to these threats. This factor has also 
increased the importance of intra-ASEAN cooperation on counter-terrorism, especially 
as the transnational plans of the terrorists frequently require a response beyond the 
scope of individual national governments. U.S. references to Southeast Asia as 'a 
second front' in the GWOT strengthened the idea that terrorism is a regional problem, 
rather than an issue concerning just one or two ASEAN member-states. The policy of 
U.S. to deal the issue of terrorism regionally, rather than only on a state-by-state basis 
has encouraged ASEAN member-states to adopt more regional perspectives and 
postures. Also of concern to ASEAN is the possibility that the U.S. may unilaterally 
intervene in the region to act against terrorism suspects. For ASEAN countries such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia who are protective of their sovereignty the prospect of U.S. 
intervention is one to avoid, if at all possible. 
The prospects of external intervention in the region were heightened by the 
transnational character of contemporary terrorist networks. Such links gave al-Qaeda a 
truly global reach. Since the 1990s the al-Qaeda network made significant inroads into 
Southeast Asia. Early in that decade, Osama Bin Laden's brother-in-law, Mohammad 
Jamal Khalifa, served as a 'benefactor' for the Abu Sayyaf Group and MILF. 124 Later, 
the locus of activity appears to have expanded to Malaysia and Singapore, but even 
more recently to Indonesia. Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian operatives helped transpose 
Jemaah Islamiyah into an indigenous, semi-autonomous arm. Indeed, JI's regional 
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terrorist network has sometimes been described as a 'mini-al-Qaeda.' Al-Qaeda's links 
to other Southeast Asian Islamic militant groups are described by Singapore security 
analyst, Rohan Gunaratna, as operationally associated with such groups as JI, Laskar 
Jundulah, (located in Indonesia); MILF, ASG, (Philippines), Rajah Sulaiman 
Revolutionary Movement (RSRM), and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) in 
Malaysia. Other groups, classed as Muslim nationalist organizations, are operationally 
independent and ideologically unconnected to al-Qaeda, but have received training from 
al-Qaeda tacticians and technical experts. 125 Similarly, Clive Williams has argued that 
Southeast Asia terrorism is part of an interconnected global web of terrorists that forge 
various links with al-Qaeda. Williams categorizes these links as: (1) funding for 
spiritual leaders activities; (2) provision of training in states such as Afghanistan or 
Pakistan; (3) provision of training teams and experts at a local level; (4) financing of 
regional operations; (5) requesting regional operations (6) sharing combat, religious or 
training experiences in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Mindanao; (7) providing sanctuary for 
wanted individuals; (8) meetings of activists to exchange views, and (9) support from 
regional groups for al-Qaeda operations. 126 While the extent and details of such links 
remain debatable, Singapore's Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, has concluded that, 
"Whatever their specific goals, these groups were committed to mutual help in the 
pursuit of their common ideology. They helped each other with funds and support 
services, in training and in joint operations."127 
Funding for regional terrorist groups has been a particular focus for 
investigations. Al-Qaeda has been implicated in the financial backing of JI and 
Rabitatul Mujahiddin, a regional alliance of jihadi or mujahiddin groups. 128 It has also 
funded Islamic militant groups fighting in regional areas such as Mindanao in the 
Philippine and Maluku and Poso in Indonesia. According to Malaysian and Singaporean 
intelligence reports, JI received more than 1.3 billion rupiah (about $US 130,000) from 
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al-Qaeda between 1996 and 2001. 129 Al-Qaeda funds given to JI were clearly used for 
the 2002 Bali Bombing. 130 'Sheikh Abu Abdullah al Emarati' (an alias used by Osama 
bin Laden) purportedly gave $US74,000 to terrorist kingpin Omar al-Faruq, via Reda 
Seyam and Aris Munandar, high ranking al-Qaeda and JI officials, to purchase three 
tons of explosives for JI operations which might have been used in Bali. 131 Wan Min 
Wan Mat, a JI treasurer in Malaysia, stated in court that "through Mukhlas (one of the 
key organizing figures of the 2002 Bali attack) ... some of the money (for the Bali 
bombings) came from al-Qaeda." 132 Hambali, allegedly al-Qaeda's chief operative in 
Southeast Asia and at one time the operational head for JI, has also confessed that most 
of the funds came from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a leading al-Qaeda strategist. 
Hambali used $US30,000 to fund the Bali Bombing and al-Qaeda was so pleased with 
the result that it forwarded him an additional $US 100,000 for future operations. He 
allocated $US45,000 to JI's Indonesian cell (including $US15,000 to support the 
families of arrested JI members) and transferred another $US27,000 to the MILF. 133 
Until it was broken up in the 1990s, al-Qaeda's Manila cell provided extensive financial 
assistance to Moro militants such as the ASG and MILF. Collaboration between al-
Qaeda and regional terrorists included training militants in Abubakar camp, the largest 
MILF installation in Baguoi City, the Philippines. Al-Qaeda also used the site to train it 
own recruits after its trainees had difficulties entering Afghanistan via Pakistan 
following the bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa in August 1998.134 Al-
Qaeda also reportedly provided funds and trainers for camps operated by local groups in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
Investigations by Singapore's government have led it to claim that, although it 
was JI that planned the foiled attacks on American targets in Singapore, the initiative 
came from al-Qaeda. The 2002 Bali Bombing was also in accordance with Osama bin 
Laden's fatwa to attack Americans throughout the world and similarly conformed to 
themed lectures by JI leader's in Malaysia. 135 Indonesian intelligence officials also 
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accuse al-Qaeda of sending fighters to participate in and foment Muslim attacks on 
Christians in Maluku and on Sulawesi in 2000. Another key factor implicating al-Qaeda 
in Southeast Asian terror attacks was the key role played by Hambali prior to his 
capture. He was trusted by al-Qaeda and formed the main link between it and JI. U.S. 
officials have since claimed that Hambali was the major operations chief for the JI 
network and the only non-Arab to sit on al-Qaeda's central military committee.136 The 
result of these close links have meant that, over time, al-Qaeda's presence in the region 
has increased the level of expertise in local terrorist groups and forging strong ties 
between them, as well as with al-Qaeda itself. This close involvement by al-Qaeda in 
the region has been especially dangerous due to its ability to weave together a network 
of local terrorist and militant organizations, each with its own individual history and 
agenda, but linked by a generally shared ideology. 
Even if al-Qaeda could be destroyed, regional terrorist networks in Southeast 
Asia are now able to pursue a transnational agenda based on a range of connections that 
include common structures, motivations, operational aims, funding, ideology and 
leadership. Indeed, in late 1999, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual leader of the 
al-Qaeda affiliate JI, called a meeting to improve cooperation between Islamist militant 
groups in Southeast Asia. The meeting was held in January 2000 at the International 
Islamic University in Selangor, Malaysia attended by Militants from Burma, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. They formed a secret caucus called 
the Rabitat-ul Mujahidin (Mujahidin Coalition) which united key leaders from militant 
Islamic groups across the region. 137 
It should be noted, however, that many of JI's operatives have been 
compromised, which has to some extent neutralized the organization. How this has been 
accomplished will be investigated latter in this chapter. Nevertheless, as with many 
other Rabitat-ul Mujahidin member organizations, JI still shares the long-term goal of 
establishing an Islamic mega-state within the region. A 'daulah Islami' or 'khilafa' 
(Islamic State) would presumably embrace Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the 
136 
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southern Philippines and perhaps also southern Thailand. 138 JI has collaborated 
extensively with other radical Islamic groups including KMM, Indonesia's Lascar Jihad 
and the Philippines MILF and ASG. 139 These collaborations encompassed the planning 
and execution of operations such as the Bali Bombing. The investigations into that 2002 
episode have revealed the extent and nature of transnational cooperation between 
regional terrorist groups. Preparations for the attack involved the JI network throughout 
Southeast Asia, from Singapore to Malaysia and Thailand. A planning meeting for the 
operation was held in Bangkok in February 2002. 140 Investigations into the August 2003 
JW Marriott bombing in Jakarta also implicated both Indonesian and Malaysian 
nationals. Indonesian police traced the transportation of the explosives used in that 
attack from Malaysia to Dumai in Riau Province of Sumatra in Indonesia. 141 JI member 
and Indonesian, Fathur Rohman Al Ghozi (who was killed during a police shootout in 
Mindanao in late 2003), was accused of involvement in five blasts in a Manila Light 
Rail Transit System (LRT) station which killed twenty-two people and wounded one 
hundred others on 30 December 2002. When he was captured in the Philippines he had 
fifty sacks of explosives weighing 1.1 tons, 300 detonators, and six coils of detonator 
cables. 142 Yet, despite the extent of these networks and the ambitions of their planning 
sessions, the actual record of terrorist inroads has not matched their aspirations. 
The available information on the JI' s structure reveals that the organization 
became well set up to engage in such transnational operations. The group's reach within 
the region included all of the core ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia). It encompasses four different regional zones or 
mantiqi across Southeast Asia: 
Mantiqi I: West Malaysia and Singapore (for fund-raising) 
138 See Hasyim Djalal, 'An Indonesian perspective on terrorism and counter-terrorism', Defender- Winter 
2003, p. 36. also Bertil Lintner, 'Confronting a new battlefield in Thailand', Opinion and Editorial -29 
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139 
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141 
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Mantiqi II: Sumatra, Java and Nusa Tenggara143 Gihad) 
Mantiqi III: Sabah Malaysia, East Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, North 
Sulawesi and Mindano, (for training) 
Mantiqi IV: Australia (for fund-raising) 144 
As this list shows each of the Mantiqi has a specific administrative function such 
as training or fund raising. However, there was also ample scope for the network to 
provide sanctuary and distribute funds over such a huge geographic area. Afghan 
Alumni such as Imam Samudra, Muklas, Ali Imron, and Nasir Abbas and Abu Dujana 
provided training for recruits from across the region at places like the MILF's Camp 
Abu Bakar. 145 Dulmatin and Umar Patek, Indonesian nationals suspected of involvement 
in the 2002 Bali bombing escaped to Jolo Island in the southern Philippines. Dulmatin 
was later confirmed killed in a clashed between ASG members and the Philippines 
Armed Forces on January 2007. 146 Malaysian nationals Azhari and N oordin Top were 
both in hiding in Indonesia for years. In addition, as the evidence from Hambali' s 
interrogation has demonstrated, the JI network could easily make arrangements to 
transfer funds within the region for operational and training purposes. 147 The existence 
of this terrorist network, with strong links to global terrorism, presented the ASEAN 
states with a problem that is regional in scope and required a collective and cooperative 
solution. Yet there remain important differences in the way that the ASEAN states have 
perceived and are attempting to deal with this challenge. 
Variations in ASEAN's Image of Regional Terrorism 
Unsurprisingly, the Association has been greatly challenged in adopting a 
collaborative approach to the threat posed by terrorism. National differences arise in the 
degree to which different member-states perceive terrorists as a threat to their national 
security. For example, compared to other core ASEAN member-states, Malaysia has not 
been exposed to fatal terrorist activities of the kind suffered by Indonesia or the 
Philippines, which has tended to render its response to the problem as a lower priority 
143 The term Nusa Tenggara refers to the islands ofLombok, Sumba, Sumbawa, Flores, Moyo, Timor and 
Komodo. 
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than that of its neighbours. 148 In addition, other ASEAN members such as Brunei, Laos 
and Cambodia, which have no experience of terrorist incidents on their national 
territory, do not see the need for regional cooperation on the issue with the same 
urgency as the five core member-states do. 149 
Despite the strong evidence of close links between regional militant 
organizations and al-Qaeda, the ASEAN states still differ in their response to the threat. 
While Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have all experienced the problem of major 
terrorist operations being planned or executed within their national territories, some of 
the ASEAN member-states still perceive terrorism as if it were a domestic issue 
associated with ethnic separatist movements rather than regional and international 
terrorist networks. 
Indonesia has been the largest nexus for Southeast Asian terrorism. Malaysia has 
been identified as 'a perfect place for terrorist rest and recreation' where terrorists from 
the region and their al-Qaeda backers can meet. The Philippines, has become a prime 
training area for al-Qaeda fighters. At least three members of a Philippines based 
terrorist cell were involved in planning major attacks including the 1993 bombing 
World Trade Center and the plan to crash commercial airliners into the Pentagon and 
World Trade Center. 150 In Thailand and the Philippines, however, the presence of JI and 
al-Qaeda is often discounted as being less important than the goals of indigenous 
insurgent groups, which have sought greater autonomy or independence from central 
government over a long period of time. 151 In the Philippines, the MILF is motivated by 
domestic factors such as landlessness, poverty, unemployment, widespread 
discrimination and abuses by Catholic militia. Various Moro rebel groups have accepted 
foreign assistance, including funding and training. Although Islam serves as a uniting 
148 Interview with staff of Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter- Terrorism, (SEARCCT), Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, 8 June 2006.Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. see also loannis Gatsiounis, 
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factor in their resistance to the central government, the Moro struggle is principally a 
nationalist and territorial one rather than an international in scope. 152 
The protracted Muslim separatist struggle in the south made the Philippines a 
natural choice as a training base for Al-Qaeda to locate its regional operations. The 
main attraction as a base for training was the generally poor law and order situation in 
the south. This enabled fighters from a number of countries to train in isolated camps 
relatively undisturbed by the Philippines authorities. Southern Thailand has also been 
used as a sanctuary, due to the sympathies of the Muslim population and weak central 
government control in the area. According to the Singapore government, elements of JI 
who escaped arrest in December 2001 fled to southern Thailand. According to press 
reports, substantiated by Western intelligence officials, a group of al-Qaeda -linked 
terrorists met in the area in January 2002 to prepare a strategy for attacking soft targets 
throughout Southeast Asia. 153 Terrorists have also used Bangkok for transit and stop-
over in the early and mid-1990s. Fathur Rohman al Ghozi was scheduled to board a 
flight to Bangkok when he was arrested. Likewise Agus Dwikarna, an Indonesian 
radical, was headed for Bangkok from Manila when he was arrested. Bangkok has also 
been a haven for money-laundering and document forgery within its significant Middle 
Eastern and African Muslim communities. 
The threat of terrorism in Malaysia is diffuse and less easily characterized than 
the ethnic separatism that underpins Thai and Philippine militant groups. Radical 
insurgent Islamic groups exist in the country, and an extremist element in Malaysia 
forms the basis for a logistical network that has figured prominently in the activities of 
Muslim militants, both regionally and internationally. Perhaps the clearest indication of 
these contacts at work is the example of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation 
(PULO) and its smaller offshoot the New PULO - two Islamic separatist groups that 
were active in southern Thailand for much of the 1990s. Both organisations were known 
to have used operational and logistical bases in the northern Malaysian state of Kelantan 
and were allegedly assisted by the active sanction of the state's ruling hard line Parti 
Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). The Thai government also believes the PAS was critical to 
allowing the perpetration of several high-profile PULO attacks in Thailand, including a 
string of thirty-three bombings and assassinations in late 1997 that targeted state 
officials, law enforcement personnel, schoolteachers and other perceived symbols of 
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'Buddhist repression'. Thai politicians firmly believe that assaults such as these could 
not have taken place without sustained support from within Malaysia, such as training 
across the border. 154 In relation to the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Southern 
Thailand currently, the Thai security agencies believe that such are getting outside help, 
"possible from the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM)". 155 Fellow Muslim 
understandably will obviously be concerned. The consequences of physical support that 
Muslims communities may give to terrorist groups professing their own faith are 
difficult for Thai law enforcement authorities to check. 
Malaysia has also been connected to the activities of Islamic militants operating 
in the Philippines and Indonesia. Manila has long alleged, for instance, that weapons 
and logistics bound for the ASG and MILF have been smuggled via the porous Sabah 
border and that indigenously based expatriates and militants have assisted these 
activities. 156 However, it should be noted that many of these accusation might be linked 
to insurgency movements that have previously been spawned by the territorial dispute 
between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. Yet, various Indonesian intelligence 
sources have claimed Malaysian-based associates of Osama bin Laden worked in 
conjunction with Laskar Jihad (LJ) and JI to plan and conduct several acts of terrorism 
and the stirrings of communal violence that hit the archipelago between 2000 and 2003. 
These included the bloodshed between Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas 
(Maluku) and Sulawesi.157 Indonesian government sources have also directly linked the 
KMM to the plot to attack U.S. targets in Singapore, portraying the group as a key 
logistical hub in JI' s explosives procurement network. 158 Authorities further attest that 
through links provided by operatives such as Hambali, the KMM has used Malaysia as a 
base for planning and logistical activities. 159 The way in which terrorist groups and 
militants have been used or operated in various national jurisdictions of ASEAN states 
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has helped shaped the threat perceptions of ASEAN governments and have helped to 
determine the level of priority that some nations place on combating terrorism. 
Some Impacts on the Economyffourism 
By targeting civilians and foreign tourists, terrorists have called into question the 
ability of Southeast Asian governments to guarantee their domestic security. How well 
ASEAN member-states prove able to coordinate their joint efforts to overcome this 
region-wide terrorist threat may well prove to be the benchmark of ASEAN' s ability to 
function as a viable security actor as it moves further into the twenty-first century. 
While Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have so far borne the brunt of these 
attacks, Singapore and Malaysia, with no recorded terrorist incidents are nevertheless 
concerned about the possibility of terrorists striking in their territory. Singapore foiled a 
JI (al-Qaeda inspired) plot to attack Western targets and also claims that several other 
planned attacks have been neutralized by effective law enforcement measures. 
Malaysia, with its large proportion of Islamic citizens, is seen as yet another potential 
source of Islamic militant activity in Southeast Asia. 160 
The financial impact of these attacks on ASEAN economies has been serious. 
After the October 2002 Bali bombing, the Balinese economy, which relies on tourism, 
was devastated. There was also a ripple effect across Southeast Asia. The majority of 
foreign tourists left Bali within twenty-four hours of the attacks and Western 
governments recommended against all non-essential travel to Indonesia. The Indonesian 
national airline, Garuda, had to dramatically cut its schedules to Australia, Germany, 
Japan and the UK. 161 Studies by the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) have revealed the dire condition of post-October 2002 Indonesian economy. 
In 2001, the Indonesian tourist industry yielded foreign exchange earnings of £5.4 
billion, with 70 percent of the total generated in Bali. Hotels occupancy rates in Bali 
collapsed to below 20 percent from highs of 70 percent in the months prior to the 
bombings. A survey of the impact on Bali indicated that 94 percent of respondents 
observed income declines in their communities between October 2002 and May 2003 
with an average income decline of 43 percent across the island. 162 The Bali bombing 
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removed half a percentage point from Indonesia's gross domestic product (GDP) of 3.5 
percent in 2002. 163 It was a serious blow for the island which had already seen a 20 
percent drop in visitor numbers since September 11, 2001. Across the region a similar 
slump in tourism earnings occurred, with. Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia all 
reporting declines in visitor numbers. 164 
By targeting the tourist sector m ASEAN member states, terrorists have 
damaged an important source of employment and revenue. The long-term decline in 
tourist numbers has been aggravated by travel warnings issued by various Western 
nations. Many Southeast Asian nations felt that such advice was indiscriminate because 
of the tendency to generalize and to impose blanket warnings on entire countries based 
on raw intelligence. In the days following the Bali attacks, for example; Britain, Finland 
and Australia issued travel warnings to their citizens that resulted in many cancelled 
international bookings. 165 Hotel bookings for resorts in Malaysia and Thailand also 
suffered. 166 Such travel warnings have not always been consistent. After the Bali 
bombing, Australia issued a travel advisory for all of Southeast Asia, not just Indonesia. 
The U.S. Ambassadors to Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand reportedly asked State 
Department to exclude these three countries from its travel advisories because they were 
less prone to terrorist attacks. 167 Nevertheless, the State Department issued a travel 
advisory for eleven Asian nations that included Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
Travel warnings have not only directly resulted in lower tourist arrivals. They have also 
severely damaged international investor confidence. The travel warning reflected a 
strong message to the host countries that the authorities cannot guarantee domestic 
security. Consequently, if there is no guarantee of security, business and commerce are 
sufficiently disrupted and there is no point to investing in the effected areas. 
Social and Political Consequences 
The aim of terrorist attacks is different from normal criminal activities. The 
political goals of the terrorists are advanced when societies are made to feel insecure 
and governments are destabilized. Some analysts see global terrorism as the result of an 
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internal clash within the Islamic world between those who want to revert to feudal 
traditional and those who want to accommodate Islam with modem ideas. Essentially, 
this is a conflict between those who strive for open society and those who want a closed, 
traditional social order. 168 
The religious outlook of Islamist militants is drawn from the radical Middle 
Eastern doctrines of salafism, with its political goal of a massive Islamic state, called 
khilafatism. 169 The spread of such teachings into ASEAN member-states endangers the 
continuation of the moderate, pluralist form of Islam that has been the major 
characteristic of the religion in modem Southeast Asia. Within their Islamic political 
entities, radical Islamists want to implement the shariah law - in which the state and 
civil relationship should be based on Islamic law. This could undermine the long-
standing social and political order in those ASEAN nations with majority (Malaysia and 
Indonesia) or minority (Singapore, Thailand and Philippines) Muslim populations and 
could even threaten the very existence of the Association. The implementation of 
shariah law removes many basic individual rights and liberties such as freedom of 
expression and religious freedom. Within ASEAN, a highly polarising Islamic 
movement such as this would seriously weaken or destroy the inter-communal relations 
that directly influence the domestic stability of many member-states. 
ASEAN governments, whose secular leaderships have attempted to maintain 
harmony within their religious and culturally pluralist populations, are a clear target for 
Islamist terrorists. Militants have threatened both what they deem to be the 
'unbelievers' regime controlling in Thailand and the 'evil' governments of Muslim 
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. They declared war on all governments that 
adopt 'man-made laws' instead of those derived from the Quran and Sunnah.170 The 
transnational nature of Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia is a direct threat to the social 
harmony of the region's ethnically and culturally diverse nations. Indonesia and 
Malaysia, for example, have both recently experienced race riots and in Indonesia, JI 
has exploited sectarian communal conflicts in places such as Maluku and Sulawesi to 
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promote its goals. 171 The demands of separatist groups such as ASG, MILF and PULO 
present a challenge to the sovereignty of both the Philippines and Thailand. 
However, as previously mentioned, the ambition of groups such as JI to create 
an Islamic State embracing the national territories of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Brunei, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand presents ASEAN with a much 
more complex threat. This challenges the Association's concept of sovereignty at both 
the regional and national level. Seized JI documents show that the group has sought to 
established regional aims for its 'Dau/ah Islamiyah'. The groups grand strategy for 
Indonesia, as disclosed by Ali Gufron and Abu Bakar Ba' asyir, is to tum the Republic 
of Indonesia from a country based on the secular state ideology of Pancasila, into a 
theocratic Islamic state. 172 
Although such grand ambitions are unlikely to be realised, the existence of 
groups supporting such aims demonstrates the profound nature of the threat to the 
stability of Southeast Asia. Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Co-ordinating 
Minister for Security and Defence, Dr Tony Tan, has indicated that his nation takes 
these threats seriously: "We in Singapore see the terror threat for what it is - an attempt, 
ultimately to undermine our very sovereignty and sense of nationhood."173 The 
transnational nature of this threat is also recasting traditional Southeast Asian notions of 
power and sovereignty away from their traditional foundation within the territorially 
bounded nation state. 174 While terrorism and other transnational threats are becoming 
more numerous, they have also proven thus far to be relatively immune to traditional 
law enforcement strategies largely because they transcend the jurisdiction of individual 
states. 175 
A related issue for the ASEAN states is developing and managing appropriate 
counter-terrorism policies. In Southeast Asia, a region that is so ethnically, religiously 
and culturally diverse, terrorists can appeal to a wide range of constituencies. Poorly 
developed or executed counter-terrorism policies can be counter-productive, especially 
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if they stir up sensitivities that can actually create a backlash against the authorities that 
might lead to domestic instability. Since 1998, the Indonesian government has been 
caught between its desire to combat terrorists and other radical elements and the need to 
maintain fragile domestic power relations in a post-authoritarian political environment. 
Singapore has to consider race relations in its counter-terrorism policies. The discovery 
of JI networks and the arrest of 21 Singaporean terror suspects on August 2002 in 
Singapore clearly pointed the participation of some Singaporean Muslims in regional 
terrorist networks. 176 The Singaporean government has endeavoured to quell rumours 
that those who turned to terrorism were marginalised members of their own national 
community. 177 In developing its counter-terrorism policies the government of Singapore 
has had to make special efforts to assure its Malay population that anti-terrorist 
operations by the authorities are not directed against the communities themselves. These 
sensitivities have been heightened by the fact that Singapore is a staunch ally of the U.S. 
and its GWOT. 178 
Likewise, Thailand and Philippines have been concerned with how to deal with 
their respective domestic separatist and terrorist movements in Pattani and Mindanao 
without alienating their Muslim populations in those regions. The insurgency in 
southern Thailand poses a serious challenge for Bangkok; how to maintain harmony 
between its Pattani Malays and the rest of the Thai population. This situation can only 
be exacerbated by recent serious demonstrations against an unstable Thai government 
by disaffected factions supporting former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin (who was ousted 
from his position in 2006) by a military coup. Like Singapore, the Thai government 
must also worry that any involvement by external forces such as the U.S. will 
exacerbate its problems in the south or, increasingly, in Bangkok itself. For this reason 
the Thai government maintains that the insurgency problem in the South and growing 
overall political instability are internal issues that will only be resolved by Thailand 
alone. The Philippines is facing similar issues in handling the MILF in Mindanao, but 
has been more amenable to accepting outside support from the U.S., Australia and other 
allies in developing its counter-terrorism strategies. One main reason for this is that 
Philippines needs to boost its military capacity to fight international or local terrorism 
such as ASG. It also appears that the persistence of President Gloria Arroyo in insisting 
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on the involvement of external partners is helping the Philippines to withstand terrorist 
challenges, even as her position attracts substantial domestic criticism. 179 
Regional apprehensions regarding the involvement of any external powers in 
ASEAN counter-terrorism operations are, however, still largely evident and most 
strongly felt in Indonesia and Malaysia. Both of these countries tend to see the problem 
of terrorism in their countries as a domestic problem with a regional dimension and 
therefore are keen to dismiss the possibility of extra-regional terrorist links with al-
Qaeda. Indonesia and Malaysia are clearly worried that evidence of such links will 
prompt the U.S. to become directly involved in eradicating al-Qaeda's regional 
affiliates. They have demonstrated this anxiety by 'disapproving' of the presence of 
American forces in the Philippines to 'advise' the Philippine army on counter-
insurgency operations against the ASG. 180 One particular factor in this anxiety is their 
desire not be seen as the 'pawns' of the U.S., which would weaken their domestic 
support. They are thus trapped between the demands of the U.S. to take strong action on 
countering terrorism and the fear of alienating a large domestic constituency of 
nationalists and religious groups if they do. 
Again, the presidency of Indonesia's Megawati Sukarnoputri provides an 
example of how difficult balancing these two demands can be. While pressure from the 
U.S. and the international community forced Megawati's administration to crack down 
on radical and terrorist movements, the Indonesian authorities had to convey the 
impression to its public that they were not slavishly following U.S. demands. 181 For 
instance Megawati had been accused by the West of being 'too silent' and maintaining 
'soft stance' when massive rallies, particularly of Muslim hardliners across the country 
condemned U.S. and its 'aggression' in Afghanistan. Speaking in front of House 
leaders, who demanded that she assume a more resolute stance against the attacks, 
Megawati said "the government will take note of developments and at the appropriate 
time will issue a new statement."182 This very difficult situation resulted in giving a 
general impression that Megawati's government did little to satisfy either domestic or 
international concerns. 
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ASEAN's Institutional Response to the Issue of Terrorism 
Reaching a Common Definition: Preliminary stages 
Despite the views of external parties such as the UN and the U.S. government, 
ASEAN was initially unable to define the threat of transnational terrorism. It even 
lacked consensus at the region-wide level over what kind of violence constitutes a 
terrorist act. When A SEAN members signed the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism on 5 November 2001, the document lacked a clear definition of terrorism and 
failed to mention the names of regional militant groups. The Declaration only goes as 
far as describing terrorism as a "direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress 
and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020."183 It also 
mentions that terrorism as a "profound threat to international peace and security which 
requires concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of 
the world." 184 Such broad and bland characterizations of terrorism form a poor basis for 
united action by the Association's member-states. 
In May 2002, Malaysia initiated a move towards deriving a clearer definition of 
terrorism in a Joint ASEAN Ministerial Communique. The Malaysian proposal was 
based on a similar proposition which Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad had put to 
the aforementioned Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) meeting in April 2002. 
Mahathir suggested that terrorism should be seen as any use of violence against 
civilians, regardless of whether the perpetrators are individuals or representatives of a 
state. 185 Under this definition both the suicide bombings by Palestinians and attacks 
against Palestinians by Israel's armed forces would "all ... be considered as acts of terror 
and the perpetrators [would] be considered as terrorist." 186 According to Malaysian 
Foreign Minister, Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi, adopting this particular definition 
would strengthen regional and international co-operation against terrorism in a 
comprehensive manner. He also believed that this conceptual approach would help 
clarify "what we are confronted with, why are we confronted with it and how it 
confronts us."187 However, the Malaysian proposal quickly invited criticism and created 
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problems for ASEAN member states. For states such as Indonesia, or Brunei and for 
many Muslims in Malaysia as well, the labelling of Palestinians as 'terrorists' 
contradicted their support of the Palestinian struggle and invited a backlash from both 
their respective domestic as well as the international Muslim constituencies. Not 
surprisingly, the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) meeting rejected any 
attempt to link terrorism to the struggle of the Palestinian people to establish an 
independent state. 188 For ASEAN states such as Singapore and Thailand, classifying 
Israel as a 'terrorist state' would damage their bilateral relationships with the Jewish 
state. 189 
Consequently, due to these competing interests, the Malaysian definition was 
not adopted by the delegates at the ASEAN ministerial meeting. That conclave finally 
agreed to dispense with any common definition of terrorism and instead chose to boost 
'practical measures' in the regional fight against terrorism. 190 Despite the 2002 terrorist 
attacks in Bali and in the Philippines cities of Zamboanga and Quezon, the gth ASEAN 
Summit held in Phnom Penh on 3 November 2002 also failed to agree on a common 
definition of terrorism. While the involvement of al-Qaeda and JI in these separate 
incidents provided a clear demonstration of the transnational nature of the threat, the 
best the summit could do was to urge member-states to "intensify our efforts, 
collectively and individually to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist 
groups in the region." 191 At the same time its declaration 'deplored the tendency in some 
quarters to identify terrorism with particular religion or ethnic groups.' 192 Such dilatory 
efforts on adopting something as basic as a common definition indicate that ASEAN's 
counter-terrorism efforts needed focus, especially in the face of clearly identifiable 
transnational terrorist activities. 
The ASEAN states have been more successful in agreeing on what constitutes 
terrorism at the sub-regional levels. A trilateral agreement between Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Philippines on anti-terrorism and an Agreement on Information Exchange and 
Establishment of Communication Procedures, for example, actually provides a 
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definition of terrorism which the wider organization has been unable to formulate or to 
achieve complete unity. The wording adopted is: 
Any act of violence of threat thereof perpetrated to carry out within the 
respective territories of the Parties or in the border area of any of the 
Parties an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing 
people, of threatening to harm them or imperilling their lives, honour, 
freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or 
public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or 
endangering a national resource, or international facilities, of threatening 
the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of 
independent States. 193 
While this represents an advance on previous efforts, the definition still lacks 
conceptual clarity. As with some other notions of terrorism, this definition tends to 
criminalise the act ofterrorism. 194 The problem with the 'criminalisation' of terrorism is 
that such a broad categorisation makes it difficult to draw a clear distinction between an 
ordinary criminal act and a terrorist act. Moreover, defining terrorism as 'a criminal 
plan with the aim of terrorizing people' is both redundant and laden with ambiguity. 195 
The definition stereotypes through its limitation to the concept of a criminal action and 
fails to differentiate it from other types of criminal activities. Most significantly the 
definition fails to acknowledge that terrorism differs from criminal activities because 
they use or attempt to employ 'acts of force aimed at achieving political goals' .196 This 
approach to the problem contrasts markedly from those adopted by the UN and the U.S., 
both of whom clearly define their perception of terrorist acts and also list terrorist 
organizations and individuals person as the terrorist. ASEAN' s inability to devise a 
viable common definition of terrorism for itself, or to adopt those of the UN or the U.S. 
creates a perception that there is a lack of will to combat terrorism within the region and 
leads to the labelling of Southeast Asia as a 'terrorist haven'. 
Without common agreement on what constitutes an act of terrorism A SEAN' s 
counter- terrorism efforts are vulnerable to distorted perceptions between individual 
states that could easily hamper the effectiveness of the Association's cooperation 
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against terrorism. As already noted, Indonesia and Malaysia disagreed on whether Dr 
Ashari and Nordin Top were terrorists. Unlike the UN and U.S., some ASEAN states 
have also baulked at identifying JI as a terrorist organization due to the fear of a 
domestic backlash.197 However, failure to denounce a shadowy group such as JI makes 
the problem of explaining counter-terrorism policies to potentially sympathetic 
domestic audiences even harder. This problem was illustrated by remarks made by 
Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla who argued that: "Jemaah Islamiyah does not 
exist as an organisation and therefore it cannot be banned."198 'How can we impose a 
ban? Who is the group president? Where are its headquarters? Who are its members?' 199 
Moreover, because JI' s radical agenda is intertwined with a larger, peaceful struggle for 
Islamic values and includes activities such as education, preaching and provision of 
social services for people in conflict areas such as Maluku, it is difficult at times for the 
Indonesian public to separate these actions from those of JI's militants.200 There is also 
an element of the classic dilemma of 'one man's terrorist being another's freedom 
fighter'. This is particularly the case with militant groups such as GAM, PULO, KMM, 
ASG and MILF who portray themselves as advancing a particular ethno-religious 
agenda. With 20 percent of the world's Muslims residing in Southeast Asia, imposing 
bans on such organizations has great potential to anger and alienate devout but 
otherwise moderate Muslims.201 
To avoid such problems with the wider Muslim community the Indonesian 
police do not refer to JI as terrorists, but instead classify individuals as terrorists on the 
basis of their involvement in specific terrorists attacks, for example, the 'Bali Bomb 
terrorist' .202 The Indonesian public, protective of its newly won democratic freedoms, is 
very conscious of the potential for misusing bans on organizations for political purposes 
or the violation of human rights. Under the Suharto regime accusation of links to the 
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banned Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) or Indonesian Communist Party were used to 
charge, punish and stigmatize people who opposed the government. 
These domestic tensions within ASEAN states can also be exacerbated by 
pressure from outside sources. On the issue of terrorism this pressure most often comes 
from the U.S. to adopt policies that would brand certain regional militant groups as 
terrorists and outlaw them. Many ASEAN members are extremely sensitive to the 
possibility of external intervention on any issue because they fear that it could 
undermine their sovereignty. Aligning ASEAN policy too closely with international 
definitions and stances against terrorism has the potential to increase the possibility of 
external military intervention in their territory. This would be the case, many of its 
political elites believe, especially if certain ASEAN states were seen to be in breach of 
internationally agreed anti-terrorism policies and initiatives. Such pressures would be 
most strongly resisted in countries with a dominant Muslim population such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Singapore is closely allied with the U.S. and has adopted 
strong anti-terrorist policies. This country is acutely aware that its closest neighbours 
are states with majority Muslim populations 203 Similarly, although both Thailand and 
Philippines are allied with the U.S., they need to mediate their anti-terrorism policies 
due to the vital domestic considerations imposed by the existence of significant Islamic 
militant separatist groups within their national boundaries. The reasons for ASEAN' s 
failure to adopt a common definition of terrorism arise from complex domestic and 
external motivations and sensitivities. As is so often the case with ASEAN, retaining 
ambiguity on the question of terrorism actually helps to avoid the creation of a wide 
range of problems among the member-states. 
The Regional Concern over Terrorism before 911112001 
Nevertheless, ASEAN began to address the issues of terrorism and transnational 
crime even before the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attack on the U.S .. Regional 
concerns over the problem of terrorism and a commitment to cooperate in dealing with 
the issue can be traced to the 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), which took 
place in Kuala Lumpur during July 1997. The Joint Communique produced by this 
meeting addressed the Association's need to combat terrorism and other forms of 
transnational crime. Chapter 52 of the Joint Communique " ... stressed the need for 
sustained cooperation in addressing transnational concerns including the fight against 
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terrorism, trafficking of people, illicit drugs and arms, piracy and communicable 
diseases."204 The communique amounts to a recognition of regional concerns over the 
issue. In reality, however, the attention it received was marginal, particularly as 
terrorism was just one of many other issues mentioned in the communique under the 
heading of 'External Relations'. A sign of the issue's greater importance to the 
Association would have been its appearance with other points under the heading of 
'Political and Security Cooperation.' 
In the same year, ASEAN conducted its first conference on Transnational Crime 
in Manila, between 18 and 20 December. The senior delegates were the ASEAN states' 
Ministers of the Interior or Horne Affairs. The meeting produced the ASEAN 
Declaration on Transnational Crime. The Declaration recognised "the need for clear and 
effective regional modalities to combat these crimes", targeting especially the 
requirement for information exchange and policy coordination.205 Although the 
conference was intended as a follow up to the Kuala Lumpur AMM in July, this vague 
statement was the only reference to the need for regional cooperation on a range of 
transnational criminal activities. The declaration did little more than affirm the 
agreement of the First International Conference on Terrorism held in Baguio City, from 
18-21 February 1996, which had already agreed " ... to enhance international 
cooperation against all forms of terrorism through such modalities as intelligence-
sharing, coordinated policies and law enforcement training".206 In 1999, ASEAN also 
adopted an Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crime that was intended to implement 
the 1997 declaration. In these initial efforts to cooperate on terrorism, the issue was dealt 
with as a type of transnational crime and was not viewed as a high priority by the A SEAN 
member-states. During this period, as well, A SEAN' s focus on cooperation in matters 
of transnational crime centred on the problem of drug trafficking. Member-states' 
concern over the problem of the international drug trade in the region had been 
growing as a result of pressure from the international community, especially after 
Laos and Myanmar, two of the world's largest producers of illegal drugs, had joined 
A SEAN in Julyl 997 
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The Regional Concern Post 9111 
The 2001 terrorist attacks in U.S. provided a strong impetus for ASEAN to 
review its focus on terrorism, especially in the light of proven links between regional 
and international terrorist networks. On 13 September 2001, immediately after the New 
York and Washington attacks, ASEAN sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell, expressing "deepest sympathy and profound condolences" and promising to 
"seek closer cooperation with the U.S." to combat terrorists.207 This short letter 
seemingly demonstrated the willingness of ASEAN to work with U.S., notwithstanding 
considerable intra-ASEAN divisions on how to wage the war on terrorism (much of 
these differences have been discussed already in this chapter's analysis of core member-
states responses to terrorism). The Association's Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism issued on 5 November 2001 in Bandar Seri Begawan during the 7th ASEAN 
Summit revised and elaborated on the member-states' commitment to fight terrorism, 
with a strong focus on regional aspects of the problem. The declaration also signalled 
the member-states' intentions to strengthening national mechanisms as well as to 
improve regional channels of cooperation. 
However, the ASEAN-member-states rejected what they viewed to be the 
'unilateralism' of U.S. policy, which had significant potential to heighten domestic, 
national and regional sensitivities within the Association's member-states. The 
Declaration stated that ASEAN would: 
- Reject any attempt to link terrorism with religion or race; 
- Ensure that ... all cooperative efforts to combat terrorism at the regional 
level shall consider joint practical counter-terrorism measures in line with 
specific circumstances in the region and in each member country.208 
The 2001 Declaration on Terrorism is an important statement of ASEAN's 
political will to combat terrorism by considering the characteristics of domestic and 
regional threats, capacities and social political consequences, without blindly following 
the U.S. scenario. Not only was it agreed at the highest level within the Association, 
(the heads of government), but it also expressed a joint political commitment to combat 
regional terrorist threats. In the context of such a loose association of states, marked by 
considerable political, cultural, and historical diversity, the declaration had a powerful 
symbolic value that should not be too readily discounted. However, in terms of 
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translating this will into policy achievements, the Declaration has largely remained 
emblematic of the Association's desires, rather than its ability to act. 
At the 3rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) on 
11 October 2001, the Association renewed its commitment to combating terrorism and 
plans were made for implementing practical cooperation. There was agreement that an 
Ad Hoc Expert Group meeting should be convened to work on the implementation of 
the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime in ways that would 
encompass neutralising terrorism. Delegates also committed themselves to supporting 
the conduct of a special session on terrorism at the 2nd Annual Senior Meeting on 
Transnational Crime.209 While still formally treating terrorism as an aspect of 
transnational crime, ASEAN' s foreign ministers had begun to recognize the need to pay 
more attention to what was clearly a separate issue. 
The Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism was held in Kuala 
Lumpur on 20 and 21 May 2002. This meeting was dedicated to devising a work plan 
and emphasised capacity building measures to deal with the threat. At the meeting, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore showed that they had begun to coordinate their 
initiatives on counter-terrorism. These included a Malaysian plan to conduct training on 
intelligence procurement and workshops on anti-terrorist psychological operations 
(PSYOPS or PSYWAR); an Indonesian plan to conduct a workshop on combating 
international terrorism; and a Singaporean scheme to initiate a range of training 
assistance programs (such as the provision of logistical support for training on 
bomb/explosive detection, post-blast investigation, airport security and 
passport/documents security and inspection) to its neighbouring countries. Singapore 
also proposed facilitating a dialogue on terrorism at the upcoming Association of 
Southeast Asian Chiefs of Police (ASEANAPOL) meeting and designating a special 
unit within each member country to serve as the principal point of contact on terrorism 
issues.210 
The Ministerial Meeting also adopted a work program for implementation of the 
ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crimes, with an emphasis on the 
program's counter-terrorism component. The work program covered terrorism together 
with other seven areas of transnational crime, such as trafficking of persons, illicit drugs 
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trafficking, money laundering, piracy, smuggling of arms, cyber crime and commercial 
crime. The aim of the program was to facilitate the exchange of information, greater 
legal cooperation and law enforcement cooperation, training programs, institutional 
capacity building and collaboration on these issues with ASEAN's dialogue partners 
and other like-minded organisations and countries from outside the region. 211 The 
program also outlined a three-stage process to combat terrorism by ratifying 
international conventions and protocols, prescribing practical cooperation between 
national law enforcement agencies under the headings of ASEANAPOL and 
encouraging extra-regional cooperation with ASEAN partners. 
The joint communique issued by the 2002 AMMTC restated ASEAN's position 
on sensitive terrorism-related issues. These included the continued proscription on 
attempting to compose a common definition of terrorism and the importance of 
territorial integrity and domestic law. The communique 'strongly emphasize[ed] that 
terrorism must not be identified with any religion, race, culture or nationality' .212 In 
taking action for combating terrorism it pledged the Association's 'commitment and 
support to undertake the fight against acts of terrorism committed wherever, whenever 
and by whomsoever without discrimination and with due respect to religion, race, 
culture and nationality' .213 The language of the communique shows the importance that 
ASEAN members attach to preserving religious and social harmony by not stereotyping 
any particular ethnic or religious groups. Yet the ninth point in the communique also 
registered an unequivocal commitment to national sovereignty: 'We recognise that the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic laws of each ASEAN member country 
shall be respected and upheld in undertaking the fight against terrorism. ' 214 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the AMMTC emerged as ASEAN's main 
mechanism in the fight against terrorism. It was a useful platform for sharing 'best 
practice' and enhancing information exchange, intelligence sharing, and capacity 
building. Exchanges among police forces, armed forces and other relevant agencies -
both in terms of dealing with specific incidents and suspected terrorists, as well as in the 
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sharing of expenences - were also important to the role of the AMMTC m 
strengthening the ASEAN member-states' capacity to fight terrorism.215 
The Bali, Zamboanga and Quezon terrorism incidents in late 2002 led the 8th 
ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in November of that year to reiterate the Association's 
determination to cooperate in combating terrorism. Member-states expressed their 
solidarity with Indonesia and the Philippines and pledged ASEAN' s full support for 
their determined pursuit of the terrorist elements responsible for the attacks. This 
announcement demonstrated a visibly stronger resolve to combat terrorism in the face of 
attacks on the territory of two of ASEAN's founding members, especially as these 
incidents also reinforced the regional scope of the problem. The Association's 
leadership expressed their determination to intensify their efforts to address terrorism in 
the region through 'practical cooperative measures' within ASEAN and also 'with the 
international community' .216 The summit ended with commitments to conduct activities 
and initiatives such as an International Conference on Anti-Terrorism and Tourism 
Recovery in Manila, a Regional Conference on Combating Money-Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing, to hold an Inter-sessional meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
on the subject of terrorism and to establish a Regional Counter-terrorism Centre m 
Kuala Lumpur. 
Behind the actions outlined in this summit's declaration was the concern of 
ASEAN's leaders about the impact of terrorism on their economies, particularly on the 
tourism sector due to international travel advisories for countries targeted by terrorists. 
These warnings undermined investor confidence and threatened ASEAN' s steady but 
fragile recovery from the 1997 economic crisis.217 In the declaration ASEAN called on 
the international community, 
... to avoid indiscriminately advising their citizens to refrain from visiting 
or otherwise dealing with our countries, in the absence of established 
evidence to substantiate rumours of possible terrorist attacks, as such 
measures could help achieve the objectives of the terrorists. 218 
The declaration reminded the international community " ... to support ASEAN' s 
effort to combat terrorism and restore business confidence in the region."219 
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Separate to the 8th ASEAN Summit's declaration was a trilateral agreement 
between Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines on coordinating counter-terrorism 
between the three countries. In May 2002, these three states agreed to a wide range of 
cooperation to combat transnational crimes. The agreement sought to neutralize terrorist 
threats and devise measures to tackle transnational criminal activities such as money 
laundering, illegal immigration, people trafficking, smuggling, piracy, hijacking, and 
theft of marine resources, marine pollution, and illicit traffic in arms. The agreement 
sets out the mechanisms for cooperation, including: 
Facilitating proper coordination and collaboration during border and/or 
security incidents, transnational crimes and other illegal activities where 
individual resources of a Party may be inadequate; 
Establishing common understandings and approaches to managing the 
multiple and complex issues arising from transnational crimes; 
Strengthening national and sub-regional capacities to manage border 
and/or security incidents and transnational crimes through information 
exchanges, agreed communication procedures and training; 
Reviewing and enhancing internal rules and regulations, both legal and 
administrative, to ensure proper, effective, and timely collaboration and 
responses to border and/or security incidents and in times of operational 
constraints in the implementation of defence, border and security 
arrangements; 
Providing opportunities for the Parties duly authorized representatives to 
establish linkages to facilitate cooperation; 
Facilitating dialogue among the Parties on criminal and crime-related 
activities committed within their respective territories which may 
adversely affect the interest of any or all of the other Parties; and 
Establishing mechanisms for immediate response and assistance among 
the Parties. 220 
The substance of the accord was an arrangement on information exchange and 
an agreement to act jointly in pursuing terrorist activities and suspects.221 The number of 
states acceding to the agreement grew from three to six after Thailand, Cambodia, and 
Brunei signed the document in October 2003. So far the agreement has had the practical 
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effect of facilitating ASEAN information exchanges on terrorism developments and the 
ability to launch joint police operations.222 
Under this higher level of political cooperation exists an operational level of 
cooperation via the Association of Southeast Asian Chiefs of Police (ASEANAPOL) 
that has allowed capacity building and operational cooperation in combating terrorism 
to be developed between regional police forces. ASEANAPOL is not under ASEAN 
Secretariat coordination, but ASEAN organises it to set up a focal point for ASEAN 
police forces. 223 This focal point is significant in facilitating the cooperation because the 
person acting as a focal point actually has the right to make contact and to be contacted 
among the members. ASEANAPOL was created in 1981, but terrorism only became 
part of its agenda at its 22nd meeting in 2002. Since then the delegates have annually 
restated their willingness to cooperate on combating terrorism and other transnational 
crimes by " ... enhancing police professionalism, forging stronger regional co-operation 
in police work and promoting lasting friendship amongst police officers of ASEAN 
countries".224 With regard to terrorism ASEANAPOL has more detailed aims.225 In 
January 2003, police chiefs from ASEAN pledged to boost cooperation in combating 
terrorism including sharing resources after an attack and setting up investigating task 
forces. They envisaged cooperation on identifying, pursuing and apprehending suspects, 
examining witnesses, searching for and seizing evidence, evacuating and treating 
victims along with providing forensic expertise. The delegates, however, shied away 
from endorsing a proposal by the host country Indonesia to extradite terrorist suspects 
or witnesses for trial purposes between member countries. 226 The institutionalisation 
process can be seen, however, as a tangible cooperation to intensify coordination in 
threat response. 
Apart from the broad agreements and commitments reached at the regional level, 
the actual operational level of ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation takes place at the 
bilateral and sub-regional levels in the form of 'person to person' contacts among the 
police officers which are conducted to increase capacity building and facilitate 
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investigations.227 For example, such cooperation employing intelligence sharing and 
police cooperation resulted in the capture of key militants: Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi in 
Manila in early 2002; the Singaporean JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari arrested in the 
Indonesian Riau islands in February 2003; and Arifin Ali of the Singaporean JI and the 
JI operational chief, Hambali both arrested in Thailand in May and August of 2003 
respectively. In addition, both the Singaporean and Malaysian governments provided 
video testimony by Singaporean and Malaysian JI members being held in custody 
during the trial in Indonesia of alleged JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. 
In the wake of the Jakarta bombings of the Marriot Hotel and the Australian 
Embassy in August and September 2004, ASEAN member states also sought to 
strengthen the regional legal framework for combating terrorism by signing a Treaty on 
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) in Criminal Matters on 28 November 2004, in Kuala 
Lumpur. This treaty provided for a wide range of legal cooperation between member 
states, while at the same time respecting the sovereignty of their domestic laws. Its 
provisions included an arrangement for catching criminals who cross borders to escape 
from the law.228 Regional cooperation in criminal matters through mutual legal 
assistance will bridge the differences in the respective countries' legal systems and 
procedural requirements with a view to facilitating effective law enforcement. This 
treaty is relevant and much needed by ASEAN since criminals or terrorists show no 
respect for sovereign boundaries. By January 2006 all ten ASEAN member-states had 
ratified the treaty. The implementation of this treaty appears not to challenge state 
sovereignty because the treaty includes an article which guarantees the states' right to 
reject requests for assistance from other countries "when the requesting assistance will 
[lend] offence of a domestic political nature."229 
More advanced measures to enhance regional cooperation on counter-terrorism 
were introduced in the ASEAN Convention on Counter-terrorism. The Convention was 
signed on 13 January 2007 at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Philippines. A 
draft was tabled in September 2006 by the Philippines and Indonesia and the final text 
which was revised to ensure harmony with national laws and regulations of the different 
member nation's legal systems was adopted in November 2006 in Bali. The pact is the 
culmination of ASEAN's anti-terrorism measures that began following the 2001 attacks 
227 Formal interview with the staff at Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kuala Lumpur, 8 June 2006. 
228 ASEAN, Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal matters, Kuala Lumpur, 29 November 2004 
<http://www.aseansec.org/17363 .pdt> Accessed 23 October 2008. 
229 Ibid., article 3. 
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in the U.S. The Convention paves the way for a more legally binding approach to 
counter-terrorism cooperation within ASEAN. It provides a framework for regional 
cooperation to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism, in addition to reinforcing the 
2004 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which is ASEAN's only legally binding 
agreement related to counter-terrorism. The Convention is an historic document for 
ASEAN because it is the first legally binding, region-wide agreement on terrorism. 
Importantly, it specifically demarcates terrorist acts. It also provides a framework for 
broad regional cooperation in the following areas such as:230 
Enhancing intelligence exchange and sharing of information; 
Strengthening capability and readiness to deal with chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, cyber terrorism and any new 
forms of terrorism; and 
Ensuring that any person who participates in the financing, planning, 
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is 
brought to justice. 
The Convention allows the tracking of movements of suspicious money or 
people throughout the region and for the extradition of terror suspects. It also commits 
member-states to prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate, or commit terrorist acts 
from using their respective territories for those purposes against' other member 
countries. '23l 
The Convention also calls on countries to address the root causes of terrorism 
within the region and, importantly, it contains two articles that demonstrate an 
innovative approach to dealing with terrorism that might even be a model for other 
nations. Article 8 deals with the concept of fair treatment, while Article 11 concerns 
rehabilitation programs for terrorists. As part of its comprehensive agenda to prevent 
terrorist acts, ASEAN agreed to share best practice programs related to rehabilitation 
and social reintegration between the member states. Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines have all had experience with rehabilitating terrorists and have found 
such programs are an important part of any campaign to counter local terrorist groups. 
The article on fair treatment is an indication of A SEAN' s growing sensitivity to 
international human rights law, especially in the wake of the reported American abuse 
of detained terror suspects in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. The Association 
230 See Article VI, Areas of Cooperation, in ASEAN, ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, 13 
January 2000 <http://www.aseansec.org/19250.htm> Accessed 23 October 2008. 
231 Ibid. 
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has been able to make progress on initiatives such as the counter-terrorism convention 
due to its pragmatic approach, which allowed it to side-step controversial issues like 
designating an official definition of 'terrorism. ' 232 It has also been able to draw on 
various UN agreements and protocols in the drafting of its own convention, ensuring 
that it meets with international standards. 
The ASEAN terrorism convention is an example of how the Association can 
reinvent itself and still rely upon the proven mechanism of decision by consensus. The 
Convention on Counter-Terrorism signals the greater degree of ASEAN's political will 
to deal with terrorism, while still demonstrating that grouping's traditional reluctance to 
be seen as interfering in member country's internal affairs. For example, the Convention 
acts as a solid legal basis for extradition of terror suspects in the absence of bilateral 
extradition treaties. This step alone is a major improvement because, in the past, 
extraditions between member-states have sometimes taken years to negotiate due to the 
wide variation in national legal systems. The Counter-terrorism Convention should 
boost the solidarity of the group and assist it in treating terrorism as a regional issue. 
Certainly it is a demonstration of how the issue of terrorism, which was once treated as 
a domestic problem, has become a more region-wide concern. Moreover, this change in 
attitude has prompted a higher level of security cooperation between ASEAN member-
states that is commensurate to a security community-building process. 
ASEAN and Its Dialogue Partners 
Another dimension of ASEAN' s commitment to fight terrorism is its moves to 
promote cooperation on the issue with countries external to the group - the so called 
'Dialogue Partners'. An important vehicle for this form of regional cooperation is the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the ARF meeting on 4 October 2001 in Bandar Seri 
Begawan, that body's members denounced the terrorist attacks in the U.S. through a 
statement by the Chairman. The ARF member-states also promised to "address ways 
and means to cooperate further in the fight against terrorism in its future 
deliberations".233 That pledge was honoured the following year in Brunei when the July 
meeting of the ARF held a series of workshops to enhance capacity building and issued 
a statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing. This statement suggested specific 
steps that could be adopted by the ARF participants which include: freezing terrorist 
232 Kavi Chongkittavom, 'Asean's accord on counter-terrorism a major step forward', The Nation, 19 
February 2007 <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/option/print.php?newsid=30027193> Accessed 12 
November 2008. 
233 Ibid. 
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assets; the implementation of an international standard for exchange of information and 
outreach; measures for providing technical assistance; and agreements on compliance 
and reporting. 
ASEAN states, while generally supporting this statement, still found some of its 
specific measures difficult to implement. This was especially the case with freezing 
terrorist financial assets because regional terrorist groups often did not use the banking 
system, but transferred funds by couriers, making their finances difficult to track. 
Nevertheless, the ARF has proven to be a useful forum for ASEAN states to draw on 
outside political and technical support in their fight against terrorism. This can be seen 
from the Chairman's statement at the 9th ARF Meeting, which notified the Forum 
members of ASEAN anti-terrorism initiatives (see above) and called for the ARF 
members to support these programs: 
The Ministers noted that further collaboration was needed to support 
capacity building, in particular to enhance participants' capability to 
counter-terrorism especially in areas such as legal assistance, financial 
measures, and practical law enforcement cooperation. 234 
The ARF has responded with support in the area of capacity-building with a 
senes of seminars and workshops. These meetings have dealt with topics such as: 
Cooperative Counter-terrorist Action on Border Security in June 2003; Information 
Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing 
Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Other Transnational Crimes in July 2005; Cyber 
Terrorism in 19 October 2007. Such input has helped ASEAN to keep up to date with 
the changing challenges of terrorism. 
Cooperation between ASEAN and the U.S. on the issue of terrorism was 
cemented with a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in 
Bandar Seri Begawan on 1 August 2002. The declaration pledges that the U.S. and the 
ASEAN states will improve intelligence-gathering efforts, strengthen capacity-building 
measures, enhance mutual cooperation and liaison and strengthen border and 
immigration controls.235 During the 17th U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue in Bangkok in January 
2004, a Counter-Terrorism Work Plan was adopted to complement ASEAN's own 
234 See A SEAN Regional Forum, Chairman's Statement the Ninth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, 31 July 2002 <H:\Chapter terrorism\document terrorism\Chairman's 
Statement on the 9th ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, 31 July 2002.mht> Accessed 11 
December 2008. 
235 ASEAN, ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International 
Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 August 2002<http://www. Asean.org> Accessed 12 December 
2008. 
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Counter-Terrorism Program. The focus of the plan was on information sharing, capacity 
building and border controls. The Work Plan has been an important mechanism for the 
U.S. to alter its engagement with the region. For ASEAN governments it has major 
significance as recognition by the U.S. that the Association is an equal and the high 
level of bilateral cooperation has recast ASEAN's relationship with the U.S. in terms of 
a partnership, instead of the perceived superpower paternalism of the past. The accords 
criminalise the practices of international terrorism and enlist vital regional partners in 
the global fight against al-Qaeda. In terms of political cooperation, diplomacy, military 
assets, and money, America has recast its strategic engagement in Southeast Asia on the 
basis of security to the mutual agreement of both partners. The U.S. is supporting the 
ongoing efforts of ASEAN to prevent, suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism within 
the region and this commitment was been updated via a comprehensive agreement for 
more intensive cooperation in a Joint Vision Statement released in November 2005: 
Promote closer cooperation on combating transnational crimes, including 
inter alia, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit 
drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, and enhancing maritime and border 
security, and express readiness to build on the ASEAN-United States Joint 
Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism signed in 
Bandar Seri Begawan in 2002 to develop joint activities; 236 
It is important to highlight that the development of ASEAN-United States ties 
on combating terrorism were initially based on the counter-terrorism component of the 
ASEAN Plan of action in 1999 and its Work Program in 2002.237 
Similar cooperation programs have been instituted between ASEAN and its 
other Dialogue partners. A joint declaration between ASEAN and China on cooperation 
in non-traditional security matters was issued at the 6th ASEAN-China Summit in 
Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002. This declaration was a largely diplomatic 
requirement in the light of the Association's agreement with U.S. reached the previous 
August. ASEAN has also reached similar agreements with the EU (January 2003)238, 
India (October 2003)239 and Australia (July 2004).240 These declarations all contain 
236 ASEAN, Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership, November 2005 
<http://www.aseansec.org!l 7872.htm> 
237USAID, United States Assistance to ASEAN <http://www.asean-us-
partnership.org!us_assistancel.htm> Accessed 3 March 2009. 
238 ASEAN, Joint Declaration on Co-operation to combat Terrorism, 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial 
Meeting Brussels 27-28 January 2003, <http://www.aseansec.org/14030.htm> Accessed 11 January 
2004. 
239 ASEAN, Asean-India Joint Declaration For Cooperation to combat International Terrorism, October 
2003 <http://www.aseansec.org/15276.htm> Accessed 12 December 2007. 
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pledges to increase liaison between law enforcement agencies, to cooperate on 
intelligence and to strengthen capacity building efforts through training and education 
and similar counter-terrorism measures. 
Terrorism and ASEAN Security Community Building 
ASEAN's response to terrorism is relevant to the Association's development as 
a regional security community. The 2003 Bali Concord II signalled the group's political 
commitment to act collectively and cooperate on a range of counter-terrorism measures. 
Article No 10 of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) states that: 
The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing 
institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening 
national and regional capacities to counter terrorism ... 241 
By including terrorism in the Bali Concord II, the ASEAN member-states have 
recognised that successful counter-terrorism often requires a response far broader than 
individual states acting within their specific national domains. Article No 10 recognizes 
that terrorism is a regional issue that must be dealt with at the regional level. Moreover, 
ASEAN' s willingness to include terrorism in the ASC - which is a kind of blue print for 
A SEAN' s future development - means that the members understand the type of long 
term commitment that regional cooperation in counter terrorism will require. 
This statement, however, is also a recognition of ASEAN's limited ability to 
deal with such a threat. The commitment to cooperation is specifically stated as using 
the Association's existing institutions and mechanism, rather than declaring a new 
institutional regional framework in order to combat terrorism. In addition, the reference 
to 'strengthening the national (and regional) capacities' is an indication that individual 
national priorities and interests still take primacy, even in matters of regional 
cooperation. Absent from the language of the Article are promises to direct, unite, or 
coordinate the national resources of the member states, a further indication that the 
development of a security community in Southeast Asia is constrained by the interests 
of the individual ASEAN member-states. 
In classical security community theory, the degree of interdependence between 
the members is a factor that provides strong indications of the existence of potential for 
a security community. In the ASEAN context, this case study of the Association's 
240 ASEAN, Australia-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, July 
2004 <http://www.aseansec.org/16205.htm> 13 December 2007. 
241 ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, 7 October 2003. 
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efforts to combat terrorism provides an example of how this issue has spurred the 
development of interdependence within the grouping. Despite the many differences 
between ASEAN member states, the issue of terrorism has created the need for greater 
institutional cooperation because of its transnational character. Within the region, 
terrorists have created networks that cooperate in areas of funding, training, providing 
sanctuary and on operations. These cross border links, within Southeast Asia have led 
the ASEAN states to the realization that they face a common threat. The nature of this 
challenge has strengthened the awareness of their security interdependence. Dealing 
with terrorism has also created both compelling reasons and new opportunities to 
develop security cooperation to a much higher level than in the past. 
The mutual political commitment recently developed by ASEAN states on the 
issue of counter-terrorism is a clear demonstration of such trends. The Association's 
declarations and agreements at the highest levels of state authority have now 
demonstrated a common perception of the threat posed by terrorism and a desire to 
cooperate in countering it. Examples already reviewed in this chapter include the 
Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (2001), the Declaration on Terrorism 
(2002), Trilateral Agreement between Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines (2002) and 
the Bali Concord II (2003). An examination of these documents provides an 
understanding of the increased commonality with which the ASEAN states have defined 
the threat of terrorism and how much that perception owes to international, regional or 
domestic considerations. This pattern alone is a sign that ASEAN is moving to towards 
future as an entity that may one day be able to transform itself into a distinct and a rules-
based community. 
Such achievements, however, can be contrasted with the policies adopted by the 
various ASEAN states in relation to their cooperation with external partners on the issue 
of terrorism. Classical security community theory argues that the existence of the 
community should not create exclusivity among the members. Security community 
members should be able to develop a common position vis a vis external states, or at the 
very least, their individual state policies and actions relative to non-members should not 
confront other members of the security community. Within ASEAN, different states 
have projected diverse levels of support for the U.S. global campaign against terrorism. 
Singapore's strong support for the U.S. contrasts with the much less effusive support of 
Indonesia. In this situation it is reasonable to ask whether Singapore's bilateral support 
for the United State' international anti-terror campaign has actually been counter-
productive to regional cooperation on terrorism. This is because Singapore's strong 
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posture might actually (and unintentionally) serve as a lightening rod which extreme 
jihadist factions could exploit to isolate Singapore from the rest of ASEAN as an overly 
enthusiastic proponent of the U.S. global war on terror. 
Moreover, while classical security community theory suggests that successful 
cooperation on security issues requires 'thick' institutional arrangements, within 
ASEAN the existing levels of cooperation can only be described as 'thin' or 'loose' due 
to the overriding importance that member-states of the Association still attach to their 
own national policies. Increasing cooperation on counter-terrorism with ASEAN at the 
operational level - between state executives and law enforcement agencies - provides a 
further illustration of the Association's ability to act as a security community. This 
cooperation, however, remains nascent and qualified. 
Conclusion 
This survey of ASEAN' s attempts to formulate policy and act against terrorism 
has demonstrated the complexity of the problem. The difficulties arise, as so often the 
case with A SEAN, from factors as the diversity of the member states, their domestic 
conditions and their foreign policies. While the issue of terrorism has been able to 
generate a broad general consensus arising from the common threat confronting the 
member states, significant differences still remain in their ability to prosecute anti-
terrorist policies at the national level. 
Despite such problems, there are indications that security cooperation between 
the member states on this issue has been real. As this case study shows, in reaching this 
point ASEAN has had to surmount considerable difficulties to achieve levels of 
cooperation that are unprecedented in the Association's forty-year history. These 
obstacles to cooperation are derived from such factors as the diverse geographic, 
political, social, ethnic, religious and economic differences between the ASEAN states, 
variations in their national priorities and limitations on the resources and capacities that 
they are able to devote to the struggle with terrorism. Perhaps the most important 
difficulty that the Association had to overcome was its own weak institutional 
mechanisms, which have tended to favour national interests and priorities over regional 
concerns. The case study of ASEAN' s cooperation in combating the threat of terrorism 
also provides an example of how the Association has been able to rise above its long-
standing preoccupation with state sovereignty in some important ways. 
It was the very transnational character of the threat that opened a window of 
opportunity to greater cooperation. The ability of terrorist networks to operate across 
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borders has political, social and economic consequences that ASEAN could not ignore. 
The solution to such a problem lay in new levels of cooperation and collaboration 
between the member states government's and their law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies. In some ways, ASEAN's progress on the issue of terrorism reflects its old 
ways of doing business. The Association's resolution of the problem in finding a 
common definition of terrorism by dispensing with the need for an overly precise 
definition is a prime example of this behaviour. In terms of security community theory, 
the case study of ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts does not conform to classical 
notions of how such a community should act. However, the way in which ASEAN has 
approached regional counter-terrorism demonstrates the Association's ability to reinvent 
itself and find unique solutions to the many challenges that have confronted it since its 
foundation in 1967. 
ASEAN cooperation m the combating of terrorism can be summarised by 
highlighting these specific characteristics. Firstly, such cooperation represents a discrete 
and viable position in the global war on terror. This position is not predicated as much 
on definition of the threat as it is on tangible cooperation to reduce the threat's regional 
impact. Second, ASEAN has functioned best in the counter-terrorism arena when it 
develops bilateral or trilateral avenues of cooperation among the core member states. 
The trilateral Agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines reflects this 
trend. Finally, ASEAN has become a 'pioneer' in reconciling the intra-state and inter-
state dynamics that shape terrorist threats, counter-terrorism policies and overall 
regional cohesion towards the policy challenges-at-large. The outcome of its balancing 
approach will have a decisive impact not only on ASEAN' s own quest for realizing a 
more tangible community building process. If successful, it will showcase ASEAN as a 
model for similar quests in other developing regions to apply counter-terrorism as an 
instrument of successful regional integration. 
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Chapter Five 
Regional Security Politics in Malacca Straits 
This chapter is a case study of security politics in the Malacca Straits between 
three ASEAN member states: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The case is an 
appropriate example of how core ASEAN states have either collaborated with or 
contested each other in ways that test their ability to reconcile their individual sovereign 
interest with community-building approaches for managing one of the world's most 
critical maritime chokepoints. It thus constitutes an appropriate benchmark for 
measuring the key variables associated with this study's process-tracing indices. 
Process-tracing is incorporated in this chapter by cross-comparing the national security 
interests and postures of three core ASEAN states as they pertain to their perception of, 
and their actions to neutralize, security threats in Malacca at both the sovereign and sub-
regional levels of cooperation. What will be shown here is the extent to which the 
interests of the three states diverge and converge as they attempt to deal with a range of 
security issues in the Straits, with a particular emphasis on the issue of piracy. The 
process tracing analysis will consider where states are upholding or violating 
international norms of maritime security when they attempt to balance sovereign 
interests with broader intra-ASEAN interests. The analysis will also examine the 
measures adopted by the three states to create modes of security cooperation that reflect 
ASEAN member-states' ability to formulate a joint response to problems that challenge 
their ability to develop a sense of community. 
The chapter will begin by identifying the significance of the Straits in a general 
sense and how each states values this vital sea lane according their national interest. 
This section will be followed by a description of type of insecurity or threats that exit in 
the Straits and how each of the states perceive these problems. The case study will then 
examine the nature of security cooperation between the three ASEAN members and 
evaluate the importance of this collaboration before discussing some obstacles to the 
development of this cooperation. The chapter will conclude by assessing the prospects 
for the maritime security cooperation in the light of ASEAN' s future development as a 
security community. 
Maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits is an important precedent 
from which it may be possible to envisage the form of the security community within 
ASEAN. The ASEAN members have themselves recognized the significance of 
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maritime cooperation among the member states as contributing to the development of an 
ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali 
Concord II), in Article No 5: 
Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore 
shall be addressed regionally in an holistic, integrated and comprehensive 
manner. Maritime cooperation between and among ASEAN member 
countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security 
Community. 1 
As the Declaration demonstrates, the member-states recognise the potential that 
the successful management of maritime security issues have for providing a major 
contribution to building a security community within ASEAN. In practice, managing 
collective action in the Straits has been carried out through mutual respect for state 
sovereignty. They have conducted limited coordination in securing the Straits from 
various threats. This is because although they have commonality for exposure to such 
threats they have different perceptions of what are their own priorities in the straits. 
The Significance of Geography and Economic Interdependence 
Maritime issues, particularly those involving the Malacca Straits, have several 
dimensions that have shaped the development of strong regional interaction. 
Geographically, the Malacca Straits is bounded by four key ASEAN member states -
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The general geographic boundary of the 
straits area is usually defined as follows (see Map 1 ): the northwest boundary is a line 
from Ujong Baka; the north-western most point of Sumatra; to Laem Phra Chao - the 
southern most point of Ko Phukit in Thailand. To the northwest, this waterway leads 
through the Great Channel, separating the Nicobar Islands from Sumatra, or through the 
Cocos Channel north of the Andaman Islands and into the Bay of Bengal. The southeast 
boundary is a line from Tanjung Piai, the southern most part of Peninsular Malaysia, to 
Pulau Iyu, an island in Indonesian territorial waters, then to Pulau Karimun Kecil and 
onward to Tanjung Kedabu in Sumatra.2 The Strait of Malacca itself extends for about 
500 miles (800 km) joining with the much smaller Singapore Strait, which extends for 
65 miles (105 km) long at the southern end of the waterway.3 
1 See ASEAN Secretariat, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), 7 October 2003. 
<http:www.aseansec.org/15160.htm> Accessed 19 September 2005. 
2 See Donald B. Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet? (London: University Press, 
2003), p. 7. 
3 In general discussion these are often referred to in combination simply as the Straits of Malacca. 
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Figure 1: The Location of Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia 
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Figure 2: Principal International Sea lanes through Southeast Asia 
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In the south, the Malacca Strait has a width of only 40 miles (65 kilo meters), 
but broadens northward to some 155 miles (250 kilo meters) between We Island off 
Sumatra and the Isthmus of Kra on the Thai mainland. The shape from north to south 
resembles a funnel, with the widest part in the north and the narrow section in the 
southeast. The narrowest point is the Singapore Straits, which is only about three miles 
wide and lies within the territorial seas of Singapore and Indonesia before debouching 
into the South China Sea. Where it enters the South China Sea in the east, the waterway 
is about 11 miles wide and adjoins Malaysian and Indonesian territory. The depth of the 
Straits rarely exceeds 37 meters, with the average water depth being about 27 meters. 
The location of the Malacca Straits adjacent to four different ASEAN states 
means that any problems which occurs in this waterway will most likely be the problem 
all of them, not just one particular state. In addition, the importance of the waterway as 
a strategic economic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) means that the international 
community also has a vital stake in the security of the Malacca Straits. A narrow strait, 
by general standards, with high volume of vessels, it is therefore considered to be the 
key choke point in Asia. For all of these reasons it is preferable for ASEAN to tackle the 
issue of maritime security within the Straits collectively. 
The economic importance of the Malacca Straits is a dimension that may also 
contribute to the development of a security community in ASEAN because of the 
collective dependence on the Straits by the littoral states of the Asia-Pacific and beyond. 
The importance of the Malacca Straits as a vital strategic sea lane of communication for 
the trade and economies of the littoral states of ASEAN and the world is beyond 
question. The three littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), the user states 
and other interested parties have a common interest in the security of the Straits as their 
supply line. The littoral states have a special economic and security dependence on the 
Straits for their international and domestic trade and communications. For Indonesia and 
Malaysia, the seaway is an alternative domestic transport route between islands and an 
important fishery, particularly for mackerel4• One study has shown that the production 
of the fishery in the Malacca Straits, has reached around 389,000 tons in 2001.5 As for 
4 The study was conducted by the Indonesian Fisheries and Marine Research Institute (Ministry of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries/DKP) in cooperation with the Research Centre for Oceanography (Indonesian 
Institute ofSciences/LIPI), see MASDEC (Malaysian Research and Development Centre), 'Introduction 
to the Straits of Malacca' <http://www.fsas.upm.edu.my/~masdec/web/straits.html> Accessed 29 April 
2009. 
5 Anugerah Nonji, 'Managing the Marine Environment of the Straits of Malacca', Research Centre for 
Oceanography, Indonesian Institute of Science, Indonesia, Paper presented in the Conference on the 
Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 11- 13 October 2004. 
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the big pelagic fish the potential is around 28,000 tons per year, small pelagic fish 
150,000 tons per year, and demersal (bottom -dwelling) fish about 83,000 tons per year 
6 For Indonesia, the Straits contributes the second highest fish production after the Java 
Sea. About 85,000 or 17 % of the total number of fishermen in Indonesia depend their 
life on fisheries along the Malacca Straits.7 High quality, reliable fish harvests are 
extremely important to ensure sustainable socio-economic development and health of 
the region's population. As a key entre port, Singapore's economic life depends on the 
Strait, while Malaysia derives significant revenue from its ports along the Straits, such 
as Klang. 
Many states within the international community ('user states') depend on the 
Straits for trade and energy supplies. User states such as China and Japan are concerned 
to ensure that this vital SLOC, through which much of their trade and energy supplies 
must pass, is not disrupted. The United States also has interests in the Malacca Strait for 
reasons that are strategic as much as economic. Admiral Gary Roughead of the US 
Pacific Fleet has noted: 
... the Strait of Malacca is the heaviest trafficked Strait in the world, and 
for that reason any disruption to that commerce, not only would affect the 
region, I would suggest it would have global implications. 8 
A major U.S security interest relative to the Malacca Straits is to ensure the 
passage of international commercial traffic from the Middle East to East Asia. This 
especially pertains to the access of the energy supplies for its key allies, South Korea 
and Japan. Indeed, the Straits of Malacca remain the key littoral on the shortest sea 
route from the ports of India, the Middle East and Europe (via Suez Canal) to ports of 
East Asia.9 Vast quantities of oil, coal, iron and minerals are shipped to the 
<http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/conferences/som04/papers/anugerah.pdf> Accessed 18 April 
2009. 
6 Anugerah Nonji, 'Managing the Marine Environment of the Straits of Malacca', Research Centre for 
Oceanography, Indonesian Institute of Science, Indonesia, Paper presented in the Conference on the 
Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 11- 13 October 2004, 
<http://www.mima.gov .my/mima/htmls/conferences/som04/papers/anugerah.pdf> Accessed 18 April 
2009. 
7 Gomal H Tampubolon, and Gede Sedana Merta, 'Mackerel Fisheries in the Malacca Straits', in Reports 
- BOBP/REP/39, Investigations on the Mackerel and Scads Resources of the Malacca Straits, Food and 
Agricultural Organization, United Nations, Marine Fishery Resources Management in the Bay of 
Bengal. Colombo, Sri Lanka, December, 1987 <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007 /ad828e/ad828e06.pdf> 
Accessed 29 March 2009. 
8 Michael Perry, 'Terrorist attack in Malacca Strait would rock world economies', The Jakarta Post, 2 
February 2006, p. 4. 
9 The best alternative to the Malacca and Singapore Straits are three routes that run through the 
Indonesian archipelago - the Strait ofMakassar between Kalimantan and Sulawesi, the Sunda Strait and 
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manufacturing centres of South-East and North-East Asia, while millions of containers 
flow in the opposite direction to feed consumer markets all over the world. Ships 
carrying one quarter of the world's commerce and half the world's oil pass through the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore annually. In 2005 alone, well over 65,000 vessels 
passed through the waterway. '0 The route is thus important not only in terms the high 
volume of shipping that passes through the Straits, but also the proportion of global 
trade and energy resources carried by vessels using the route. It is likely to be even 
busier in future because of increasing trade flows and energy demands in Asia. Traffic 
density is projected to increase to 141,000 ships in 2020." In addition, nearly 20 million 
barrels of oil are expected to pass through the Straits during that year. 12 The high 
economic value of the cargoes that pass through the Straits means that any disruption, 
including a terrorist strike against key shipping lanes or ports, could paralyze the 
international economy. 
This vulnerability 1s highlighted by the exposure of user nations whose 
international commerce moves through these waters. Twenty percent of tens of 
thousand vessels passing through the Malacca Strait annually belong to Japan. 13 
Approximately a fifth of the world's trade transits via the Strait, including 60 percent of 
China's foreign trade, 14• 80 percent of Japan's and South Korea's oil and gas and 80 
percent of China's oil flow through this conduit. 15 About 70 percent of China's foreign 
trade is carried via shipping here and recently, China surpassed Japan as the number one 
'user' nation of the Malacca Strait. 16• From these figures, it is not difficult to conclude 
that the Chinese economy has been and will continue to be heavily reliant on the 
maritime security in Southeast Asia. Disruption to China's energy supply and trade 
the Lombok Strait. These routes apply especially to ships running between the Middle East (the 
Persian/Arabian Gulf) and East Asia (such as a country like Japan). See Graham Gerard Ong, 'Ships can 
be Dangerous Too Coupling Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia's Maritime Security 
Framework', ISEAS Working Paper: International Politics and Security Issues Series, 1, 2004, p. 22. 
'
0 
'Malaysia says Lloyd's calling Malacca Strait war-risk area will affect economies', Forbes, 8 January 
2006. 
"Vijay Sakhuja, 'Malacca: Who's to pay for smooth sailing?', Asia Times on line, 16 May 2007. 
<http//www .atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_ Asia/IRl 6Ae0 I .html> Accessed 21 August 2008. 
12 
'Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore set up co-operative mechanism', Channel New Asia, 4 September 
2007 <http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 29 August 2008. 
13 Shin Ebihara , 'Japan gives RI three boats to patrol Malacca Strait', The Jakarta Post, 1 December 
2007. 
14 Ary Hermawan, 'Malacca coast patrol to stay local', The Jakarta Post.com, 26 August 2007. 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/ detailheadlines.asp ?fileid=20070826.@O1 &irec=O> Accessed 26 
August 2007 
15 Perry, 'Terrorist attack in Malacca Strait', p. 4. 
16 Anders C Sjaastad 'Southeast Asian SLOCs and security options', in Kwa Chong Guan and John K 
Skogan (eds), Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (London, New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 3-14. 
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would significantly influence its economic growth and also send ripple effects through 
the world economy. 
The passage of vessels via Straits of Malacca is thus a vital logistic element in 
the growth and prosperity of both Southeast and Northeast Asia. Regional states and the 
international community have a common interest in ensuring that the Straits remain 
safe, open and secure for shipping. For the ASEAN member-states, the need to 
guarantee the navigational safety, environmental protection and maritime security of the 
Straits is driven by both their collective dependence on the seaway and the interests of 
international users. There is thus considerable pressure on the key ASEAN coastal states 
to cooperate in providing the kind of overlapping or linked security jurisdiction that the 
operation of the Straits requires. The need for them to collaborate on realizing this 
mutual interest has the potential to add to the type of interdependence required to build 
a security community. 
Differing Perceptions of the Significance of the Straits 
Despite the fundamental interest among the littoral ASEAN states to secure the 
Malacca Straits, there exists a degree of divergence between them as to how the Straits 
relate to their separate national interests. The differences between the states can be 
described as a 'gradation' of interests. 17 Singapore places a very high value on the 
Straits because it is vital to its identity as a commercial and service centre for Southeast 
Asia. For Malaysia, whose economy is also dependent on its access to the Straits, their 
importance to its national interest is only marginally less than that of Singapore's. In 
fact, the Malaysian government has committed to ensure the safety, security and 
environmental protection of the straits. 18 To Indonesia, however, the Malacca Straits are 
but one of many access points to the sea that this large archipelagic nation possesses. 19 
The Sunda Straits and Lombok Straits are likewise critical to sustaining Indonesian 
economic and socio-cultural viability. 
Economically and politically, Singapore is heavily dependent on safe, secure and 
free passage through the Straits. The Port of Singapore is the most important entre port 
in Southeast Asia. As a small nation with no natural resources or agricultural 
17 Interview with anonymous Indonesian's leading expert in the Malacca Straits and International Law, 
Jakarta, 16 June 2008. 
18 Straits safety not just littoral state' burden, New Straits Times, 25 November 2008, 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 22 May 2009. 
19 Interview with Operational Staff of TNl-AL (Indonesian Navy), the Headquarters of Indonesian Navy, 
Cilangkap, Jakarta, 12 June, 2006. 
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production, maritime and port security are essential to this city-state's economic well-
being. The importance of the seaway to Malaysia is the fact that the Malacca Straits run 
parallel to the industrial heartland of the country and serves the so called 'Western 
Corridor of Malaysia'. Every major Malaysian port is located along the Straits, with a 
significant effort being made to promote two ports - Port Klang and the Port ofTanjung 
Pelepas - as international transhipment hubs for container traffic. The Straits' pre-
eminent role is therefore as a 'transport link' for Malaysia as nation that is highly trade-
dependent. 20 
Though Indonesia uses the Strait for trade, it does not view the Malacca Straits 
from the same perspective as Malaysia and Singapore. This is partly because Indonesia 
does not derive as much economic benefit from the waterway as do the other two 
countries. Indonesia's ports have difficulty competing with the Singapore and 
Malaysia's ports, with 60 percent of the vessels using the waterway making landfall in 
either Malaysia or Singapore.21 Relative to Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesian ports 
are uncompetitive due to high handling costs and poor infrastructure, as much as for 
Indonesia's economic problems. For these reasons, Belawan, the most important port in 
the Sumatra, is not as attractive to international trade as are Malaysia or Singapore. Part 
of this attributable to the Suharto government's tendency to focus on the management 
and control of land resources and downplay the importance waterways as part of its 
'national resilience' strategy. Nevertheless, while each ASEAN littoral state may place 
a different emphasis on the economic benefits it can derive from the Straits; this does 
not prevent the Straits from being a source of intermittent conflict between them. 
One reason for intra-ASEAN conflict is the tendency of these states to perceive 
their interests in the Straits as issues of state sovereignty. This contrasts with the 
emphasis of user states and commercial interests who are primarily concerned with 
ensuring the freedom of passage in the Straits as an international waterway. Mark J. 
Valencia believes that both Indonesia and Malaysia can be seen as "defending the 
Westphalian Treaty".22 One nationalist Indonesian view is that Malacca Straits is an 
'etalase' (prism) for showing state sovereignty'.23 Beyond such nationalist rhetoric, 
20 G. Naidu, 'The Straits of Malacca in the Malaysian Economy', in B.A. Hamzah (ed.), The Straits of 
Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding and Navigational Sefety (Petaling Jaya: 
Pelanduk Publications, 1997), p. 33. 
21 See 'Selat Malaka belum optimal berikan keuntungan ekonomi bagi Indonesia.' ('Malacca Straits has 
not yet give economic benefits to Indonesia'), Business News, 30 January 2006. 
22 Mark J. Valencia, 'Malacca Straits: Clash of Sovereignty?' Jakarta Post.com, 8 November 2004. 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com/misc/Printerfriendly.asp> Accessed 28 June 2008. 
23 Interview with Indonesia's Western Fleet commander, Jakarta, 5 July 2006. 
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Indonesia and Malaysia argue that they have sound legal claims to the Straits. Under 
international law the waters in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore constitute part of 
the territorial waters of the littoral states over which they have sovereignty. This 
sovereignty is subject only to the regime of transit as stipulated by the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which, through practice, has 
become customary international law. For these reasons any activities or manoeuvres in 
the Straits by foreign vessels, which are not exercising the right of transit - whether they 
are for civilian or military purposes - are subject to the consent of the respective coastal 
states.24 
Indonesia has special reasons to enforce state sovereignty in the Malacca Strait. 
The concept of Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelagic Outlook) defines Indonesia as a 
unitary entity consisting of its islands and archipelago waters. Indonesia's position is 
that its territorial waters are an extension of its land territory, making the provision of 
security in its territorial waters its sole responsibility. Moreover, Indonesia has a 
tradition of non-alignment so that its laws, regulations and foreign policy do not permit 
the deployment of foreign forces in its territory for any reason (even combating 
terrorism). This response enjoys strong public support in Indonesia as many people 
feared that outside intervention could endanger the country's national sovereignty of 
countries in the region, destabilize their domestic politics and also provoke a response 
from political or religious radical groups. Thus a US proposal advanced in 2004 to 
deploy forces for security to the Straits (to be discussed in more detail below) was from 
the Indonesian perspective, contrary to international law and harmful to its national 
security interests.25 Indonesia was not alone in advancing this position, as both Malaysia 
and more tentatively, Singapore also opposed this American initiative. 
This concept is further reinforced by its right (along with that of Singapore and 
Malaysia) to maintain territorial authority over the Straits based on the 1982 United 
Nations Convention the Law of the Sea. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have applied the 
regime of innocent passage, which under the Convention allows them to deny any 
passage prejudicial to their peace, good order and security. The geography of the Straits 
has also encouraged cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia. In 1957, Indonesia 
adopted the principles of archipelagic state and in 1960 it adopted a 12 mile territorial 
24 Nugroho Wisnumurti, 'Upholding security in the Malacca Straits', The Jakarta Post, 12 April 2004. 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com/ Archives/ ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20040412.F03> Accessed 28 June 
2008. 
25 Ibid. 
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waters limit, which it passed into Law No 4 of 1960. Later, Malaysia also adopted the 
12 mile territorial limit. On 17 March 1970, both countries concluded a territorial sea 
delimitation treaty for the Strait of Malacca in areas of less than 24 nautical miles width. 
Indonesia and Malaysia thus shared many similar views on the legal status of Malacca 
Straits as part of their national waters, while admitting its use for the purposes of 
international navigation and trade. 
For Singapore the issue of sovereignty m the Malacca Straits is of lesser 
importance. Singapore shares only small a co-jurisdiction with Indonesia, which is 
mostly in the Singapore Straits. Although it recently began to assert its sovereignty over 
offshore islets such as Pedra Branca as part of a strategy to increase its land space, it 
remains predominantly dependent on unrestricted flow of traffic through the Straits as 
its economic lifeblood. This island-state, therefore, has always considered that the 
Malacca Straits are an international waterway and that freedom of navigation should 
apply. Singapore prefers to support the transit passage rather than the innocent passage 
of navigation supported by Indonesia, Malaysia and other Southeast Asian states. 
Transit passage recognizes that ships of all nations should have unimpeded passage 
through the straits. Unsurprisingly, this stance is supported by the major maritime 
powers, whose interests coincide with the concept of free access to and free transit 
through the Straits. 
The differences between the three littoral states are not merely semantic. Their 
individual preferences on the freedom of access to the Straits reveal that each nation 
exerts different postures on the passage issue. Indonesia and Malaysia prefer to apply 
the right of innocent passage, while Singapore and the international community have a 
clear preference for the right of unimpeded passage. The application of these different 
standards has the potential to create conflict between the three ASEAN littoral states. 
The right of innocent passage recognizes that certain restrictions apply to the ships 
using the territorial waters of another nation, while the right of unimpeded passage does 
not. In essence, the application of these different charters by the three nations means 
that Singapore's position challenges the national interest of Indonesia and Malaysia and 
vice versa. 
The sovereignty issue has also underlined other divergences in the Straits 
security politics. The main differences occur over who should instigate security 
measures. As a basic principle, Indonesia and Malaysia reject any military collaboration 
with other countries. For Indonesia, the security in the Malacca Straits has always been 
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the responsibility of the three ASEAN littoral states.26 Malaysia and Indonesia also 
argue that shipping companies should not employ private armed escorts in either the 
Strait of Malacca or the Singapore Strait. Their firm stand on escorts has disappointed 
countries such as India, Japan and particularly the United States, who have repeatedly 
offered such assistance.27 Indonesia's preference is for user states to assist it with 
building its own capacity to secure the Straits through measures such as the provision of 
technical assistance.28 This response was also given to the aforementioned US offer of 
assistance in 2004, relating to the report of the U.S. Pacific Command, which suggested 
that American marines could help patrol the Straits.29 
The reasoning behind rejecting foreign assistance and the use of security 
companies in the Straits relates to the protection of national sovereignty. Both Malaysia 
and Indonesia feel that rejecting direct assistance is the best way to protect themselves 
from gunboat diplomacy and other forms of foreign intervention in their national 
affairs.30 These sensitivities to intervention are derived from their colonial past, while 
the rejection of foreign assistance is based on their interpretation of international law, 
with both Indonesia and Malaysia arguing that UNCLOS III provides no legal basis for 
the naval vessels of foreign powers patrolling in their territorial waters.31 
While Indonesia and Malaysia have taken a firm stand against the deployment of 
foreign forces in the Strait of Malacca to combat piracy, Singapore initially welcomed 
the US proposal for joint patrols in the Straits. Indonesia clearly felt annoyed when 
Singapore indicated its strong support for a larger US presence in the region in 2004, 
arguing that the island-state was only thinking about its own interests and not 
considering those of its neighbours.32 Singapore has also allowed private security 
companies to escort ships and their crews passing through the Malacca and Singapore 
Straits. In the eyes of Indonesia and Malaysia, these vessels are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the states whose waters they are transiting. While the UNCLOS (to which 
26 Formal interview with staff at the Directorate General of Strategic and Defense, Indonesia, Jakarta, 22 
June 2006. 
27 Mark J Valencia, 'Straits cooperation: A glass half-full', The Jakarta Post.com, 21December2006 
<http://www.theJakartapost.com/detaileditoral.asp?filied=20061220.e02&irec= 1> Accessed 26 August 
2007. 
28 Hermawan, 'Malacca coast patrol to stay local', 26 August 2007. 
29 Indonesian Foreign Minister, Jawaban Menteri Luar Negeri Dalam rapat kerja dengan Komisi I 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakya (Jakarta: The Bureau of Administration, October 2004) p. 4. 
30 Valencia, 'Malacca Straits: Clash of Sovereignty?', 8 November 2004. 
31Dr Hj Sutarji, Cooperation with Japan, Australia, in the Fight Against International Terrorism: A 
Malaysia Perspective (Kuala Lumpur: University Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2008). 
32 
'Concerns over Straits of Malacca', The Jakarta Post, 9 June 2004 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 29 August 2008. 
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all three ASEAN states are signatories) stipulates that vessels in transit in a strait used 
for international navigation cannot be impeded, should these ships engage with or 
pursue pirates in the territorial waters of a littoral state, they would forfeit their right of 
innocent passage and be subject to the laws of the littoral state whose waters they were 
transiting. Thus any such pursuit technically usurps the 'host' state's law enforcement 
role. In areas under Malaysian or Indonesian jurisdiction, the possession of firearms and 
even bullets by unlicensed private citizens is a serious offense, so the use of escorts or 
'guards' in these states' territorial or archipelagic waters raises difficult questions of 
law, sovereignty and accountability.33 
As already noted, Singapore has good reasons to prefer the involvement of 
external parties in the security of the Malacca Straits. Outside involvement represents a 
guarantee that the international trade it depends upon will continue to flow through the 
Straits. As a basic policy Singapore has always welcomed cooperation and collaboration 
with other countries. Singapore acknowledges that the task is beyond the will and the 
capability of Malaysia and Indonesia, and thus feels that the responsibility for security 
in the Straits should be borne by the 'international community'. However, this position 
seemingly opens the Straits to just the type of unilateral intervention that Malaysia and 
Indonesia categorically reject. Some see Singapore's willingness to allow external 
parties including private companies of armed escort service to operate in the Straits as 
another tactics in its attempt to get Malaysia and Indonesia to allow Singapore anti-sea 
robber and anti-terrorist patrols into their waters.34 Under pressure from its neighbours 
Singapore eventually agreed 'to manage without foreign intervention' and agreed to 
joint patrols of the Straits to suppress piracy, terrorism and other threats. 
It should be noted that Thailand stayed clear of the Malacca Straits Patrol 
agreement made by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to conduct joint sea and air 
patrols until 18 September 2008 after decades of "ambivalence and recalcitrance".35 
Thailand was less enthusiastic to become involved in the Malacca Straits because it has 
no significant territorial sovereignty over the Straits. More importantly, Thai defence 
doctrine has always given top priority to the Gulf of Thailand, due its traditional 
strategic value, rich marine resources and overlapping claims.36 The Royal Thai Navy 
33 Mark J Valencia, 'Mercenaries in the Straits of Malacca', The Jakarta Post, 28 July 28, 2005 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 28 June 2008. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Kavi Chongkittavom, 'Thailand embarks on maritime security cooperation', The Nation, 6 October 
2008 <http:nationmuldtimedia.com/2008/10/06 opinion> Accessed 6 April 2009. 
36 Ibid 
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has paid attention only to surveillance of the Andaman Sea, concerned mostly with 
protection of the Thai fishing fleet and dissuading the arrival of refugees from nearby 
Burma and Bangladesh. However, the recent influx of Rohinya refugees from Burma 
landing in Thailand's eastern coastal provinces and increases in the use of maritime 
routes to support Thai insurgent groups in Southern Thailand has upgraded the strategic 
relevance of the straits to Thai government. 
The Threats, Concerns and Insecurities in the Malacca Straits 
Piracy: A Real and Significant Threat? 
The issue of piracy in the Straits is an old one, over the past decade, incidents of 
piracy in the Malacca Straits have been widely reported in the press.37 The International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB)38 also comprehensively monitors and reports incidents of 
piracy. 
Table 1: Reported Piracy Incidents 
Venues 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
for 
Attacks 
Global 202 300 469 335 370 445 329 276 239 263 
SEA 99 167 257 170 170 189 169 79 51 38 
Malacca 6 32 75 17 16 28 48 12 11 7 
Straits 
Indonesia 59 113 199 91 103 121 94 74 50 43 
Sources: 39 
Table 1 shows that during the ten year period surveyed there have never been 
less than 200 incidents per year. However it can not be concluded from this data that an 
unmitigated rise in overall piracy has occurred; instead the general trend is more 
37 J.N. Mak, Securing Piracy in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, The International maritime Bureau and 
Singapore, Draft final submitted for the Ford Foundation Programme on Non- Traditional Security 
Issue', Singapore, Sep. 2-3, 2004, p. 10. 
38 IMB is a special bureau of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), a non-profit making 
organization which was established in 1981 to monitor types of maritime crime and malpractice. Since 
1992 this organization also created IMB Piracy Reporting Centre which keeps a 24 hour watch on the 
world shipping lanes, reporting pirates attack to local law enforcement and issuing warning about piracy 
hotspots to shipping. See International Maritime Bureau, overview <http://www.icc-
ccs.org/imb/overview.php>Accessed 28 August 2008. 
39 This record has been compiled from various sources; IMB, 'Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships', 
Annual report 1 January-30 December 2003, (Kuala Lumpur: International Maritime Bureau, January 
2004), p. 5; and from various reports in The Jakarta Post. 
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nuanced. Over the last ten years, acts of piracy in Southeast Asian waters have averaged 
more than 45-55 % of the total incidents around the world. However, from 2005 to 2007 
this frequency was reduced to around 15-30% of the global total. The Malacca Straits 
seems to have a smaller percentage of incidents than Indonesia. This is partly because 
Indonesia, as the largest archipelago country in the world, has many other straits and 
waterways such as Lombok-Makassar Straits and Sunda Straits in which shipping is 
also vulnerable to acts of piracy. It is also however, related to intensified patrolling that 
will be reviewed later in this chapter. 
Indeed, incidents of piracy in Indonesian waters contributed over 60% of the 
total for the region. When world totals were at peak levels in 2000 ( 469) and 2003 
(445), Southeast Asia recorded 257 and 189 respectively, with 119 and 121 attacks in 
Indonesia making it the state with the highest record of piracy incidents in the world. 
This unfortunate record has since been surpassed by pirates operating out of Somalia. In 
terms of the general world trends, the Malacca Straits is no longer the highest risk area 
even if some users still entertain perception that cargoes passing through the area are 
under threat. During 2008, only two pirate attacks occurred in the Straits and during the 
first quarter of 2009 only one was recorded.40 In fact, piracy attacks now occur against 
0.001 % of the total volume of traffic through the Straits.41 This significantly declining 
rate can be linked to increased coordinated patrols conducted by the Malacca Strait Sea 
Patrol of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore (MALSINDO) since its creation in July 
2004. As will be documented later in the chapter, air patrols (such as the 'Eyes in the 
Sky initiative) have also contributed to the reduction of pirate attacks. 
Despite such favourable trends, ASEAN remains aware of how piracy might still 
be combined with acts of terrorism or with internal insurgencies to present an ongoing 
security threat to Southeast Asian security. Piracy activities linked to kidnappings or 
insurgencies provide a source of income, and political leverage for making political 
demands to governments. Before Indonesia struck a deal to grant broader autonomy to 
40 See 'Piracy attacks almost doubled in 2009 first quarter', ICC 21April2009, 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/iccjcfc/index.html.> Accessed 21 April 2009; and 'Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships' ICC, International Maritime Bureau Annual Report 1 January- 31December2008. 
<http://www.arc-tc.com/pages/documents/2008AnnualIMBPiracyReport.pdf> Accessed 21 April 2009. 
41 On the basis of38 attacks in the Straits in 2004 as reported by IMB against 63,636 ships traversing the 
Straits in 2004 as reported by the Malaysian Marine Department; and Richel Langit-Dursit, 'Indonesia 
key to end piracy in Malacca', The Jakarta Post, 6 August 2006 <http://old 
.thejakartapost.com/ Archives/ AtchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20060806.BO 1> Accessed 28 June 2008. The 
IMB figures only record incidents of piracy against registered cargo vessels. Incidents of piracy against 
fishermen are not included leading to accusations of bias against the IMB for reflects the interests of 
nations and companies, rather than recording all acts of piracy. 
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GAM in a peace agreement signed on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, for example, there 
were suspicions that this separatist group was responsible for planning and carrying out 
several maritime attacks.42 Noel Choong, head of the IMB's piracy reporting centre in 
Kuala Lumpur, believed that rebels linked to Indonesia's Aceh separatist movement had 
also been involved in ransoming crews to fund arms purchases.43 There have, moreover, 
been numerous complaints from fishermen, businessmen and ship owners who had been 
subject to extortion by armed groups in the seas offNanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) 
province. On one occasion pirates armed with M16 rifles hijacked a fishing trawler and 
took the skipper and crew to Aceh as hostages.44 The motivation for such attacks goes 
beyond simple criminal activity and has transformed the purpose of piracy to funding 
politically inspired groups who aim to challenge the authority of the Indonesian 
Government. 
Current international security concerns over terrorism have added new anxieties 
about piracy in the Malacca Straits. In particular, following 9111, there has been 
apprehension that similar high profile attacks could be made against international 
shipping. The Bali bombing in October 2002 raised concerns throughout the region that 
Southeast Asia was in particular on the front lines of international terrorism. After the 
October 2000 suicide-boat attack on the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) 
in Aden, fears were raised that a terrorist attacks against other U.S. Navy warships 
might be mounted in an important SLOC and oil transit 'chokepoints' such as the 
Malacca Straits with the aim of creating dire economic consequences via a disruption of 
the shipping lanes. Referring to these trends in modem piracy, Washington cautioned 
that " ... the area could be used by terrorists to attack and severely disrupt international 
trade."45 Similarly, as reported by the Jakarta Post, "The US believes international 
terrorist group al-Qaeda and its regional network Jamaah Jslamiyah (JI) plan to target 
the Straits, where chemical and oil tankers mingle with small craft that could be 
42 Apriadi Gunawan, 'Official blames GAM for piracy, request more funding', The Jakarta Post, 13 
January 2003, p. 5. 
43 Goh Chin Lian, 'Shippers want better policing of straits', The Straits Times, 10 May 2004 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 29 August 2008. For similar account see Alan 
Boyd, 'Piracy: Terror on the High Seas', Asia Times.com., 21August2002. 
<http://www.atimes/Asian_Economy/DH21Dk01.html.> Accessed 10 May 2005. 
44 K.C. Vijayan, 'Malacca Straits 'still most dangerous', 7 February 2005, The Straits Times, 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 29 August 2008. 
45 Jakarta, KL, S'pore navies to coordinate Malacca patrol', The Jakarta Post, 20 July 2004 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 28 June 2008. 
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equipped to carry out suicide bomb attacks."46 In addition, the attacks on the French 
tanker Limburg in 2002 and on the Basra oil terminal in April 2004 demonstrated that 
maritime targets continue to be at risk from various terrorist attacks. 
In Southeast Asia a number of incidents both before and after September 2001 
demonstrated the capacity of indigenous groups involved in politically motivated 
criminal activities to engage in acts of piracy and terror. Since 2000, al-Qaeda, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the 
Kumpulan Militant Malaysia(KMM), the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and Laskar 
Jihad have all been suspected of planning or executing maritime attacks. These groups 
have also used the sea to transport weapons, move forces, and raise funds. 47 In February 
2000, the bombing of the Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix by Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) killed forty people and wounded another fifty. There were also 
the high-profile kidnappings of Western tourists carried out by the ASG from resorts on 
Sipadan, Malaysia in March 2000 and Palawan, the Philippines in May 2001. Philippine 
officials have also confirmed ASG claims of responsibility for the 26 February 2004 
sinking of Superferry 14 near Manila, in which 116 people were killed. 
Al Qaeda and its close regional allies JI and the KMM have demonstrated their 
intent to conduct large-scale operations against the U.S. Navy and global trade. There 
has been increasing concern that al-Qaeda or its affiliates might use a merchant vessel to 
administer a cataclysmic attack - perhaps a nuclear bomb, a radiological 'dirty nuke', or 
some other weapon of mass destruction - by smuggling the weapon in a shipping 
container. A large petroleum, liquefied gas or chemical carrier could be hijacked for use 
as a gigantic bomb to be crashed into a port facility or population centre, or just sunk in 
a key waterway. Any of these scenarios could cause unprecedented loss of life and 
substantial economic disruption. 48 While no such incidents have yet occurred in the 
Malacca Straits, the examples listed above establish that several Southeast Asian 
guerrilla and terrorist groups possess substantial capabilities for operations in the 
maritime environment. It should be noted, however, that significant counter-measures to 
avoid such contingencies have been introduced and will be covered later in the chapter. 
Despite such progress, ASEAN states remains vigilant against future adverse 
developments. Singapore is the most active among the littoral states in articulating the 
46 Tianna Siboro, 'U.S. Troops Unnecessary: Navy Chief, The Jakarta Post, 18 June 2004 
<http://old.thejakartapost.com> Accessed 28 June 2008. 
47 Bradford, 'The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security', p.70. 
48 Michael Richardson, Maritime-Related Terrorism in Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004 ), p. 49-72. 
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link between piracy and terrorism. Singaporean intelligence services claimed to have 
disrupted a plot against several international targets, including American warships 
transiting to the island-state. They argue that terrorists are very close to conducting an 
operation in the Malacca Straits and point to the March 2003 hijacking of the chemical 
tanker Dewi Madrirn, during which pirates wielding assault rifles and VHF radios 
disabled the ships radio and took over helm for about half an hour before kidnapping the 
captain and first officer for ransom. What looked like just another act of piracy may in 
fact have been - according Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, Tony Tan - a training 
run for a future terrorist mission.49 Mr Tan has suggested that the link between piracy 
and terrorism might be entering a new phase: 
The perpetrators are well-trained, have well laid-out plans and have 
sophisticated weapons. Therefore the threat of commercial vessel or cruise 
liner being hijacked and used as floating bomb against Singapore is a very 
serious one. 50 
Any terrorist scenario that involved either: (1) an attack on an individual ship; 
(2) the hijacking of a ship carrying dangerous materials; and (3) the use of ship as a 
weapon to attack port or land facilities is of concern to Singapore. 51 Adding to its fears 
is the volume of traffic that flows through the Malacca Straits and the geography of the 
Strait which, moving from north to south, resembles a funnel. At some points the 
waterway is no more than 20m to 2m deep. A typical bulk oil tanker is 340m long and 
projects 20m below its waterline. Sinking a vessel at a strategic point could severely 
disrupt international and regional trade in the Straits, leading to substantially higher 
freight and insurance charges, a reduction in tourism and disruption of local industries 
such as fishing. 52 These fears are greatly augmented due to the high number of vessels 
that transport a range of hazardous materials through the Straits that might be hijacked 
and employed by terrorists to attack ports or other important facilities. 53 
Perceptions that such threats are imminent have already had financial 
repercussions on trade passing through the Straits. The IMB' s reporting of increasing 
piracy in the Malacca Straits between 2002 and 2004 and the additional fear of terrorism 
49 Bradford, 'The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security', p. 72. 
50 Reme Ahmad, 'Rise in S-E Asian piracy fuels terror attack fears', The Straits Times, 8 May 2004, 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 29 August 2008. 
51 See 'Melaka Straits must be kept safe from maritime terrorism, says IGP', Bernama Daily Malaysian 
News, 12 June 2007 <http://global.factiva.som/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 29 August 2008. 
52 Lian, 'Shippers want better policing of straits', 10 May 2004. 
53 
'Fewer cases of piracy attacks in Malacca Straits', The Jakarta Post, 13 June 2007 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx> Accessed 28 June 2008. 
216 
resulted in increased insurance rates for ships using the Straits. During that period, 
insurance rates for tankers traveling through the Straits were unchanged, but insurance 
companies did place a 'war-risk' designation on Indonesian ports (meaning that ships 
docking at those ports must get underwriters' specific approval before making landfall). 
Then, in July 2005, the Lloyd's Market Association's Joint War Committee (JWC), 
deemed that the threat to security of shipping in the Straits was great enough to 
designate the Malacca Strait as "one of the world's most dangerous waterways" putting 
it in the same category as the waters around nations such as Somalia, Iraq and 
Lebanon.54 In an August 2005 joint communique, the foreign ministers of Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia called on the JWC to "review its risk assessment." The 
ministers expressed their regret that the decision was taken without consultation and 
failed to take into account their existing efforts to deal with the threats to safety and 
security in the Straits. The Federation of ASEAN Shipowners' Association (FASA) 
described the decision as 'misguided' and similar protests were registered by other 
shipping industry associations in the region. These protests have been unsuccessful and 
the JWC maintains that it has done no more than publish a list of areas considered at 
high risk of war or war-related perils on the basis of advice received from its 
consultants. It has also denied asking insurers to charge higher war risk premiums for 
ships transiting the Malacca Straits. The Committee says that it is entirely up to 
individual insurer make its evaluations, however, given the weight the Committee's 
assessment carries, insurers are likely to take advantage of the JWC's categorization to 
raise insurance premiums for vessels using the Straits. 
The JWC's decision has been of most concern to Singapore and Malaysia. Not 
surprisingly, both countries considered the classification unjustified and an exaggeration 
of actual situation. Malaysia Transport Minister, Chan Kong Choy, said that the JWC's 
decision: 
... will make the handling of the containers ... at the ports ... more 
expensive. That directly will make our ports less competitive so all this 
will have a negative impact, a chain effect on economy. 55 
These concerns prompted the littoral states to make greater efforts to ensure the 
security of the Straits in the form of intensifying coordinated patrols in the Malacca 
Strait, expanding military exercises and increasing information sharing (see the 
54 See 'Malaysia says Lloyd's, 8 January 2006 and 'Malacca Strait stays on high-risk list', Jakarta Post, 
21Jan2006. 
55 Ibid 
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coverage of bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation offered later in this 
chapter).56 As a result of these efforts, by August 2006 the London based insurer Lloyds 
removed the Straits of Malacca from its list of dangerous waterways, opening the way 
for a reduction in insurance premium and providing tangible economic benefits to the 
region. The improved security along the straits had also helped Malaysia promote ports 
like Port Klang, Penang Port and the port of Tanjung Pelepas.57 
Since no high profile maritime terrorist incident has occurred in the Malacca 
Straits, the link between piracy and terrorism has been described by regional maritime 
security experts as a 'low probability, high impact scenario.' 58 A study by the RAND 
Corporation, moreover, shows that there is no evidence to support fears of a nexus 
between extremist politically motivated groups and pirates.59 However, despite the sharp 
reduction in piracy and the absence of a terrorist attack on ships sailing through the 
Straits, there remains the impression that this prime passage is unsafe for vessels. 60 
While piracy in Southeast Asia has been recognized as a complex issue, it is now a 
relatively minor one in the overall security of the Malacca Straits. Other issues such as 
territorial disputes, illegal fishing, smuggling and environment damage have assumed a 
greater importance in recent years, and constitute more tangible reasons for ASEAN 
states to work together in stabilizing this littoral. 61 
Illegal Immigration and Smuggling 
Many vessels using the Straits have been identified as carrymg illegal 
immigrants from countries such as Indonesia to work in Malaysia. Batam in Indonesia is 
an important transit point for destinations in Malaysia such as Melaka and Johor. The 
whole island of Sumatra, which forms the western boundary of the Straits is another 
transit point for illegal immigration which is of great concern to the Malaysian 
authorities. In early February 2001, for example, a Malaysian navy patrol boat opened 
fire on an Indonesian trawler suspected of smuggling illegal immigrants. The incident 
56 
'Cooperation made Malacca Strait Safe: Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister', Peoples Daily Online, 3 
September 2007 <http://english.peopledaily.com> Accessed 14 February 2006. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Bateman Sam, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, 'Safety and Security in the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits', IDSS Commentaries, 29 May 2006. 
<http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/Perspective/IDSS0412006.pdt> Access 23 June 2008. 
59 
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occurred as the Indonesian boat entered Malaysian waters near the resort island of 
Langkawi, off Malaysia's West Coast.62 In February 2002 nine GAM rebels were caught 
trying to smuggle 139 Acehnese into Malaysia.63 More recently, in July 2008 Selangor 
Marine Police captured 19 Indonesian illegal immigrants concealed in a secret 
compartment on a boat near Port Klang. 64 As these reports illustrate, people smuggling 
is a common phenomenon in the Straits and one that has often created conflict between 
the littoral states, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia. High numbers of illegal 
immigrants are a threat to the sovereign authority of the target country, as well as posing 
significant economic, social and regulatory problems. When the issue flairs in the media 
following a high profile interception or a round of expulsions it also creates problems at 
the government level, with both Indonesia and Malaysian blaming each other for the 
problem in order to deflect public criticism over the poor enforcement of immigration 
laws. As these examples of transnational crimes demonstrate, the need for cooperation 
between the member-states was urgent. However, in order for that cooperation to be 
more effective, especially in terms of successful security community building, the 
ASEAN member-states still need to address some outstanding issues including lingering 
political sensitivities, differences in the capacities of security forces and a range of legal 
and bureaucratic problems that impede cooperation. 
The smuggling of arms and the trade in illegal timber are also rampant in the 
Straits. A number of ASEAN member-states have problems with ethnically or religious 
based separatist movements, such as in Maluku in Indonesia, Patani in South Thailand, 
the Karen in Myanmar and the MILF and ASG in Philippines. These rebel groups have 
used the Straits for transporting arms shipments. The demand for small arms in the 
region is not limited to separatist movements; criminal organizations and other similar 
groups also create a ready market for illegal weapons. The availability of weapons has 
also been blamed for exacerbating ethnic, religious and separatist conflict. 65 In 
Indonesia it is believed that inter-religious conflict in the Maluku Islands has been 
aggravated by arms smuggled into the area via the seas. 
62 
'Malaysian navy fires on trawler', BBC, News, 4 February 2001 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/l 152564.stm> Accessed 30 July 2008 
63 Apriadi Gunawan, 'Navy battles crime Medan', The Jakarta Post, 14 February 2002 
<http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx.> Accessed> 30 July 2008. 
64 Dharmende Singh, 'Marine police nab 19 illegals', The Star, 25 July 2008 
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Illegal logging is another issue that has caused problems between Indonesia and 
Malaysia and reflects the growing problem of transnational environmental crime as a 
dimension of regional security in Southeast Asia. This particular activity has been 
linked to criminal gangs and also as a source of funds for ethnic separatist minorities. 
Illegal logging takes place on the Indonesia/Malaysia border on the island of 
Kalimantan and in the Straits of Malacca between Sumatra and Malaysia. Malaysia has 
a shortage of wood for its manufacturing industries and buys much of its requirements 
from Indonesia. However, the country's demand for timber has also given Malaysia a 
reputation for involvement in the international trade in illegal timber. There are also 
suggestions Malaysia condones smuggling of logs from Indonesia, which causes further 
problems between the two A SEAN neighbours. 66 
Illegal Fishing and Sand mining 
Illegal fishing and sand mining are two particularly important resource issues 
that have become the basis for security problems within the Straits. Illegal fishing has 
become a concern because it results in conflict between resident and foreign fishermen 
(a sovereignty issue) and has an impact on the local economies of the areas around the 
Straits. In Belawan, on the island of Sumatra, the local fishermen have had to compete 
with trawlers that come all the way from Thailand to illegally fish in the area. The 
foreign fishermen have been blamed for the destruction of coral reefs and the once rich 
fishing grounds around Belawan now yield few fish. Accordingly, local fishermen have 
been forced to seek other means of earning a livelihood.67 The Indonesian Navy has 
frequently captured Thai and Malaysian vessels found fishing in the province's waters. 
In June 2001, for example, an Indonesian warship, KEI Teuku Umar-385 opened fired 
on a Malaysian trawler while conducting a sea patrol code-named 'RENCONG LAUT 
2001' in the Malacca Straits.68 Indonesian fishermen illegally fishing in Malaysian 
territorial waters have also frequently been apprehended by the Malaysian Navy. 
Illegal sand mining in the Straits has centred on Indonesia's Riau Province. This 
illicit trade has sprung up to provide resources for Singapore's construction sector and 
its coastal reclamation project, which require an estimated 1.5 to 2 billion cubic meters 
66 See Tod Taylor, 'Timber Mafia', ABC.News ,30 June 2002 
<http://www.abc.net.au/4comers/content/2002/timber _mafia/interviews/interviews_ taylor .htm> 
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of sand every year. An estimated 60 percent of the trade of sand between the two 
nations is thought to move through illegal operations involving well-connected players 
at both ends. Indonesia has accused Singapore of conducting its reclamation project 
through the illegal sand mining. Mary Pangestu, the Indonesian Minister of Trade 
finally banned her country's sand exports to Singapore in February 2003. Indonesia was 
worried that continued exports would endanger the environment. Marine ecosystems 
and habitats have been irreparably damaged by uncontrolled sand extraction. The island 
of Nipah, on the maritime border between the two nations only 20 km from Singapore, 
is now almost submerged due to sand mining. A group of tiny islets in the province of 
Riau, located in the Straits, have actually disappeared sparking Jakarta's concern that 
more of its territory might vanish into Singapore's construction and reclamation 
projects. The problem of reclamation and encroachment also has an impact on the issue 
of sovereignty in the Straits, as the many islets mark the international boundary between 
the two countries in those waters. In June 2006, Freedy Numberi, the Indonesian 
Minister for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, reiterated that Singapore's reclamation of 
its coasts could confuse the demarcation of the common border between the two 
nations.69 
Supporting Factors for Piracy, Smuggling and Other Illegal Activities 
A range of geographic, economic and political factors combine to make the 
Straits of Malacca almost irresistible to pirates and other criminals. The following 
section will briefly examine each of these factors in tum, in addition to discussing other, 
inter-related factors that exacerbate the security problems in the Straits. 
Geographic Factors 
As previously noted, the geography of the Malacca Straits, with its narrow 
channels, shallow reefs and thousands of tiny islands, concentrates commercial shipping 
into constricted sea lanes that make merchant vessels vulnerable to attacks by pirates 
and other criminal gangs. The maze of tidal inlets, estuaries and islands that line the 
Straits provide a haven for pirates to hide in and the small crews on international cargo 
ships make them highly vulnerable to attack.70 In addition, the high volume of traffic 
69 
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through the Straits, and the concomitant environmental concerns about collisions and 
oils spills, combine to make navigational safety a serious security issue. 
Poverty and Economic Grievances 
Contributing to the problem of piracy is the poverty and economic problems of 
the coastal areas contiguous with the Straits. 71 In Indonesia many people in the 
provinces bordering the Straits tum to crime because they are unable to find a legitimate 
job. For many local Malay Celates and members of other indigenous communities 
piracy has traditionally been seen as a viable alternative to the hard and dreary life of a 
fisherman or smallholder and a passport to adventure, riches and prestige, rather than as 
a criminal occupation. 72 
Weak National Law Enforcement Capacity 
For many commentators, Indonesia is seen as the key to maintaining security in 
the Straits. Protecting this specific littoral in addition to those other maritime passages 
within its overall sovereign jurisdiction, however, would require many more naval 
vessels than it currently possesses. At present the strength of the Indonesia's navy is 117 
vessels comprising 14 warships, 57 patrol boats and 44 support vessels. Only 30 percent 
of the ships, however, are seaworthy.73 This very limited capability is not sufficient to 
secure its territorial waters. The inability to curb crimes sufficiently in the Straits can be 
ascribed at least partially to such limited resources and equipment shortages. The 
Indonesian Navy's admits that the Navy is running short of patrol craft and lacks 
equipment such as radar and modem weapons. 74 At least 10 to 15 patrol boats, together 
with an adequate number of trained personnel, are required to monitor the traffic in the 
Straits. These equipment shortages have been aggravated in recent times by the need to 
dedicate vessels to other, more urgent, tasks (including piracy that remains a problem in 
other parts of Indonesia). For example, several patrol boats stationed around the Riau 
Quarterly 30, 4, 2002, pp.441-455 and Freeman, 'The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet?', p. 
174. 
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Archipelago and assigned to patrol the Straits were instead deployed to the restive 
Indonesian province of Aceh. 75 
Corruption in the Indonesian Navy and accusations of complicity in piracy by 
some of its members is another factor that weakens Indonesia's patrolling capacity. 
Sometimes the Indonesian authorities are also blamed for turning a blind eye towards 
piracy or, more seriously, for complicity in illegal activities. Some maritime experts 
have pointed to the involvement of rogue elements in the Indonesian law enforcement 
agencies, including the Indonesian Navy, in acts of piracy. 76 
Indonesia's lack of capacity to maintain security in the Malacca Straits has been 
recognised as a national priority. The 1957 Declaration on territorial unity, along with 
the UN Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 ceded to Indonesia international recognition 
as an archipelagic state for the "the rights over its continental shelf and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ)." However, while successive Indonesian governments 
recognized their national interest in maritime issues, until recently they were unable to 
formulate an adequate response to the problem.77 In 2002, the House of Representative 
(DPR) passed a law No 3/2002 on National Defence, Article 3 of which states, "defence 
policy has to consider the geographical reality that Indonesia is an archipelagic state." 
Despite this law, the strategic thinking of the New Order era still remains a strong 
influence on the culture and mentality of senior Indonesian military officers and the 
development of a defence policy that gives more attention to the navy and air force 
faces resistance from the army, whose officers maintain that the major threats to 
national security are still internal ones. 78 
Another aspect of Indonesia's lack of capacity is the absence of an entity within 
its legal system that can support enhanced maritime security. For example, Indonesia 
does not have a court to deal with maritime problems. The Public Courts are not able to 
deal adequately with maritime disputes, with only 28% of cases, from total of 958 cases 
having come before the courts.79This undermines the country's ability to cooperate 
75
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systematically with its neighbouring state in coordinating common legal norms for 
Straits administration and dispute resolution. 
Other Concerns and Disputes 
Environment Concerns 
The environmental conditions in the coastal areas adjoining the Straits are 
important to the ASEAN littoral states because they support a wide range of economic 
activities. One of the examples is overfishing where the potential fishery is about 276, 
000 ton/year. However the fishery production reached 390,000 ton/year. An exploitation 
rate already above 100% or beyond the MSY (Maximum Sustainable Yield).80 Apart 
from overfishing, these areas have also been subjected to pollution which has caused 
damage to coastal habitats, including mangroves and coral reefs. 81 Ships also often 
dump waste or void their bilges in the Straits causing harm to fish, sea birds and the 
livelihood of fishermen and those involved in the tourist industry and based on 
precedents documented below, fear of collision, causing a massive oil spillage remains 
high. 
For Indonesia a general concern is damage to its coral reefs. A report by the 
Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project (CRREMAP) indicates that only 6.5 
percent of Indonesia's coral reefs are in good condition, with 28.4 percent listed as 
damaged and 42.5 percent as heavily damaged. The worst damage is on reefs in the 
western areas of Indonesia, around the Malacca Straits. Reefs in the Riau Islands have 
borne the brunt of environmental damage as a result of their proximity to the busy 
shipping lanes. The area has in the past suffered from large oils spills in the Straits, with 
one of the biggest accidents involving the tanker Showa Maru, which released one 
million barrels of diesel fuel into the ocean in 1975. In the same year another spill was 
caused by the collision of the tanker Jsugawa Maru and the tanker Silver Palace spilling 
more oil. 82 As these and other similar incidents have demonstrated, threats to the 
environment in the Straits are a trans-boundary issue and affect all of the littoral states. 
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Some cooperation in this area has been introduced, such as the designation of routing 
and traffic separation schemes and vessel traffic system. 83 
Disputes Over Territory and Maritime Rights 
Unsettled territorial claims and maritime boundary disputes between the three 
littoral states have serious potential to create tension between them and make 
cooperation difficult.. In the past, however, Indonesia and Malaysia have shown that it 
is possible for them to settle some of these issues. In Octo her 1969, for example, they 
reached agreement on the delimitation of their continental shelves and in March of the 
following year they signed a treaty relating to the delimitation of the territorial seas. 
Initially, Malaysia only claimed maritime limit of 3 nautical miles. This limit was 
extended to 12 nautical miles by an Emergency (Territorial Waters) Ordinance in 1969. 
With Indonesia already claiming a 12 nautical mile limit under UNCLOs, it was 
necessary for the two states to employ a median line principle to divide Malaysian and 
Indonesian waters in the Straits equitably. 84 Similarly, the boundary between Singapore 
and Malaysia was settled by agreement in August 1995. 
However, outside the border defined by this agreement, there is still no formal 
agreement between them to delimit their common borders, which are the subject of 
several overlapping claims. Indonesia and Singapore concluded a territorial sea 
delimitation treaty in May 1973, defining six boundary line turning points. Indonesia 
ratified the treaty in December 1973 and Singapore in August of the following year. 
Despite this treaty, it is worth noting that the two states have not been able to agree on 
all the boundaries that require delimitation. In 2005, negotiations were initiated to 
finalise the 1973 maritime boundary treaty, but these discussions have yet to produce an 
agreement. 85 In addition, while both countries have an existing agreement on marine 
territory, they have yet to settle on such questions as their respective continental 
coastlines, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and their boundary in the western part of 
the Singapore Strait. 
The Singapore Strait is a particular area of contention because there are areas 
within the Strait, near the tri-junctions, that have not been subject to demarcation, either 
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bilaterally, with Indonesia or Malaysia, or trilaterally with both countries. There remain 
problems due to the intersection of their territorial 12 nautical mile limits, as well as 
their contiguous zone 24 nautical mile limits in the Strait of Singapore. 86 In the case of 
Indonesia and Singapore, it is almost impossible for the former country to claim its full 
entitlement to internationally recognised maritime zones without infringing upon latter's 
entitlements, and vice versa. For example, the southern most point of the territorial 
boundary between Indonesia and Malaysia and the western most point of the boundary 
between Indonesia and Singapore remain matters for negotiation between the countries 
concerned.87 Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia have yet to conclude an agreement 
covering the northern end of the Malacca Straits. 
These border disputes create difficulties with the implementation of law 
enforcement in the contested areas. As one Indonesia Defence official has noted: 
We can not easily allege that a particular foreign vessel is involved in 
illegal fishing or other crimes in our waters because there are no clear 
borders and this has prevented law enforcers at sea from carrying out their 
duties effectively.88 
The Indonesian Navy has caught Malaysian trawlers fishing in Indonesian 
territorial waters, but the Malaysian fishermen have countered Indonesian accusations 
and maintained that they were in their own territorial waters. 89 This particular case 
became difficult when a Malaysian naval vessel and helicopter prevented the Indonesian 
marine police from detaining the three Malaysian trawlers. While senior officials in 
both countries try to play down such incidents, due to the lack of a clear border they are 
a relatively common occurrence and have the potential to escalate into serious disputes. 
The most pressing contemporary territorial related issue between the three 
littoral states relates to the loss of land in areas along the Straits through erosion and 
environmental degradation. Nipah Island at the southern end of the Straits has served as 
reference point marking Indonesia's maritime borders with Singapore and Malaysia. 
However, as a result of illegal sand mining to provide raw material to Singapore for 
reclamation and building, Nipah Island has experienced numerous environmental 
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problems, including the sinking of the island to the point where only five percent of it is 
now above sea level. 90 There are also the legitimate concerns of lost revenue as result of 
the illegal sand trade and costs for rehabilitation to the damaged areas.91 With some 
parts of the Indonesian-Singapore maritime border still in dispute, illegal sand mining 
has the potential to destroy the basis for some of Indonesia's territorial claims. As a 
result of its problems with Nipah Island, Indonesia is seeking to define its border with 
Singapore, particularly as the land area of the latter continues to grow through 
reclamation projects that encourage illegal sand mining. Due to such concerns, as 
previously noted, Indonesia imposed a total ban on sand mining in January 2003. In 
February 2007, the Indonesian government was still reluctant to lift the band, but illegal 
sand mining remained rampant in the area as a result of collaboration between 
Singaporean businessman and corrupt Indonesian officials and security personnel who 
have allegedly protected the illegal mining. 92 
In the past, the three countries have been able to settle some of their disputes 
over territory in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, while such instances 
might be interpreted as demonstrating the potential for building a security community in 
ASEAN because all three nations have cooperated to resolve issues for the common 
good, this is not necessarily the case. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia sought to 
resolve their tensions over Sipadan and Ligitan islands through mediation by the ICJ. 
The result of the mediation was that the court decided in favour of Malaysia's position 
and Indonesia consequently lost its authority over the two islands. For Indonesia, this 
experience with ICJ was an embarrassing and painful one. The strength of nationalism 
in Indonesia has ensured that the disappointment of losing Sipadan and Ligitan means it 
is unlikely that it will agree to refer the case of Ambalat, another island whose 
ownership is disputed with Malaysia, to the ICJ. Ambalat has since become the subject 
of confrontation between the navies of both nations, indicating that the resolution of this 
issue has potential for further conflict between the two states. 
Resort to international institutions and conventions cannot resolve every issue. 
Singapore and Malaysia settled a 28 year dispute over the sovereignty of Pu/au Batu 
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Puteh or Pedra Branca after the ICJ ruled in favour of Singapore. In a ruling delivered 
on 23 May 2008, Middle Rock was awarded to Malaysia, which created new territorial 
conflict. In July 2008, Singapore claimed territorial waters and an Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) around Pedra Branca. This claim, which was seen by Malaysia and 
Indonesia as a threat to their sovereignty, was in contravention of the UNCLOS, to 
which Singapore is a signatory. Malaysian Foreign Minister Rais Yatim cautioned 
Singapore that its claims were unacceptable and unreasonable, and contradicted the 
principles of international law. He described Singapore's actions as "very regrettable."93 
Rais Y atim also reportedly told to Malaysia's Parliament that Malaysia gave a note to 
Singapore on the sidelines of an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting pointing out that it's 
claim was against the spirit of ASEAN and the legal structure.94 The Director General of 
the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Datuk Cheah Kong Wai, further argued that, 
"Singapore's claims were contrary to the spirit of the agreement and could be seen as 
undermining the work of the committee."95 
The problem arises from the fact that it is almost impossible for Singapore to 
claim an EEZ and even the full 12 nautical mile limit for territorial waters because these 
claims infringe on Malaysia's and Indonesia's international boundaries. Middle Rock is 
only one nautical mile from Pedra Branca, which itself is only 7. 7 nautical miles from 
Tanjung Penyusup in Malaysian territory, while to the South, just 7.6 miles away, is 
Tanjung Sading in Indonesian territory. Similarly, Malaysia and Singapore have. a 
dispute over Pulau Pisang, which is unlikely to be resolved by either negotiations or the 
involvement of the ICJ as Malaysia, like Indonesia, does not relish the possibility that it 
could lose sovereignty to the islands it claims. As a result of strong criticism levied 
against Singapore's positions on territorial disputes emanating from Malaysia and 
Indonesia, the Singapore government confirmed that " ... should the limits of our 
territorial sea or Exclusive Economic Zone overlap with the claims of neighbouring 
countries, Singapore will negotiate with those countries with a view to arriving at 
agreed delimitations in accordance with international law."96 The case of Singapore's 
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sovereign claim of Pedra Branca is a major example of how bilateral issues test relations 
between ASEAN neighbours, notwithstanding their efforts to solve the problem through 
adjusting their principles of state sovereignty 
Such ongoing territorial disputes have a considerable impact on increased 
cooperation for the maritime security of the Straits. With the ICJ now an increasingly 
improbable option, there remain few other avenues for mediation between the claimants 
because the ASEAN High Court was never been convened to tackle the sensitive issue 
of territorial disputes. In the short term, the prospects for resolving these disputes are 
not high. Under these circumstances, the threat of a conflict escalating from a minor 
naval encounter between the claimant states cannot be completely discounted. Given the 
proximity of these disputed areas to the busy international sea lanes of the Straits, even 
a minor clash would have very serious political, diplomatic and economic implications. 
External Intervention: Challenges to State Sovereignty 
The issue of intervention by external actors presents the ASEAN littoral states, 
in particular Indonesia and Malaysia, with challenges to their national sovereignty that 
are very different from the threats posed by piracy or other illegal actions that occur in 
the Straits. While illegal activities can have political implications, their main effects are 
frequently either economic or environmental. External intervention by other nations 
presents a direct political challenge to states still working to escape the legacies of 
colonialism. 
An example of the impact that an external actors can have on the security of the 
Straits is the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) proposed by the United 
States following the terrorist attacks of September 2001. This initiative was one of 
several U.S. proposals aimed at making the seas safer following the 9/11 attacks. In 
essence, RMSI was devised to address concerns that terrorists and other criminals could 
operate in unsecured seas in the Asia-Pacific region and launch costly attacks against 
shipping. The international media widely reported that Admiral Thomas Fargo, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command, had testified before Congress that 
U.S. Special Forces and Marines would be deployed under RMSI to safeguard the 
Straits of Malacca. Fargo's statement prompted immediate objections from Indonesia 
and Malaysia, whose officials strongly asserted their right to control the waterway. In 
the view of Indonesia and Malaysia, deploying foreign forces to the Straits, which is 
part of their territorial waters and EEZs, would infringe upon their sovereign rights and 
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internationalise the Straits.97 Both of these ASEAN members-states strongly rejected 
any plan by the United States to deploy forces for countering potential terrorist attacks, 
conducting joint patrols, or escorting vessels passing through the Strait, as violations of 
their national sovereignty. 
Indonesia's interpretation of the initiative was that it infringed the international 
laws governing state sovereignty. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Hasan Wirayuda, told 
the Indonesian legislature on 16 September 2004: 
Concerns over security in the Malacca Straits. . .. should not become the 
justification for external intervention ... [the matter is] related to national 
sovereignty, which should be respected and not eradicated.98 
In a similar manner, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Najib Tun Razak, 
said that control of the Straits was the sovereign prerogative of Malaysia and Indonesia 
and US military involvement was not welcome: 
In principle, ensuring the security of the Straits of Malacca is the 
responsibility of Malaysia and Indonesia and for the present we do not to 
invite the United States to join the security operations we have mounted 
there .... Even if they wished to act, they should get our permission, as this 
touches on the question of our national sovereignty."99 
These very public rejections of the proposal put the United States on the 
diplomatic defensive. Its embassies in Malaysia and Indonesia claimed that Fargo had 
been "mischaracterized" when he was quoted as saying that Marines or Special Forces 
would be deployed in the Straits of Malacca. The statement released by the embassies 
said that the Admiral did not mention this plan to a US Congressional Committee on 
maritime security in the region. 100 Admiral Fargo himself visited the Malaysian capital 
twice to clarify the newspaper reports. Despite these actions, there remained a strong 
belief that the US would deploy forces in the Straits if it felt the need to do so, leaving 
both Indonesia and Malaysia with the perception that the United States had announced 
its intention to violate their sovereignty. 
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Admiral Fargo's testimony on the RMSI to the U.S. House of Representatives in 
March 2004 did indeed not explicitly mention the deployment of U.S. troops to the 
Malacca Straits. However, it did touch on the subject of security in Southeast Asia's 
littoral regions, which both Indonesia and Malaysia perceived as a challenge to their 
sovereignty. Fargo told the House that the "ungoverned littoral regions of Southeast 
Asia are fertile ground for exploitation by transnational threats like Weapon Mass 
Destruction (WMD) proliferation, terrorism, trafficking in human drugs, and piracy."101 
While this statement may have accurately reflected the potential threats in the region, 
his use of the term 'ungoverned' was provocative and even insulting to the governments 
of Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia, in particular, was sensitive to any inference of 
instability or that it was unable to govern its territory. Further increasing tensions was 
Fargo's observation that US forces were ready to "take action when the decision has 
been made to do so."102 The unilateral US intervention in Afghanistan (and later Iraq) 
was widely interpreted by large sections of the Malaysian and Indonesian populations as 
undermining Islamic states. Under these circumstances, the Admiral's speculation 
further heightened sensitivities as both nations, with their majority Muslim populations, 
needed to consider the possibility of a backlash from radical elements if they were seen 
to be cooperating with the United States. 103 The prospect of either nation cooperating 
with the US to ensure the security of the Straits was thus rendered less likely for reasons 
of national prestige and a range of domestic political considerations. 104 
Responsibility and Burden Sharing 
The question of who should pay for the safety and security of the Malacca 
Straits has also been an important one for the ASEAN littoral states. There is a 
perception that users should pay, or at least significantly contribute to the maintenance 
of security and maritime safety in the waterway. At present, however, the cost is borne 
by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, something which causes friction among the 
littoral states and user states, as well a being a source of tension among the ASEAN 
states themselves. Malaysia and Indonesia feel that Singapore, as the largest and busiest 
port in the world, benefits most from the trade that flows through the Straits. Malaysia 
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has the longest coastline fronting the Straits and bears the greatest cost of keeping the 
waterway safe from such incidents as oil spills, collisions or acts of terrorism. 105 
Between 1984 and 1997, Malaysia paid US$1 billion for the development of maritime 
infrastructure in the Straits (buoys, lighthouses, oil-spill equipment and Vessel Traffic 
System Radar, etc). Maintenance costs added another US$1 billion, hydro graphic 
survey another US$70 million, while the cost of cleaning up more than 30 oil spills in 
its territorial waters was US$34 million. These costs do not include compensation for 
loss of income, equipment and stocks to fishermen and aquaculture farms affected by 
pollution. In addition, since the late 1990s, Malaysia has spent more than US$50 million 
to install and maintain a range of navigational and security-related facilities in the 
Straits. 106 
Singapore and Indonesia also bear considerable financial burdens to fund 
infrastructure in the Straits. With the Indonesian economy only recovering slowly from 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the cost of contributing to the maritime security and 
safety of the Straits has imposed a considerable fiscal burden. Even the fuel required for 
security patrols in the waterway has been a problem for Indonesia, which enjoys very 
few commercial benefits from these outlays. Former Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Dr. 
Mahathir Mohammed, observed that "while foreign countries consider the Straits of 
Malacca as an international waterway they are unwilling to meet the cost of keeping it 
safe and free from pollution."107 He also said that Malaysia and Indonesia should not be 
the only countries to care for the security of the Straits and questioned whether it was 
fair that these two states be burdened with overseeing shipping and dealing with 
pollution in the waterway when the main beneficiaries were international shipping 
companies. The costs of initiatives such as MALSINDO and EiS (see below), which 
meet international obligations and user-states' requirements within the waterway are 
constantly increasing, with Indonesia and Malaysia carrying the bulk of the financial 
burden. 108 As one Malaysian newspaper has commented: 
Malaysia and Indonesia are not entitled to collect any fees for passage 
through the Straits. But both countries have to maintain costly equipment 
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and men to deal with pollution of the Straits as well as piracy and 
maintenance of navigational aids. 109 
With the notable exception of Japan, no user state, shipping line or international 
organization has answered the call of the littoral states for voluntary contributions to the 
maintenance of safety and pollution control in the Straits. Japan has made regular and 
significant contributions through the Malacca Straits Council over the past 35 years. 
These contributions have totalled around US$130 million on improving navigational 
safety in the Straits and also set up a Revolving Fund in 1981 to deal with oil pollution 
in the Straits.II0 As part of its Counter-Terrorism Assistance from 2004 to 2007, Japan 
provides capacity building assistance to port and maritime security in Southeast Asia 
that included: (1) provision of three patrol vessels to Indonesia; (2) provision of security 
equipment for the Indonesian major ports and airports; (3) provision of security 
facilities and equipment in the main international ports of Cambodia; (4) provision of 
facilities and equipment for the enhancement of communications system for maritime 
safety and security of the Philippines; (5) coast guard human resource development in 
the Philippines; ( 6) dispatch of experts to the guard and rescue for Malaysia: (7) the 
dispatch of experts for enhancing maritime security capacity for Indonesia and the 
Philippines and; (8) joint exercises between coast guard agencies. III 
The littoral states have pointed to the provisions of Article 43 of UNCLOS (111), 
which states that user nations and the states bordering a strait should co-operate in the 
establishment and maintenance of navigational and safety aids and other improvements 
that assist with the prevention, reduction and control of pollution. m Indeed, while 
Article 26 of the UN convention explicitly states that no charges may be levied on 
foreign ships in transit through the territorial waters of another state, it does allow for 
charges in relation to specific services rendered to ships. 
The issue of burden sharing remains a source of frustration for the ASEAN 
littoral states because, without contributing to the cost of maintaining security and 
safety in the Straits, many users pressure Malaysia and Indonesia in particular to 
continually upgrade navigational facilities. Thus the considerable financial outlay of 
maintaining the security of the Straits falls on nations who have the least capacity, but 
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also those who arguably, may reap the smallest benefits from any improvements in the 
navigational safety of this strategic waterway. 
Perceptional Divergences 
Among the littoral states there is a wide divergence regarding the perception of 
threats to, as well as the sources of insecurity in, the Malacca Straits. Each state, for 
example, has a different view about how instability in the Straits would affect its own 
national security. To Singapore the Straits are vital to their national security and 
economy. A blockade of the Strait- from any cause -would cripple Singapore's role as 
an international entrepot and have a devastating influence on its service-based economy. 
Regarding Malaysia's national interests the Straits also have high importance for both 
security and economic reasons. 113 However, unlike Singapore, Malaysia's east coast 
provides it with alternative access to the Straits, giving it more options and flexibility in 
the event of the Malacca Straits being closed for some reason. For the large archipelagic 
state of Indonesia any problems in the Malacca Straits would be a concern, but they 
would not touch on its vital national interests, political or economic. To begin with, 
from an Indonesian perspective, the Straits are just one of many strategic waterways 
within its territory. 114 Indonesia's territorial waters cover some 5.8 million square km, or 
about 70% of its total territory. Within this huge expanse are 17 ,580 islands, 6,000 of 
which are inhabited. Indonesia's coastline totals 81,000 km, which means that it has 
responsibility for an area totalling approximately 14% of all the world's coastlines. 
As each state has a different assessment of the importance of the Straits to its 
own national interests, their perceptions also diverge on the relative importance of the 
various threats to security in the Straits. As previously described, the range of threats in 
the Malacca Straits varies from petty crime, smuggling people and arms, illegal fishing 
and logging, piracy and terrorism to the possibility of a major environmental disaster. 
These differences also influence the way in which the ASEAN littoral states view and 
apply a range of international conventions and initiatives that attempt to govern 
international maritime trade and security. Such international agreements include the 
1982 United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and various 
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conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Singapore ratified SUA 
in 2003, largely due to its dependency on international trade, which makes it highly 
receptive to measures designed to enhance maritime security. However, for states such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia, who closely guard their territorial sovereignty, acceding to 
conventions like SUA is a contentious issue and both states have only recently signed 
the convention. 
The reasons for this hesitation are that SUA imposes financial obligations on 
signatory states as well as having the potential to encroach on their national sovereignty. 
The convention obliges signatories to share information, extradite or prosecute 
suspected criminals under their national laws 'without exception' and 'without delay' 
and to take all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories 
for the commission of those offences within or outside their territories. 115 While there 
can be few objections to the goals of these obligations, for a state such as Indonesia the 
added expenditure on security that conforming to these provisions entails would impose 
significant financial burdens. 116 In addition, SUA's provisions seek to determine how 
states will deal with criminals within their own jurisdictions, in matters of enforcement 
and prosecution. This type of intervention in domestic issues is a sensitive topic among 
ASEAN nations, making the actual application of SUA in the Straits problematic. 117 
Other international agreements such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
and Container Security Initiative (CSI) have been promoted by the United States since 
September 2001 to enhance maritime security. Singapore has recognised PSI and CSI, 
while Malaysia and Indonesia, like many other Asian countries are reluctant to do so. 
Malaysia recognises the value of PSI, but has not acceded to the agreement which 
allows for the inspection of ships suspected of trafficking in nuclear and other illegal 
materials because it feels aspects of the initiative do not conform to international norms 
relating to national sovereignty and freedom of navigation. 118 The reluctance of some 
Southeast Asian nations to commit to PSI can be explained by the potential of the 
initiative to place restrictions on China, with the related issue that many nations in the 
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region are unwilling to be seen as too close to the US. 119 Similarly, the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPSC) is another international initiative in 
maritime security that has been greeted with less that universal approval by the littoral 
states. Indonesia, unlike Malaysia and Singapore, has not yet joined this agreement, 
which is intended to enable better monitoring of freight flows, combat smuggling and 
reduce the threat of terrorist attacks. The initiative requires shipping terminals and 
shipping lines to appoint security officers at transhipment facilities and aboard vessels 
to ensure that security measures and procedures are observed. 120 
While all of these initiatives aim to enhance maritime security internationally, 
for Singapore (and many of the nations whose trade passes through the Straits), piracy 
remains the primary threat, along with fears that criminal gangs might find a common 
cause with terrorists to create a major incident in the Straits. For this reason the focus of 
Singapore's concerns is on the safety and security of navigation. 121 Singapore's ally, the 
United States, is also concerned with preventing possible terrorist attacks on its 
vessels. 122 For Malaysia, piracy has never been high on its security agenda. Even though 
its long coastline in the Straits makes it vulnerable to piracy, Malaysia did not see piracy 
as a priority until after the kidnapping of Malaysian nationals and foreign tourists from 
the island of Sipadan in Eastern Sabah in 2000. 123 Even after this incident the primary 
target of Malaysia's counter measures were not just pirates, but included terrorists, 
kidnappers and illegal immigrants. Malaysia has continually downplayed the issue of 
piracy, insisting that it is not a serious problem. Similarly, Indonesia has maintained that 
piracy in the Straits is not its primary concern. Indonesia argues that concerns about 
Malacca Straits should also entail other issues such as illegal logging, smuggling, and 
illegal fishing rather than just prioritizing piracy. Singapore, by contrast, sees Straits 
security issues limited largely to piracy, armed robbery and terrorism. 124 Illustrative of 
this perceptional gap are more recent remarks by the Indonesian Navy's chief, Admiral 
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Bernard Kent Sondakh, who accused foreign nations of 'conspiring' to use the issue of 
piracy as a justification for external intervention in the Straits. 125 
One reason for this tendency by Malaysia and Indonesia to downplay the threat 
of piracy is that both nations are concerned to maintain their ability to exercise their 
conceptual and practical sovereignty over the waters of the Malacca Straits. For the 
international community and foreign journalists world wide piracy, as reported by the 
IMB, is regarded as a major threat to the security of the Straits. Not surprisingly, 
however, Indonesia and Malaysia both dispute the IMB's statistics and argue that the 
IMB has exaggerated the incidence of piracy. Indonesian's Admiral Sondakh points out 
that on his country's reckoning there were far fewer piracy cases in the Straits and 
elsewhere of Indonesia than in the IMB' s reports. 126 Malaysia's naval chief, Admiral 
Tan Ilyas Din, has condemned the London-based Lloyd's Market Association Joint War 
Committee (JWC), which uses the IMB' s data as presenting a position that is both 
"inaccurate and unclear"127 Indonesia has argued that the crime which journalists call 
'piracy' is not in fact not so. Its view is that much of what is reported as 'piracy' is 
actually only "pick pocketing at sea or in ports."128 Indonesia prefers to call piracy in the 
Malacca Straits 'armed robbery', although even the definition of this crime is 
debatable. 129 The fact is that there remain discrepancies between how the IMB on one 
hand and the littoral states on the other define piracy. The IMB's definition is that 
piracy is the act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit 
theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance 
of that act. Indonesia and Malaysia argue that this definition is too general and prefer 
the definition of piracy used by the 1982 United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III). Article 101 ofUNCLOS defines piracy as: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private 
ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(1) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such as ship or aircraft; 
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(2) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
( c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b). 130 
The importance of this definition to both Indonesia and Malaysia is that it 
designates 'piracy' as a crime that occurs only on the high seas, i.e. beyond the 
jurisdiction of any state. 131 This definition explicitly excludes such acts when they occur 
in territorial waters like the Singapore and Malacca Straits. Another significant 
distinction is that the UN CLOS definition of piracy also excludes crimes that occur in 
port. 132 The differences between the two definitions are largely technical, but 
nonetheless noteworthy when applied to the Malacca Straits, since under the terms of 
the UN CLOS articles most of the thefts that happen at sea occur will be within the 12 
mile limit and thus cannot be classified as piracy, but only as acts of armed robbery. 133 
When it comes to the threat posed by the possible nexus of piracy and terrorism, 
Singapore is again at odds with Indonesia and Malaysia. Malaysia's then Deputy Prime 
Minister, Najib Razak, has said that there is "no evidence" of such a nexus. 134 Indonesia 
has also objected to the idea that the Straits are a particular target for this type of 
terrorism, with Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirayuda, dismissing the idea of any link 
between piracy and terrorism. 135 This position is a common one among Indonesian 
authorities. The idea, for example, that terrorists could disrupt the flow of vessels 
passing through the waterway by sinking a ship is played down by Indonesian 
authorities. 136 
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In contrast, Singapore has embraced this threat as a real possibility. Wong Kan 
Seng, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs believed that "The 
consequence of an attack in the Straits make it an attractive target for terror groups to 
pursue". 137 Stronger opinion on the nexus between terrorist and piracy has also been 
mentioned by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong who warned in 2005 that the threat was 
"real and urgent". 138 As a close ally of the US that is also surrounded by Muslim states, 
Singapore fears that radical groups from the region could attack its trade by hi-jacking a 
ship, placing conventional or even nuclear explosives on it and then detonate the device 
in its port. 139 
In an attempt to address these and other concerns about piracy, Japan has 
fostered a Regional Co-operation Agreement on Anti-Piracy or ReCAAP to provide a 
framework for enhancing co-operation, information exchange and capacity building 
among fourteen regional nations. The centerpiece of ReCAAP is the establishment of an 
information sharing centre in Singapore to provide more accurate reports of incidents of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. Singapore is the member of 
ReCAAP, but Indonesia and Malaysia have yet to become full members of the 
agreement. Indonesia has remained aloof because it fears the initiative may be a 
mechanism for internationalizing the Malacca Straits. 140 It has also questioned why the 
information sharing centre has been entrusted to Singapore, when the security of the 
Strait is as much the responsibility of Indonesia and Malaysia. 141 Indonesia's stance on 
ReCAAP serves to highlight differences between the littoral states regarding 
international conventions and initiatives and how these stem from varying threat 
perceptions, as well as disparities in the way each nation perceives its national interests. 
The issue of piracy and other security concerns in the Malacca Strait continue to 
divide the littoral states. The problems are both political and conceptual as Bantarto 
Bandoro has noted, " ... finding exact definitions for piracy and terrorism has been 
problematic for national and international policy makers alike. Many are unsure at 
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which point piracy becomes terrorism." 142 Given the diversity of threats to the security 
of the Straits and the differing interests of the nations concerned it is not surprising that 
consensus has been difficult to realise. International initiatives only tend to increase the 
divergence, since they aim to satisfy a broad constituency of nations, rather than the 
particular priorities and interests of one or more of the three littoral states. 
Securing the Straits 
Despite the perceptional divergence addressed above, the three littoral states of 
the Malacca Straits do collaborate to secure their common waterway. Such cooperation, 
moreover, is hardly new. In mid-November 1971, they issued a joint communique 
affirming their responsibility for the Straits, including the safety of navigation. On 24 
February 1977, Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, together with his 
counterparts, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen of Malaysia and S. Rajaratnam of Singapore 
signed an agreement reaffirming the 1971 joint statement and stating their determination 
"to further promote the existing tripartite cooperation on enhancing the safety of 
navigation and promoting close cooperation and coordination on anti-pollution policies 
and measures in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore."143 
Over the years, the implementation of security cooperation in the Straits between 
the navy and police of the three states has been conducted largely on a bilateral basis. 
However, since 2004, the avenues of cooperation between the littoral states have 
changed, with greater effort on trilateral cooperation to increase the security of the 
waterway. This shift can be seen as a reaction to the proposal by Admiral Fargo, as 
previously mentioned. It was Indonesia which initially proposed coordinated patrols or a 
joint task force to guard the Straits in June 2004. Malaysia quickly agreed to the 
proposal, as did Singapore, which had pushed for greater security cooperation all along. 
National Initiatives 
Each of the littoral states conducts its own national programs aimed at enhancing 
security in the Straits. Indonesia has regularly carried out security operations in its 
territorial waters. Since 2005, the Indonesian Navy has conducted patrols under the code 
name Operasi Gurita ('Octopus Operation') to curb illegal activities in Indonesian 
waterways. Operasi Gurita V was run by the Western Fleet Command between 17 July 
and 5 August 2008 in the Natuna and Malacca Straits. The main targets of the patrols 
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were illegal fishing, illegal logging, fuel smuggling and shipping operating without 
proper documentation. 144 In order to curb piracy and other illegal activities such as 
terrorism the Western Fleet Commander also deployed elite naval special forces troops, 
Komando Pasukan Khusus TN! AL ('Kopaska'), frogman and under water demolition 
unit.145 
Besides such regular operations, the Indonesian Navy has also set up an 
operation center on Batam Island, in the Singapore Strait to monitor the passage of all 
ships through this busy shipping lane 146 Indonesia has installed radar stations at nine 
locations in the Malacca Strait to monitor traffic and boost security. Among the littoral 
states Indonesian currently has the weakest naval capability. In 2006, the Indonesian 
Navy possessed just two submarines of the former East German U209 type: KR! Cakra 
and KR! Nanggala. In a move that aims to increase the overall national capacity to 
secure the archipelago, Indonesia plans to purchase submarines, corvettes and 
destroyers from Russia. 147 
Plans have also been mooted regarding the creation of an Indonesian Coast 
Guard. However, there idea has sparked debate about whether the defence budget would 
be able to support such a new body or whether the funds would be better spent on 
maximizing the Navy's territorial patrol capacity. 148 One argument for a Coast Guard is 
that international shipping would acknowledge its authority. 
In another move to improve its maritime security, the Indonesian Government 
has endorsed new legislation in the form of a shipping bill consisting of 22 chapters and 
355 articles. This comprehensive bill has eight new chapters regulating, among other 
things, mortgages and loans, maritime safety and security, harbour masters and the 
establishment of a Coast Guard. 149 
Malaysia has established its own maritime security agency to combat maritime 
crime and illegal activities, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) in 
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February 2005. The Agency began official operations in November 2005, even as Kuala 
Lumpur was playing down the piracy-terrorism nexus, by placing armed policemen 
aboard vessels carrying high-risk cargo through Malaysian waters or entering Malaysian 
ports. 150 On 21 March 2006, Malaysia also launched its own Coast Guard, with the then 
Defence Minister, Najib Razak, saying the force symbolized his country's determination 
to protect its territorial waters. Besides creating these new organizations, in February 
2006 Malaysia purchased 15 high speed police boats to support its maritime law 
enforcement operations. 151 
Singapore, which has always taken maritime security threats more seriously than 
its neighbours, has adopted strong measures to tighten security in the country's ports 
and territorial waters. The government now requires all vessels in its territorial waters to 
carry identification transponders and the Republic of Singapore Navy deploys armed 
security teams onboard selected ships entering Singaporean waters. 152 To strengthen 
inter-agency cooperation and enhance maritime domain awareness Singapore plans to 
open the Changi Command and Control Centre in 2009, which will integrate the 
operations of elements of the navy, police coast guard, maritime and port authorities. 
Bilateral Cooperation 
In addition, to their own national programs, the three littoral states also conduct 
cooperative bilateral security programs: between Indonesia and Malaysia (MALINDO); 
between Indonesia and Singapore (INDOSIN); and between Malaysia and Singapore 
(MALAPURA). At the time they were instituted, these bilateral agreements were seen 
as the most operationalized maritime security cooperation within Southeast Asia. 153 
Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to hold joint exercises in the Malacca Straits to deter piracy 
and threats from terrorism in June 2004. Both countries have also conducted annual joint 
exercises such as coordinated patrols held in October 2004. These five-day joint exercises 
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involved around 560 personnel and eight warships belonging to both navies in waters off 
the Riau Islands. 
As noted previously, Thailand has just recently joined the Malacca Straits Patrol 
agreement (in September 2008) and has agreed with Indonesia to help to provide 
security in the Straits in 2009. In the past, Thailand's control of the northern approaches 
to the Straits was particularly important for Indonesia with regard to its security 
problems in Aceh Province, especially the smuggling of weapons into Aceh from 
Thailand. 154 Thailand has also been involved in cooperative maritime patrols in the 
northern Malacca Straits with the Malaysian Navy since 2003. The current problem of 
Rohingya refugees from Burma demonstrates the continuing need for both Malaysia and 
Indonesia to cooperate with Thailand on maritime security issues. 
The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) and Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) have 
also conducted a series of joint exercises. The EAGLE exercise series was inaugurated 
in 197 4 and has run for over twenty years. Another series of mine-countermeasure 
exercises, code-named Exercise Joint Minex, have run for nine years. In June 2006, the 
MINEX program involved two RSN mine-countermeasure vessels, one TNI-AL mine 
hunter and one TNI-AL minesweeper vessel operating off Pulau Bintan in the Singapore 
Straits. 155 Such exercises enhance the professionalism of the two navies, as well as in 
their interoperability, especially mutual understanding and trust between their 
personnel. To boost efforts for avoiding attacks on ships passing through the waterway, 
Indonesia and Singapore have shared the cost of a new radar system to monitor traffic in 
the Straits. Unveiled in 2005, this new ship-tracking technology means that there is 
probably no target that the authorities of the two countries cannot detect. The Royal 
Malaysian Navy and the RSN interact regularly though bilateral exercises such as 
Exercise MALAPURA. This is an annual exercise between the two countries conducted 
in the Malacca Straits, which in Nov 27 to December 9 2006 involved a total of six 
ships from both countries. 156 The value of all of these bilateral exercises and cooperative 
programs is their ability to develop understanding and enhance better working 
relationships between various agencies of the littoral states. 
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Multilateral Cooperation 
The littoral states have also expanded their cooperation with non-ASEAN 
nations to enhance their capacity to secure their maritime territories. Under the Five 
Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), Singapore and Malaysia have been able to 
cooperate in boosting the security in the Straits. In June 2004, a meeting of FPDA 
Defence Ministers in Penang, Malaysia, proposed successfully to orient this 
organisation for the first time toward non-traditional maritime security, focusing on 
anti-terrorism, maritime interception and anti-piracy. On April 2007, two Royal 
Malaysian Navy (TUDM) ships and one from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
embarked on five-day FPDA exercise code-named MAS TEX in the Strait of Malacca. 157 
Other initiatives supplement the FPDA. In February 2007, Coast Guard officials from 
Japan, Malaysia and Thailand staged their first joint exercise to fight piracy.158 A 
particularly significant cooperative measure at the regional level is the Regional Co-
operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. It 
is the first arrangement to deal with piracy and armed robbery by regional states. The 
signatories include Japan, India, Thailand, Vietnam and South Korea. 
Many states external to the region have signalled their interest in assisting with 
security in the Straits. Apart from the USA, India, China and Japan have been active in 
offering their direct assistance with maritime patrols to the ASEAN littoral states. 
However, as noted already, Indonesia and Malaysia reject the notion of direct assistance 
and prefer that any external contributions to security in the Straits should come in the 
form of technical support such as information systems and equipment to improve their 
own ability to monitor shipping. The US has promised technical assistance in the form 
of an early warning system which will be installed at several points along the waterway 
and through the provision of maritime patrol aircraft. It has also agreed to exchange 
information with the three littoral states on various matters relating to the Malacca 
Straits. 159 In 2005, the Chinese and Indonesian governments signed a strategic 
partnership deal which led in July 2007 to exploring the possibility of conducting joint 
maritime operation in the Straits between the navies of both nations. 160 It is unlikely, 
however, that Indonesia would be any more comfortable with a permanent Chinese 
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naval presence in the Malacca Straits than it would with the permanent presence of U.S. 
forces in that waterway. 
Among the external states providing assistance, Japan has tried to be most 
responsive to both the needs of the littoral states. In late 2007 the Japanese government 
planned to provide three patrol boats to the Indonesian Water Police. However, the 
handover was suspended when the Japanese tried to attach a condition that the vessels 
should be used specifically to target piracy, maritime terrorism and weapon smuggling 
in the Straits. For Japan, this condition was a basis for strengthening the usefulness of 
the boats to protect the safety of their cargo in the Malacca Straits. It was also to 
safeguard the limits of the use of the boats to strictly 'defensive' missions. For Japan, 
this condition related to· Article 9, of its 'Peace Constitution' .161 This caveat caused 
offense to the Indonesian authorities, who felt that any stipulations regarding the use of 
the boats infringed Indonesia's sovereignty. For Indonesia such assistance is viewed as 
a part of responsible user state behaviour by assisting with the security in the region. 
However, Indonesia did not believe that Japan could dictate what it might do with the 
assistance. In April 2006, China offered to exchange information with, and provide 
training for Malaysian maritime security forces. This offer should be understood in the 
context that almost 80% of China's energy imports transit through the Malacca Straits. 
China would not like to see a greater security role for the US, Japan or India in the 
Malacca Straits, and it has quietly applauded Malaysia's resistance to the 
aforementioned American proposal for RMSI. 162 China has also reportedly offered to 
assist securing the Straits in low-key ways designed to not violate the sovereignty of the 
littoral states. 163 As is the case with Indonesia, however, it is unlikely that Malaysia 
would support a permanent Chinese naval presence in the Straits. 
While the incidents of piracy have decreased in the Straits, many external states 
are still trying to persuade the Indonesian Government to soften its opposition to foreign 
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vessels conducting patrols there164 Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, often raised 
his country's concerns over security of the water way and tried to persuade President 
Yudhoyono to soften Indonesia's stance on sovereign prerogatives. Despite such 
appeals, Indonesia has been unwilling to change its policy on such direct cooperation 
with external parties. Malaysia has maintained a similar policy and still opposes greater 
external involvement in the region, despite complaints from user states that its own 
maritime forces are not sufficient to provide the necessary levels of security to the high 
volume of commercial vessels passing through the Straits. Representatives of the littoral 
states have also met with user states counterparts to strengthen cooperation and 
exchange ideas, with a view to undertaking joint projects and pledging monetary 
contributions to the Aids to Navigation Fund for the Straits. As of this writing, six 
projects have been identified, among them the removal of wrecks in the Straits, 
cooperation on capacity building to assist the littoral states to deal with accidents 
involving hazardous or noxious substances and a building program to replace navigation 
aids along the Sumatran coastline that were destroyed by the 2004 Tsunami. 165 
ASEAN has also strengthen an effort to create greater support in securing the 
Malacca Strait through ARF. The 15th ASEAN Regional Forum in Singapore 24 July 
2008 issued more promising collective action in maritime security by proposing the 
establishment of the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security. 166 This forum will 
provide an annual platform for discussion of maritime security issues and could create 
main common understanding including: (1) agreement on principle; (2) maritime 
security environment and threats; (3) managing threats and; (4) operational 
solution. 167These extensive common understanding will be significant to support 
ASEAN in maintaining security in the Malacca Straits in the future. 
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Trilateral Cooperation 
In response to pressure from external states, the ASEAN littoral states have 
embarked on a range of security cooperation programs. For example, members of the 
Police Coast Guard of Singapore, the Malaysian Marine Police and the Indonesian 
Marine Police of the Riau region have met regularly for discussions. 168 However, there 
are also a number of trilateral security programs such as MALSINDO, Eyes-in-the-Sky 
and the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol Network (MSP), which have been instituted 
in recent years. Each of these initiatives will be discussed more fully below. 
MALSINDO. On 20 July 2004 heightened security cooperation in the Malacca 
Straits began was attained with the launch of a trilateral Malacca Strait Sea Patrol of 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore (MALSINDO). The importance of these coordinated 
naval patrols is that they constitute a cooperative arrangement that developed out of an 
informal network of bilateral agreements. Given the negative 'motivation' of Admiral 
Fargo's RMSI announcement, the MALSINDO patrols were clearly intended to 
preclude the US, and to lesser extent Japan, from assuming any more direct roles in the 
provision of security in the Straits. These trilateral patrols were built upon bilateral 
patrols conducted by the three states for over a decade. Without this precedent, it is 
unlikely that the trilateral patrols would have been formalized so quickly or have 
reached the same level of effectiveness. 169 
The coordinated naval patrols include about seven ships from each country 
working together, but each remaining in their own territorial waters. The MALSINDO 
patrols have been planned to operate on a year round basis, making them very different 
from the previous bilateral operations. Under this arrangement, the participating states 
conduct coordinated patrols while facilitating the sharing of information and 
intelligence between ships through a Monitoring and Action Agency (MAA). These 
arrangements permit patrol activity to take place all year and 24 hours per day. 170 The 
coordinated patrols are a compromise with the idea of a joint patrol, which would 
require much greater levels of integration and collaboration. 
Eyes in the Sky (EiS). In June 2005 an attempt to further enhance the 
effectiveness and coverage of MALSINDO naval patrols, Malaysia proposed an 'Eyes-
in-the-Sky' or EiS surveillance initiative. This initiative mobilises other military assets 
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of the three littoral nations such as maritime patrol aircraft to complement the naval 
surface patrol arrangements under MALSINDO. Launched on 13 September 2005, EiS 
provides for maritime patrol aircraft from each of the three states to conduct two sorties 
per week along the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Every flight carries a Combined 
Maritime Patrol Team (CMPT) consisting of military personnel from each of the 
participating states. CMPTs report 'suspicious activities' to centres on the ground in 
each of three countries for follow-up action by maritime law enforcement agencies. For 
operational purposes, the Straits are divided into four sectors, with each patrol usually 
covering two sectors. 171 
The addition of Thailand to these joint patrol programs was discussed at a 
meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Force from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and 
Thailand in Kuala Lumpur on 2 August 2005. The reason behind this meeting was that 
many illegal activities were occurring in the northern approaches to the Malacca Straits 
in Thailand's territorial waters. However, due to the intensification of internal political 
problems in Thailand in early 2006, planning to include that country in the cooperative 
patrol program was cancelled. 172 In August 2007, Thailand renewed its interest in 
joining the cooperative effort to patrol the Straits. Thai Prime Minister, Surayud 
Chulanont pledged that 'Thailand will help take care of security in the Strait of Malacca 
by joining the patrols' .173 There was little follow-up beyond this statement of intent, 
until finally on 18 September 2008, Thailand became the fourth country to join the 
Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP). Thailand's participation in the MSP was formalized in 
signing ceremony for the revised Standard Operating procedures and Terms of 
Reference for the Malacca Straits Patrol joint Coordination Committee. The extent to 
which the Thais will be able to follow through with systematic participation hinges on 
their ability to resolve the intensifying domestic political crisis which forced the 
cancellation of an East Asian Summit in April 2009. 
Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol Network (MSP). In order to bring 
together the existing security cooperation of surface patrols and air surveillance, the 
Chiefs of the Defence Forces of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia signed an 
agreement to formalise the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol Network (MSP) on 
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Batam Island in Indonesia on 21 April 2006. Under the terms of this agreement 
Malaysia and Singapore are responsible for contributing five naval and two air patrols, 
while Indonesia is providing seven naval and two air patrols. The agreement has no 
provisions for 'hot pursuit' into each others sovereign territories, but the three states did 
agree to sign a Terms of Reference for a Joint Coordinating Committee (TOR JCC) that 
will oversee both the air and sea patrol programs. There was also agreement on 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the patrols. Perhaps the most important 
feature of the planned JCC is that it will act as a channel for communication and 
information exchange, as well as coordination all operations in the Straits. 174 
An MSP Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) was formed among the three 
participating states in 2006 to support the sea and air patrols. This led to the 
development of an information sharing platform called the Malacca Strait Patrol 
Information System or MSP-IS. The MSP-IS was set up in November 2006 for trial 
operations and has been in operation since then to share maritime intelligence. The 
MSP-IS is a demonstration of the resolve and capability of the states to meet the 
requirement to provide security in the Malacca Straits in a co-operative manner. The 
system has enhanced their situational awareness in the Straits and its approaches via 
information passed on by air and sea assets. Dealing with incidents can be managed 
through the Monitoring and Action Agencies (MAA) on a real-time basis to greatly 
facilitate a co-ordinated response. 
In recent times, the MSP-IS has been enhanced with two new features - an Open 
and Analysis Shipping Information System (OASIS) and a Sense-Making Analysis and 
Research Tool (SMART). OASIS provides a near real-time Recognised Maritime 
Picture (RMP) drawing on a database of more than 150,000 vessels. SMART 
complements the OASIS database because it is capable of detecting any anomalous 
behaviour of ships transiting in the region and providing early warning to the MAA to 
cue operational responses where necessary. The SMART program thus promotes 
collaboration among the participating states through the sharing of detailed information 
on threats to maritime security in the region. 
In late March 2008, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia (TNI) or Indonesian Armed Forces, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and 
the Royal Thai Armed Forces (TRATF) participated in an inaugural Malacca Strait 
Patrols (MSP) Information Sharing Exercise held at the Information Fusion Centre, 
174 
'Three littoral states agreed to set up a Joint Coordinating Committee' Business Times Singapore, 22 
April, 2006. 
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Tuas Naval Base in Singapore. The two day exercise validated and strengthened the 
information-sharing linkages for maritime security amongst the four countries. The 
MSP Information Sharing exercise employed the latest Internet-based MSP Information 
System (MSP-IS) developed by the Singaporean Defence Science and Technology 
Agency (DSTA). The MSP-IS aggregates shipping databases and relevant real-time 
information to improve coordination and overall awareness of the situation at sea, 
thereby enabling timely responses to maritime incidents in the Malacca Strait. The 
exercise took place under the auspices of the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) initiative, 
which includes the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP), EiS and the intelligence 
Exchange Group (IEG). Together these programs comprise a set of practical co-
operative measures which had been effective in enhancing the security of the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore. 
Operational Impediments 
Though these arrangements represent an improvement on the past, there are still 
issues that constrain cooperation. For example, the current Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) restrict the operational effectiveness of the patrols. At present there 
are also no plans to upgrade the MSSP from coordinated to joint patrols. Before joint 
patrols become a reality the three ASEAN littoral state partners, and perhaps Thailand 
as well, will need to address some problems, particularly over the issue of whether joint 
patrols could impinge on one another's territorial rights. Malaysia has indicated that 
while joint patrols are a possibility, the three partners must first overcome certain 
'sensitivities' - a veiled reference to sovereignty concems. 175 Indonesia does not want to 
create join patrols with Malaysia and Singapore because it feels that these would 
remove each country's sovereign rights, by allowing forces from the other nations to 
enter Indonesian territory freely. In July 2008, Indonesia's Defence Minister, Juwono, 
clarified this point: 
We do not want the format of the existing joint coordinated cooperation to 
lead to the removal of a certain littoral country's security right, which will 
then be replaced by another country. 176 
There is also a view in Indonesia and Malaysia that the coordinated patrol 
program has already achieved the necessary objective of bringing better security to the 
175 Malaysia Deputy Prime Minister: Joint Patrols in Malacca Strait Possible', Associated Press, 17 April 
2007 
176 
'Indonesia against joint patrols of Malacca Strait', AFX News Limited, Agency France Press, 7 June 
2005, <thttp://www.forbes.com/home/feeds/afx/2005/06/07/afx2078829.html> Accessed 7 July 2008. 
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Straits. Najib Razak, the Malaysian Defence Minister noted in April 2007 that, 'At the 
end of the day, the objective is to make the Straits of Malacca very, very secure and we 
have done that' .177 The view that the success of the current arrangements obviate the 
need for more extensive joint patrols also allows the ASEAN partners to avoid such 
difficult issues as which country should command any joint patrol program. The issue of 
command and control hierarchy within joint patrols is a highly sensitive one.17s When 
Malaysia urged the idea of joint patrols in April 2007, for example, Indonesia rejected 
the proposal due to a less than clear demarcation of who would assume overall 
command of the exercise. Singapore would also like to adopt a joint patrol program, but 
has recognised the reluctance of its partners on this issue and is currently not pursuing 
the idea. 
Apart from the issue of command, the most important obstacle to any joint patrol 
program is the question of rights of 'hot pursuit'. This is a condition "when a law 
enforcement officer is so close behind the alleged criminal that he/she may continue the 
chase into another jurisdiction without stopping or seeking a warrant for an arrest in the 
other county or state". 179• Until a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) covering the 
issue was signed in April 2006, ships participating in the MSSP were denied hot pursuit 
rights to cross into the territorial waters of another state. Once again the problem that 
had to be overcome was one of sovereignty. Under the SOP, MSSP ships now have 
right to pursue a suspect vessel up to a maximum 5 nautical miles (nm) into the 
territorial waters of another state. 1s0 However, in practice, this has never occurred and 
the arrangements for hot pursuit have been dealt with on a bilateral basis between 
Indonesia and Singapore, and Indonesia and Malaysia. Singapore and Malaysia, 
however, do not have such an agreement and need to seek official permission before 
entering each other's territorial waters. 1s1 The lack of an agreement covering hot pursuit 
indicates that the existing sensitivities between Singapore and Malaysia over their 
mutual respect for national sovereignty is seen as being more important than effective 
policing of the waterways. While such attitudes prevail, the security of the Straits will 
177 See 'Malaysia warms to joint patrols in Malacca', MIMA New Flash, April 2007 
<http://www.mima.gov.my/mima> 
17s Another interview with anonymous Operational Staff ofTNl-AL, Headquarter ofTNI AL, Cilangkap, 
Jakarta, 12 June 2006. 
179 See the definition in 'hot pursuit' <http://dictionary.law.com> Accessed 6 April 2009. 
iso Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes', p. 119. 
isi 'Three littoral states agree to set up a Joint Coordinating Committee', The Business Times, 22 April, 
2006. In addition, information gained in a personal interview with Indonesian Western Fleet 
Commander, June 2006. 
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be not be assured due to the cross-border nature of piracy and many of the other illegal 
activities that occur in the Straits. 
Achievements in Cooperation 
The fact that trilateral security cooperation has been successful is demonstrated 
by several factors. For example, functional cooperation has been achieved relatively 
smoothly. 182 Cooperation has worked well at this level because of regular interaction to 
meet and exchange information. Joint exercises and joint initiatives such as 
MALSINDO, Eyes-in-the-Sky and the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol Network, 
together with the Joint Coordinating Committee, moreover, act as critical elements for 
communication, information exchange and coordination of trilateral maritime 
operations in the Malacca Straits. 
Another register of success has been the significant decline in the incidence of 
piracy and other transnational crimes in the Straits. The recent drastic drop in piracy is a 
direct result of the intense efforts undertaken by the littoral states themselves. As Table 
1 (above) shows, a reduction of 68% took place after the trilateral security cooperation 
programs discussed above were launched in 2005. The International Maritime Bureau's 
Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, has acknowledged that the reduction was due to 
increased vigilance and patrolling by the three littoral states. Indonesia was particularly 
singled out for praise, after its navy targeted 'hot spots' in operations such as the 
GURITA series. 183 Since July 2005, these efforts have led to a marked decrease in the 
number piracy incident occurring in Indonesian waters 
The decline in piracy and transnational crime cannot be attributed solely 
however, to the trilateral security cooperation of the littoral states. The 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami devastated areas where many pirates lived. This natural disaster 
destroyed their bases, vessels and manpower, as well as changing water depths in many 
areas making their operations more difficult. The tsunami also brought greater 
international scrutiny to the area. In addition, the peace agreement between the 
Indonesia Government and GAM rebels in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam that was signed 
on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki has reduced the propensity of separatist rebels to engage 
in acts of piracy to secure funds for their armed struggles and discontinue smuggling 
activities. 
182 Ho, 'A Coast Guard for Singapore?', 6 November 2005.p. 24. 
183 Donald Urquhart, 'IMB tells industry not to lower guard despite drop in piracy', The Business Times, 2 
February 2006 <http://global.factiva.com/ha default.aspx> Accessed 29 August 2008. 
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The repercussions of these successes have also been felt internationally. The 
insurance company designated status 'war risk' has been removed from the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits. Maritime insurer, Lloyds of London made the announcement, which 
has had the immediate result of lowering insurance rates for ships passing through the 
Straits.184 A further outcome of the cooperation between the littoral states has been a 
reduction in pressure from external states to intervene in the region's affairs. This result 
has been particularly satisfying to Indonesia and Malaysia, who feared the consequences 
of military intervention by external parties. 
Protracted Obstacles to Cooperation 
Even though the coordinated security cooperation between the littoral states has 
been successful, obstacles remain that impede the ability of the three nations to further 
their cooperative efforts. 
The first of these obstacles, as already noted, is the relatively informal nature 
underscoring much of the ongoing nature of cooperation. The Malacca Strait Sea Patrol 
(MSP) is a coordinated rather than joint patrol program, with each state responsible for 
security within its own maritime jurisdiction. This level of cooperation is insufficient to 
secure the Straits against transnational crimes, for example, because the trilateral 
collaboration does not include the right of hot pursuit across territorial borders. Some 
maritime experts do not recognize the coordinated patrols as being sufficiently serious 
efforts and still press the littoral states to mount joint patrols. These authorities argue 
that joint patrols would close loopholes such as hot pursuit and prevent suspected 
pirates from evading capture simply by crossing into another jurisdiction. Captain 
Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the London-based IMB, has argued that 'Joint patrols 
would be effective and would help further improve the situation in the Malacca 
Straits.' 185 Joint patrols would certainly be an effective deterrent, enhancing surveillance 
and furthering understanding between the maritime security forces of the littoral states. 
It would also alleviate problems of differences in capacity by allowing stronger, more 
capable forces to come to the aid of weaker partners. 186 Moreover, joint patrols would 
184 
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streamline command and control, reduce the potential for confusion, and reduce 
inefficiency in the allocation of resources. 
An example of under-resourcing is the weakness of the EiS component in the 
MSSP. Officially, the MSSP is capable of securing the Straits around the clock, but the 
veracity of this statement is doubtful. Due to lack of night-vision surveillance 
equipment EiS patrols are not conducted at after dark, the period when most piracy and 
other crimes occur. 187 Similarly, there are also problems regarding detection, 
identification, and interdiction of suspect vessels. 188 Again, the issue is a lack of 
equipment on the maritime patrol aircraft used by the various states to patrol the large 
and busy areas of the Straits. For example, it is unclear whether the small, powerful 
motorboats which are normally used by pirates can be tracked and identified by the 
surveillance radars on some of the patrol aircraft. In addition, the areas of operation are 
too large for the current number of aircraft sorties to cover in a significant way. It is 
estimated that for a complete 24/7 coverage, at least 10 daily sorties or 70 sorties per 
week are required. At present there are only 8 weekly sorties by EiS dedicated aircraft. 
A further weakness of the MSSP is the number of surface vessel allocated to the 
program. There are currently only 17 craft involved in MALSINDO, with round-the-
clock coverage requiring an estimated 24 vessels to patrol the entire Malacca and 
Singapore Straits area. To compensate for this lack of equipment, or at least Malaysia's 
and Indonesia's inability to purchase enough of it, the assistance of external members to 
enhance capacity building is critical. However, a liberalisation of littoral state positions 
on sovereign prerogatives will need to occur if such assistance is to be forthcoming or 
employed effectively. 
Other pro bl ems arise from the differing approaches adopted by each state to deal 
with maritime security cooperation at the higher level, especially regarding 
transnational threats. 189 Malaysia, for example, has decided to centralize all agencies 
dealing with maritime affairs in peacetime into the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement 
Agency (MMEA). Beginning operation in November 2005, the MMEA, which is 
similar to the US Coast Guard, is charged with maintaining law and order, preserving 
peace, safety and security, detecting and preventing crime, apprehending and 
187 Storey, 'Securing Southeast Asia's Sea Lanes', 2008, p. 119. 
188 This description borrowed heavily from Graham Gerard Ong and Joshua Ho, 'Maritime Air Patrols the 
new Weapon Against Piracy in the Malacca Straits', IDSS Commentaries, 13 October 2005, 
<http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/Perspective/IDSS0372006.pdf> Accessed 16 August 2008 
189 Joshua Ho' Managing the peace conflict continuum', IDSS Commentaries, 28 November 2005 
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prosecuting offenders and collecting security intelligence. The MMEA performs these 
tasks only within the Malaysian Maritime Zone and in the event of emergency, special 
crisis or war the Agency will come under the command of the Malaysian Armed Forces. 
In contrast, Indonesia has opted to decentralise much of its maritime policing 
functions from the central government to the provinces. For example, the Indonesian 
Navy is no longer the sole agency responsible for maritime security, with provinces 
having authority up to 12 nm out to sea and regencies up to 3 nm. In line with the goal 
of decentralisation, Indonesia's armed forces have recently been placed under the 
Minister for Defence, while the Police Force has been put under the Minister for Home 
Affairs. The result of these moves has been to diffuse power and create the need for new 
modes of operation, especially as under the previous regime the police and military 
were essentially one entity. Indonesia lacks a dedicated Coast Guard and the impetus to 
create such a force is still not great. In addition, no single military or civilian component 
is responsible for maritime security. Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut (Bakorkamla) 
or Maritime Security Coordinating Board is an ad hoc body with no coordinating 
function. 190 This means that responsibility for maritime security is shared between the 
navy, police, customs service and the Ministry of Transportation's Sea and Coastal 
Security Unit or Kesatuan Pengawas Lepas Pantai (KPLP), with the result that there is 
a great deal of overlap and even competition between these various agencies. 
Singapore on the other hand has opted for a high degree of coordination between 
its maritime security forces. Each of the island-state's three maritime agencies are 
responsible for their respective professional areas. The Maritime Security Task Force is 
charged with coordinating the activities of the agencies, in addition to researching 
methods for further enhancing maritime security and promoting Singapore's broader 
maritime interests. The Maritime and Port Authority (MP A) is tasked with regulating 
the port of Singapore and to oversee the implementation of security measures mandated 
by the International Maritime Organisation. The MP A also handles civil emergencies 
such as oil or chemical spills from tankers transiting the Singapore's territorial waters. 
Traditionally, the Republic of Singapore Navy has been charged with the maritime 
defence of Singapore and its sea lanes. However, the formation of Accompanying Sea 
Security Teams (ASSeT) is indicative of a shift in policy, with the navy being assigned 
constabulary duties to prevent hijackings and other criminal activities. 
190 
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One result of these differing policy approaches to the problems of maritime 
security is that, while cooperation between the navies and other maritime agencies of 
the three littoral states is excellent at the tactical level, this level of proficiency does not 
extend to the operational level. With Malaysia pursuing centralisation, Indonesia 
decentralisation and Singapore coordination, the different decision-making structures 
resulting from each nation's security approach to straits security contributes to the lack 
of operational efficiency in their cooperative maritime security efforts. The 
incompatibility of command and control organization makes it difficult to achieve any 
degree of competence at the operational level and impedes performance when it comes 
to both the decision-making and interdiction. This has specific implications for future 
joint patrolling prospects. 
A further obstacle to effective cooperation is the different national priorities of 
the littoral states. Piracy is a threat that demands a focused multilateral policy from all 
of the participating states, but competing domestic priorities within the littoral states has 
hindered more effective cooperation. 191 Indonesia sees the goal of maritime security 
policy as curbing illegal logging, fishing, and smuggling. The problem of terrorism 
ranks below the challenges of maintaining the integrity of its national territory. Indeed, 
since 1998 the issue of retaining a unitary national identity has been the main priority 
for Indonesia's military forces. Within that context, the limited capacity of the 
Indonesian Navy has been diverted into dealing with internal conflicts, in particular the 
problems of separatism in Aceh and Irian Jaya and communal violence in areas such as 
Ambon, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Those conflicts have preoccupied the Navy and used 
up resources that might otherwise have been applied in the Malacca Straits or other 
areas of the huge archipelago. 192 Such disparate priorities detract from the collective 
effectiveness of the littoral states to adequately secure the Straits. 
For Indonesia a key problem constraining its cooperative ability is the limited 
capacity and capability of its Navy. Despite being an archipelagic state, the Indonesian 
Navy is not well developed and suffers from a serious lack of adequate funding. The 
result is that the navy is chronically under-manned, under-equipped, and underpaid. 
Effectively, then, Indonesia lacks a suitable agency to support its share of responsibility 
for maintaining the security of the Malacca Straits. For example, Indonesia's 
contribution to the EiS program is the relatively unsophisticated Nomad aircraft, 
191Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy, p. 3. 
192 Sukma, 'Indonesia's Maritime Security Interests', p. 6. 
256 
compared to Singapore's specially modified Fokker 50 aircraft. 193 Indonesia thus lacks 
the capacity to fully exercise its responsibilities because its navy is smaller and poorly 
equipped, relative to its two partners. 194 
A lack of basic trust is another problem which detracts from the effectiveness of 
the trilateral cooperation initiatives. Although joint efforts by the ASEAN states have 
gradually strengthened and the general levels of mutual trust have been greatly 
enhanced, nevertheless the problem trust between the three littoral states has not been 
totally resolved. Indonesia still accuses its neighbours of creating many of the problems 
in the Malacca Straits. Commander of the Western Fleet, Admiral Tedjo Edhie 
Purdijatno, for example, has accused Malaysia and Singapore of damaging Indonesia's 
maritime national interests. 195 Under the terms of a defence cooperation agreement with 
Singapore, the small island-state is allowed to use designated Indonesian territory for 
military exercises, while Indonesia is given access to Singapore's sophisticated military 
technology and facilities. However, Indonesia has accused Singapore of gaining more 
benefits from this agreement, essentially short changing Jakarta on the cooperative 
arrangement to gain maximum benefits to the detriment of its partner. 196 In 2003, under 
Megawati Sukarno Putri, Indonesia discontinued leasing its airspace (in Natuna and 
Riau) for the use of the Singapore Air Force, an agreement which had been in effect 
since 1973. 197 As part of this ongoing dispute, Indonesia has insisted that concluding a 
treaty of extradition with Singapore remains a separate component to their already 
existing defence agreement. Indonesia maintains that the existing defence arrangements 
are not connected with an extradition agreement, while Singapore insists that the two 
have always been part of a package deal. Without such basic security consensus, it is 
difficult to imagine the two states engaging in more effective cooperation for the 
security of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. This basic lack of trust is further 
emphasized by the ongoing territorial dispute between the three parties, with clashes 
193 Another interview with Director General of Strategic and Defense of Indonesia, Jakarta, 22 June 2006. 
194 Debbie A. Lubis, 'Government told to make rings on maritime', The Jakarta Post, 20 January 2003; 
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over ownership of islands (such as Ambalat and Nipah) contributing to their mutual 
susp1c10ns. 
Finally, though joint patrols would be a sign of greater trust between the littoral 
states, they would not in themselves deal with the basic causes of crime and insecurity 
in the Straits. The current levels of cooperation do not really touch on the roots of the 
problem. While international attention is also predominantly focused on piracy and 
organized criminal networks, the vast majority maritime crime is motivated by issues of 
poverty and disenfranchisement that affects the local populations of fishermen, 
subsistence farmers and small traders. In themselves, security policies do not address 
the motivations that lead to participation in piracy. By addressing only short-term 
solutions, multilateral and international efforts are ultimately like trimming the leaves of 
an invasive weed, rather than pulling it out by its roots. 198 To be effective, policies 
aimed at addressing the causes of piracy need to prioritise programs aimed at economic 
development in coastal regions and deal with rampant corruption in order to give 
various elements of the societies surrounding the Straits a viable stake in the economies 
of their respective nations. 199 
The real challenge to making improvements such as joint patrolling, and, indeed, 
to achieving overall closer regional cooperation lies with how the ASEAN states 
conceptualise state sovereignty. Sovereignty remains the paramount reason limiting 
cooperation, which has, in essence, functioned as a type of preventive diplomacy 
undertaken to relieve tensions, rather than arrive at a lasting solution. For this reason, 
one Southeast Asian expert on maritime security has characterised cooperation among 
the ASEAN states in Malacca Straits as a 'wayang kulit' or Indonesian puppet show, in 
the sense that countries only cooperate because they fear outside intervention200 If they 
were serious about stamping out piracy, they would remove the political barriers to 
engagmg m a truly joint patrol program and allow hot pursuit across territorial 
boundaries. 201 
Conclusion 
The Malacca Straits are a real and significant security concern for all of the 
littoral states. While there remain divergences between them, essentially their national 
198 Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy, p. 3. 
199 Ibid. 
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interests on this issue are closely interrelated. Indeed, many of these interests are 
mutually supportive and complementary. For example, the security of the Straits has 
significant implications for the economic interests of all three littoral states. In addition, 
they face a common problem because the transnational nature of crimes such as piracy, 
armed robbery, smuggling and environmental degradation represent shared threats that 
require cooperative solutions. Contributing to these crimes are structural issues such as 
poverty and insurgencies which provide the motivation for people to participate in 
illegal activities. These mutual threats have been the impetus for the littoral states to 
develop new levels of security cooperation. 
As a response to these threats, trilateral cooperation in the security of the 
Malacca and Singapore Straits between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore has reached 
unprecedented levels. Such cooperation is now carried out on a routine basis and is 
further developed by regular annual exercises. These recent developments show that 
security cooperation between ASEAN members is not impossible. Although there 
remain some important areas of divergence regarding the perception of threats, national 
priorities for addressing problems and more basic questions of capacity, there are also 
strong indicators of willingness to cooperate in order to address the immediate issues by 
all three countries. To be even more successful, the littoral states will need to agree on 
common interests and mitigate their national priorities in order to achieve regional goals 
that in the long term will uphold their respective national interests. Currently, maritime 
security cooperation in Southeast Asia is still in its formative stages, so the interests, 
agendas and strategies of the littoral states are often both overlapping and yet divergent. 
For example, while all parties whether littoral states, user countries or other interested 
parties unanimously favour arrangements that safeguard innocent passage of 
commercial shipping through the Straits, when it comes to drawing agreements that 
protect these aims, things become more difficult. 
Outstanding problems stem from questions of how to share the responsibility for 
the security of such a vital international waterway, while reconciling this requirement 
with very discrete national interests that are at best divergent and at worst conflicting. 
The causes of these tensions are not just differing national priorities, but also mistrust 
and a lack of confidence. Littoral states still remember their colonial past, accordingly 
the principle of sovereignty is sacrosanct and closely linked to their national identity to 
the point that any arrangement or action that would seem to undermine it is unthinkable. 
Nevertheless, the cooperative security efforts of the littoral states in the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits have achieved much more than reducing the incidence of piracy and 
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lowering the insurance rates for ships using the Straits. Cooperation has taught the 
ASEAN member-states that by working together they can defend their state sovereignty 
from the external intervention. In many ways their main purpose for cooperation was 
not the illegal activities that disturbed the international community (piracy, smuggling, 
freedom of navigation), but more as a reaction from external political pressure that 
threatened intervention in their domestic affairs and territorial waters. Even so, in the 
context of building a security community in Southeast Asia, the cooperative efforts of 
the littoral states in working towards maritime security in the Malacca Straits, for all the 
residual tensions, shows genuine promise. Their current collaborative security efforts 
demonstrate that ASEAN's three key littoral states are capable of striking a judicious 
balance between their respective sovereign prerogatives and community building 
efforts, but not to the point where the primacy of sovereignty is extinguished. This 
'adaptable' form of sovereignty can be seen in their simultaneous protection of state-
centric primacy, while also pursuing the higher levels of institutionalization and 
interdependence necessary for effective security cooperation to develop. With regard to 
the Malacca Straits, their cooperation has now shown the world, and themselves, that 
they are able to collaborate and achieve significant goals. 
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Chapter Six 
Analysis and Conclusion 
This study has examined cooperation among the five core ASEAN member 
states as it reflects the tensions between its member-states' traditional sovereign 
prerogatives and the Association's stated ambition to develop into a regional security 
community. The questions raised and examined in this study remain both timely and 
critical to ASEAN's future evolution. The ASEAN Charter ratified by all the states in 
2008, signifies that the Association has a vision of creating a more legalised and 
formalised set of institutions that might, in the future, constitute three parts of an 
'ASEAN Community': the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASC). The 
extent to which ASEAN's vision for itself can be actually achieved, however, remains 
contingent on how it can be reconciled with individual member-states still strong 
national interests. Analysis here, of course dominantly concerned with the first 
component. 
For now it is premature to describe ASEAN as a 'security community' beyond a 
nascent degree of development. This is particularly the case if the basis for making that 
judgment is a comparison often made by western analyses with the European Union 
(EU). The EU and ASEAN are vastly different in their approaches to issues such as 
governance. The differences between the two entities reflect much more than varying levels 
of institutionalization; they flow from different 'political rationalities' that are themselves a 
function of the fundamental historical, cultural and political differences between European 
and Southeast Asian polities. 
However, if a security community can be viewed as being on a continuum 
between 'tight' and 'loose' security communities, then ASEAN at least falls into the 
'loose' classification, at the other end of the spectrum from the 'tight' European model. 
ASEAN's 'looseness' comes from its lack of strong institutional ties and centralized 
structure. The inability of the Association to mandate solutions to regional problems via 
a strong central institution is amply demonstrated by the case studies of counter-
terrorism policy and the maritime security of the Malacca Straits. That said, tangible 
institutional ties do exist and are growing, albeit very slowly. 
The chapters in the study addressed this tension in different contexts. The first se 
has and the second chapters presented an overview of security community and 
sovereignty theory. The third chapter provided historical context for ASEAN's 
development from 1967 to the present, with the aim of explaining the Association as a 
product of its strategic and political circumstances. The next two chapters provided case 
studies of ASEAN' s ability to cooperate in security matters by addressing regional 
counter-terrorism policy and by examining various member-states' attempts to secure 
the Malacca Straits. The two case studies employ the methodology of process tracing, in 
particular by investigating the level of convergence and divergence in the ASEAN 
member-states' threat perceptions and the strategies and policies they developed to deal 
with the issues that each of the case studies address. This final chapter briefly re-
examines the three key propositions posed at the study's outset, before pinpointing 
factors that demonstrate continuity, transformation and constraints in ASEAN's 
progress towards becoming a security community. The chapter will conclude by arguing 
that the Association's member-states must sustain and deepen their sense of genuine 
collectively if ASEAN is to become a robust security community. 
The study began by posing the following propositions about A SEAN: (1) the 
Association does have some security community characteristics, but only if considered 
judiciously and from a perspective other than that of classical security community 
theory; (2) building a security community in ASEAN will only occur if the member 
states do not have to substantially sacrifice their national sovereignty prerogatives while 
simultaneously strengthening their sense of community over time and; (3) the grouping 
does display features of an organization that can increasingly be characterised as a 
'loose security community'. 
Power, institutions, interests and norms 
Power 
The evolution of ASEAN towards a security community has been a cautious 
one. Within the Association, from its creation up until the present, the exercise of 
national power resembles that of the realist paradigm in international relations theory 
rather than one more congruent to liberal-institutionalist or constructivist models of 
interdependence or amalgamation. ASEAN's two most significant statements, the 
declaration of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPF AN) 
in 1971 and the Bali Concord I of 1976, were the Association's response to the 
superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The ZOFPAN 
declaration stemmed from the perception that Southeast Asian states would remain 
pawns in a long-standing game of great power competition if ASEAN' s neutrality were 
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not respected. The stakes were both ideological and geopolitical. ASEAN' s collective 
security interests were to be limited to those aspects that did not challenge the 
competing ideological interest of the Cold War's two superpowers beyond Southeast 
Asia but would command the Soviet Union's and the United States' respect of their own 
sovereign independence and prerogatives within the sub-region. Similarly, Article 1 of 
Bali Concord I was a self-confident affirmation by the Association that the stability of 
its member states and of the region was an essential contribution to international peace 
and security. The Concord sought to bolster the resilience of the whole ASEAN group 
by strengthening its adherence to the principle of individual state sovereignty. 
In this sense the development of regionalization in Southeast Asia has been a 
response to shifting structural configurations in world politics. This understanding of 
the concept of power can also be used to analyze the extent to which the position of 
Indonesia, as perhaps Southeast Asia's most significant regional power, has influenced 
the development of ASEAN. As a consequence of its size, Indonesia has arguably held 
significant sway within the region. Prior to ASEAN's founding, Jakarta's use of this 
influence was arguably problematic, for example during the Konfrontasi period of the 
1960s. This legacy generated tensions which have further shaped the character of 
regionalization. In this sense, Indonesia can be compared to the role India plays in South 
Asia. Paradoxically, as the most powerful country in South Asia, India initially 
appeared reluctant to push forward the regionalization of South Asia. In a similar way, 
Indonesia's commitment to preserve its own state sovereignty was initially a significant 
constraint on Southeast Asia's regionalization but since the Suharto government came 
to power it has been less so. 
As the case studies in Chapters Four and Five illustrate, Indonesia's attitude 
towards counter-terrorism policies and its view of maritime security in the Malacca 
Straits have had a significant influence on how other ASEAN member-states have 
responded to these issues. In the case of regional counter-terrorism policy, the perceived 
threat of intervention by outside parties, in particular the United States, has fostered a 
compromise in which key states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have 
instituted cooperation at the sub-regional level. Meanwhile, the Association as a whole 
has been able to agree on a general framework for responding to the region's terrorism 
problems. In the case of maritime security issues, while Singapore might welcome the 
participation of external parties, Indonesia has strongly rejected the idea. Indonesia's 
response has largely been mirrored by that of Malaysia. The concept of non-interference 
has gained acceptance by the other core ASEAN states, with the result that limited inter-
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state cooperation to secure the Malacca Straits has been instituted by the partners, but 
without impinging on the national sovereignty of either Singapore, Malaysia or 
Indonesia. Both of these cases illustrate how ASEAN has adopted a realist perspective 
with regard to state sovereignty and has protected individual state prerogatives by 
creating cooperation regimes that leave it largely intact. 
National Self-interest 
The concept of national self-interest also demonstrates how the realist 
perspective has largely shaped ASEAN' s evolution towards a regional security 
community. ASEAN's establishment in 1967 can be explained via the logic of rational 
calculation, as fragile Southeast Asian states adopted a very loose form of collaboration 
as a means of ending the regional impact of Indonesia's Konfrontasi policy. This policy 
approach facilitated the five core ASEAN states' quest to resolve that particular 
conflict. At the same time, this solution meant that they were left free to concentrate on 
a range of pressing domestic challenges free from interference by neighbouring 
countries. The creation of ASEAN can be seen as a case of enlightened self-interest, in 
which each member state's national interests were advanced by the creation of a 
regional association. This explanation also helps refute critics of the Association who 
focus on its mixed performance in the area of institution building and the limited 
implementation of a range of ASEAN agreements and declarations such as ZOFP AN or 
the Bali Concord. Underlying this national self-interest is, of course, the diversity of 
social, economic and political conditions within the ASEAN member states. All of the 
member countries have different national priorities that have proved to be extremely 
difficult to accommodate within a highly structured set of regional institutions. 
As the case studies in this thesis demonstrate, member-state domestic interests 
usually dominate any ASEAN effort to advance regional cooperation, whether in 
shaping of counter-terrorism policies or securing the Malacca Straits. The core ASEAN 
states have not been able reach a consensus in responding to the US policies embodied 
in the what was until recently known as the Global War on Terror (GWOT)1. Indonesia 
and Malaysia have been unreceptive to such US policy, while Singapore and the 
Philippines have provided the US with strong support for it. Naturally both the 
Indonesian and Malaysian governments have had to cope with domestic sensitivities 
that stem from their majority Muslim populations who have viewed GWOT as political 
1 Al Kamen, 'The end of the Global War on Terror' The Washington Post, 24 March 2009 reports that the 
Obama Administration decided to 'retire' that phrase in favour of using the term 'Overseas Contingency 
Operation' <http://voices.washingtonpost.com> Accessed 21April2009. 
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shorthand for a 'war on Islam'. The governments of Singapore and the Philippines, 
meanwhile, have no such constraint. 
Applied to the Malacca Straits case study, the national self-interest explanation 
is also cogent. As this case study illustrates, the level of economic importance attached 
by a state to the Straits, reflects the degree that any particular state is dependant upon 
this littoral for its national income. Thus for Singapore, this waterway is of major 
economic importance, while Indonesia, as a large archipelagic state, views the problems 
of security in the Malacca Straits in the context that they are but one of a number of sea 
lanes it must try to secure in its national economic and political interests. Furthermore, 
Singapore entertains major concerns about piracy, where Malaysia focuses on 
environmental issues, and Indonesia wants to focus more on illegal fishing or arms 
smuggling. 
Neo-liberalism and Institutions 
Yet the perspective of neo-liberalism or institutionalism offers at least some 
explanation for the process of community-building in Southeast Asia. One reason for 
the creation of ASEAN was the consensus between political elites in the core member 
states, who saw peaceful relations with their neighbours as being to their mutual benefit. 
The preamble to ASEAN's foundation document (the Bangkok Declaration) 
demonstrates that the birth of the Association was strongly bound up with common 
interests and common problems identified by the political elites. 
Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among 
countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen 
further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation ... 2 
As an organization, ASEAN has a history characterized by a variety of 
institutionalist strands. Growing numbers of meetings between key government officials 
have resulted in numerous declarations, accords and agreements. Proponents of 
institutionalism, however, remain critical of ASEAN because of the non-binding nature 
of many of the covenants produced by this process. They point to the questionable 
substance of ASEAN's institutional frameworks, without seeming to recognize that the 
process itself is an important community building measure in an organization where 
member states lack any real commonality in terms of their social, political, economic 
and legal traditions. 
2 ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok, 8 August 1967 
<http://www.aseansec.org>. 
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This interpretation of the institutionalist perspective can be seen in the two case 
studies offered here. At times, the ASEAN states have been able to agree on forms of 
regional cooperation and to produce various declarations that have been supported by 
some level of political commitment. Their efforts in counter-terrorism policy have, in 
such instances, displayed a common commitment to combat terrorism through agendas 
that have a truly regional focus, rather than being invariably or inevitably shaped by the 
influence of the US. However, even when they are able to reach a common agreement, 
the behaviour of the ASEAN nations does not conform to classical neoliberal theory. 
Both the issues of counter-terrorism policy and the maritime security of the Malacca 
Straits ideally call for strong trans-national solutions, requiring cooperation between 
states. To date, however, ASEAN has not yet produced sustained high level cooperation 
or policy convergence. 
In the case of terrorism, significant national differences in the roles, structure 
and organization of police, justice, and immigration authorities, together with very 
different perspectives on human rights, have hampered progress in efforts to create 
closer inter-state cooperation. In the case of the Malacca Straits, the three littoral 
ASEAN states have arguably achieved greater levels of cooperation. The reasons for 
this achievement rests on the fact that their effort against piracy can be enacted through 
collaborative programs such as the trilateral Malacca Strait Sea Patrol of Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Singapore (MALSINDO) and Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS). These collaborative 
programs only require the coordination of the resources allocated by the individual 
states concerned, rather than being truly joint ventures. On the other hand, ASEAN's 
attempts to reach an agreement to combat regional terrorism have yet to produce 
enduring cooperative activities that go beyond training or the sharing of information. 
Again, from a purely institutionalist perspective, intra-ASEAN regional cooperation in 
the Malacca Straits is still generally weak. Such a perspective, however, fails to 
recognize that a more systematic regional cooperation would be hindered by the fact 
that the three littoral states still approach their maritime security challenges from a 
predominantly nationalist perspective and that their legal systems have yet to reach 
sufficient compatibility in approaching this issue. Perhaps most relevantly, they lack a 
common appreciation of how the threat of illegal activity in the Straits affects their 
national security. 
A regional 'we feeling' 
The perspective of norms or a common identity also has utility when addressing 
the question of ASEAN's success in regional security community building. The desire 
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to avoid inter-state conflict has been one of the most powerful forces in cementing 
ASEAN's harmony. The concept of the 'ASEAN Way', which is founded on the ideas 
of consensus and respect for state sovereignty are among the most important rationales 
in explaining why this otherwise disparate grouping of nations remains intact today. The 
'ASEAN Way' provides an alternative perspective on the development of 
regionalisation in Southeast Asia. For constructivists, the establishment of ASEAN can 
be explained as the consequence of the individual member state's commitment to settle 
their differences peacefully, which is based on a deep respect for the concept of national 
sovereignty. This commitment, largely engineered and observed by political elites, has 
become the Association's informal code of conduct for the resolution of problems. It 
has also acted as a guiding principle for the engagement of the member states from the 
very beginning of ASEAN. 
Constructivists argue that these norms, together with the shared historical values 
of the ASEAN states have acted as the basis for the success of the Association, 
including its expansion in the past decade. The loose processes of interaction fostered 
by the organization have allowed its members to gradually redefine their interests, thus 
avoiding potentially serious territorial conflicts such as the disputes that exist or have 
existed between Indonesia and Malaysia over Sipadan-Ligitan, or Malaysia and 
Singapore over Pedra Branca and Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. The 
continuing development of such norms and the growth of an ASEAN-wide 'we feeling', 
however subtle, generate the promise that the member states could realise uniquely 
ASEAN security community. 
Again, the case studies offer evidence that demonstrate how the 'we feeling' 
among the members-states has been expressed through a series of declarations, 
agreements and action plans aimed at tackling the issues of maritime security and 
regional counter-terrorism policy. This thesis cross-compared the national security 
interests and postures of the five core ASEAN states as they pertain to viewing and 
neutralizing the security threats considered in each case study at both the sovereign 
national and regional levels of operation. It can be concluded that ASEAN has balanced 
sovereign interests with intra-ASEAN negotiations more effectively in recent years to 
maintain reasonable aspirations regarding security community politics. 
However, while various ASEAN declarations and policy responses are the 
expression of a common perception that action is required, the weakness of norms and 
policy consensus at the individual state level has resulted in a situation where sub-
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia is still fragile and limited. In the case of the 
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regional response to terrorism, national differences arise in the degree to which different 
member-states perceive terrorists as a threat to their national security. Countries not 
exposed to fatal terrorist activities of the kind suffered by Indonesia or the Philippines 
tended to adopt responses that had less urgency than that of their neighbours. The 
variation in the way terrorists used the states for their operation also influenced the 
perception of the countries for how to respond in challenging the terrorist threat. There 
are also significant differences in the member-states' understanding and response to 
America's counter-terrorism policies. Thus, as already noted, while there may be a 
common regional perception that terrorism or piracy are problems requiring resolution, 
the degree to which ASEAN is able to act on these issues is constrained by individual 
states' sensitivity to an issue. 
The advantage of using such a multiple theoretical perspectives to explain the 
realities of security community building in ASEAN is that it permits the possibility to 
discriminate between what ASEAN says and what it does. By amalgamating a number 
of viewpoints, this approach can reduce analytical ambiguity and limit the Eurocentric 
bias inherent in international relations theories when they are applied to A SEAN' s 
organizational behaviour. ASEAN's unique community-building characteristic is that is 
has gone far to consolidate its historical, cultural and organizational experiences over 
the past four decades in the face original expectations that this would not be possible. 
Preoccupation with State Sovereignty 
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the consolidation of ASEAN and its further 
development have been moderated by the concept of state sovereignty. Individual 
ASEAN states' respect for sovereignty has guided the nature of their engagement with 
each other and shaped the development of regional order in Southeast Asia. The strong 
commitment to this concept is a key norm affirmed in ASEAN' s agreements at each 
stage of its evolution, including: the ZOFP AN Declaration, the Bali Concord I/TAC, 
and at the accession of new ASEAN members. Each of these agreements has embodied 
ASEAN' s collective vision of new regional order and demonstrated, above all, a desire 
for autonomy in the management and maintenance of regional security. The two case 
studies presented also indicate that respect for individual state sovereignty remains a 
strong determinant of ASEAN' s overall ability to achieve cooperation in security 
matters. 
The results that ASEAN has achieved in institution-building reflect the degree of 
progress it has made in moderating traditional preoccupations with state sovereignty. 
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One indicator of this is the way in which, even limited intra-ASEAN cooperation, has 
been achieved with a level of political commitment much greater than was previously 
possible. National efforts still often dominate policy responses, but the responses 
themselves have been shaped by 'considerations of collective identity and shared 
identity' .3 The case of the maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits in the 
form of MALSINDO, Eyes-in-the-Sky and the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol 
Network has demonstrated that the littoral states have lowering their traditional 
preoccupancy with state sovereignty and are not as protective as they were previously. 
In the case of counter-terrorism policy, the political commitment to cooperate has been 
developed through such trust-building measures as sharing information between police 
forces and exercises in capacity-building via seminars and training. 
Logically, the common trans-boundary nature of both terrorism and piracy 
should create similar opportunities for greater inter-state cooperation between ASEAN 
members. However, in the case of counter-terrorism policy, moderating the influence of 
state sovereignty has proved to be more difficult than generating cooperative efforts 
towards maritime security. Terrorism has proved to be a much more sensitive issue than 
piracy, for example, with much greater domestic influence on the behaviour of political 
elites and other decision makers. This is especially true in states such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines where the terrorism issue is bound up with 
religious sensibilities that include the role of Islam in society and politics. The existence 
of such sharp divides has made it difficult for the ASEAN states to reach a degree of 
common understanding on the overall issue of terrorism. As well as individual 
differences between the member-states, each nation has responded differently to 
external pressure from the US and the wider international community who have called 
for ASEAN to act against the regional problem of terrorism. This type of external 
pressure has done little to change how the basic principle of state sovereignty operates 
in Southeast Asia security politics. The form of cooperation remains based on individual 
state interest, rather than on a region-wide desire to deal with the issue in ways that 
could result more readily in a genuine sharing of sovereign authority among ASEAN 
member states. 
3 Muthiah Alagappa, 'Managing Asian Security: Competitive, Cooperation and Evolutionary Change', in 
Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. 2003), p.50-52. 
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Other Sovereign Legacies 
As the issue of the APKF demonstrates, ASEAN does not constitute a clear or 
complete departure from the Westphalian state system. ASEAN member-states still 
have insufficient political will to act to reconcile the existing regional system with 
greater scope for security cooperation. It seems that whenever ASEAN is presented with 
an opportunity to develop a measure of interdependence in the area of state sovereignty, 
the predisposition of ASEAN members for a Westphalian style sovereignty usually 
limits the possibility of coordinating their actions more effectively. 
As Chapter Two underscores, ASEAN states reject interference in the domestic 
affairs of member states for a number of reasons, which include the historical 
experience of colonialism, their Cold War experiences of rivalry between superpowers 
and fear of outside support to domestic rebellions. The fieldwork undertaken as part of 
this study also revealed a number of pragmatic reasons for the doctrine of non-
interference enduring as it has, including: (1) the fact that there is often no intra-
ASEAN material capacity to interfere; (2) interference is costly; (3) member-states 
don't see any significant advantage to interference in the affairs of others; (4) their own 
domestic problems restrain the urge to interfere; (5) there are often widely differing 
perceptions as to what constitutes a 'domestic issue' and what constitutes a 'trans-
boundary issue'; and (6) sovereignty in Southeast Asia has strong links to nationalism 
and in this context, even accepting help from outside can be seen as a sign of weakness. 
Realising the difficulty of surrendering or lowering state preoccupation with 
sovereignty, therefore, it is impossible to create tight, rigid, institutionalisation of 
ASEAN at least in the short period. If the ASEAN member-states were to do so, 
moreover, any product of their efforts would only effectively constitute 'a paper plan'. 
However, this thesis argues that elites who support greater institutionalisation of 
security in Southeast Asia could become a more permanent feature of the region's 
landscape if future cooperation is driven by threats that are distinctively 'regional' in 
nature and if external powers accept regionally-based rather than bilateral approaches to 
Southeast Asian order-building. The case studies of combating terrorism and the 
Malacca Straits illustrate the immense difficulties of security cooperation but also 
inspire hope that systematic patterns of regional security, cooperation can be identified, 
and implemented, the feasibility of creating regional security cooperation can be 
eventually realised. This will require a step-by-step approach, incorporating sensitivity 
to issues of state sovereignty. This sensitivity must be balanced by a realization that 
region-wide security challenges are becoming more paramount and region-wide 
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solutions to meeting them are becoming more fundamental. This outcome is congruent 
with the 'adaptable sovereignty' criterion raised in Chapter One. 
ASEAN as a Security Community? 
Despite the argument by some scholars that there exists a 'we feeling' within 
ASEAN, the organization has considerable difficulties in reconciling the many deep 
cultural, social and political differences between its member-states. The commonality 
that Europeans have taken for granted does not exist in Southeast Asia, which accounts 
for the differences in regionalization between the two areas, including their differing 
status as security communities. Again, the case studies demonstrate that ASEAN is 
more prone to create a 'common front' when presented with the prospect of external 
intervention that would challenge the traditional role that individual state sovereignty 
has played in the organization. Thus change and greater inter-state cooperation in the 
ASEAN context is a product of a compromise that balances external pressures against 
the domestic national interests of individual member-states. 
To argue that ASEAN is only an 'embryonic' or 'nascent' security community' 
is not to insist it will forever remain that way. Recent developments show that there is a 
determination among ASEAN's elites to progress beyond the level of nascent security 
community. Evidence for this desire can be seen in the establishment of the ASEAN 
Defence Minister Meeting (ADMM) and the issue of the ASEAN Charter. 
The inaugural ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur on 
9 May 2006. This gathering concluded with an agreement to meet annually in what may 
well become an influential new forum within ASEAN. The establishment of this annual 
conclave represents an important early step in the institutionalization of ASEAN. The 
future function of the ADMM should also be a significant benchmark for the 
organization, especially considering that since its establishment, ASEAN has been 
reluctant to include any type of security cooperation as part of its core business. 
Indonesia's Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, observed that the ADMM "fills that 
gap between policy and vision and operational units of the defence forces and 
intelligence. "4 The forum would be useful mechanism for facilitating the realisation of 
an ASEAN security community. It embraces the potential to become 'the apex of all 
defence-related meetings within the ASEAN framework'. 5 In addition, the ADMM will 
4 Elisia Yeo, 'SE Asian defense ministers gather for 'historic' meeting, The Jakarta Post, 11 May 2006. 
5 ASEAN Secretariat, Protocol to the Concept paper for the Establishment of the A SEAN Defense 
Minister Meeting (ADMM). 
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be the 'highest ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism 
which reports directly to the ASEAN Heads of State/Government' .6 In order to realise 
the goal of regional security cooperation, the ADMM issued a three year work program 
aimed at: (1) promoting greater regional defence and security coordination (2) shaping 
and sharing of norms; (3) conflict prevention; (4) conflict resolution; and (5) post-
conflict peace building. 
The creation of the ADMM and its work program should eventually support the 
development of an explicit security community but this initiative has, as well, its share 
of sceptical observers. This is due to the many basic differences still evident between 
ASEAN members on various security issues including over the structure and purpose of 
their respective militaries. However, from a less critical perspective, the creation of the 
ADMM represents an important institutional step that has accelerated ASEAN's 
commitment to a higher level of security cooperation. This represents an important 
initial move in developing a more robust security community in Southeast Asia. 
The introduction of an ASEAN Charter is another recent development that 
illuminates ASEAN's intent to create a 'higher level' or 'tighter' of security 
community. The charter was signed by ASEAN leaders on the 40th anniversary of the 
Association's establishment in November 2007. Interestingly for ASEAN, whose 
previous resolutions have been voluntary and non-binding, the charter is a legally 
binding document. This is a significant step, converting the organization into more 
legalistic institutional entity. The Charter has also simultaneously shifted ASEAN's 
approach to security cooperation. This previously rested on the principle of the 'lowest-
common-denominator', but has now shifted to one of pursuing specific agenda. The fact 
that the Charter is being ratified by the parliaments of individual ASEAN member states 
is also an important shift towards creating a greater sense of community, in which 
decision-making is no longer dominated by the top echelon decision-making elites. 
The Charter still confronts some very sensitive issues that challenge the basic 
non-intervention principle that has been a cornerstone of state sovereignty in ASEAN 
since its inception. It calls for the member-states to adhere " ... to the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms"7 In the context of ASEAN' s history, this is a very 
bold mandate. Indeed, few ASEAN member-states have highly developed democratic 
6 See ASEAN Secretariat, Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Enhancing Regional 
Peace and Stability, 2007. 
7 ASEAN, The ASEAN Charter,www.asean.org 
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systems of government, with the repressive regime in Myanmar, in particular, under 
international scrutiny for its violation of human rights. In Thailand, democratic 
institutions have recently been seen to be fragile. Over the past few years the democratic 
system in that country has been degraded through successive political crises that 
culminated in the military coup on 19 September 2006. With domestic political 
conditions within many of Southeast Asian nations running counter to those outlined in 
the Charter the document could well be described as a 'high sounding, collective 
aspiration'. 
Two key problems underscore the above point. First, the ASEAN states' 
collective ability to create and sustain viable regional institutions is impeded by their 
shared uncertainty about their domestic political legitimacy. In this context, any 
'charter' should enhance rather than challenge their individual sovereign prerogatives 
by reinforcing the consent for ruling elites to govern rather than to impose any 
overriding 'social contract' upon those elites to be more accountable to their populaces. 8 
Second, as David Martin Jones has observed, the ASEAN charter is currently worded 
in a way that could intensify political schisms between ASEAN' s 'more politically 
mature and economically developed states found in peninsular Southeast Asia and less 
predominant single-party authoritarian regimes found in ASEAN' s Indochinese 
'northern tier'. In this sense, ASEAN's 'democratic deficit' could possibly lead to a 
'promotion of sovereignty transcending norms of democracy, transparency and human 
rights' opening up opportunities by one or more exploitive outside power(s) to apply 
divide and rule tactics against an increasingly divided intra-ASEAN polity.9 
Only time will tell whether ASEAN states will uniformly adopt democratic 
forms of government as part of a move to establishing a mature security community. 
More sceptically the charter can be viewed as a mechanism to reduce pressure exerted 
by the US and the international community on ASEAN to encourage the Association's 
member states to promote greater acceptance of democracy and human rights in 
Southeast Asia. 
8 Shaun Narine, 'State sovereignty, political legitimacy and regional institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific' 
Pacific Review 17, 3, 2004, pp. 423-450 and Muthiah Alagappa, "The anatomy oflegitimacy', in 
Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1995), pp. 11-30. 
9 David Martin Jones, 'Security and democracy: the ASEAN charter and the dilemmas ofregionalism in 
Southeast Asia', International Affairs 84, 4, 2008, pp. 735-756 and especially p. 745. 
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Future Prospects: A Final Word 
ASEAN' s evolution towards a Southeast Asian security community has some 
unique characteristics that warrant further consideration. The grouping was initially 
established to maintain peaceful relationships among the member-states, but is now 
moving to a broader and more complex agenda. Much of this process has involved 
either the creation of long-term policies and agreement at the highest level of 
government or a reactive response in order to accommodate changes in the international 
environment. While security community theory proposes that there should also exist 
strong evidence of economic and social ties between member states, in reality within 
ASEAN there has been relatively less economic and social cooperation than this 
perspective anticipates. The traditional idea of the development of a security community 
focuses on building interaction among the member states, whereas building of security 
community in A SEAN has been based on defending the member states' interests as a 
response to the possibility of external intervention. The development of a security 
community should provide the basis for collective action, but in ASEAN even when 
there is consensus on the form that action should take, because of the weak institutional 
framework, implementation has been modest. For ASEAN 'regionalism' has been a 
policy tool largely useful at the margins, but still elusive at the core of state-to-state 
interaction within Southeast Asia. 
Prospects for an ASEAN Security Community 
This thesis demonstrate that the prospects for ASEAN' s continued evolution 
towards a more mature security community rest on the Association's ability to meet the 
following conditions: 
ASEAN member states would have to genuinely accept that the project of 
developing a security community as part of an overall community-building process is a 
serious business and one that cannot be separated from the survival of the state in the 
future. The member-states would have to believe that their future economic, political 
and international relationships will be supported by an increasingly viable Association 
and that individual state policies, in tum, will support A SEAN' s common interests. 
Member-states would have to accept that the Association will increasingly guide state 
policies, but this would require greater levels of trust that would allow ASEAN 
mechanisms and elitists a greater mandate in formulating regional policy. For this to 
happen would require the ASEAN member-states to develop stronger political 
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commitments to finesse or manage misunderstandings and to bridge outstanding basic 
differences. 
ASEAN member-states would have to also be prepared to show more 
commitment to the implementation of its agreements and move away from its reputation 
for being a 'talkfest'. This would require greater commitment to identifying and 
implementing formulas for cooperation and order to overcome their common problems. 
As the ASEAN Declaration on Combating Terrorism showed, present prospects for 
anti-terrorism cooperation are limited not just because of the complexity of domestic 
problems within the various member-states, but also because the Association's 
collective commitment to strengthen such cooperation is weak. 
The ASEAN member-states would have to come to view unity as their greatest 
priority in order to maximize the Association's collective interests in dealing with extra-
regional actors. At present there is a general preference for dealing with external states 
bilaterally because this does not greatly disadvantage other member-states. In reality, 
while bilateral arrangements can complement regional agreements, they also have 
greater potential for prioritizing individual national interest over the process of 
community-building. 
Finally, outside powers would need to extend greater support for regionalization 
of ASEAN. Such backing would greatly assist ASEAN's unity and boost its capacity to 
develop commonality in foreign policy. Realising this condition would be a truly 
significant step towards creating of more mature Southeast Asian security community. 
However, this will only occur as the member-states become more resilient and self-
confident about their own national identities. Only then will they be capable of relaxing 
their preoccupations with state sovereignty to levels that will satisfy the concerns of 
their domestic constituencies while simultaneously facilitate their request to realize 
viable regional community-building. Striking such a balance would constitute the 
ASEAN member-states' most remarkable collective achievement and cap an initially 
improbable legacy of institutional development and viability. 
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